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Car	Wash,	Crisis,	and	Political	Cataclysm:	
Corruption	Narratives	in	the	Brazilian	Mediascape	
	
Mads	Bjelke	Damgaard	
Abstract	
A	wave	of	corruption	disclosure,	leaks,	and	media	exposés	engulfed	the	Brazilian	democracy	in	the	period	2014-
2018.	Below	the	surface	of	an	uncommonly	successful	investigation	into	high-level	corruption,	undercurrents	of	
political	crisis	swept	President	Dilma	Rousseff	from	office	through	impeachment	proceedings.	Rousseff	was	ousted	
in	2016	by	members	of	the	political	elite	-	themselves	embroiled	in	the	scandal	going	by	the	name	of	Operação	
Lava-Jato	or	 “Operation	Car	Wash”	–	 long	before	 she	even	became	 indicted	 in	 the	 corruption	 case.	 Thus,	 the	
scandal	featured	a	curious	temporality	and	a	displacement	of	crisis	that	dragged	Rousseff,	her	popular	presidential	
predecessor	Lula	and	their	party	with	it	in	the	undertow.	The	media	built	up	a	crisis	of	increasing	complexity	as	
the	investigations	became	ever	more	wide-spread	in	an	avalanche	of	evidence	and	plea	bargains.		
	
This	thesis	analyzes	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	as	a	textual	system,	unfolding	in	the	Brazilian	mediascape	and	governed	
by	a	set	of	narrative	structures.	Countering	the	existing	hesitance	of	media	studies	to	draw	in	narrative	theory,	
the	 thesis	 constructs	 a	 theoretical	 and	methodological	 foundation	 to	 analyze	 intertextual	 narrative	 structures	
emerging	in	a	distributed	manner	across	a	system	of	news	texts	dealing	with	scandal.	With	this,	the	thesis	attempts	
to	 answer	 why	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 ended	 with	 such	 surprising	 and	 self-contradictory	 results,	 and	 how,	
theoretically,	 narrative	 theory	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 field	 of	 scandal	 studies.	 Inspired	 by	 Frederick	 Jameson’s	
reading	of	Greimas,	 it	 is	argued	that	the	intertextual	narratives	that	underpin	the	production	of	news	texts	on	
scandal	constrain	and	co-constitute	the	field	of	political	action.	Thus,	to	understand	the	outcomes	of	the	Lava-Jato	
scandal,	it	is	necessary	to	analyze	how	the	disequilibrium	of	Brazilian	democracy	was	symbolically	solved	in	the	
narratives	interpreting	the	scandals	and	the	impeachment.	
	
	
Resumé	
En	 bølge	 af	 korruptionsafsløringer	 ramte	 Brasilien	 i	 2014-2018.	 I	 kølvandet	 på	 en	 usædvanligt	 effektiv	
politiundersøgelse	af	politisk	korruption	blev	 landets	præsident,	Dilma	Rousseff,	 suget	med	af	bølgen	og	afsat	
gennem	 en	 rigsretssag	 i	 2016.	 Bag	 rigsretssagen	 stod	 medlemmer	 af	 den	 politiske	 elite	 som	 selv	 var	 under	
efterforskning	i	sagskomplekset	kendt	som	Operation	Bil-Vask	(Operação	Lava-Jato),	men	afsættelsen	fandt	sted	
før	Rousseff	blev	sigtet	for	korruption.	Både	Rousseff,	hendes	folkekære	forgænger	Lula	og	deres	parti	blev	trukket	
med	 af	 skandalens	 bemærkelsesværdige	 temporalitet	 og	 transponering	 af	 krisestemning.	 Mens	
politiundersøgelsernes	 net	 blev	 bredere	 og	 bredere,	 byggede	 medierne	 en	 stadigt	 større	 og	 mere	 kompleks	
fortælling	op	om	korruptionen	på	det	højeste	politiske	niveau.	
	
I	denne	afhandling	afdækkes	måden	hvorpå	Lava-Jato	skandalens	tekst-system	udfoldede	sig	igennem	narrative	
strukturer	 i	 Brasiliens	medielandskab.	 Trods	modviljen	mod	 narrativ	 teori	 i	 gængse	medie-teoretiske	 tilgange	
opbygges	der	i	afhandlingen	et	teoretisk	og	metodisk	grundlag	til	at	analysere	den	slags	intertekstuelle	narrative	
strukturer	 som	 opstår	 i	 et	 distribueret	 tekstunivers	 på	 tværs	 af	 nyheder	 om	 skandaler.	 På	 dette	 fundament	
forsøger	 afhandlingen	 at	 besvare	 hvorfor	 Lava-Jato	 skandalen	 højst	 overraskende	 betød	 at	 en	 korrupt	
vicepræsident	kunne	overtage	magten	i	Brasilien.	Teoretisk	består	bidraget	i	at	afdække	hvordan	skandalestudier	
kan	integrere	narrativ	teori.	Med	afsæt	i	Frederick	Jamesons	læsning	af	Greimas	hævdes	det	her	at	intertekstuelle	
narrativer	 i	nyhederne	 former	og	begrænser	de	politiske	handlerum.	Derfor	må	man	forstå	hvordan	Brasiliens	
demokratiske	systems	uligevægt	forsøges	løst	i	disse	narrativer	for	at	forstå	hvordan	rigsretssagen	og	skandalerne	
udviklede	sig,	som	de	gjorde.	
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Introduction		
Embedded	Contradictions	and	Political	Fantasies	
	
Political	 corruption	 is	 a	 central	 concern	 to	 any	 democracy.	 However,	 the	 problems	 of	 political	
corruption	go	beyond	sub-optimal	decision-making	and	the	economic	loss	to	society.	The	outcome	
of	a	corruption	scandal	should	not	be	conceived	as	an	isolated	matter	-	as	individuals	being	held	
accountable,	 or	 failing	 to	 be	 held	 accountable.	 Corruption	 scandals	 can	 have	 wildly	 varying	
consequences	 for	 the	 involved	 persons;	 even	 if	 convicted	 for	 corruption,	 individuals	 holding	
positions	of	trust	and	public	authority,	as	appointed	or	elected	representative	of	citizens,	can	still	in	
many	cases	count	on	impunity,	due	to	political	protection	or	judicial	sluggishness.	In	other	cases,	
scandalizing	information	is	disclosed	to	great	effect,	and	public	officeholders	must	face	the	pressure	
of	 courts,	 their	 own	 constituencies	 and	 the	 electorate	 in	 general.	 But	 disclosure	 of	 scathing	
information	may	also	 impinge	upon	the	quality	of	government	and	democracy	 in	a	wider	sense.	
Exposés	can	be	a	political	game-changer,	even	if	the	information	turns	out	to	be	inaccurate	or	false.	
Disclosing	corruption	may	thus	wreak	havoc	in	consolidated	as	well	as	emergent	democracies,	and	
the	effects	of	corruption	scandals,	of	disclosing	transgressions	and	alleging	moral	misconduct,	can	
be	traced	beyond	the	immediate	horizons	of	individual	punishment	or	impunity.	
	
The	research	object	of	this	thesis	is	the	complex	Brazilian	corruption	scandal	that	since	2014	has	
gone	by	the	name	of	Operação	Lava-Jato.	The	Lava-Jato	case	had	profound	impacts	-	impacts	that	
went	well	beyond	the	individuals	investigated	in	the	case.	Spinning	off	from	the	Lava-Jato	case,	the	
President	Dilma	Rousseff	was	impeached,	political	reforms	were	obstructed	for	years,	and	scores	of	
federal	representatives,	senators	and	governors	became	targets	as	investigations	mushroomed	off	
of	the	original	probe.	The	Vice-President	Michel	Temer	stepped	in	for	Rousseff	in	May	2016,	despite	
being	under	suspicion	himself,	and	he	picked	a	cabinet	from	the	ranks	of	his	party	which	had	every	
key	figure	under	scrutiny	in	the	very	same,	initial	corruption	probe.	In	the	midst	of	scandal,	with	no	
elections	held,	and	despite	the	absence	of	criminal	charges	against	the	impeached	President,	the	
political	orientation	of	 the	Brazilian	government	changed	completely	overnight,	disrupting	social	
conquests	made	 in	Brazil	 in	 the	 last	decade	and	manifesting	 the	prevalent	Latin-American	trend	
towards	(or	back	to)	neo-liberal	economic	politics.	The	ousting	was	the	climax	of	a	monumental	
process,	 breaking	 the	 13	 years	 of	 a	 neo-developmental	 state-centered	 model	 of	 governance,	
spearheaded	 by	 the	 Brazilian	Worker’s	 Party	 (PT).	 As	 key	 figures	 of	 the	 PT	 cadre,	 including	 ex-
President	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	became	indicted,	charged	and	sentenced,	the	party	image	was	
severely	 tarnished,	 leaving	the	 left	wing	of	Brazilian	politics	 in	 tatters.	Furthermore,	by	breaking	
with	the	established	pattern	of	impunity	common	to	Brazilian	political	corruption	cases,	the	probe	
and	resultant	trials	heralded	–	perhaps	prematurely	-	the	end	of	one	of	the	mechanics	that	made	
the	particular	Brazilian	hybrid	regime	of	coalitional	presidentialism	work	in	practice.		
	
However,	at	the	time	of	writing	(June	2018),	that	promise	of	an	end	to	impunity	did	not	result	in	
sentences	to	the	many	politicians	and	parties	embroiled	in	the	corruption	case	-	aside	from	the	PT.	
Conspicuously,	the	execution	of	arrest	warrants	for	members	of	the	government	nucleus	parties	PP	
and	PMDB	(now	MBD)	has	been	stonewalled	in	all	but	three	cases,	while	two	indictments	of	the	
President	Temer	have	also	been	blocked	 in	Congress.	Likewise,	 leaders	of	the	former	opposition	
parties	of	PTB,	DEM,	and	PSDB,	who	also	appeared	in	the	inquiry,	escaped	seemingly	unscathed	by	
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the	probe	even	after	 the	obtainment	and	publication	of	hard	evidence	of	 their	 corruption.	 This	
unequal	application	of	the	rule	of	law	appears	at	least	as	a	contradiction	in	terms,	if	not	a	way	of	
doing	 politics	 by	 other	means	 (Peruzzotti	 2006:256).	 The	 paradox	 of	 substituting	 one	 allegedly	
corrupt	president	for	another	president	also	under	suspicion	is	another	of	the	central	contradictions	
of	this	case.		
	
The	Lava-Jato	scandal	made	possible	not	only	the	sea	change	of	political	orientation,	but	also	drove	
radical	outsider	candidates	to	the	front	of	the	polls,	undermined	a	generation	of	political	leaders,	
and	 obliterated	 the	 citizens’	 already	 negligible	 trust	 in	 political	 authorities	 and	 institutions.	
Furthermore,	 targeting	 the	 top	 construction	 companies	 of	 the	 country	 as	 well	 as	 the	 state	 oil	
company	Petrobras,	the	scandal	brought	to	a	standstill	investment	and	public	works	in	an	already	
retracting	economy.	The	disclosure	of	corruption	in	the	Brazilian	political	and	economic	elite	had	
critical	consequences	for	the	whole	political	paradigm	of	the	nation,	for	the	state	apparatus	and	
economy,	as	well	as	the	balance	between	the	branches	of	government.	Although	such	disclosure	in	
principle	 should	 strengthen	 democracy,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 laid	 bare	 a	 range	 of	 accountability	
problems	in	the	political	system,	the	judicial	system,	and	the	media	system,	exacerbating	crises	and	
tensions	 between	 actors	 of	 those	 systems	 (Damgaard	 2018b).	 Political	 life	 was	 shaped	 by	 the	
spectacle	of	 the	ongoing	 scandal	 (Edelman	1988,	Kellner	2002),	 and	 this	 “molding	 force”	of	 the	
media	(Hepp	2012)	must	be	unpacked,	if	we	want	to	grasp	how	the	tensions	and	contradictions	of	
the	case	played	out.	
	
This	thesis	posits	the	importance	of	news	media	in	scandals,	not	only	for	disclosing	corruption,	but	
for	 narrating	 solutions	 to	 the	 contradictions	 and	 tensions	 of	 political	 and	 social	 struggles	 that	
emerge	in	scandals.	When	disclosure	demands	closure,	and	political	crisis	provokes	calls	for	regime	
change,	 it	 is	 urgent	 to	 analyze	 the	 deep	 structures	 underpinning	 the	 media’s	 emplotment	 of	
scandalous	events	and	projections	of	possible	solutions.	In	line	with	theories	of	the	discursive	turn	
in	social	and	political	sciences	(Torfing	2005:22),	I	believe	it	necessary	to	pay	attention	to	narratives,	
or,	 as	 Frederic	 Jameson	 remarked	 in	 The	 Political	 Unconscious,	 to	 detect	 “the	 structure	 of	 a	
particular	 political	 fantasy”	 because	 “the	 fantasy	 or	 protonarrative	 [is]	 the	 vehicle	 for	 our	
experience	of	the	real”	(Jameson	1981:33).	Adapting	Jameson’s	literary	theory,	I	propose	to	transfer	
this	 attention	 to	 narrative	 structures	 to	 the	 study	 of	 political	 discourse	 in	 the	 news,	 ultimately	
breaking	 down	 the	 disciplinary	 limits	 between	 studies	 of	 political	 science	 and	 of	 media	
representations.	Because	media	representations	of	corruption	invoke	a	distinct	set	of	narratives	and	
metaphors	(Breit	2011,	Forsberg	and	Severinsson	2015,	Kajsiu	2014),	and	because	such	narratives	
trigger	 political	 and	 institutional	 conflict,	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 grasp	 how	 narratives	 configure	 the	
horizons	of	political	space.	Therefore,	I	draw	methodological	tools	from	narrative	theory	and	share	
its	ultimate	goal	of	analysis,	summarized	here	by	the	Dutch	narrative	theorist	Mieke	Bal:		
	
the	aim	of	textual	analysis	is	not	to	account	for	the	process	of	writing,	but	for	the	conditions	of	the	process	
of	reception.	The	distinction	emphatically	does	not	imply	that	the	one	layer	exists	before	the	other.		
How	is	it	that	a	narrative	text	comes	across	to	the	reader	in	a	certain	manner?”	(Bal	1997:78)		
	
The	texts	that	spark	the	scandal,	elevate	it	to	the	attention	of	a	public,	and	maintain	it	as	central	
object	 of	 the	 agenda	 will	 within	 them	 contain	 some	 of	 these	 “conditions	 of	 the	 process	 of	
reception.”	While	a	scandal	obviously	also	comprises	other	elements	such	as	judicial	processes	and	
material	 evidence,	 media	 texts	 are	 the	 vehicles	 of	 this	 particular	 informational	 and	 political	
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phenomenon,	by	narrating,	in	their	totality,	an	unfolding	and	episodified	story	(Bird	1997),	which	
constitutes	the	continuously	updated	horizon	of	political	agency	for	the	 involved	actors.	What	 is	
encompassed	 and	 what	 is	 excluded	 by	 the	 scandal	 might	 change	 dynamically,	 related	 to	 the	
strategic	 interests	of	 the	actors,	and	 that	might	bring	with	 it	 changing	usage,	 connotations,	and	
definitions	of	the	term	“corruption”–	and	for	this	reason,	I	will	refrain	from	providing	a	definition	of	
the	 term.	Corruption	may	be	 thought	of	 as	 an	 “empty	 signifier”	par	 excellence	 (Koechlin	2013).	
Analyzing	 the	 media	 representations	 of	 corruption	 is	 but	 the	 first	 step	 to	 understanding	 what	
corruption	comes	to	signify	in	a	local	context,	and	how	the	formatting	of	corruption	scandals	come	
to	shape	a	political	field	in	the	way	that	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	did	in	Brazil.	The	next	step	is	to	
consider	 the	media	 texts	 systematically,	 specifically,	 to	 see	 “narrative	as	a	 system	of	exchange”	
(Silverstone	1981:94),	and	its	“achievement	[as]	the	resolution	of	disequilibrium”	(ibid.:93).	
	
This	thesis	asks	how	narratives	emerging	in	news	on	scandals	may	shape	and	restrain	the	field	of	
political	action.	To	seek	answers	to	this	on	the	basis	of	narrative	theory	and	literary	studies	may	
seem	unconventional,	but,	as	Pietilä	observed	(1992),	many	seminal	studies	of	news	claim	to	see	
narratives	in	news	texts.	The	concept	is	however	mostly	cursorily	treated;	only	in	a	few	cases	is	the	
concept	 of	 narrative	 treated	 methodically	 and	 deployed	 to	 excavate	 systems	 of	 meaning	 (e.g.	
Silverstone	1981,	Hartley	1982).	Recently,	several	scholars	(e.g.	Matheson	2010,	Montgomery	2007)	
have	even	argued	emphatically	that	news	should	not	be	treated	as	narratives.	Therefore,	after	a	
review	 of	 these	 different	 arguments,	 I	 will	 start	 the	 thesis	 by	 assembling	 a	 methodology	 for	
reconstructing	the	unfolding	narratives	that	informed	production	of	news	on	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	
in	the	mainstream	media	of	Brazil.	This	method	is	then	deployed	to	analyze	how	the	disequilibrium	
of	Brazilian	democracy	 is	 symbolically	 solved	 in	 the	narratives	 interpreting	 the	 scandals	and	 the	
impeachment.	
	
The	goal	of	the	thesis	is	thus	not	merely	to	explain	the	remarkable	results	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	and	
the	impeachment	proceedings	which,	in	conjunction,	pushed	the	Brazilian	democracy	precariously	
close	to	a	Constitutional	abyss	of	coalitional	deadlocks.	The	neigh-rupture	of	Brazilian	democracy	(a	
democracy	that	was	perceived	as	increasingly	consolidated)	and	the	attempts	to	“stop	the	bleeding	
of	the	political	elite”	(Valente	2016)	through	overt	political	interventions	are	very	important	topics	
that	 has	 been	 discussed	 intensely	 lately	 (Albuquerque	 2017,	 Avritzer	 2016a,	 Damgaard	 2018a,	
2018b,	Gentili	et	al.	2016,	Guimarães	et	al.	2016,	Souza	2016).	Here,	I	will	not	merely	shed	light	on	
the	intricacies	of	the	case	and	the	meanings	produced	in	this	particular	scandal,	but	consider	it	as	a	
case	that	may	help	to	produce	an	explicit	theory	of	narrative	structures	found	in	political	news.	
	
A	fundamental	question	in	this	type	of	research	is	how	events	come	to	be	signified	in	the	media	as	
transgressions,	as	elements	of	a	scandal,	since	such	semiotic	processes	are	often	what	triggers	the	
interventions	of	accountability	institutions	(Porto	2011a:112).	Which	actions	qualify	as	scandalous	
and	breaking	news,	what	is	merely	considered	business-as-usual,	and	what	is	the	role	of	media	in	
arbitrating	 political	 accountability?	 The	 period	 of	 2014-2018	 provided	 a	 multitude	 of	 Brazilian	
corruption	cases	of	different	magnitude	in	the	public	eye,	but	the	explosion	of	high-level	corruption	
investigations	 also	 created	 problems	 of	 accountability	 in	 its	 messy	 transparency.	 Among	 the	
extensive	investigations	recently	probing	into	the	Brazilian	political	and	business	elite,	only	a	limited	
range	of	suspicions,	allegations	and	pieces	of	evidence	ever	made	the	front-pages	and	remained	
salient	in	the	mainstream	media	for	more	than	a	few	hours.	The	dilemma	of	longevity	is	of	course	
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built	into	the	limited	temporal	scope	of	news.	But	the	criteria	for	even	including	some	events	in	a	
corruption	scandal	on	the	media	agenda,	and	not	others,	are	worth	considering	in	more	detail.	Most	
audience	members	will	naturally	accept	that	some	events	make	the	news,	while	others	don’t.	 In	
order	to	make	news,	scores	of	newsworkers	decide	on	the	newsworthiness	and	public	relevance	of	
disclosed	events,	before	finding	the	best	angle	from	which	to	write.	This	yields	two	ways	to	think	
about	 the	 phrase	 “making	 the	 news”:	 What	 (event)	 makes	 the	 news?	 Who	 makes	 the	 news?	
Semantically,	 “the	news”	 is	 betwixt	 and	between	hard	 realities,	 social	 construction,	 and	 textual	
performance.	Temporally,	events	are	newsworthy	only	if	they	can	be	incorporated	into	meaningful	
wholes	and	assembled	to	connect	previous	and	future	events	deemed	important.	Thus,	already	in	
the	 construal	 and	 construction	 of	 each	 event	 as	 newsworthy,	 journalistic	 production	 sets	 into	
motion	mechanisms	 of	 narrative	 imagination:	 The	 news,	 in	 each	 instance,	 is	 performed	 as	 one	
meaningful	 moment	 that	 arrests	 the	 flow	 of	 time	 (Bødker	 2016),	 narrates,	 and	 thereby	 “puts	
together	 a	 story,	 even	 as	 it	 is	 happening…	 captures,	 live,	 the	 essential	 temporal	 structure	 and	
dynamic	of	the	living	moment”	(Scannell	2014:174-5).		
	
Some	events	seem	to	demand	media	attention	instantly,	to	have	that	special	quality	that	makes	the	
event	instantly	ubiquitous	in	news.	In	most	media	systems	today,	scandals	rank	high	on	the	list	of	
issues	that	commandeers	newsworkers	by	sheer	force	of	the	news	values,	maybe	only	surpassed	by	
acts	of	terror,	natural	disasters,	and	perhaps	elections.	During	elections,	scandals	may	take	center	
stage,	 triggering	 electoral	 accountability	 (or	 vertical	 accountability,	 see	Mainwaring	 and	Welna	
2003).	In	a	much	less	transparent	way,	scandals	may	also	configure	the	political	field	in	the	periods	
between	elections	by	locating	candidates	and	parties	in	adverse	narrative	environments,	as	objects	
of	opprobrious	discourse	 (Thompson	2000).	 In	doing	 so,	 the	 scandal	narratives	may	 change	 the	
course	of	the	next	election,	or	indeed,	history.	This	happens	when	a	(scandalous)	event	seems	to	
radically	transgress	the	 limits	of	what	 is	normally	possible,	manifesting	the	spirit	of	the	times	so	
perfectly	that	the	newsworkers	deem	it	“historic.”	If	events	make	history,	they	must	be	endowed	
with	meaning.	But	how	does	 this	happen?	This	question	 reflects	 the	main	 themes	and	 research	
problems	of	this	thesis:	the	political	impact	of	scandals	and	media’s	narration	of	scandalous	events.		
	
It	is	a	platitude	that	scandals	are	born	in	media,	but	even	so,	it	is	worthwhile	to	probe	this	uterine	
environment	of	scandals	(ibid.),	or,	to	be	more	precise,	the	stratum	of	the	mediascape	we	know	as	
news	media.	I	will	throughout	this	thesis	use	Arjun	Appadurai’s	term	mediascape	for	the	purpose	of	
designating	a	consistent	 if	 fluid	repertoire	of	media	discourse	and	imagery	 in	the	global	flows	of	
imagination.	“The	imagination	has	become	an	organized	field	of	social	practices”	(1996:31),	and	this	
field,	which	Appadurai	terms	the	imaginary,	is	both	a	form	of	practice	and	a	site	for	negotiation	of	
agency	 and	 possibility.	 Stemming	 from	 Benedict	 Anderson’s	 notion	 of	 imagined	 communities	
(1983),	 Appadurai	 envisioned	 that	 this	 field	 was	 organized	 by	 sometimes	 homogeneous	 (e.g.,	
Americanized)	and	sometimes	heterogeneous	cultural	flows	(see	also	Fiske	1994).	These	flows	run	
through	 many-layered	 global	 currents	 and	 cultural	 interchanges.	 Identifying	 five	 such	 flows,	
Appadurai	coined	the	terms	ethnoscape,	mediascape,	technoscape,	financescape,	and	 ideoscape.	
They	are	perspectival	and	may	look	different	from	various	analytical	angles,	but	are	undoubtedly	
connected	and	related	in	empirically	verifiable	ways.	The	scapes	are	also	fluid,	but	congeal	around	
certain	configurations.	Mediascapes	and	ideoscapes	are	”image-centered,	narrative-based	accounts	
of	strips	of	reality,	and	what	they	offer	to	those	who	experience	and	transform	them	is	a	series	of	
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elements	 (such	 as	 characters,	 plots,	 and	 textual	 forms)	 out	 of	 which	 scripts	 can	 be	 formed	 of	
imagined	lives”	(Appadurai	1996:35).		
	
In	mediascapes,	the	circulation	of	narratives	informs	various	genres:	“Narrative	is	present	in	myth,	
legend,	fable,	tale,	novella,	epic,	history,	tragedy,	drama,	comedy,	mime,	painting…”	according	to	
Roland	 Barthes	 (1977:79),	 and	 Catherine	 Riessman	 added	 “memoir,	 biography,	 autobiography,	
diaries,	 archival	 documents,	 social	 service	 and	 health	 records,	 other	 organizational	 documents,	
scientific	theories,	folk	ballads,	photographs,	and	other	art	work”	to	Barthes’	list	(2008:4).	Thus,	it	
should	 not	 surprise	 that	 news	 could	 articulate	 proto-narrative	 structures,	 given	 the	 ubiquity	 of	
narrative	structures	in	just	about	every	possible	cultural	form,	media	and	discourse	type	(Virtanen	
1992,	Ryan	2004).	However,	as	I	will	discuss	in	chapter	1,	the	idea	that	news	articulates	narrative	
structures	has	been	contested	by	scholars	and	students	of	media	discourse	since	the	1980s.	Chapter	
2	 and	 3	 contribute	 to	 the	 field	 of	 media	 studies	 by	 revisiting	 this	 debate	 and	 its	 fundamental	
questions	-	questions	that	should	also	be	posed	to	the	events	constituting	the	Lava-Jato	scandal:	
Can	news	be	considered	to	have	narrative	qualities	in	general	or	in	the	specific	case	of	scandals?	By	
developing	an	answer	to	this,	the	thesis	also	contributes	to	the	body	of	theory	on	scandals,	which	
is	 often	 content	 with	 typologically	 registering	 phases	 in	 scandals,	 rather	 than	 considering	 the	
meaning	and	import	of	narrative	temporality.	Chapter	1	and	2	thus	sort	out	the	theoretical	challenge	
of	reconciling	theories	of	narrative	analysis	with	prevailing	paradigms	of	media	research.		
	
The	following	two	chapters	do	not	attempt	to	give	a	comprehensive	view	or	the	ultimate	definition	
of	 the	 concept	 “scandal,”	however.	 I	will	 use	 the	word	 “case”	 to	 refer	 to	 legal	processes,	while	
“scandal”	 will	 refer	 to	 the	 media	 representation	 of	 an	 action	 regarded	 as	 transgressive	 (Adut	
2008:13,	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 2012,	 Thompson	 2000).	 Throughout	 the	 thesis	 I	 work	 under	 the	
assumption	 that	acts	and	events	perceived	as	 transgression,	corruption,	and	scandal,	are	 in	 fact	
defined	 as	 such	 through	 media-borne	 discursive	 activities;	 interpretation	 and	 narration,	 in	
particular.	 Scandals,	 and	 media	 hypes	 in	 general,	 are	 products	 of	 journalistic	 pack	 behavior	
(Damgaard	2018b,	Vasterman	2005),	rather	than	individual	feats	of	investigative	journalism.	Media	
actors	and	journalists,	referring	to	other	media	actors	(Kristensen	and	Mortensen	2015:360)	and	
partaking	 in	“media	hunts”	(Allern	and	Pollack	2012:22),	recycle	the	same	basic	speech	acts	and	
perspectives.	 Thereby,	 they	 mutually	 constitute	 disclosed	 information	 as	 scandalous,	 construct	
certain	 acts	 as	 corrupt,	 and	define	what	 is	 “historic.”	 To	 constitute	 something	 as	 “historic”	 and	
“transgressive”	requires	more	than	description,	as	Koselleck	observed	(1985:106),	and	should	be	
seen	 essentially	 as	 an	 act	 of	 narration.	 The	 recycling	 of	 narratives	 should	 however	 not	 blind	
researchers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 constitution	 of	 events	 as	 scandalous	 is	 often	 a	 contested	 act	
(Damgaard	 2015b),	 appearing	 as	 a	 maze	 of	 utterances	 with	 different	 truth	 claims	 (Eckel	 and	
Leiendecker	2013)	in	a	particular	form	of	distributed	narrative	(Walker	2004).		
	
An	initial	problem	for	conceptualizing	news	as	narrative	is	the	common-sense	parceling	of	news	as	
reality	and	narrative	as	fiction.	News	media	organizations	are	inhabited	by	a	kind	of	journalists	with	
specific	ideological	and	professional	roles,	goals,	and	foundational	myths	(Schudson	1978,	2003),	
and	their	claim	to	societal	legitimacy	rests	upon	the	professed	goal	of	modern	news	journalism:	to	
depict	 the	state	of	 the	world	as	close	 to	 reality	as	possible	 in	 service	of	 the	general	 readership,	
providing	 facts	 and	 sources	 (Chalaby	 1996,	 Tuchman	 1978:82-103),	 whilst	 avoiding	 value	
judgements	(Vliegenthart	and	Skovsgaard	2017:90),	or	containing	judgments	in	the	so-called	op-ed	
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pieces.	While	nothing	prevents	facts	and	sources	from	being	arrayed	in	a	narrative	sequence	in	the	
so-called	“hard	news,”	the	limited	mandate	for	fictional	creativity	(Cornfield	1992:50)	means	that,	
ideally,	such	news	writing	should	resist	transforming	and	narrating	events	in	ways	that	support	or	
work	to	the	detriment	of	specific	political	or	social	causes.	The	ideal	of	objectivity,	although	viewed	
with	some	reservations	in	Latin	American	media	(Biroli	and	Miguel	2012,	Waisbord	2000),	can	be	
hoisted	as	a	professional	flag	in	order	to	downplay	situations	of	self-censorship,	vested	interests	of	
media	owners,	and	clientelistic	allegiances	(Albuquerque	and	da	Silva	2009,	Porto	2012:172).		
	
In	 the	 age	 of	 fake	 news	 and	 post-factuality,	 simple	 distinctions	 of	 objective/fictional	 and	 hard	
news/soft	news	are	clearly	challenged,	although	the	challenge	may	not	necessarily	arise	from	within	
the	 legacy	news	media.	 In	any	case,	despite	 the	claims	 to	objective	 reporting	and	 fact-centered	
news,	news	media	may	still	draw	upon	narrative	resources	found	in	a	cultural	stock	(Alexander	and	
Jacobs	 1998:29),	 reflecting	 a	 publicly	 shared	 symbolic	 system	 (Geertz	 1973)	 in	 their	 textual	
production.	Even	 in	 the	 supposedly	golden	age	of	 investigative	 journalism,	even	 in	 the	carefully	
patrolled	newsrooms	of	public	 service	outlets,	 the	 substratum	of	news	media	 is	 not	necessarily	
distinct	 from	 fictional	 or	 mythological	 cultural	 strata	 present	 in	 the	 mediascape	 (Hall	 1984,	
Silverstone	1981).	Taking	one	 step	back	 from	 the	 linguistic	and	 text-centered	approach	of	news	
discourse	analysis	found	in	seminal	studies	(such	as	Bell	1991,	Fowler	1991,	Fairclough	1995,	Hartley	
1982,	van	Dijk	1988),	 I	argue	 in	Chapter	2	 that	narrative	structures	still	 function	by	tying	events	
together	 in	 news	 texts	 and	 thereby	 assigning	meaning	 to	 events.	 Following	Roger	 Silverstone,	 I	
believe	it	is	necessary	to	grasp	media	texts	(generally,	and	scandal	texts	especially)	not	as	singular	
texts,	but	as	elements	of	a	general	structure	(in	Saussurean	terms,	parole	as	instances	of	langue):		
	
Any	attempt	to	face	the	problems	of	a	text’s	semantic	quality	involves	moving	away	from	a	close	concern	with	
its	manifest	structure,	with	its	visible	patterns,	and	a	correlative	movement	away	from	a	desire	to	preserve	the	
text’s	integrity.	Questions	about	a	text’s	meaning	necessarily	involve	leaving	the	particular,	albeit	temporarily,	
in	order	to	establish	the	generality	according	to	which	that	particular	becomes	possible.	Structure	replaces	
classification,	logic	chronology,	and	by	and	large,	deduction	replaces	induction.	The	analysis	of	a	text,	which	
might	be	a	folktale	or	an	individual	myth,	becomes	the	analysis	of	meaning,	of	language	or	of	myth	as	such.	
(Silverstone	1981:91)		
	
By	foregrounding	meaning	as	it	appears	in	a	totality	of	texts,	I	thereby	deliberately	downplay	the	
individual	 contributions	 of	 journalists,	 editors,	 and	 pundits.	 From	 these	 initial	 considerations,	
Chapter	2	establishes	the	theoretical	model	and	methodological	approach	deployed	in	the	thesis.	
Most	importantly,	the	second	chapter	defines	the	distributed	and	never-closed	narrative	structures	
as	fabulas	(Bal	1997).	The	fabulas	of	news	are	the	blueprints	that	precede	each	particular	news	item,	
and	it	is	the	fabulas	that	retain	narrative	structures	such	as	plot	and	temporality,	which	may	unfold	
to	different	degrees	in	particular	instances	of	news	text.	Events	are	endowed	with	meaning	through	
the	fabula’s	emplotment.	By	combining	this	understanding	of	plot	and	emplotment	with	the	notion	
of	 intertextuality,	 I	 arrive	at	 the	 research	object	of	 this	dissertation:	 fabulas	 that	emerge	 in	and	
across	news	texts	precisely	in	the	emplotment	of	a	common	narrative	structure.	Drawing	together	
news	texts	that	select	and	establish	relations	of	the	same	elements	and	emplot	events	within	the	
same	causal	logic,	I	attempt	to	identify	intertextually	recurring	fabulas	that	translate	and	organize	
events	into	coherent	and	symbolically	meaningful	story	arcs.	
	
Seminal	newsroom	studies	(Bell	1991,	Gans	1980,	Tuchman	1978)	have	explored	the	modern	media	
organization,	 the	 labor	 of	 newsworkers,	 and	 the	 news	 values	 and	 textual	 styles	 governing	 the	
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production	of	news	texts	in	minute	detail.	I	will	not	repeat	the	insights	of	these	authors,	nor	consider	
how	each	text	is	conceived	journalistically	and	morphs	as	it	wanders	from	sources	to	journalists	and	
across	editorial	desks	on	to	eventual	publication.	The	relations	between	the	production	of	news	and	
political	 institutions	 in	Brazil	do	merit	a	closer	 look,	 though,	and	Chapter	3	 therefore	provides	a	
short	description	of	the	Brazilian	media	organizations,	following	the	media	system	theory	of	Hallin	
and	Mancini	(2004,	2011).	Chapter	3	outlines	the	contours	of	the	mediascape,	as	well	as	the	place	
of	corruption	discourse	in	recent	examples	of	Brazilian	political	journalism.	Based	on	the	review	of	
the	media	system,	I	motivate	the	choice	of	sampled	media	outlets,	formats,	and	texts.		
	
The	shared	newsroom	culture	and	news	values	across	the	sampled	outlets	–	the	shared	textual	webs	
of	facticity	(Tuchman	1978,	ch.	5)	-	are	arguably	the	main	reasons	that	scandals	appear	as	uniformly	
newsworthy	to	media	organizations:		A	scandal	constitutes	the	moment	par	excellence	when	the	
media’s	 role	 as	 society’s	 watchdog	 is	 invoked,	 drawing	 upon	 ideals	 harking	 back	 to	 founding	
moments	of	American	press	(Schudson	2004).	In	this	sense,	I	see	more	continuity	than	rupture	in	
the	mediascape,	and	because	of	these	continuities,	I	will	analyze	Brazilian	mainstream	media	texts	
as	parts	of	the	same	textual	system.		
	
The	chapters	that	follow	the	third	are	then	situated	to	gradually	excavate	layers	of	meaning	in	the	
emergent	fabulas	of	corruption.	Chapter	4	presents	one	hundred	fragments	of	text,	large	and	small,	
together	with	a	few	exemplary	visual	fragments	from	the	Brazilian	mediascape	(located	in	appendix	
A).	These	examples	of	news	texts	are	used	to	assemble	the	unfolding	storylines	of	the	Lava-Jato	
scandal	and	the	impeachment	process,	their	emplotment	and	characterizations	of	actors.	Then,	the	
empirical	material	is	gradually	rarefied:	whereas	Chapter	4,	in	a	synoptic	manner,	presents	quotes	
and	 paraphrases	 of	 the	 texts	 as	 they	 appeared,	 Chapter	 5	 abstracts	 the	 chronology	 and	 causal	
relations	of	events,	as	well	as	the	subject-actants	in	order	to	analytically	construct	the	fabulas	of	the	
Lava-Jato	 scandal	 and	 the	 impeachment.	 Starting	 with	 a	 brief	 consideration	 of	 how	 seriality	 is	
achieved	in	media	in	general,	the	fifth	chapter	discusses	how	narrative	desire	and	time	in	the	news	
are	thoroughly	intertwined.	Through	six	examples,	I	explore	the	idea	that	the	timing	of	telling	in	the	
media,	as	well	as	the	specific	temporal	scopes	of	each	of	the	fabulas,	strategically	limited	the	scope	
of	visibility	for	the	political	consequences.	Having	explored	the	temporality	and	narrative	desire	of	
media	 texts,	 I	 then	 present	 six	 fabulas,	 constructed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 corpus	 of	 media	 texts	
presented	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	timing	and	temporality	of	the	six	fabulas	are	analyzed	and	
connected	to	the	sequence	of	political	events	in	Brazil	in	2016.		
	
Chapter	 6	 reduces	 the	 syntagmatic	 relations	 of	 the	 fabulas	 –	 their	 plot	 and	 temporality	 -	 to	
fundamental	semiotic	systems,	distilling	the	underpinning	ideological	relations	of	the	fabulas.	With	
this,	the	complexity	of	actors	and	fragments	of	narrative	is	boiled	down	to	the	basic	oppositions	and	
tensions	that	govern	the	fabulas	and	their	circulation	and	permutations	in	the	Brazilian	mediascape.	
In	this	textual	system,	the	issues	of	impunity	and	opposing	political	truth	claims	play	out	and	find	
narrative	solutions	on	the	backdrop	of	a	pervasive	conflict	between	the	abstract	historical	entities	
of	State,	Politics,	Citizens	and	Justice.	In	the	vein	of	Jameson,	I	finally	consider	how	the	news	stories	
on	the	Car	Wash	operation	were	delimited	by	this	specific	political	unconsciousness	which	gave	rise	
to	the	successful	impeachment	through	fabulas	about	corruption,	crisis,	and	political	cataclysm.	In	
four	appendices,	I	provide	various	visual	examples	of	media	representations,	a	timeline,	transcripts,	
and	some	of	the	quantitative	data	collected	during	my	research	on	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.	
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Chapter	1	
Literature	Review	
	
	
Journalists	do	not	write	articles.	They	write	stories.	(Bell	1991:147).	
	
[We]	cannot	overstate	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	“story”	when	analysing	scandals.	The	need	
for	stories	is	basic	to	all	societies,	even	pre-literate	ones.	A	scandal	is	not	just	a	logical	reporting	of	
damaging	facts,	no	matter	how	shocking	they	may	be.	In	a	scandal,	the	story	triumphs	over	facts	at	
some	point	and	in	doing	so	takes	on	a	life	of	its	own.	(Lull	and	Hinerman	1997:13)	
	
One	becomes	aware	of	the	powerful	impact	of	narrative	in	making	myth	appear	to	be	real.	[…]	I	think	
in	that	sense	we	make	an	absolutely	too	simple	distinction	between	narratives	about	the	real	and	
the	narratives	of	fiction.	(Hall	1984:5-6)	
	
If	scandals	(like	news	articles)	are	indeed	stories,	as	suggested	by	authors	such	as	the	above-quoted,	
one	obvious	methodological	path	to	understanding	scandals	should	be	narrative	analysis.	After	all,	
narrative	analysts	and	researchers	of	narratology	have	developed	fine-grained	analytical	tools	to	
describe	 the	 dimensions	 of	 temporality,	 spatiality,	 and	 focalization	 in	 diverse	 genres.	 Scandals,	
however,	emerge	in	news	media,	and	the	extant	academic	literature	on	news	discourse	of	the	last	
decades	does	not	generally	incline	towards	narrative	analysis.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	review	the	state	
of	 the	 art	 of	 several	 strands	 of	 media	 studies,	 not	 only	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 reluctance	 to	 use	
narrative	as	a	concept,	but	also	to	argue	that	there	is	still	conceptual	space	in	this	literature	to	claim	
a	place	for	narrative	as	a	relevant	(albeit	under-researched)	category.	
	
The	general	stance	found	in	countless	studies	of	news	is	that	news	is	a	particular	order	of	discourse	
which	ultimately	 locates	an	identifiable	collective	(a	public)	 in	space	and	time.	Influential	writers	
have	argued	that	the	 idea	of	nationhood	is	an	artefact	of	news	(Anderson	1983)	and	that	public	
spheres	and	deliberative	democracy	co-evolved	with	the	production	of	news,	insofar	as	the	political	
conditions	provided	a	marketplace	(Habermas	1989[1962]).	Although	such	historical	insights	have	
been	challenged	in	various	ways	(Calhoun	1992),	they	still	underpin	many	assumptions	of	what	news	
used	to	be,	but	neither	insight	specify	the	content	of	news,	thus	leaving	us	with	the	question:	What	
is	news	texts,	or	what	is	it	news	texts	do?	Can	news	be	considered	narration?	This	would	perhaps	
be	the	assumption	in	disciplines	adjacent	to	media	studies,	given	the	fact	that	“the	narrative	turn”	
in	the	1980s	introduced	the	concept	of	narrative	into	psychology,	historiography,	anthropology,	and	
social	movement	theory	with	much	success.	
	
The	notion	that	news	is	story-telling	(in	general	or	only	in	specific	types	of	news	such	as	scandals)	
can	however	be	questioned	and	has	indeed	been	challenged	on	many	grounds.	First	of	all,	whether	
news	can	be	characterized	as	narration	or	can	be	said	to	contain	narratives	depends	on	theoretical	
approach	and	method.	This	is	the	case	for	both	terms	of	the	equation,	so	that	one	may	reject	the	
statement	either	based	in	definitions	of	news	or	in	definitions	of	narrative.	In	the	following,	I	will	
briefly	unpack	the	objections	to	an	equivalence	of	news	and	narrative.	
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News,	for	one	thing,	has	particular	linguistic	structures	and	features	that	sets	it	apart	from	other	
story-telling	 in	media	 or	 in	 face-to-face	 communication.	 Newspaper	 texts,	 especially	 front-page	
texts,	have	developed	unique	features:	
	
Stories	are	written	 in	 the	past	 tense,	headlines	 in	 the	present.	Paragraphs	are	short,	perhaps	one	 to	 three	
sentences.	Sentences	generally	contain	fewer	than	twenty	words	and	avoid	words	of	more	than	two	syllables.	
Word	order	is	different	from	that	of	spoken	language	[…]	newswriting	is	often	“news-speak,”	full	of	awkward	
lengthy	sentences,	packed	with	nouns	connoting	facticity…	(Tuchman	1978:106)		
	
The	linguistic	features	(which	I	get	back	to	 in	the	next	section)	reflect,	 in	a	way	particular	to	the	
discourse	of	news,	a	claim	to	facticity,	as	Tuchman	implies	in	the	above	quote.	This	claim	is	central	
to	the	professional	identity,	and	prescribes	that	the	material	of	news	should	be	accounted	for,	not	
narrated	(Schudson	1978:88ff).	News	is	a	genre	that	accounts	for	facts,	and	the	inherent	truth	claim	
of	this	statement	entails,	somehow,	that	journalists	should	resist	the	human	urge	to	tell	stories,	or,	
to	 be	 more	 precise,	 the	 urge	 to	 fictionalize	 events	 (Kormelink	 and	 Costera	 Meijer	 2015).	 The	
professional	ideology	of	avoiding	narrativization	of	real	events,	however,	exists	in	tension	with	the	
equally	present	demand	for	getting	to	the	core	of	the	story,	which	means	accentuating	news	values	
such	as	conflict	and	 framing	aspects	of	 the	reported	 facts	 to	ensure	that	 the	text	appears	as	an	
accessible,	coherent	and	easily	interpreted	whole	(Bell	1991,	Entman	1993,	Galtung	and	Ruge	1965).	
	
If	news	per	definition	differs	from	narrative,	this	may	also	be	a	categorical	statement	concerning	
the	 properties	 of	 narratives,	 depending	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 narrative:	 Is	 narrative	 simply	 an	
account	of	two	or	more	temporally	ordered	events	(Labov	and	Waletzky	1967)	or	should	we	look	
for	 “well-made	 stories	 […	with]	 coherence	 that	 permits	 us	 to	 see	 ‘the	 end’	 in	 every	 beginning”	
(White	1981:23)?	While	no-one	would	deny	that	events	are	represented	(and	linked	together)	in	
news	texts,	both	in	textual	and	verbal-visual	forms,	literary	theorists	(such	as	Genette	1980:216	or	
Barthes	1977)	went	further	and	explicitly	assumed	that	news	did	narrate	in	a	more	elaborate	way,	
even	if	they	did	not	apply	their	analytical	vocabularies	to	news	narratives.		
	
Donald	Matheson	has	argued	that,	apart	from	the	formal	linguistic	differences,	modern	news	texts	
also	deny	a	dramatic	story	world,	distant	from	the	audience’s	personal	or	social	experiential	world.	
This	was	not	always	so,	but	did	in	fact	develop	as	a	stylistic	trait	of	reporting	(especially)	in	the	20th	
century.	 His	 argument	 is	 built	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 everyday	 lived	 experience	 and	 the	
experience	of	fiction:	
	
The	news	genre	diverges	markedly	here	from	genres	that	are	governed	by	a	narrative	logic	because	it	rejects	
the	power	to	imagine	an	elsewhere	or	elsewhen	or	to	construct	characters	who	drift	toward	the	archetypal.	
The	reader	is	not	released	from	the	here	and	now.	(Matheson	2010:46)	
	
In	its	style	and	claims	to	reality,	a	news	text	thus	sets	itself	apart	from	narrative	realities	or,	in	other	
words,	apart	 from	the	 story	world.	His	 view,	however,	 ties	 together	 the	concepts	of	 fiction	and	
narrative.	Contrary	to	Matheson,	one	could	also	see	narrative	as	a	mode,	rather	than	a	substance;	
a	mode	of	organizing	speech	or	text	which	works	in	many	kind	of	genres	and	discourse	types	(Bal	
1997:xi).	Riessmann	 (2008:4)	 contends	 that	narratives	are	encountered	 in	a	variety	of	discourse	
formations,	and	may	be	present,	to	lesser	or	greater	degree,	in	almost	any	genre,	while	Virtanen,	
from	a	more	functional	than	substantial	viewpoint,	claims	that	narrative	type	of	text	seems	to	be	
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able	to	formally	realize	any	type	of	discourse	(Virtanen	1992:303).	By	seeing	narrative	as	a	mode	
rather	than	a	type	of	discourse,	the	notion	of	a	distinct	narrative	logic	must	also	be	denied.	
	
This	opens	the	theoretical	debate	of	the	way	that	a	narrative	logic	may	be	imposed	upon	narrated	
events	 by	 authors,	 even	when	 accounting	 for	 real	 events.	Matheson	 argues	 that	 this	 does	 not	
happen	in	news,	but	I	suspect,	with	Hayden	White,	that	this	really	is	an	attempt	to	cover	the	fact	
that	the	plot	is	always	“an	embarrassment	[that]	has	to	be	presented	as	‘found’	in	the	events	rather	
than	put	there	by	narrative	techniques”	(White	1981:20).	White	was	a	central	scholar	in	what	has	
been	termed	“the	narrative	turn,”	a	movement	that	triggered	debates	about	narrative	structures’	
influence	on	methods	and	theoretical	approaches	in	various	fields	of	the	human	and	social	sciences	
(Bruner	1986,	 Somers	1994,	 Polletta	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Polkinghorne	1988,	Riessman	2008).	 This	 turn,	
starting	 in	 the	 70s	 and	 maintaining	 the	 impetus	 well	 into	 the	 80s,	 saw	 influential	 authors	 in	
anthropology,	psychology,	historiography,	and	even	science	and	technology	studies	reflect	on	the	
fundamental	epistemological	consequences	of	thinking	narratives	as	basis	for	writing	and	thinking	
scientifically	(Clifford	and	Marcus	1986,	White	1973,	Latour	and	Woolgar	1979:257-8,	261).	In	the	
field	 of	 philosophy,	 MacIntyre	 even	 argued	 that	 narrative	 is	 the	 structure	 by	 which	 humans	
understand	action	and,	at	the	same	time,	the	structure	which	we	all	live	out	in	our	lives	(1984:212).	
	
Narrative	can	thus	be	defined	either	as	a	cognitive	and	experiential	structure	(in	the	very	embracing	
way	of	MacIntyre,	Bruner,	and	Polkinghorne),	or	as	a	particular	mode	of	discourse	with	 specific	
traits,	or	simply	an	account	of	an	ordered	sequence	of	events	(de	Fina	and	Georgakopoulou	2012,	
2015).	The	latter	definition,	pioneered	by	Labov,	gained	traction	in	media	studies	in	the	1980s,	but,	
as	we	shall	see	in	the	following	sections,	full-blown	narrative	analysis	of	news	never	caught	on.		
	
	
1.1	The	Debate	on	Narrative	and	Temporal	Structures	in	News	
Several	 influential	media	 scholars	 have	 advocated	 a	 turn	 to	 narrative,	most	 prominently	 Roger	
Silverstone	(1981,	1988),	and	implicitly	Daniel	Dayan	and	Elihu	Katz	(1986,	1992).	Many	more	have	
agreed	that	news	are	story-like,	and	such	a	view	is	captured	in	this	chapter’s	initial	quotes,	but	most	
researchers	shy	away	from	actually	taking	the	next	logical	step	and	analyzing	texts	within	a	narrative	
framework.	Pietilä	(1992:61)	concluded	that	many	studies	of	news	broaching	the	topic	of	narrative	
typically	 “fail	 to	 consider	 in	 any	 detail	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 narratives	 and	 the	 possible	
implications	 of	 these	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 news	 as	 narrative,”	 mentioning	 Altheide	 (1974,	 1985),	
Dahlgren	(1981,	1985),	Fiske	(1987),	Gans	(1980),	Hallin	and	Mancini	(1985),	Hartley	(1982),	Manoff	
(1989),	 Manoff	 and	 Schudson	 (1987),	 Schudson	 (1982,	 1989)	 and	 Tuchman	 (1976,	 1978)	 in	 an	
extended	 list	 of	 references.	 I	 will	 elide	 reproducing	 the	 literature	 review	 that	 led	 to	 Pietilä’s	
conclusion	and	instead	go	to	the	few	examples	where	narrative	analysis	actually	was	explicitly	used.	
From	this,	I	will	present	(in	this	section)	arguments	against	a	view	of	news-as-narrative	and	(in	the	
following	sections)	two	influential	strands	of	media	theory	that	tried	to	relegate	or	remove	narrative	
entirely	from	the	vocabulary.	The	state	of	the	nomenclature	today	suffers	a	great	deal	from	these	
attempts,	 and	 the	 conceptual	 confusion	 is	 compounded	 by	 imprecise	 or	 non-explicated	 claims	
about	news-as-narratives,	such	as	those	referenced	above.	
	
Martin	Montgomery	(1991,	Hartley	and	Montgomery	1985)	and	Allan	Bell	(1991)	worked	precisely	
with	 the	 framework	 of	 narrative	 analysis	 proposed	 by	 Labov	 and	 Waletzky,	 but	 some	
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methodological	problems	arose	from	applying	structural	narrative	analysis	to	news	studies,	as	we	
shall	 see	 shortly.	 In	 Labov	and	Waletzky’s	 seminal	 study	 (1967),	 the	basic	elements	of	narrative	
structures	are	abstracted	from	oral	narratives	of	simple	personal	experience.	Labov	and	Waletzky	
argue	that	this	kind	of	narrative	must	be	fundamental	to	more	developed	and	poetic	narrative	types,	
and	thus	must	exhibit	the	minimum	elements	constitutive	of	narrative.	The	elements	that	defines	
narrative,	 in	 their	 analysis,	 are	 the	 Abstract,	 Orientation,	 Complicating	 action,	 Evaluation,	
Resolution	and	the	Coda	(ibid.:32ff).	Inspired	directly	by	Labov	and	Waletzky,	Bell	(1991),	analyzed	
news	reports	as	doing	the	same	things:	providing	abstracts	(through	headlines),	orienting,	marking	
out	conflict	and	complications,	evaluating	and	possibly	providing	some	sense	of	resolution.	With	
this	 argument,	 the	 opening	 clause	 of	 one	 chapter	 in	 The	 Language	 of	 News	 Media	 affirmed:	
“Journalists	do	not	write	articles.	 They	write	 stories.”	 (ibid.:147).	Going	a	 little	deeper,	Bell	 saw	
abstracts	as	optional,	but	common,	and	Orientation	and	Evaluation	he	found	to	be	compressed	in	
the	 lead	sentence	of	 reports,	but,	 like	other	researchers,	he	acknowledged	that	 the	structure	of	
news	 text	 is	 not	 linear,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 chronology.	 Bell	 affirmed	 that	 news	 texts	 of	 the	
“report”	genre	usually	consist	of	Headline,	Lead,	any	number	of	satellites	describing	episodes	(and	
events	 within	 the	 episodes,	 which	 could	 be	 commentary,	 background	 and	 follow-ups)	 (Bell	
1991:164-174),	and	possibly	a	Wrap-up	(Fairclough	1995:72,	85).	Bell	concluded	that	the	“central	
action	of	the	news	story	is	told	in	non-chronological	order,	with	result	presented	first	followed	by	a	
complex	re-cycling	through	various	time	zones	down	through	the	story”	(Bell	1991:154-5).		
	
The	non-chronological	re-ordering	of	elements	was	also	present	in	Labov	and	Waletzky,	but	news	
texts,	 unlike	personal	narratives,	 do	not	 recycle	 and	 reorder	elements	 in	order	 to	build	up	 to	 a	
Resolution.	 Indeed,	 resolution	may	be	suspended	because	news	 frequently	unfolds	 in	media	 res	
(Motta	2013:97),	with	the	possibility	of	resolution	always	located	in	the	future.	Furthermore,	Bell	
pointed	 out	 that	 the	 news	 texts	 have	 four	 stylistic	 traits	 that	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	 personal	
narratives,	namely	1)	that	they	are	impersonal	(due	to	journalistic	conventions);	2)	that	they	use	
sources	and	quotes	to	present	alternative,	personal	viewpoints;	3)	that	the	use	of	numbers	is	much	
more	frequent	and	precise	in	news	stories	relative	to	personal	narratives;	4)	and	finally,	that	syntax	
in	news	stories	tend	to	be	much	more	complex	than	in	oral	narratives	(Bell	1991:155).		
	
Matheson	argues	that	the	analytical	use	of	a	narrative	framework	(such	as	Bell’s,	or	the	one	I	intend	
to	deploy)	at	times	forces	news	texts	uncomfortably	into	predefined	boxes	of	plot	and	sequence,	
when	in	fact	news	texts	cohere	in	a	number	of	ways	and	not	necessarily	through	use	of	narrative	
structures	(Matheson	2010).	Matheson	goes	further	still,	as	he	points	out	that	at	the	functional	level	
of	news	texts,	the	scattering	of	chronology	and	the	inversed-pyramid	organization	of	text	 in	fact	
undermine	the	functions	identified	by	Labov	and	Waletzky.	To	Matheson,	this	means	that	suspense	
and	equilibrium	 is	not	 constructed	 in	news	 texts	by	emplotment,	and	 the	Orientation	and	Coda	
elements	do	not	perform	the	sense-making	functions	of	introduction	and	removal	from	the	story	
world	(ibid.:44ff).			
	
Another	critique	of	the	explanatory	force	of	narrative	in	analyses	of	broadcast	news	was	brought	
forth	by	Montgomery,	who	used	 to	use	 a	 Labovian	model	 for	 analyzing	 talk	 radio	 (1991)	 and	 a	
narrative	 approach	 of	 analyzing	 point-of-view	 in	 television	 news	 (Hartley	 and	 Montgomery	
1985:247-251).	However,	Montgomery	recently	changed	his	mind	on	the	matter	of	narrative,	seeing	
television	news	as	fundamentally	working	through	and	accomplishing	communication	with	deixis	–	
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demonstrating	 “here	and	now”	 -	 rather	 than	 through	narration.	Montgomery	 today	argues	 that	
television	news	only	“intermittently	relies	on	narrative	[…]	television	news	is	not	so	much	about	
telling	 the	 structure	 of	 events	 as	 about	 showing	 where	 incidents	 are	 located”	 (Montgomery	
2007:108).	Contesting	Bell’s	story-centric	perspective	(ibid.:90-91),	he	characterizes	televised	news	
as	 a	 “curious	 kind	 of	mimesis	 as	much	 as	 it	 is	 diegesis”	 (ibid.:108),	 drawing	 on	 the	Aristotelian	
tradition.	However,	he	adds,	 “some	news	events	and	 some	genres	give	 rise	 to	 storyable	 forms”	
(ibid.:109).	
	
Montgomery’s	last	comment	makes	one	wonder	about	the	analytical	location	of	“storyable”	forms.	
Earlier,	Hartley	and	Montgomery	argued	that	“the	news	is	active	in	the	politics	of	sense-making”	
(1985:260),	and	in	particular	they	saw	that	the	“verbal	component	of	film	reports”	offer	a	narrative	
point	 of	 view	 “from	 which	 the	 viewer	 can	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 story”	 (ibid.:251).	 Sense-making	
requires	some	story-telling	on	broadcast	news,	as	deixis	and	direct	representation	of	voices	is	not	
always	enough	to	reliably	let	the	viewer	sort	out	the	intended	points	of	view.	Similarly,	one	could	
argue	 that	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 show	pictures	 of	 Congress	 to	 understand	what’s	 going	 on	 inside	
Congress,	and	so	deixis	on	television	is	not	particularly	useful	for	making	sense	of	complex	political	
interactions.	Furthermore,	Herman	(2004:263ff)	has	argued	that	a	narrative	normally	lays	out	the	
spatial	structure	of	the	story	world,	partly	defeating	Montgomery’s	argument	for	rigidly	removing	
instances	of	deixis	from	narrative	structure.	Turning	back	to	Matheson,	another	assumption	in	his	
critique	seems	problematic,	as	it	appears	locked	up	in	his	methodological	focus	on	singular	news	
texts.	A	similar	text-close	approach	has	also	led	Critical	Discourse	Analysis	(CDA)	to	avoid	narrative	
in	analysis	of	news	texts.	However,	as	we	shall	see	now,	 it	may	be	more	appropriate	to	say	that	
narrative	 is	 partly	 located	 outside	 of	 texts	 themselves,	 which	 may	 even	 explain	 how	 narrative	
anyway	reappears	in	that	strand	of	media	studies.		
	
	
1.2	The	Narrative	Lacuna	of	Critical	Discourse	Analysis		
While	 the	 concept	 of	 narrative	 caught	 the	 attention	 and	 inspired	 a	 range	 of	 social	 and	 human	
science	approaches,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	concept	remained	marginal	in	the	CDA	tradition	
led	by	Teun	van	Dijk.	Unpacking	his	critique	is	worthwhile	here,	because	it	clarifies	the	differences	
between	 the	 content	or	event-material	 dealt	with	 in	news	 text	 and	 the	narrative	 clauses	 found	
therein,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 composite	 narratives	 that	 emerge	 in	 unfolding	 intertextual	
systems,	on	the	other.	
	
Van	Dijk,	 in	 his	 social-cognitivist	 approach	 laid	 out	 in	News	 as	 Discourse,	 locates	 narrative	 as	 a	
superstructure	outside	of	texts,	and	within	the	short-term	or	long-term	memory	of	readers	of	news	
texts	(and,	of	course,	producers	of	news	texts)	(van	Dijk	1988:104).		
	
Narrative	categories	are	used	to	analyze	and	order	text	segments	of	a	story	and	help	the	representation	of	
stories	 in	 memory.	 Such	 additional	 structuring	 of	 a	 discourse	 is	 also	 relevant	 during	 retrieval:	 Discourse	
segments	that	correspond	to	a	narrative	category	(like	setting,	event,	reaction,	or	similar	general	categories)	
can	be	retrieved	better	because	language	users	can	use	the	story	grammar	categories	as	a	routine	retrieval	
cue.	(ibid.:149)	
	
Narratives	are	not	present	in	texts	as	such,	according	to	van	Dijk,	because	news	texts	in	themselves	
exhibit	quite	different	structures	from	the	assumed	cognitive	narrative	model	(or,	for	that	matter,	
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different	structures	from	that	of	Labovian	first-hand	narratives	or	literary	narratives).	Notice	that	
this	argument	is	different	from	Matheson’s,	as	it	is	based	in	textual	features.	Van	Dijk	points	out	
that	news	texts,	as	a	matter	of	convention,	convey	the	main	thrust	of	events	first	(in	the	headline	
and	the	lead),	and	then	supply	the	details	-	non-chronologically	-	in	descending	order	of	importance.	
“Dispensing	with	 suspense”	 (Bird	 and	Dardenne	 1988:76),	 news	 can	 thus	 not	 claim	 any	 kind	 of	
emplotment,	since	the	goal	of	news	is	to	provide	the	gist	of	the	“story”	up	front	and	then	elaborate	
on	details	later.	In	this	functional	view,	emplotment	is	therefore	not	to	be	found	in	news	texts,	and,	
since	 this	approach	 is	solidly	grounded	 in	actual	news	texts	and	the	 functions	of	 linguistic	units,	
analyses	in	the	vein	of	van	Dijk	would	consequently	have	to	avoid	narrative	analysis.	Narratives	were	
instead	made	the	objects	of	research	in	neighboring	fields	of	reception	research	concerning	story	
grammars	(e.g.	Mandler	and	Johnson	1977)	and	cognitive	studies	of	text-processing	(such	as	van	
Dijk	and	Kintsch	1983,	Turner	1996),	but	kept	out	of	analyses	of	news	texts.		
	
This	 is	not	the	entire	story,	however.	Van	Dijk	also	points	out	that	for	“at	 least	certain	discourse	
types,	it	is	useful	to	speak	also	about	the	schematic	structure.	Thus,	stories	can	be	characterized	by	
a	narrative	schema”	(van	Dijk	1988:189).	News	discourse	should	not	generally	be	seen	as	structured	
by	a	narrative	macrostructure,	but	van	Dijk	instead	introduces	the	term	“scripts”	to	denote	semantic	
macrostructures	that	may	provide	news	texts	with	overall	coherency:		
	
information	may	be	subsumed	by	a	macroproposition	if	it	refers	to	normal	conditions	or	components	of	the	
macroevent.	This	subsumption	takes	place	on	the	basis	of	our	general	knowledge	of	the	script	about	[…]	politics	
(political	events,	acts,	politicians,	political	talks,	visits,	etc.)	(ibid.:36)	
	
This	“general	knowledge”	of	how	situations	play	out	 is	shortly	thereafter	termed	“script”	by	van	
Dijk.	Scripts	are	apparently	what	allows	readers	to	reconstruct	events	as	they	read	tersely	written	
news	texts	that	may	be	incomplete	or	presuppose	much	information.	In	other	words,	scripts	are	
here	seen	as	implicit	standard	structures	of	events	which	journalists	draw	upon.	1	By	relegating	the	
term	“narrative”	to	cognition,	and	introducing	the	term	“script”	as	shorthand	for	the	standardized	
event	sequences	used	by	readers	and	writers,	van	Dijk	avoided	to	go	into	the	categories	and	aspects	
of	narrative	analysis.	This	choice	may	be	contested	on	empirical	grounds	however,	since	journalists	
indeed	do	narrate	(infrequently	in	quality	newspapers,	more	frequently	in	weekly	magazines	and	
long-reads),	as	do	pundits.	Thirty	years	later,	van	Dijk,	even	situated	in	the	media	storm	of	Brazil	
during	the	exact	events	that	this	thesis	treats,	continued	to	ignore	this2	(van	Dijk	2017).	I	do	agree	
with	 van	 Dijk	 that	 newsworkers	 and	 audience	members	may	 draw	 upon	 a	 pool	 of	 generalized	
knowledge,	ordered	in	so	many	scripts,	when	describing	and	understanding	recurring	public	events.	
Such	scripts	are	not	necessarily	invested	with	much	moral	meaning	or	greater	significance,	but	they	
provide	a	model	for	reporting	on	public	events.	Quite	simply,	a	script	provides	the	standard	pattern	
of	such	events;	the	list	of	actions	and	reactions	to	be	expected	of	a	speech	in	parliament,	a	state	
visit,	a	primary	election,	and	so	forth.	Because	the	reader	is	supposed	to	have	seen	these	numerous	
times,	and	because	they	usually	conform	to	the	standard,	the	implicit	script	allows	the	journalists	
to	rewrite	and	often	shorten	texts	by	operations	such	as	deletion	and	implication	(van	Dijk	1988:36,	
see	also	Fairclough	1992:200-201,	Wodak	1999:34).		
	
There	is	however	another	strand	of	CDA	that	provides	another	view	of	narrative.	Norman	Fairclough	
suggested,	 in	 a	 direct	 reply	 to	 van	 Dijk,	 that	 narrative	 belongs	 to	 the	 macrostructural	 level	 of	
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intertextuality.	In	this	view,	narrative	is	not	purely	located	in	the	mental	models	of	readers	or	text-
producers	and	function	as	the	cognitive	scaffold	behind	realized	discourse.		
	
Whereas	 linguistic	analysis	shows	how	texts	selectively	draw	upon	linguistic	systems	(again,	 in	an	extended	
sense),	 intertextual	 analysis	 shows	 how	 texts	 selectively	 draw	 upon	 orders	 of	 discourse	 -	 the	 particular	
configurations	of	conventionalized	practices	(genres,	discourses,	narratives,	etc.)	which	are	available	to	text	
producers	and	interpreters	in	particular	social	circumstances...	(Fairclough	1992:194,	italics	in	the	original)	
	
To	Fairclough,	narratives	appear	intertextually	in	the	analysis	as	conventions	in	linguistic	systems.	
He	added	that	narrative	may	be	understood	as	one	intertextual	property	of	particular	texts,	and	
emphasized	 that	 any	 given	 text	 should	 thus	 not	 be	 conceived	of	 as	 a	 homogeneous	 expression	
within	a	single	genre	or	order	of	discourse,	but	rather	a	stitched-together	work.		
	
Intertextual	 analysis	 draws	attention	 to	 the	dependence	of	 texts	upon	 society	 and	history	 in	 the	 form	 the	
resources	made	available	within	the	order	of	discourse	(genres,	discourses,	etc.);	genres	according	to	Bakhtin	
are	'the	drive	belts	from	the	history	of	society	to	the	history	of	language’	[…]	from	this	perspective,	accounts	
of	 individual	 genres	 and	 discourse	 types	 appear	 to	 be	 largely	 accounts	 of	 ideal	 types,	 for	 actual	 texts	 are	
generally	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	constituted	through	mixing	these	types.	(ibid.:194-5)	
	
Fairclough	 refers	 to	 both	 Bakhtin’s	 writings	 (especially	 Bakhtin	 1981,	 containing	 the	 dialogical	
notion	of	textual	heteroglossia)	and	Kristeva	in	his	development	of	intertextuality,	but	Faircloug	has	
a	less	embracing	view	of	intertextual	systems	than	Kristeva.	According	to	the	editor	of	Kristeva’s	
Desire	 in	 Language,	 Kristeva	was	misread	by	many,	 and	probably	 Fairclough	as	well	 (Roudiez	 in	
Kristeva	1980:15).	Rather	than	particular	texts	or	identifiable	authors	in	dialogue	with	other	texts	
or	 authors,	 Kristeva’s	 original	 vision	 of	 intertextuality	 was	 oriented	 to	 textual	 systems	 of	 signs	
spanning	centuries	and	the	operations	and	functions	of	these	systems.	Jameson	contributed	to	this	
line	 of	 thinking	 by	 showing	 how	 textual	 systems	 could	 sediment	 into	 specific	 forms,	 carrying	
ideological	 messages	 of	 their	 own	 (Jameson	 1981:84).	 I	 must	 elide	 Bakhtinian	 and	 Kristevan	
concepts	for	now	to	avoid	unnecessary	confusion	of	terms,	however.	
		
Misreading	Kristeva	or	not,	Fairclough	advocates	for	the	use	of	intertextual	analysis	(opposed	to	the	
purely	linguistic	analysis),	but	grounded	in	a	close	reading	of	texts,	since	“intertextual	properties	of	
texts	 are	 realized	 in	 linguistic	 features”	 (ibid.:195).	 Taking	my	 cue	 from	 Fairclough,	 I	 think	 that	
intertextuality	could	be	a	key	to	discovering	narratives	not	just	in,	but	across	or	between	texts	and	
speech	events.	For	now,	I	will	reserve	a	theoretical	space	for	narratives,	so	that	I	can	argue	for	the	
importance	 of	 narrative	 a	 little	 later,	 all	 the	 while	 maintaining	 the	 insight	 of	 Fairclough	 that	
narratives	 appear	 in	 dialogue	 with	 other	 discursive	 orders	 and	 textual	 genres	 present	 in	 news	
(interviews,	op-ed	pieces,	news	reports,	etc.)	as	well	as	the	genres	of	cultural	production	in	a	wider	
sense	(i.e.	crime	novels	or	telenovelas).		
	
I	will	now	briefly	turn	to	the	theory	of	framing	and	frames,	not	just	to	explain	why	narratives	also	
disappeared	 conceptually	 from	 this	 field,	 but	 especially	 to	 clarify	 possible	 overlaps	 to	 narrative	
theory	and	to	argue	for	the	ultimately	limited	relevance	of	framing	to	my	present	endeavor	by	way	
of	an	empirical	example	from	the	mediascape	of	Brazil.	
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1.3	Disentangling	Frames	and	Narratives:	A	Theoretical	Review	and	an	Example	
Framing	 analysis	 has	 been	 frequently	 used	within	mainstream	media	 studies,	 but	most	 authors	
using	this	approach	also	avoid	the	concept	of	narrative.	This	is	not	surprising,	since	the	concept	of	
“frame”	has	been	the	topic	of	extended	turf	wars	(with	agenda-setting	analysis,	in	media	studies,	
and	definitional	struggles	with	psychology	and	political	science,	see	Chong	and	Druckman	2007,	Van	
Gorp	2007).	Even	after	extended	conceptual	debates	of	 this	 field,	one	still	encounters	problems	
when	trying	to	distinguish	between	a	“narrative”	and	a	“frame,”	as	I	will	show	here,	since	either	
could	be	analytically	constructed	on	the	basis	of	news	texts.		
	
The	embedding	or	successive	nesting	of	related	concepts	of	“frames”	and	“framing”	in	a	range	of	
scientific	 fields	 makes	 some	 preliminary	 disentanglement	 necessary.	 Initially,	 the	 concept	 was	
picked	 up	 from	 the	 social	 interactionism	of	Goffmann	 (1956)	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 cognitive	
theory	of	Gregory	Bateson	(Bateson	1972).	Bateson,	in	the	essay	“A	Theory	of	Play	and	Fantasy”	
(written	in	1955,	but	included	in	his	later	book	Steps	to	an	Ecology	of	Mind),	stated	that		
	
a	frame	is	metacommunicative.	Any	message,	which	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	defines	a	frame,	ipso	facto	
gives	the	receiver	instructions	or	aids	in	his	attempt	to	understand	the	messages	included	within	the	frame.	
(1972:188)	
	
The	concept	of	framing	then	took	off	in	media	and	communication	studies,	but	it	was	also	developed	
in	 the	 fields	 of	 political	 science,	 social	 movement	 theory	 and	 psychology.	 Between	 all	 these	
“frames,”	however,	the	scope	is	not	clear	in	each	field	nor	across	the	board	(Aalberg,	Strömbäck	
and	 de	 Vreese	 2011,	 Reese	 2007,	 Cacciatore,	 Scheufele	 and	 Iyengar	 2016),	 and	 the	 cumulative	
ambiguity	of	the	term	”frame,”	when	viewed	from	several	theoretical	perspectives,	is	staggering.		
	
In	psychologically	or	socio-cognitively	inclined	studies,	the	frame	is	the	clue	that	defines	an	entire	
context,	setting	up	expectations	and	interpretative	schemata	for	the	relevant	situation.	This	was	
the	view	of	Gregory	Bateson,	referencing	Margaret	Mead	(1934),	as	well	as	Erving	Goffman.	The	
frames	are	socially	instituted	and	enacted,	define	a	range	of	possible	scripts	for	each	situation,	and	
can	be	specified	with	increasing	degrees	of	complexity;	from	Bateson's	crude	”this	is	play”	frame	
that	 even	animals	may	 signal	 to	Goffman's	 ”how	 to	 interact	 in	 a	 restaurant”	 and	even	 ”how	 to	
behave	rudely	as	a	waiter	in	this	restaurant	without	apparently	breaking	decorum”	(Goffman	1959,	
1974).	 In	 economics	 and	 prospect	 theory,	 Kahneman	 and	 Tversky	 (1979,	 1982)	 performed	
experiments	concerning	test	subjects’	responses	to	inversely	worded	frames,	and	the	concepts	of	
equivalency	 framing	 (concerning	 logically	 but	 not	 emotionally	 equivalent	 wordings	 of	 a	 given	
context)	 and	 emphasis	 framing	 (concerning	 omission	 and	 highlighting	 of	 certain	 subsets	 of	
attributes	of	a	context)	were	coined.	These	proved	hard	to	apply	consistently	in	studies	of	actual	
political	talk	(Chong	and	Druckman	2007,	Sniderman	and	Theriault	2004).		
	
Shanto	 Iyengar	 (1990),	 in	 a	 famous	 study	 of	 news	 frames	 of	 the	 American	 poor,	 distinguished	
between	 episodic	 frames	 and	 thematic	 frames,	 which	 he	 thought	 stimulated	 variations	 in	 the	
audiences’	 attributions	 of	 responsibility.	 Reducing	 frames	 to	 attribution	 of	 either	 personal	 or	
systemic	 responsibility	 is	 of	 limited	 value	when	analyzing	 scandals,	 however,	 as	 responsibility	 is	
precisely	the	perennial	battle	zone	invoked	in	news	reports	on	scandals.	This	is	the	first	problem	of	
framing	theory	when	researching	scandals:	The	form	of	scandal	gives	priority	to	a	frame	that	locates	
guilt	or	innocence	(Kepplinger,	Geiss	and	Siebert	2012).	This	conveniently	reduces	complexity	for	
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the	reader,	but	also	the	potential	of	analytical	 insights	for	the	researcher,	and	I	will	argue	below	
that	 news	 texts	 covering	 scandals	 in	 fact	 bring	 more	 issues	 to	 the	 table	 than	 just	 the	 guilt	 of	
particular	individuals.			
	
Communication	 scholars	 often	 take	 the	 formulation	 of	 Entman	 (1993)	 as	 the	 canonical.	 Here,	
Entman	takes	the	function	of	frames,	or	rather	the	process	of	framing,	to	be	transfer	of	salience.	In	
this	 definition,	 framing	 “essentially	 involves	 selection	 and	 salience.	 To	 frame	 is	 to	 select	 some	
aspects	of	a	perceived	reality	and	make	them	more	salient	in	a	communicating	text,	in	such	a	way	
as	 to	 promote	 a	 particular	 problem	 definition,	 causal	 interpretation,	 moral	 evaluation,	 and/or	
treatment	recommendation	for	the	item	described”	(ibid.:52,	italics	removed	from	the	original).	In	
a	later	formulation,	Entman	defined	framing	as	“selecting	a	few	aspects	of	a	perceived	reality	and	
connecting	them	together	in	a	narrative	that	promotes	a	particular	interpretation	[…]	Framing	works	
to	shape	and	alter	audience	members’	interpretations	and	preferences”	(Entman	2010:391).	
	
One	strand	of	media	studies	has	taken	a	more	inclusive	and	less	functionalist	view	than	Entman	and	
Iyengar.	Gamson	and	Modigliani	thought	of	frames	as	“a	central	organizing	idea	or	story	line	that	
provides	meaning	 to	 an	unfolding	 strip	 of	 events	 ...The	 frame	 suggests	what	 the	 controversy	 is	
about,	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 issue”	 (1987:143;	 compare	 with	 Appadurai	 1996:35	 quoted	 in	 the	
introduction).	 In	such	a	 formulation,	 it	 seems	that	 frames	and	narratives	converge	 theoretically.	
After	all,	how	can	research	ever	determine	where	a	frame	stops,	and	a	narrative	begins?	More	to	
the	point,	when	is	it	theoretically	viable	to	say	that	a	framing	invokes	a	narrative	structure?	Under	
what	circumstances	can	research	check	if	“an	organizing	idea”	was	really	a	condensed	narrative,	or	
whether	an	“emphasis	frame”	actually	emphasized	an	emplotment?	In	order	to	answer	this,	I	will	
describe	 a	 bit	 of	 the	 news	 media	 sphere	 in	 Brazil	 in	 2015	 and	 2016.	 The	 example,	 hopefully,	
demonstrates	how	this	may	be	solved,	by	showing	that	frames	and	narratives	differ	in	scope	and	
partly	in	function.		
	
After	months	of	news	coverage	that	gradually	revealed	how	many	politicians	and	political	parties	
benefitted	 from	kickbacks	 from	 the	 sub-contracts	 of	 Petrobras,	 the	 scandal	 became	part	 of	 the	
established	web	of	 facticity	 in	political	 reporting	 (Tuchman	1978).	This	meant	that	a	 lot	of	news	
reports	about	the	corruption	cases	and	investigations	were	included	on	the	media	agenda,	referring	
to	this	overall	“frame”	or	to	the	developing	back-log	strip	of	events,	gathered	under	the	heading	of	
“Lava-Jato.”	Even	minor	processes	in	Congress	or	in	the	courts	could	be	justified	as	interesting	and	
newsworthy	on	the	media	agenda	because	the	journalists	made	the	connection	to	the	corruption	
case	salient.	This	was	the	standard	frame,	so	to	speak,	accumulating	the	media	events	of	the	case	
and	implicitly	inscribing	each	minor	event	in	the	larger	story	line	but	without	necessarily	spelling	
out	any	narrative	structure	or	causality.	The	“corruption	of	Petrobras”	frame	could	have	been	(but	
never	was)	countered,	say,	by	a	 frame	describing	Petrobras	as	a	company	with	a	 fundamentally	
healthy	business	model	 and	 continuing	market	dominance	–	again,	 a	 frame	without	an	 intrinsic	
narrative	structure.	
	
In	contrast,	once	the	process	of	presidential	 impeachment	got	underway	 in	December	2015	and	
especially	in	2016,	the	legitimacy	of	the	process	was	increasingly	contested	through	two	interpretive	
models	that	could	be	called	frames,	but	really	featured	very	clear	narrative	structures.	Rousseff	and	
the	PT	tried	to	unmask	the	impeachment	process	as	a	coup	d’état,	or	golpe,	and	by	this	they	meant	
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that	Eduardo	Cunha,	President	of	the	Câmara	dos	Deputados	or	the	Lower	House	of	Congress,	had	
started	the	process	to	protect	himself	(as	well	as	his	party	colleagues	from	PMDB	and	supporters	in	
Congress)	 from	 judicial	 persecution.	 In	 this	way,	 it	was	not	 a	 legitimate	 attempt	 to	 remove	 the	
President,	but	a	subversive	strike	to	secure	impunity	for	the	corrupt	political	elite	that	had	grown	
disenchanted	with	Rousseff’s	leadership.	Facing	off	against	this	narrative,	an	inverted	tale	was	also	
found:	PT	and	Rousseff	had	 installed	 themselves	 in	 the	center	of	power	 to	corrupt	 the	national	
legacy	that	is	Petrobras,	and	using	the	spoils	of	this	corruption	to	lure	Congressmen,	they	had	plans	
to	sustain	their	hegemonic	project	of	power	indefinitely.	The	impeachment	was	perfectly	legitimate,	
since	it	would	put	an	end	to	this	project,	even	if	it	required	the	signature	of	Cunha	(who	in	2016	was	
turning	into	a	pariah	in	public	discourse,	if	not	in	actual	back-stage	politics	of	the	Câmara).	I	return	
to	narrative	and	counternarrative	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	
	
In	news	 texts	of	2016,	portions	both	 large	and	 small	 of	 either	or	both	narratives	were	 recycled	
endlessly.	Characteristic	wordings	for	each	narrative	(such	as	golpe)	provided	short-hand	cues	on	
which	 frames	 could	 be	 constructed	 by	 journalists	 in	 order	 to	 interpret	 the	 commotion	 of	 the	
Congress;	 in	other	words,	the	narratives	were	central	organizing	 ideas,	and	an	unfolding	strip	of	
events	was	tied	together	by	these	narratives,	even	as	various	frames	about	political	conflict	and	
denunciations	of	corruption	were	also	used	in	parallel	in	particular	texts.	Such	frames	had	a	more	
limited	scope	that	focused	on	particular	happenings	and	speech	acts.	To	mention	a	few	examples	
of	some	of	the	frames	that	were	used,	newspapers	and	newscasts	foregrounded	aggression,	horse-
race	politics	(Cappella	and	Jamieson	1997),	and	backstage	deals,	but	the	textual	devices	of	these	
framings	hinged	upon	the	story	arcs	of	the	narratives	about	the	impeachment.	
	
The	limited	conceptual	reach	of	“a	frame”	-	its	lesser	organizing	affordances	-	is	but	one	problem	of	
applying	 a	 frame	 research	 design	 to	 extensive	 scandals	 such	 as	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 (and,	
admittedly,	 precisely	 what	makes	 frame	 analysis	 interesting	 for	 comparative	 research	 between	
political	 contexts,	 while	 narratives	 are	 more	 unwieldy).	 Another	 problem	 is	 the	 fact	 that	
conventional	framing	analysis	impedes	access	to	the	diachronic	level	of	analysis,	being	locked	up	in	
the	synchrony	of	“frame	A	versus	frame	B.”	To	analyze	evolving	scandals	over	time,	with	frames	that	
emerge,	merge,	or	supersede	earlier	ones,	 this	 research	design	 is	 then	 inadequate,	as	would	be	
more	 advanced	 models	 of	 competitive	 frames	 (Chong	 and	 Druckman	 2007).	 Even	 to	 find	 out	
whether	 or	 not	 frames	 engender	 changes	 in	 political	 beliefs	 or	 preferences	 would	 require	 the	
researcher	to	isolate	audiences	from	external	interventions,	but	such	an	artificial	sequestering	of	
the	audience	 (Sniderman	and	Theriault	2004)	 is	hardly	 feasible.	 It	would	have	been	hopeless	 to	
assess	 the	 actual	 effect	 of	 specific	 frames	 concerning	 Brazilian	 politics	 in	 this	 period,	 since	 the	
scandals	were	so	massively	visible	as	to	defy	the	“sequestering”	or	control-group	isolation	needed	
to	determine	effects.	“Ultimately,	in	the	case	of	the	Lava	Jato	probe	and	the	impeachment	process,	
it	is	highly	unlikely	that	any	one	journalistic	framing	would	produce	any	effect	at	all,	since	the	case	
is	so	central	to	the	contemporary	public	debate	of	Brazil,	and	audience	members	would	be	likely	to	
have	formed	opinions	before	encountering	specific	texts”	(Damgaard	2018a:120).		
	
Due	to	these	doubts	about	the	terminological	ambiguity	and	utility	of	framing	research	designs,	I	
think	it	is	necessary	that	research	into	news	coverage	of	corruption	scandals	takes	the	temporally	
and	casually	ordered	sequences	of	event	-	in	a	word,	the	emplotment	-	into	account.	As	is	apparent	
in	 the	above	examples,	 it	 is	an	 imminently	strategical	practice	 to	deploy	specific	narratives	 (and	
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frames	 organized	 by	 these	 narratives)	 in	 the	most	 prestigious	 news	media.	 It	 is	 a	 political	 and	
communicative	 practice	 that	 journalists	 partake	 in,	 knowingly,	 albeit	 presumably	with	 different	
goals	than	political	actors.	Whereas	the	point	of	narrating,	for	the	political	actor,	would	be	to	define	
agency	and	political	space	in	strategic	terms	to	his	or	her	cause,	the	journalist	will,	ideally,	faithfully	
represent	 the	 differing	 voices	 and	 different	 narratives	 juxtaposed	 to	 an	 objective	 recounting	 of	
recent	relevant	events.	Whether	the	journalistic	practice	can	ever	be	unbiased	is	another	discussion,	
and	whether	Brazilian	media	actors	in	fact	do	produce	“news”	with	this	“objective”	ideology	at	heart	
has	been	discussed	extensively	(Biroli	and	Miguel	2012,	Feres	Júnior	2016,	van	Dijk	2017).		
	
Even	though	frames	might	be	interesting,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	the	presence	of	narrative	macro-
structure	is	what	enables	certain	news	frames,	which	I	see	as	dependent	microstructures	that	can	
be	deployed	by	journalists	in	order	to	fit	together	events	and	different	textual	material.	Indeed,	one	
might	 suspect	 that	 frames	 may	 only	 be	 “selected”	 by	 news	 text	 producers	 if	 they	 fit	 within	
established	 narratives:	 For	 instance,	 Petrobras	 could	 never	 be	 represented	 as	 anything	 but	
“broken,”	because	that	would	not	fit	with	primary	definition	of	the	problem	(Hall	et	al.	1978:57-59),	
that	 is,	 the	established	 fact	of	 the	 corruption.	 In	 the	perspective	of	 thinkers	 such	as	Barthes	or	
MacIntyre,	in	which	narrative	affords	and	enables	cognitive	processes,	events	may	only	ever	be	truly	
apprehended	if	they	find	a	place	in	such	a	narrative.		
	
The	third	problem	I	will	discuss	is	the	problem	of	delimiting	frames	vis-à-vis	narratives,	exacerbated	
by	the	mired	conceptual	ground	between	them	and	the	fluffy	use	of	the	term	“narrative.”	In	CDA,	
the	idea	of	a	common-knowledge	“script”	used	by	news	producers	was	also	introduced,	constituting	
yet	 another	 concept	 adjacent	 to	 “frame.”	 While	 van	 Dijk	 (1988),	 as	 we	 saw,	 explicitly	 denies	
narratives	conceptual	space	in	news	texts	(locating	narratives	instead	in	the	minds	of	text	readers	
and	 producers),	 the	 concept	 of	 scripts	 still	 indicates	 the	 existence	 of	 textual	 cues	 that	 cohere	
because	they	refer	to	a	structure	outside	of	a	particular	text.	These	structures	can	in	some	cases	
also	be	thought	of	as	frames	(say,	when	the	script	of	elections	is	being	framed	as	contest	or	sports	
match).		
	
The	scripts,	if	I	read	van	Dijk	correctly,	are	of	a	generic	type	or	“standard	story	lines”	(Cappella	and	
Jamieson	 1997:46).	 Gamson	 and	 Modigliani’s	 accounts	 of	 strips	 of	 events	 seem	 to	 be	 located	
outside	of	specific	texts,	like	those	generic	scripts	and	like	several	related	concepts	not	discussed	
here,	such	as	public	narratives	(Green,	Strange,	and	Brock	2002)	and	story	lines	(Hajer	2005).	Unlike	
scripts,	 however,	 I	 assume	 that	 such	 narrative-based	 accounts	 of	 strips	 of	 events	 (Appadurai	
1996:35)	must	 logically	have	definite,	non-generic	content,	and	have	identifiable	story	elements.	
Why?	Because	such	accounts	or	the	various	types	of	“organizing	ideas”	precisely	pick	out	and	pull	
together	 events,	 rather	 than	 generically	 calling	up	 themes.	A	border-line	 case	 is	 the	 concept	of	
master	 narratives,	 which	 to	 some	 scholars	 are	 of	 the	 generic	 type,	 but	 to	 others	 seem	 more	
culturally	bound	and	historically	defined	(Jameson	1981,	Lyotard	1984).	Various	narratives	could	
certainly	be	of	the	same	generic	plot	type	(a	quest,	a	contest,	and	so	forth,	i.e.	Dayan	and	Katz	1992).	
Generic	invocation	of	themes	would	fall	under	the	category	of	an	order	of	discourse,	while	to	my	
mind	 intertextuality	 implies	 the	specific	case	of	dialogical	 reference	between	particular	 (textual)	
events,	rather	than	the	recycling	of	words	and	metaphors	in	broader	terms.	
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Concepts	of	scripts,	frames,	and	narratives	may	furthermore	reside	in	metaphorical	“containers”	
(Lakoff	2002).	 In	 sum,	 the	 theoretical	 indeterminacy	and	complexities	of	distinguishing	between	
script,	frame,	narrative,	metaphor,	public	narratives	or	even	discourse	strands	(Link	and	Link-Heer	
1990,	Jäger	2001)	are	staggering.	They	are	all	analytical	concepts	corresponding,	to	various	degrees,	
to	empirical	discursive	phenomena,	and	one	could	be	tempted	to	put	much	the	same	content	into	
each	formula.	For	example,	a	news	report	on	a	tough	court	sentence	might	invoke	
	
• A	disciplinary	discourse	(Fairclough	1995:96)	
• A	frame	that	makes	discipline	salient	as	value	and	model	for	judging	action		
• A	strict-father	metaphor	(Lakoff	2002:65,	390)	
• A	transgression-and-just-punishment	narrative	
• A	“trial	in	court”	or	a	“justice	fulfilled”	script	
	
These	 examples	 overlap	 each	other	 to	 different	 degrees	 and	 in	 different	 dimensions:	 Some	are	
located	mentally,	some	textually;	the	elaboration	varies;	and	some	concepts	could	be	nested	within	
(several)	 others.	 For	 example,	 a	 (textual)	 frame	might	 cue	 a	 (cognitive)	 narrative	 (Cappella	 and	
Jamieson	1997:77).	
		
I	have	here	argued	briefly	that	the	frames	found	in	the	empirical	material	presented	later	in	this	
thesis	are	nested	within	narratives,	and	that	frame	analysis	for	scandals	is	generally	of	little	use	if	
only	considering	framings	of	guilt	and	responsibility.	The	bottom	line	of	all	this,	however,	is	not	to	
say	that	frame	analysis	is	not	worth	pursuing	in	general,	but	rather	that	it	is	worthwhile	to	elucidate	
why	some	researchers	seem	to	reach	an	upper	limit	of	the	concept,	a	boundary	zone	that	shades	
into	narrative	territory.		
	
	
1.4	State	of	the	art	in	scandal	studies		
Researchers	 of	 scandals,	 like	 other	 media	 scholars,	 have	 also	 remarked	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	
narrative,	 but	 like	 studies	 of	 media	 in	 general,	 scandal	 research	 has	 gained	 little	 ground	 in	
understanding	why	exactly	narrativity	is	important,	and	either	ignored	narrative	analysis	or	created	
customized	frameworks	that	explain	the	event	structures	of	scandals	outside	of	news	(which	may	
still	be	reflected	in	coverage,	of	course).		
	
I	will	briefly	summarize	some	of	the	seminal	studies	that	are	ultimately	unsatisfactory	as	models	for	
approaching	narratives	emerging	in	news	during	corruption	scandals.	Some	of	these	studies	work	
in	a	no-man’s	land	between	political	science,	history,	and	media	studies,	without	a	methodological	
basis	in	news	analysis,	and	it	therefore	sometimes	appear,	despite	disclaimers	to	the	contrary,	as	if	
scandals	are	a	social	phenomenon	distinct	from	news.		
	
Lull	and	Hinerman	could	not	“overstate	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	 ‘story’	when	analyzing	
scandals”	 (1997:13).	 Their	 typology	 of	 scandals,	 however,	 only	 differentiates	 different	 casts	 of	
characters,	and	they	present	diachronic	criteria	for	defining	“the	status	of	these	stories	as	scandals”	
(ibid.:11),	but	ignore	the	synchronic	development	of	such	stories.	In	the	same	edited	volume,	Bird	
and	Thompson	pick	up	the	narrative	strand	(and	I	shall	return	to	Bird’s	arguments	in	the	following	
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chapter).	 Thompson’s	 arguments	were	 developed	 further	 a	 few	 years	 later	 in	 his	 book	Political	
Scandal,	which	contains	the	following	acute	observation:	
	
…	one	key	feature	of	mediated	scandals	is	that	they	are	essentially	open-ended…	if	one	is	situated	in	the	midst	
of	a	mediated	scandal	and	watching	(or	participating	in)	its	development	in	real	time,	it	is	extremely	difficult	
to	predict	how	it	will	unfold…	mediated	scandals	are	of	interest	to	readers	and	viewers	[because],	for	those	
who	are	witnessing	the	unfolding	events	as	they	occur,	the	eventual	outcome	is	intrinsically	unclear.	Hence	
they	fuel	speculation	and,	like	a	good	novel,	they	constantly	test	the	capacity	of	readers	and	viewers	to	assess	
the	veracity	of	the	protagonists,	to	figure	out	the	and	to	predict	its	resolution.	(Thompson	2000:73)			
	
This	quote	suggests	that	Thompson	is	keenly	aware	of	the	unfolding,	enthralling	and	almost	literary	
quality	 of	 mediated	 scandals.	 He	 constructs	 a	 basic	 as	 well	 as	 a	 more	 elaborate	model	 of	 the	
scandal’s	unfolding	events	(2000:24-5),	a	model	which	was	also	partly	present	in	his	contribution	to	
Lull	and	Hinerman’s	volume	(1997:39).	Thompson	specifically	sees	scandal	as	“a	kind	of	narrative	
with	multiple	 plots	 and	 subplots”	 (2000:25),	 but	 he	 then	 ends	 up	developing	 a	 social	 theory	 of	
scandal	based	on	the	theory	of	Bourdieu	(ibid.:245).	In	this	concluding	part,	scandal	(in	the	political	
field)	is	seen	as	a	negotiation	of	symbolic	capital	and	reputation,	and	Thompson	connects	this	to	
trust	in	political	leader	figures.	Perhaps	because	of	the	profound	complexity	of	the	unfolding	itself,	
or	because	of	his	huge	 range	of	historical	examples,	 Thompson	avoids	 connecting	 the	model	of	
scandal	phases	to	the	theory	of	political	impact.	Other	recent	examples	of	researchers	working	with	
the	trajectory	or	“career”	of	scandals	include	Tiffen	(2002),	Adut	(2008)	and	Breit	(2011:99f),	mostly	
as	descriptive	categories	characterizing	shifts	in	the	content	and	tone	of	media	coverage.		
	
The	connection	between	scandal	events	and	outcome	could	perhaps	be	explained	more	satisfyingly	
through	comparative	studies.	Hypothetically,	such	comparisons	could	shed	 light	on	the	different	
trajectories	of	media	“plots	and	subplots”	and	their	contribution	to	the	thrust	of	events.	This	line	of	
thinking	 is	 central	 to	 Pujas’	 research	 design	 (2002),	 to	 Canel	 and	 Sanders	 (2006),	 and	 to	 the	
contributions	 in	 the	 volume	 edited	 by	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 (2012).	 Canel	 and	 Sanders	 made	 an	
inventory	 of	 framing	 devices	 across	 Spanish	 and	 British	 scandals,	 but	 failed	 to	 connect	 this	 to	
outcomes	 (2006:154-68).	 Pujas	 highlighted	 the	 factors	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 the	 journalistic	
profession	that	had	an	impact	on	the	trajectory	of	two	similar	scandals	in	France	and	Spain,	while	
several	 of	 the	 Scandinavian	 political	 scandals	 compared	 by	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 explored	 how	
variables	of	gender	and	political	career	length	influenced	the	outcome.	Allern	and	Pollack	expands	
Thompson’s	framework	and,	like	him,	acknowledge	the	narrative	and	dramatic	aspects	of	scandals	
(2012:17-9),	 but	 in	 their	 conclusion	 to	 seven	hypotheses	 about	 scandals	 emphasize	 intra-media	
agenda-setting	 and	 framings	 of	 personal	 wrong-doing	 as	 the	 significant	 parameters	 of	 scandal	
coverage	(ibid.:181-8).	
	
A	 literature	 review	 of	 Brazilian	 scandal	 research	 (Silva	 2013:164)	 showed	 that	 Brazilian	 authors	
frequently	base	their	work	on	Thompson	(e.g.	Chaia	2015,	Feres	Júnior	and	Sassara	2016,	Miguel	
and	Coutinho	2007).	Other	Brazilian	researchers	study	scandals	and	public	opinion	in	an	aggregate	
sociological	manner	 (Baptista	2017,	Meneguello	2011),	or,	 like	Guazina,	Prior	and	Araújo	 (2017)	
state	that	they	work	with	framing	analysis,	but	end	up	discussing	narrative	structures	and	plots.	
Prior	(2015)	bases	his	characterization	of	scandals	in	news	on	Motta	(2013),	but	Motta,	surprisingly,	
tries	to	salvage	narrative	from	the	concept	of	macro-proposition	found	in	van	Dijk	(1988),	thus	going	
against	the	explicit	grain	of	van	Dijk’s	argument.		
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Although	 they	make	 no	 connection	 to	 narration	 there,	 Lull	 and	 Hinerman’s	 criteria	 of	 scandals	
resemble	phases	of	a	scandal	(1997:11-13),	while	Tiffen	(2002)	explicitly	presents	stages	of	scandals,	
like	Thompson	(2000:24).	If	stages	are	important,	it	is	somewhat	surprising	that	typologies	such	as	
these	never	consider	stages	or	phases	as	epiphenomena	of	media	coverage	or	as	rules	for	slicing	up	
material	for	a	narrative	analysis,	despite	the	postulated	critical	importance	of	the	concept	of	story	
(e.g.	 Lull	 and	 Hinerman	 1997:13).	 When	 historical	 and	 sociological	 analyses	 thus	 remain	
unconnected	 to	 emplotment,	 it	 becomes	 difficult	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 media’s	 representations	
(whether	narrative	or	not)	are	even	important	to	the	outcome.	I	would	argue	that	scandals	should	
not	be	seen	as	fundamentally	different	from	other	news,	nor	do	they	require	special	typologies.	
What	is	needed,	however,	is	to	take	the	narrative	injunction	seriously,	and	furthermore	to	explicitly	
establish	links	to	the	methods	found	in	media	studies	and	literary	studies.		
	
Another	trait	of	this	type	of	news,	often	alluded	to	in	the	above	studies,	is	the	newsworthiness	of	
scandals.	Because	scandals	are	essentially	reports	on	alleged	transgressions	of	the	ideal	frontstage	
role	 (Goffman	 1956)	 of	 public	 office-holders,	 scandals	 embody	 just	 about	 every	 news	 value:	
relevance,	 drama,	 scandal,	 negativity,	 conflict,	 human	 interest,	 proximity,	 and	 suspense.	 These	
newsworthiness	criteria	(originally	discussed	in	Galtung	and	Ruge	1965,	see	also	Bell	1991:155-160)	
are	 loosely	and	heuristically	applied	principles	for	 justifying	what	material	could	be	 included	and	
what	should	be	excluded,	and	on	what	grounds,	with	the	express	intent	of	capturing	large	shares	of	
the	audience	population	of	a	given	region.	Thus,	in	principle,	news	about	niche	segments	of	society	
would	only	be	selected	for	prime-time	or	mainstream	news	if	the	journalist	is	able	to	connect	the	
news	to	something	within	the	cultural	horizon	of	a	wider	audience,	unfamiliar	with	that	segment,	
and	thereby	make	it	relatable	(or,	in	other	words,	“tellable”	and	intelligible).	News	media,	in	this	
way,	are	supposedly	extremely	influential	in	defining	what	is	hegemonic	and	what	is	divergent,	who	
belongs	to	subgroups	or	majorities,	and	so	on	(Fowler	1991:54,	Fairclough	1995:125).	Thus,	if	some	
event	or	individual	manages	to	make	the	prime-time	news,	it	can	be	inferred	normatively	by	the	
audience	that	this	event	or	person	is	very	important	and	that	the	audience	should	pay	attention.	
Corruption	scandals	in	the	media	perform	this	double	trick	by	going	into	“alarm	mode”	(Boydstun	
2013)	and	moving	the	spotlight	(and	thus	preliminarily	allocating	blame).	Even	more	importantly,	
when	reporting	“that	a	politician	has	been	charged	with	corruption,	 it	suggests,	sotto	voce,	 that	
corruption	is	bad	and	that	politicians	should	be	honest”	(Gans	1980:40).	Such	moral	considerations	
are	normally	assumed	to	hold	for	all	of	society,	and	the	assumptions	are	not	only	implicit	or	sotto	
voce,	but	may	also	be	articulated	and	cast	in	narrative	forms	in	commentary,	to	which	I	now	turn.	
	
	
1.5	Plot	and	Prediction	in	Political	Commentary	and	Punditry	
While	I	intend	to	apply	a	model	of	news	that	takes	into	consideration	narrative	emplotment	to	a	
specific	 set	 of	 scandals,	 such	 a	model	 of	 news	 could	 generate	 insights	 into	 an	 adjacent	 area	 of	
research	that	also	has	a	blind	spot	for	narratives.	Political	experts	are	important	“talking	heads”	on	
TV,	and	yet,	 in	Lunt	and	Livingstone’s	seminal	work	Talk	on	TV,	 the	authors	only	consider	story-
telling	as	the	layman’s	discourse,	disdained	or	rarely	used	by	experts	that	prefer	other	rhetorical	
strategies	(Lunt	and	Livingstone	2002:139).	Working	with	talk	show	material,	Lunt	and	Livingstone’s	
study	should	not	be	generalized,	but	 their	view	 is	perhaps	a	 symptom	of	 this	blind	spot:	Expert	
knowledge	is	not	supposed	to	be	imparted	through	narratives.	It	is	striking	that	the	rise	of	the	so-
called	political	pundits	has	been	discussed	from	various	angles,	but	rarely	is	it	discussed	how	pundits	
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actually	produce	and	narrate	their	interpretations	of	the	political	field.	The	function,	use	and	scope	
of	pundits	is	increasing	across	the	globe	according	to	this	literature,	and	in	some	countries	(such	as	
Portugal	 and	 the	 US),	 pundits	 even	 shift	 careers	 to	 become	 central	 political	 actors.	 The	 most	
frequently	researched	questions	relating	to	pundits	have	to	do	with	their	ascension	in	the	media	
hierarchy,	 their	 authoritative	 status	 and	 privileged	 access	 to	 the	 production	 of	 interpretations	
(Allern	2010,	Altermann	1999,	Bengtsson	2015,	Bro	2016,	Hopmann	and	Strömbäck	2010,	McNair	
1999,	Neveu	2002,	Nimmo	and	Combs	1992).	According	to	a	recent	typology	of	research	on	pundits,		
	
descriptive,	textual	research	is	essential	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	phenomenon.	Currently,	we	have	
little	knowledge,	and	our	 intuitions	about	 the	genre	need	 to	be	qualified	 […]	 there	 is	 to	my	knowledge	no	
research	taking	a	textual,	evaluative	approach	to	political	commentary	(Bengtsson	2015:12)	
	
Thus,	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 find	 research	 that	 explores	how,	why,	 and	 in	which	ways	 commentary	 is	
distinct	 from	 regular	 reporting,	 even	 though	 commentary	 deals	 in	 fact-centered	 news	 (but	 see	
Letukas	2014,	especially	ch.	6).	To	answer	such	questions	and	 the	previous	question	concerning	
attribution	 of	 meaning,	 we	 need	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 extant	 literature	 on	 political	 pundits	 and	
commentators,	as	well	as	the	literature	discussed	in	the	previous	sections.		
	
To	 take	 one	 example,	 in	 the	 quote	 of	 Thompson	 (the	 section	 above),	 speculation	 was	 purely	
supposed	to	be	found	at	the	level	of	the	audience.	Nimmo	and	Combs,	to	take	one	example	from	
the	pundit	literature,	initially	argue	that	pundits	connect	events	in	their	interpretations,	but	they	
never	return	to	this	initial	observation:		
	
For	major	events,	the	anchor	turns	to	someone	who	gives	a	brief	interpretation:	This	is	happening	because	of	
X,	Y,	and	Z	but	not	A,	B,	and	C;	it	is	happening	now	because	of	D,	E,	and	F	preceded	it;	we	can	expect	H,	G,	and	
I	to	come	from	what	is	happening	but	not	J,	K,	and	L.	[…]	Journalists	not	only	reported	the	event,	they	often	
interpreted	it.	(Nimmo	and	Combs	1992:2,	12)	
		
While	 not	 delving	 further	 into	 the	 emplotment	 of	 events	 presented	 by	 such	 interpreting	
newsworkers	and	pundits,	it	seems	clear	that	Nimmo	and	Combs	see	interpretation	as	a	plot-centric	
practice.	The	meaning	of	events	depends	on	other	events	 in	the	past	and	expectations	of	future	
events.	 Likewise,	 Nord,	 Enli,	 and	 Stúr	 (2012:91)	 describe	 pundits	 commenting	 on	 scandals	 as	
“professional	storytellers.”	Perhaps	 it	 is	a	general	condition	that	thinking	about	political	action	–	
such	as	the	cognitive	processes	of	audiences,	journalists,	pundits	and	professional	politicians	–	is	
always-already	 cast	 in	 a	 narrative	 form	 (echoing	MacIntyre’s	 idea	 that	 narrative	 permeates	 all	
human	meaning-work,	1984:212).	In	this	view,	interpretations	of	political	actions	can	perhaps	be	
expressed	but	barely	be	thought	without	an	emplotment	of	events.	Even	if	the	reader	(perhaps	of	
a	transcendental	Kantian	bend)	is	not	convinced	to	take	the	narrative-epistemological	stance	with	
me	in	believing	that	humans	experience	the	world	through	narratives,	it	is	still	possible,	I	think,	to	
accept	the	fact	that	newsworkers,	whether	pundits,	editors,	or	journalists,	have	stories	at	heart.		
	
I	 would	 argue	 that	 apart	 from	 inside	 knowledge	 of	 political	 structures,	 the	 culturally	 specific	
availability	of	narratives	is	precisely	what	allows	commentators,	pundits,	and	other	newsworkers	to	
infer	and	ascribe	meaning	to	events.	Tuchman	observed	that	“reporters	work	to	apprehend	and	
attribute	meaning	when	they	identify	some	items,	but	not	others,	as	news”	(Tuchman	1978:188).	It	
is	necessary	to	unpack	the	exact	way	that	this	attribution	of	meaning	works,	and	the	texts	made	by	
pundits	arguably	provide	a	prime	site	for	finding	material	in	which	attribution	of	meaning	occurs.	
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Preliminarily,	I	will	point	to	two	themes	that	appear	scattered	across	the	literature	on	pundits,	both	
of	which	have	to	do	with	sense-making	and	attribution	of	meaning.	Because	of	the	dearth	of	thick	
description-style	analysis	of	pundit	texts	and	discussions	(Bengtsson	2015),	these	themes	are	still	
incipient.	In	the	literature,	the	major	difference	between	news	reporting	and	commentary	appears	
to	be	that	pundits	and	commentators	are	allowed	to	go	beyond	the	“objective,”	purely	“fact-based”	
reporting	 of	 other	 newsworkers	when	 engaging	 in	 a)	 prediction	 and	 b)	 ascription	 (all	 the	while	
acknowledging	that	ascription	and	prediction	sometimes	enter	“fact-based”	reporting,	hence	the	
quotation	marks).	In	doing	so,	pundits	may	present	more	or	less	coherent	narratives,	although	this	
is	certainly	not	the	only	thing	that	characterize	this	caste	of	newsworkers.	
	
Punditry	 frequently	 involves	 prediction,	 and	 this	 was	 first	 pointed	 out	 by	 Alterman	 (1992)	 and	
Sigelman,	Manheim	and	Pierce	(1996).	Forecasts	of	political	events	“feed	the	insatiable	appetite	of	
[political	 elites	 and	 political	 elite	 media]	 for	 fresh	 political	 information”	 (ibid.:33-34).	 Tea-leaf	
reading	and	fortune-telling	might	be	scorned	by	political	scientists,	but	in	the	business	of	filling	out	
dead	air	when	information	flows	are	momentarily	clogged,	the	pundit	has	full	license	to	interpret	
not	only	past	events,	but	also	future	ramifications	through	conjecture	(Montgomery	2007:120-5).	
		
Another	mode	of	punditry	 is	 the	guessing	game	of	deducing	 intentions,	which	 I	 term	ascription.	
Historians	like	White	and	Mink	worked	on	the	problem	of	narrativizing	representations	of	reality	
(White	1973,	1981,	Mink	1965,	1981).	Indirectly,	Mink	stumbled	upon	one	problem	that	also	may	
arise	in	striving	for	coherency	in	news:	ascriptions.	“Intentions	and	states	of	mind	are	not	events,	
but	their	ascription	may	be	a	necessary	part	of	any	narration	of	these	events”	(Mink	1981:236).	In	
order	 to	present	political	 action	meaningfully,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 infer	 intentionality	 and	 state	of	
minds	on	the	part	of	political	actors.	Pundits	do	so	frequently	and	with	such	an	air	of	facticity	that	
readers	and	viewers	may	well	forget	that	they	never	have	direct	access,	but	must	infer,	guess	or	
even	invent.	Audiences	are	never	privy	to	the	exact	mechanic	by	which	newsworkers	select	among	
possible	ascriptions,	and	are	rarely	provided	with	several	possibilities,	because	this	would	expose	
the	fragile	claim	to	representing	reality.	Newsworkers,	commentators	in	particular,	simply	ascribe	
intentions	to	actors,	and	are	never	called	out	to	account	for	this	practice,	even	if	the	commentators’	
ascriptions	attain	substantial	agenda-setting	and	framing	power	(Nord,	Enli,	and	Stúr	2012:101).		
	
Neither	prediction	nor	ascription	are	purely	fictitious,	but	parts	of	a	reflexive	practice	that	(again)	
builds	on	the	established	web	of	facticity	provided	by	the	media	and	institutionalized	by	the	inter-
media	consensus	of	newsworthiness	principles	and	hegemonic	traditions	of	political	reporting.	In	
the	 production	 of	 journalistic	 material	 distributed	 on	 many	 authors	 and	 editors	 in	 news	
organizations,	 the	 news	 values	 and	 interpretation	 practices	 work	 in	 tandem	 to	 construct	 and	
legitimize	 certain	 points	 of	 view	 and	 truth	 regimes	 (Foucault	 1980).	 The	 evaluation	 of	
newsworthiness	is	always	already	an	interpretation	performed,	say,	with	an	eye	to	future	political	
developments	in	the	existing	institutional	order	(Tuchman	1978:190,	Hall	et	al.	1978:58-60).	Fowler	
observed	that	journalists	take	into	account	and	continuously	re-evaluate	newsworthiness	(or,	as	he	
terms	 it,	 news	 values),	 based	on	 their	 reflexive	 interpretation	of	 the	 landscape	of	media.	 Thus,	
newsworthiness	of	events	cannot	be	judged	on	the	basis	of	a	static	check-list	of	news	values:	
	
News	values	are	rather	to	be	seen	as	qualities	of	(potential)	reports	[,]	not	simply	features	of	selection,	but,	
more	importantly,	features	of	representation;	and	so	the	distinction	between	‘selection’	and	‘transformation’	
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ceases	to	be	absolute:	an	item	can	only	be	selected	if	it	can	be	seen	in	a	certain	light	of	representation,	and	so	
selection	involves	an	ideological	act	of	interpretation.	(Fowler	1991:19)	
	
Thus,	selection	of	stories	depends	not	as	much	on	the	actual	event	at	hand	as	the	potential	selected	
features	 and	 news	 values	 that	 could	 propel	 the	 reporting	 of	 the	 event	 over	 the	 threshold	 of	
attention	(the	editor’s	attention	 if	not	the	audience’s).	This	means	that	pundits,	 like	editors	and	
journalists	 in	general,	take	into	account	the	information	at	disposal,	their	own	perception	of	the	
situation,	and	what	they	hear	through	the	grapevine,	and	integrate	all	of	this	it	with	a	view	to	the	
implicit	reader	of	the	newspaper.	In	doing	so,	they	account	for	events	and	shape	their	comments	
on	these	events	so	as	to	fit	(or	perhaps	criticize)	the	editorial	line	and	the	implicit	public	idiom	(Hall	
et	 al.	 1978:61),	 other	 public	 interpretations	 current	 en	 vogue,	 and	 the	 interpretations	 and	
justifications	given	by	the	implicated	political	actors.	This	means	that	pundits	partake	in	the	general	
economy	of	telling	stories,	but	with	a	distinct	license	to	connect	or,	rather,	emplot	events,	through	
the	 modes	 of	 ascription	 and	 prediction.	 Finally,	 pundits	 may	 also	 introduce	 entirely	 new	
perspectives	once	in	a	blue	moon,	or	revive	historical	events	in	a	comparative	manner.	In	the	next	
chapter,	I	discuss	how	prediction	works	upon	and	within	narrative	structures.	
	
	
1.6	State	of	the	Art	and	Nomenclature	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	have	 identified	several	 theoretical	 lacunas	and	a	 range	of	problems	 relating	 to	
nomenclature.	 Although	 the	 concept	 of	 narrative	 has	 cropped	 up	 repeatedly	 in	 seminal	media	
studies,	somehow	it	has	done	so	without	a	common	methodology	coalescing	that	might	address	
how	 news	 narratives	 are	 different	 from	 literary	 narratives	 (Pietilä	 1992:61).	 Thus,	 we	 are	 left	
without	the	desirable	analytical	precision	that	could	be	attained	after	the	narrative	turn	and	the	
complex	vocabulary	developed	in	the	wake	of	French	structuralism.	Worse	still,	research	has	lost	
sight	 of	 the	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 overlaps,	 and	might	 be	 fooled	 into	 believing	 in	 a	 “simple	
distinction	between	narratives	about	the	real	and	the	narratives	of	fiction”	(Hall	1984:5-6).	
	
For	 reasons	 that	 have	 to	 do	 with	 diverging	 theoretical	 approaches	 and	 disciplinary	 scopes,	
nomenclature	 problems	 have	 emerged	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 definitions	 of	 narrative	 (whether	
“narrative”	 refers	 to	 a	 full-bodied	 plot	with	 a	moral	 subject	 or	merely	 to	 a	 chain	 of	 events),	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 exact	 relationship	 between	 news	 production	 and	 narration,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
narrative	 properties	 of	 scripts	 in	 either	 the	 sense	 of	 grand	 moral	 tales	 or	 mental	 common-
knowledge	schematas,	and	in	the	overlapping	empirical	extension	of	the	concepts	“script,”	“frame,”	
and	“narrative.”		
	
Apart	from	the	divergent	uses	of	terms	and	concepts,	this	chapter	has	also	identified	some	crucial	
theoretical	and	ensuing	methodological	gaps	in	existing	approaches	to	news,	and	in	particular	to	
media	scandals.	I	will	briefly	recap	them	here	in	order	to	motivate	the	development	of	a	theoretical	
model	in	the	next	chapter.	
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• Though	some	scholars	think	that	news	tell	stories,	it	has	been	argued	that	it	is	not	always	
feasible	to	press	specific	news	texts	into	the	template	of	narrative	analysis.	In	this	view,	news	
in	print	media	do	not	create	suspense	or	narrative	closure,	and	news	reports	on	television	
rely	on	images	and	deixis	rather	than	emplotment.		
• Some	scholars	assume	that	narrative	governs	the	reception-level	activity,	so	that	narrative	
can	be	explored	only	in	experimental	or	anthropological	studies	of	audiences.		
• While	it	is	plausible	that	common	knowledge	of	recurring	scripted	public	events	is	used	by	
newsworkers	in	order	to	compress	or	elide	background	explanation	in	news	texts	(e.g.	van	
Dijk	1988),	and	broadcasts	utilize	“grand	script”	(such	as	Coronations,	Conquests,	Contests	
and	Disasters,	see	Dayan	and	Katz	1992,	Katz	and	Liebes	2007),	this	has	not	led	to	the	use	of	
narrative	analysis	to	dissect	such	scripts;	indeed	Thompson	mentioned	that	the	framework	
of	Dayan	and	Katz	 is	not	applicable	to	scandals	(2000:76,	note	5),	and	Silverstone	argued	
that	television	news	“masks	its	[narrative]	forms”	(1981:83).	
• Even	theories	of	media	scandals	that	do	emphasize	the	importance	of	narrativity	shy	away	
from	the	next	logical	step:	analyzing	texts	within	a	narrative	framework.	
• Analyses	of	political	commentary	partially	suffer	from	the	same	“narrative	blind	spot.”		
	
Thus,	either	by	overlooking	or	denying	the	relevance	of	narratives,	or	else	by	locating	narratives	in	
the	human	cognition,	at	the	level	of	reception,	or	beyond	the	purview	of	the	textual	frames,	media	
studies	have	not	assembled	a	coherent	 set	of	 tools	 to	grasp	 the	way	 that	distributed	narratives	
emerge	at	 the	aggregate	and	 intertextual	 level	 through	a	 recurrent	 textual	 system	governed	by	
narrative	structures.	All	the	tools	are	there,	but	because	of	these	lacunas,	it	has	been	impossible	to	
cross-fertilize	media	studies	and	scandal	studies	with	the	insights	gained	from	narrative	analysis.		
	
The	most	important	problems	of	the	above,	I	think,	are	the	bounded	view	of	narrative	and	author,	
and	the	influence	of	discourse	theory.	First,	it	is	generally	overlooked	that	narratives	may	not	reside	
in	a	single,	bounded	“container,”	say,	within	the	pages	of	a	magazine	or	the	frame	of	a	newspaper	
article.	 This	 relates	 to	 the	 second	 theoretical	 limit:	 the	 bounded	 view	 of	 narrative	 authorship,	
attributing	 texts	 to	 identifiable	authors.	 This	 is	 an	unacknowledged	positivist	 (or	 at	 least	 a	 text-
centered)	stance	that	may	have	blinded	media	research	to	the	aggregate	aspect	of	news	and	its	
reliance	on	collective,	non-authored	narratives.	News	organizations	 churn	out	 texts	by	 recycling	
texts	spewing	forth	from	numerous	national	and	 international	news	agencies	(Aguiar	2014),	and	
news	media	outlets	are	comprised	of	layers	of	editors	cutting	and	trimming	sentences	to	produce	
texts	 that,	ultimately,	can	hardly	be	attributed	 to	single	authors	 (Bell	1991).	 In	 this	aspect	news	
stories	 appear	 like	 the	 camp-fire	 story,	 like	myth	and	 folklore:	 shared,	 evolving,	 and	 laden	with	
cultural	significance.	I	would	argue	that	the	story	ambience	of	earlier	epochs,	when	communities	
recycled	 and	 imperceptibly	 developed	 their	myths	 and	 legends	 through	 essentially	 un-authored	
story-telling,	 is	not	so	different	from	modern	mediascapes	where	news	organizations	 incessantly	
spin	news	stories	out	of	public	events.	Precisely	because	narrative	structures	emerge	“between”	
texts,	 I	 will	 dismiss	 the	 critique	 fielded	 by	Matheson:	 while	 the	 news	 genre	 in	 each	 particular	
instance	of	text	may	not	be	determined	or	structured	by	narrative	logic,	a	group	of	news	texts	may	
cohere	and	be	understood	to	audiences	and	researchers	exactly	because	they	share	a	narrative	logic	
and	structure.	
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That	cultures	and	cultural	 identity	 is	defined	by	 the	stories	 told	was	an	 inaugural	 insight	 for	 the	
modern	 humanities:	 In	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 scientists	 from	 several	 emerging	 branches	 in	 the	
humanities	(folklorists	and	historians	of	religion)	established	comparative	readings	of	myths	in	and	
across	cultures,	and	theorized	the	existence	of	cultural	repertoires	or	inventories	of	quasi-mythical	
narrative.	Similar	insights	have	cropped	up	in	various	media	studies	(Alexander	and	Jacobs	1998,	
Cottle	2006,	Hall	1984,	Carey	1988,	Silverstone	1988),	but	has	not	been	methodically	developed.		
	
The	reason	that	news	stories	are	rarely	seen	as	stories	in	the	aggregate	could	be	due	to	the	influence	
of	the	Foucauldian	concept	of	discourse	that	attracted	much	disciplinary	interest.	Discourse	theory	
is	often	more	attuned	to	the	synchronic	rather	than	diachronic	features	of	speech	acts,	however.	I	
return	 to	 discourse	 theory	 below.	 For	 now,	 I	 will	 emphasize	 that	 several	 interesting	 research	
questions	crop	up	if	news	is	seen	as	drawing	upon	not	just	various	strands	and	orders	of	discourse	
(e.g.	Fairclough	1995,	Jäger	2001),	but	upon	culturally	shared	narratives,	in	a	way	that	is	similar	to	
how	pre-modern	societies	reproduced	myth	and	lore.	What	are	the	narrative	patterns	available	to	
modern-day	 journalism	 in	 different	media	 systems?	 Do	 such	 patterns	 align	 or	 create	 space	 for	
contestation?	Which	production	processes	of	contemporary	media	are	influenced	by	an	explicit	or	
tacit	 inclination	 towards	pre-existing	narrative	patterns?	What	does	 the	degree	of	 alignment	or	
contestation	 between	 actual	 events	 and	narrative	 patterns	mean	 to	 selection	 and	 gate-keeping	
processes	in	media?	These	are	four	initial	questions	that	cannot	be	answered	by	a	view	of	narrative	
bound	up	on	particular,	closed-off	texts	with	identifiable	authorial	voices.		
	
To	answer	such	questions,	narratives	must	instead	be	approached	as	constructs	located	outside	of	
actual	texts	(verbal	or	written),	in	an	intertextual	space.	To	several	scholars	interested	in	scandals	
(Bird	and	Dardenne	1988,	Bird	1997,	Tiffen	2002,	Thompson	2000)	this	was,	in	a	way,	the	stated	
research	object	–	the	trajectory	of	a	developing	corpus	of	news	texts	dealing	with	a	transgression	
of	public	or	political	morality.	However,	scandal	studies	such	as	the	ones	mentioned	above	claim	
coherence	in	the	composite	corpus	of	texts	that	relate	to	the	scandal,	but	such	coherence	is	in	fact	
a	problematic	 assumption:	 Texts	may	be	heterogeneous	and	 try	out	 various	narratives	 to	make	
sense	of	events	and	to	articulate	multiple	visions	of	society,	and	so	coherence	cannot	be	assumed.	
Rather,	it	is	the	contestation	of	social	boundaries	and	the	posed	solutions	to	societal	tensions	and	
conflicts	 that	need	 to	be	analyzed	 (Damgaard	2015b),	 and	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 I	 develop	a	
model	for	doing	so.	
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Chapter	2	
A	Theoretical	Model	for	Narrative	Analysis	of	News	on	Scandals	
	
Media	 scholars	may	 see	narratives	 in	 news,	 but	 rarely	 stop	 to	describe	 the	way	 that	 narratives	
emerge	in	news,	or	declare	their	procedure	or	theoretical	grounds	for	detecting	such	narratives.	
This	leaves	fundamental	questions	of	how	news	texts	could	be	analyzed	as	narratives	given	their	
non-fictional	 material,	 and	 how	 the	 narratives	 emerging	 in	 news	 intersect	 with	 other	 kinds	 of	
narrative	production	in	culture.	These	are	the	main	issues	to	be	addressed	in	this	chapter,	as	I	seek	
to	 establish	 the	methodological	 ground	 for	 the	 later	 analysis	 of	 news,	 and	 thereby	 remedy	 the	
lacunas	pointed	out	in	the	previous	chapter.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	develop	a	model	to	address	the	
way	that	news	on	scandals	articulate	narrative	structures	drawn	from	a	cultural	stock	or	repertoire,	
and	 argue	 that	 this	 can	 generate	 insights	 into	 the	 political	 unconscious	 (Jameson	 1981)	 of	 the	
mediascape.	Moreover,	 I	 will	 link	 the	 cultural	 repertoire	 of	 narratives	 to	 the	wider	 sociological	
questions	of	cultural	production	and	the	circulation	of	textual	forms.	
	
	
2.1	Intertextuality	
At	 the	end	of	 the	previous	chapter,	 I	argued	that	news	must	be	understood	not	 just	as	singular	
instances	of	text,	but	as	units	partaking	in	and	expressing	shared	narrative	structures.	I	will	unfold	
this	view	here	as	a	first	step	of	the	theoretical	model	of	this	thesis,	arguing	that	intertextuality	could	
be	a	key	to	discovering	narratives	not	just	in,	but	across	texts	and	speech	events.		
	
The	 idea	of	 intertextuality	emerged	 in	parallel	with	French	structuralism,	and	was	articulated	by	
Julia	 Kristeva	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 earlier	 writings	 by	Mikhail	 Bakhtin.	 Bakhtin	 saw	 any	 discourse	 as	
dialogically	 oriented	 to	 other	 utterances,	 to	 “the	 already	 known”	 (Bakhtin	 1981:279).	 Narrative	
discourse	in	particular	has	the	common	property	of	orientation	to	conventions	outside	of	the	text,	
which	is	what	allows	us	to	understand	some	utterance	as	narrative,	and	usually	to	peg	it	down	as	
belonging	to	a	certain	genre.	Less	abstractly,	we	recognize,	for	instance,	crime	novels	and	detective	
shows	as	distinct	narrative	formats	(partly	due	to	the	media-technological	specifics)	but	situated	
within	a	common	genre	using	some	of	the	same	plot	elements;	even	more	elementary,	our	kids	are	
taught	in	schools	to	recognize	fairy	tales	by	conventional	utterances	such	as	“Once	upon	a	time...”	
and	“the	End.”	Such	cues	(or	similar	resources	in	other	cultures	that	pre-structure	the	reception	of	
narrative,	e.g.	Lyotard	1984:20)	are	available	to	language	users	across	many	genres,	and	this	allows	
for	mixing	of	discourse	types	and	the	embedding	of	narratives,	in	this	case	narration	or	insertion	of	
fairy	tale-styled	narratives.	Of	course,	language	users	are	not	limited	to	using	the	cues	that	introduce	
or	round	off	narratives,	nor	are	they	restricted	to	the	canonical	31	operations	found	in	fairy	tales	
(Propp	 1928).	 Rather,	 the	 dialogic	 aspects	 of	 text	 work	 in	 tension	 within	 or	 against	 narrative	
conventions	and	patterns,	and	language	users	may	refer	to	generic	or	particular	segments	and	slices	
of	a	wider	narrative	and	cultural	production.		
	
Kristeva	 subscribed	 to	 Bakhtin’s	 view	 of	 dialogically	 engaged	 textual	 analysis,	 and	 she	 even	
expanded	its	conceptual	extension.	To	Kristeva,	the	object	of	semiotics	and	literary	theory	should	
rather	be	“a	permutation	of	texts,	an	intertextuality”	(Kristeva	1980:36)	or	a	“mosaic	of	quotations.”	
By	this,	she	meant	systems	of	semiotic	practices,	and	she	redefined	the	analytical	vocabulary	to	
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make	“text”	signify	“culture,”	while	“the	novel”	came	to	mean	the	totality	of	novelistic	production	
(ibid.).	 Later	 discourse	 analysts,	 such	 as	 Fairclough,	 took	 a	more	 limited	 view	 of	 intertextuality,	
arguing	 that	 “intertextual	 properties	 of	 texts	 are	 realized	 in	 linguistic	 features”	 (Fairclough	
1992:195).	He	asserted	 that	 intertextual	analysis	 should	 show	“how	 texts	 selectively	draw	upon	
orders	of	discourse	-	the	particular	configurations	of	conventionalized	practices	(genres,	discourses,	
narratives,	 etc.)	 which	 are	 available	 to	 text	 producers	 and	 interpreters”	 (ibid.:194).	 Fairclough	
argued	that	intertextual	analysis	is	necessary	to	grasp	“the	dependence	of	texts	upon	society	and	
history	in	the	form	the	resources	made	available	within	the	order	of	discourse	(genres,	discourses,	
etc.).”	In	the	micro-example	above,	I	exemplified	this	with	the	conventional	narrative	introduction	
“Once	upon	a	time”	-	a	narrative	practice	that	has	the	function	of	cueing	an	“elsewhen”	and	setting	
the	stage	for	narration.	This	cue	is	indeed	textually	present	at	the	surface	level,	as	Fairclough	argues,	
and	not	only	present	in	the	abstract	functions	and	operations	of	Kristevan	ideologeme-analysis.		
	
Returning	to	news	texts,	I	will	start	out	from	Fairclough’s	assumption	(that	intertextuality	is	realized	
linguistically	in	texts),	and	the	question	is	then:	What	narrative	conventions	and	structures	are	used	
by	producers	of	news	texts,	and	how	do	they	emerge?	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	I	will	argue	that	
in	the	intertextuality	of	news,	narratives	appear	because	they	are	shared	resources	for	speech	acts	
and	 the	 range	 of	 discursive	 practices	 (Fairclough	 1995:58)	 arising	 in	 news	media	 genres.	 News	
narratives	emerge	in	intertextual	strings	of	texts	that	relate	and	build	on	top	of	each	other	(Cornfield	
1992:49).	 This	 argument	 is	 in	 line	 with	 recent	 research	 into	 narratives	 across	 speech	 events,	
underscoring	the	dialogic	nature	of	narrative	discourse	(Agha	and	Wortham	2005,	Hiramoto	and	
Park	 2010,	Wortham	 and	 Rhodes	 2015,	Wortham	 and	 Reyes	 2015).	Wortham	 and	 Rhodes,	 for	
instance	(2015:160),	argue	that	discourse	connects	across	speech	events,	and	linked	speech	events	
are	essential	to	social	life.	Because	of	this	structuring,	events	can	be	recognized	as	events,	belonging	
to	a	set	or	being	distinct	from	the	background	noise	of	history.	Wortham	and	Rhodes	claim	that	the	
connected	events	constitute	narratives,	which		
	
are	joined	together	in	chains	or	trajectories,	through	discursive	processes	that	link	speech	events	to	each	other,	
such	that	signs	and	individuals	move	along	chains	of	narrating	events	that	occur	in	different	spatio-temporal	
locations….	 [Through]	 chains	 of	 linked	 narratives	 […]	 cultural	models,	 personal	 identities,	 and	 other	 social	
phenomena	are	established	as	a	linked	trajectory	of	narrating	events	takes	shape.	(ibid.:161)	
	
As	events	unfold	in	linked	text	chains,	they	are	not	closed	off,	unlike	completed	literary	sequences	
found	 in	 novels,	 for	 instance.	 Journalists	 may	 know	 the	 typical	 stages	 of	 scandals	 (e.g.	 Tiffen	
2002:291,	Lull	and	Hinerman	1997:11-13,	Thompson	2000:24ff),	but	the	narration	of	real	events	is	
always	at	risk	of	not	reaching	narrative	closure	(Silverstone	1981:136ff),	and	may	peter	out	at	any	
moment	 (and,	 as	 Brazilian	 corruption	 research	 attests,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 proper	 ending	 to	 political	
scandal	stories	is	always	likely;	see	Power	and	Taylor	2012:252).	This	lack	of	closure,	and	ultimately	
the	instability	of	developing	chains	of	news	stories,	 is	not	necessarily	a	problem	for	approaching	
news	with	a	narratological	method,	however.	
	
If	one	follows	Bakhtin,	narratives	across	speech	events	are	not	and	could	never	be	stable	and	closed	
objects	 of	 research:	 Rather,	 discourse	 is	 always	 in	 dialogue	 and	 responding	 or	 commenting,	
contingently	unpacking	or	refolding	other	discursive	instantiations.	Thus,	each	iteration	(each	news	
text,	in	this	case)	may	always	select	different	elements	from	the	relevant	order	of	discourse	(or	even	
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importing	 elements	 from	 adjacent	 orders).	 This	 means	 that	 narratives	 proliferate,	 gradually	
transmute,	and	fade	away.	How	to	deal	methodologically	with	the	erosion	of	intertextual	stability?	
	
To	answer	this	would	in	a	way	be	to	pose	a	response	to	the	problem	of	infinite	semiosis	and	the	
implicit	 regression	ad	nauseam	 resulting	 from	Bakhtinian	 thought:	How	can	we	ever	analytically	
close	off	a	chain	of	 linked	speech	events?	My	answer	would	be	that	 in	the	case	of	scandals,	 it	 is	
feasible	to	do	so	and	even	jettison	the	entire	metaphor	of	the	chain	used	by	Wortham	and	Rhodes,	
because	news	 texts	about	 scandals	and	 the	discourse	 that	arise	 from	such	 texts	are	not	exactly	
chains	stretching	indefinitely	back	into	time	–	not	in	their	narrative	structures,	anyway.	Rather,	they	
emerge	in	specific	historic	moments	as	disclosure	of	particular	sets	of	information,	with	a	range	of	
potentials,	and	project	a	trajectory	towards	the	possible	endpoints	of	the	scandal.	Because	of	the	
particular	 characteristic	 scandals,	 I	 will	 work	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 these	
intertextual	constructs	are	more	like	arcs	than	like	infinite	chains:	The	metaphor	of	story	arc,	I	think,	
is	more	apt	to	capture	the	way	that	events	are	constructed	and	emplotted	to	cohere,	to	move	along	
a	trajectory	of	telling,	to	reach	narrative	closure,	and	thus	to	make	sense	as	a	whole.	In	this	sense,	
although	I	argued	earlier	against	a	bounded	view	of	narrative,	I	do	see	certain	contingent	limits	to	
intertextuality.		
	
The	lack	of	narrative	closure,	organized	by	one	or	more	identifiable	authors,	is	not	only	a	feature	of	
the	narration	of	real-life	events,	but	of	many	kinds	of	distributed	narrative:	
	
Distributed	narratives	are	stories	that	aren’t	self-contained.	They’re	stories	that	can’t	be	experienced	in	a	single	
session	or	in	a	single	space.	They’re	stories	that	cross	over	into	our	daily	lives,	becoming	as	ubiquitous	as	the	
network	that	fosters	them.	(Walker	2004:1)		
	
The	 common-sense	 notion	 of	 a	 “story,”	 already	 articulated	 in	 Aristotle’s	 Poetics,	 holds	 that	
narratives	are	governed	by	a	tripartite	plot	structure:	“poetic	imitation	which	is	narrative	in	form…	
should	have	for	its	subject	a	single	action,	whole	and	complete,	with	a	beginning,	a	middle,	and	an	
end.	It	will	thus	resemble	a	living	organism	in	all	its	unity”	(Poetics	chapter	23,	see	also	50b26-34).	
However,	the	classic	and	intuitive	view	of	narratives,	once	we	think	about	it,	does	not	hold	for	all	
fiction;	many	serialized	media	products,	for	example,	do	not	end	neatly	nor	respect	the	principle	of	
dramatic	unities.	Literature	and	Hollywood	movies	may	try	to	contain	their	narrative,	but	fan	fiction,	
sequels,	prequels	and	other	rehashing	and	rewriting	fundamentally	challenge	the	boundary	of	the	
artefact.	 SMS-based	 novels	 have	 exploded	 even	 the	 physical	 boundary	 of	 the	 traditional	 novel.	
Television	series	are	open-ended	until	funding	runs	dry,	and	always	hold	potential	for	revival	if	the	
fan	base	turns	out	to	be	sufficiently	active	and	loud.	Roleplaying	games	(offline	and	some	online	
versions)	contain	infinite	storylines	within	them,	although	pre-defined	to	various	extents.	Diaries	
and	weblogs	distribute	open-ended	personal	narratives,	as	do	social	media	in	a	certain	sense.	This	
thesis	works	 towards	 a	 similar	 conclusion	 for	 the	 case	of	 journalism:	News	 constitute	or	 create	
sequences	of	events	across	a	non-finite	number	of	instances.		
	
That	news	create	chains	of	events	seems	especially	clear	in	the	case	of	scandals,	but	as	discussed	in	
the	 previous	 chapter,	 neither	 seminal	 studies	 of	 scandals	 from	 the	 Anglophone	world	 (Lull	 and	
Hinerman	1997,	Thompson	2000)	nor	newer	studies	of	Brazilian	and	Latin	American	scandals	(Balán	
2011,	2014,	Llanos	and	Marsteintredet	2010,	Michener	and	Pereira	2016,	Pérez-Liñán	2014,	Prior	
2015)	work	systematically	with	the	narrative	properties	of	scandals.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	discuss	
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how	the	chaining-together	of	events	in	a	distributed	media	environment	is	accomplished,	giving	rise	
to	plot,	even	if	the	events	of	such	plot	remains	without	an	ending	or	definite	closure,	but	still	emerge	
chained	together	in	a	narrative	structure	across	the	surface	manifestations	of	text.	
	
	
2.2	Emplotment:	Identifying	Intertextual	Narratives	
Writing	news	texts	intelligibly	requires	emplotment,	just	like	other	“realist”	types	of	discourse	that	
accounts	for	events,	whether	fictional	or	factual.	I	will	follow	Ricoeur,	who	defines	plot	thus:	
	
By	 plot	 I	mean	 the	 intelligible	whole	 that	 governs	 a	 succession	 of	 events	 in	 any	 story.	 This	 provisory	
definition	immediately	shows	the	plot’s	connecting	function	between	an	event	or	events	and	the	story.	A	
story	is	made	out	of	events	to	the	extent	that	plot	makes	events	into	a	story.	(Ricoeur	1981:167)		
	
While	Ricoeur’s	definition	of	plot	 is	useful	here,	 I	think	his	complex	definition	of	emplotment	(in	
Time	and	Narrative,	Ricoeur	1984)	is	of	less	use	for	the	present	purposes.	Instead,	in	the	following,	
I	will	take	plot	to	be	the	result	of	the	practice	of	emplotment,	a	practice	which	invokes	a	specific	
causal	logic	in	order	to	organize	discourse:	
	
narrative	always	involves,	due	to	the	logic	of	emplotment,	a	strong	implication	of	causality:	“one	thing	
because	of	another.”	The	same	point	is	implicit	in	E.	M.	Forster’s	well-known	aphorism	in	Aspects	of	the	
Novel.	“The	king	died	and	then	the	queen	died,”	said	Forster,	is	a	chronicle.	“The	king	died	and	the	queen	
died	of	grief	”	is	a	story.	(Dowling	2011:5)	
	
Emplotment	 is	a	textual	practice,	 found	commonly	but	certainly	not	exclusively	 in	news.	Somers	
offers	this	insight	on	emplotment	specifically	relevant	to	social	science	research,	with	a	focus	on	the	
importance	of	emplotment	and	narrativity	for	the	social	agency	involved	in	identity	politics:	
	
From	diverse	sources	it	is	possible	to	identify	four	features	of	a	reframed	narrativity	particularly	relevant	for	
the	 social	 sciences:	 1)	 relationality	 of	 parts,	 2)	 causal	 emplotment,	 3)	 selective	 appropriation,	 and	 4)	
temporality,	 sequence,	 and	 place.	 Together,	 these	 dimensions	 suggest	 narratives	 are	 constellations	 of	
relationships	(connected	parts)	embedded	in	time	and	space,	constituted	by	causal	emplotment.	Unlike	the	
attempt	to	produce	meaning	by	placing	an	event	in	a	specified	category,	narrativity	precludes	sense-making	of	
a	singular	isolated	phenomenon.	Narrativity	demands	that	we	discern	the	meaning	of	any	single	event	only	in	
temporal	and	spatial	relationship	to	other	events.	Indeed,	the	chief	characteristic	of	narrative	is	that	it	renders	
understanding	only	by	connecting	(however	unstably)	parts	to	a	constructed	configuration	or	a	social	network	
of	 relationships	 (however	 incoherent	 or	 unrealizable)	 composed	 of	 symbolic,	 institutional,	 and	 material	
practices.		
	
The	connectivity	of	parts	is	precisely	why	narrativity	turns	"events"	into	episodes,	whether	the	sequence	of	
episodes	 is	 presented	 or	 experienced	 in	 anything	 resembling	 chronological	 order.	 This	 is	 done	 through	
"emplotment."	It	 is	emplotment	that	gives	significance	to	independent	instances,	not	their	chronological	or	
categorical	order.	And	it	is	emplotment	that	translates	events	into	episodes.	As	a	mode	of	explanation,	causal	
emplotment	 is	 an	 accounting	 (however	 fantastic	 or	 implicit)	 of	why	 a	 narrative	 has	 the	 story	 line	 it	 does.	
(Somers	1994:616)		
	
By	 combining	 this	 understanding	 of	 plot	 and	 emplotment	 with	 the	 above	 the	 notion	 of	
intertextuality,	I	can	now	specify	the	research	object	of	this	thesis:	narratives	that	emerge	in	and	
across	news	texts	precisely	in	the	emplotment	of	a	common	narrative	structure.	When	a	group	of	
news	texts	select	the	same	elements	and	establish	similar	relations	between	these	elements	and	
		 35	
emplot	the	events	within	the	same	causal	logic,	I	take	texts	of	this	group	to	be	variations	of	a	single	
narrative	structure.	The	texts,	then,	partake	intertextually	in	translating	events	into	coherent	story	
lines	 or	 story	 arcs	 that	 may	 hold	 symbolic	 meanings	 in	 the	 cultural	 context	 in	 which	 they	 are	
situated,	and	I	discuss	this	in	the	sections	below,	after	some	initial	caveats	concerning	emplotment.	
	
Not	every	shared	phrase	found	in	news	should	be	understood	as	a	narrative,	of	course.	I	will	dispel	
this	potential	misunderstanding	of	my	argument	with	a	few	brief	examples.	 In	news	on	Brazilian	
politics,	the	figure	of	ex-president	Lula	has	been	central	for	four	decades.	However,	this	mostly	takes	
on	 the	 form	of	 references	 to	 the	person	Lula	as	a	public	 figure,	and	while	 reference	 is	 certainly	
intertextual,	it	is	not	narrativity.	References	may	shade	into	something	more,	however.	For	instance,	
the	phrase	“nunca	antes	neste	país”	–	never	before	 in	this	country	–	has	been	a	staple	 in	Lula’s	
public	 speeches,	a	catchphrase	of	his	 that	highlighted	 the	so-called	social	 conquests	 (of	political	
rights	 and	 social	 security)	 during	 his	 presidential	 periods	 (Kitzberger	 2010:26).	 Quotes	 or	
paraphrases	 of	 this	 figure	 of	 speech	 that	 appear	 in	 news	 texts	 may	 either	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
reference	 to	 specific	 speeches	 or	 more	 generally	 a	 reference	 to	 his	 reputation	 as	 orator	 and	
president.	 While	 also	 intertextual,	 the	 referenced	 event	 (a	 given	 speech)	 is	 not	 necessarily	
connected	causally	 to	other	events,	nor	necessarily	 reported	as	such.	A	 reference	 to	 the	phrase	
“republic	of	Curitiba”	 (Castro	2016,	see	Chapter	5	and	 footnote	9),	on	 the	other	hand,	could	be	
considered	 to	 invoke	 the	conflict	between	 the	ex-president	and	 the	Lava-Jato	 task	 force.	 In	 this	
sense,	I	would	consider	a	news	text	reporting	on	the	phrase	“republic	of	Curitiba”	to	partake	in	a	
plot	structure	shared	with	other	texts.	 It	 is	this	kind	of	publicly	available	textual	configuration	of	
events	found	across	news	texts	that	I	wish	to	approach	with	narrative	analysis.		
	
A	second	caveat	is	the	ubiquity	of	discourse	about	corruption	in	Brazilian	news.	So	many	news	texts	
tangentially	touch	upon	corruption	and	the	diverse	trials	and	investigations	of	political	corruption	
in	Brazil	that	some	delimitation	of	the	corpus	of	news	texts	is	needed	(discussed	in	the	next	chapter),	
together	with	a	procedure	for	identifying	and	distinguishing	between	narrative	structures.	Not	every	
news	 text	mentioning	 corruption	 is	 full-blown	 narrative,	 and	 intertextual	 references	may	 be	 so	
blurry	 as	 to	 defy	 categorization.	 In	 principle,	 to	 identify	 a	 narrative	 in	 public	 media	 texts,	 the	
researcher	 must	 do	 what	 any	 discourse	 analyst	 does:	 Tentatively	 home	 in	 on	 the	 discursive	
phenomenon,	while	gradually	sharpening	the	attempts	to	produce	a	formal	definition	 in	a	back-
and-forth	manner.	At	the	outset,	this	means	trying	to	come	up	with	some	defining	features	of	the	
phenomenon,	and	then	rigorously	checking	the	margins	of	 the	corpus	 in	order	 to	see	what	gets	
excluded	by	using	those	features	as	the	criterion	for	inclusion.		
	
A	clearly	identifiable,	unique	plot	structure	that	crops	up	time	and	again	in	texts	would	prove	an	
excellent	criterion	by	which	one	could	establish	the	existence	of	a	recurrent	narrative	across	news	
texts.	However,	 less	may	also	do:	A	simpler	starting	point	could	be	a	clearly	delimited	spatial	or	
temporal	marker	present	in	the	news	discourse	at	hand	(i.e.	a	text	about	the	Second	Gulf	War).	If	
this	seems	too	generic,	the	reference	to	specific	persons,	institutions,	and	circumstances,	could	also	
mark	out	a	recurring	media	narrative	(i.e.,	“the	hunt	for	Osama	bin	Laden”).	Using	this	procedure,	
more	 general	 issues	 without	 specific	 emplotment	 (i.e.	 “public	 security”)	 cannot	 by	 itself	
conceptually	constitute	a	narrative,	and	must	be	excluded.	The	same	goes	for	news	texts	that	refer	
to	corruption	without	any	emplotment	of	events.	Some	issues	tend	to	be	mainly	cast	as	narratives	
in	discourse	because	they	give	rise	to	storyable	forms	(Montgomery	2007:109),	while	other	issues	
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become	 too	 encompassing	 to	 really	 work	 as	 narratives	 (shading	 over	 into	metaphor,	 trope,	 or	
topos).	
	
A	less	rigid	but	still	useful	criterion	for	detecting	a	narrative	structure	could	be	the	special	discursive	
markers	 that	 journalists	 use	 in	 order	 to	 abbreviate	 reference	 to	 such	 event	 structures.	 This	
intertextual	 referencing	 practice	 constructs	 a	 repertoire	 of	 short-hand	 lingo	 for	 easy-to-read	
headlines.	 Such	 condensational	 labels	 or	 symbols	 (Canel	 and	 Sanders	 2006:144)	 can	 work	
metonymically	to	conjure	up	the	organizing	idea	with	a	single	phrase,	and	are	frequently	used	to	
designate	affaires	and	scandals,	in	the	form	of	specialized	pronouns	or	suffixes	like	–gate	or	–lão:	
Since	the	Watergate	scandal,	many	scandals	in	the	US	have	been	named	by	media	with	a	–gate	suffix	
(Schudson	2004:1232),	a	pattern	that	has	been	picked	up	by	Brazilian	journalists	since	the	Mensalão	
scandal,	giving	rise	to	the	monikers	Trensalão	and	Petrolão.	Such	short-hand	tags	are	not	unique	to	
scandals,	but	are	generally	used	to	designate	and	fold	up	complex	story	lines	(Hajer	2005:301).	The	
keywords	 emerging	 in	 a	 mediascape	 may	 thus	 provide	 useable	 starting	 points	 for	 figuring	 out	
whether	a	text	shares	plot	structure	with	a	group	of	texts.	
	
Let	me	exemplify	the	dialectical	process	of	discovering	what	the	Petrobras	scandal	(not	the	Lava-
Jato	scandal)	“meant”	during	the	first	months	of	media	coverage	of	the	case.	By	“meant,”	 I	only	
intend	to	say	“designated,”	“covered,”	or	“referenced.”	The	example	may	prepare	the	ground	for	
some	of	the	themes	and	events	that	emerge	in	the	chapters	to	come,	as	well	as	clarify	some	of	the	
conceptual	problems	of	the	procedure	sketched	out	above.		
	
In	a	follow-up	operation	to	the	initial	operation	called	Lava-Jato,	the	Petrobras	ex-director	Paulo	
Roberto	 Costa	 was	 arrested	 on	 March	 20,	 2014.	 Commenting	 on	 the	 arrest,	 the	 political	
commentator	Eliane	Cantanhêde,	writing	for	Folha	at	that	time,	wrote	
	
Com	Dilma	 enfraquecida	 pela	 economia	 e	 pressionada	pelas	 pesquisas,	 a	 oposição	 tenta	mostrar	 a	 cara	 e	
avançar	justamente	quando	os	dois	escândalos	do	momento	se	cruzam:	o	da	Petrobras	e	o	da	Operação	Lava	
Jato	da	PF.	(Cantanhêde	2014,	E13/4	2014)	
	
Here,	the	scandal	of	the	“Lava-Jato	operation”	is	distinct,	but	also	linked	(“se	cruzam”)	to	the	scandal	
of	Petrobras.	This	second	scandal	to	which	Cantanhêde	refers	was	a	case	covered	in	the	same	weeks	
that	 the	money-laundering	 ring	of	 the	doleiro	Alberto	Youssef	 came	under	public	 scrutiny.	Both	
cases	are	seen	as	potentially	problematic	for	the	“weakened”	President	Rousseff.	“The	Petrobras	
scandal,”	at	 this	moment,	meant	the	 full	purchase	of	 the	Texan	oil	 refinery	Pasadena	 in	2006,	a	
purchase	that	was	forced	upon	Petrobras	through	a	so-called	put	option	in	the	contract	whereby	
Petrobras	 had	 originally	 acquired	 half	 of	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 refinery.	 The	 purchase	 of	 the	
Pasadena	refinery	had	turned	out	to	be	a	really	bad	deal	 for	Petrobras,	because	the	Belgian	co-
owners	of	Astra	Oil	pulled	out	and	a	US	court	eventually	forced	Petrobras	to	buy	Astra’s	shares	at	
elevated	prices	relative	to	the	prevailing	value	(Almeida	2016:158,	Paduan	2016).	Dilma	Rousseff,	
then	chief	of	staff	in	government	(ministra	da	Casa	Civil),	was	also	head	of	the	Petrobras	Board	of	
Administrators	when	the	first	half	of	the	Pasadena	refinery	was	bought,	and	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	
was	one	of	the	directors.	In	February	2014,	public	prosecutors	argued	that	a	criminal	investigation	
into	 the	buyout	was	necessary,	and	 the	 losses	 incurred	 in	Petrobras	was	heavily	debated	 in	 the	
public	sphere.	Because	of	the	coincidence	of	time	and	persons,	editorials,	commentary	(such	as	the	
above),	news	reports	and	infographics	from	this	period	frequently	treat	both	the	costly	Pasadena	
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buyout	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 large-scale	 corruption	 next	 to	 each	 other;	 similarly,	 the	 name	 Dilma	
Rousseff	frequently	appeared	in	news	texts	adjacent	to	that	of	Paulo	Roberto	Costa.	Note,	however,	
that	the	emplotment	of	events	is	distinct,	although	Rousseff	is	the	(suspected)	antagonist	of	both	
scandals.		
	
The	juxtaposition	of	the	two	scandals	is	interesting	because	it	implies	a	causal	narrative	link,	already	
present	 in	 the	 quote	 of	 Cantanhêde	 above.	 Somehow,	 the	 opposition	 can	 gain	 from	 the	 two	
scandals,	and	somehow,	both	scandals	will	have	an	impact	upon	Dilma	Rousseff.	It	is	not	spelled	out	
there,3	but	in	other	texts,	the	implicit	assumption	of	Cantanhêde	is	encountered	in	a	narrative	form:	
Dilma	Rousseff	knew	about	the	put	option	clause	of	the	Pasadena	contracts,	but	she	denied	it,	just	
as	she	knew	about	the	large-scale	corruption	back	when	she	headed	the	administrative	board	of	
Petrobras.	Only	six	months	later	after	the	quoted	commentary	piece,	the	Pasadena	scandal	would	
fade	away	and	only	be	mentioned	intermittently,	and	the	Petrobras	scandal	came	(interchangeably	
called	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	or	simply	“the	Lava	Jato”)	to	signify	solely	the	corruption	and	party-
allocation	of	the	company’s	directorates.		
	
This	example	demonstrates	the	procedure	of	identifying	the	intertextually	emerging	plot	structures	
that	underpin	the	Lava-Jato	case	(as	well	as	to	the	reporting	of	the	impeachment).	The	easiest	way	
is	 to	 start	 with	 some	 discursive	markers	 or	 signposts	 found	 in	 texts	 (references	 to	 scandals	 in	
Petrobras,	 to	 Rousseff’s	 corruption,	 Lula,	 Eduardo	 Cunha,	 etc.),	 and	 then	work	 out	 if	 the	 texts	
present	events	in	recurring	“narrative-based	accounts	of	strips	of	reality”	(Appadurai	1996:35).	The	
example	 above	 also	 shows	 the	 dilemma	 of	 delimiting	 narratives	 that	 really	 are	 emergent	 and	
evolving	 textual	phenomena.	 If	 one	 rigorously	pursued	 the	narrative	of	 “the	Petrobras	 scandal”	
based	 on	 the	 media	 interpretations	 found	 in	 early	 2014,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 would,	
counterintuitively,	have	to	be	excluded.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	one	excluded	the	scandal	pertaining	
to	the	Pasadena	buyout,	then	it	would	not	be	readily	apparent	why	Dilma	Rousseff	was	repeatedly	
mentioned	in	news	about	a	money-laundering	scheme	in	Paraná.	The	linkage,	in	the	above	quote,	
is	presented	as	a	proposition	without	any	explanation	(the	two	scandals	are	simply	“crossing”);	in	
later	 examples	 of	 media	 texts,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 the	 proposition	 is	 formulated	 in	 and	 through	
narratives.	Having	discussed	the	working	definition	of	plot	and	narratives	in	news	texts,	and	having	
outlined	how	 I	will	 go	 about	 identifying	 and	distinguishing	 them,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 the	question	of	
analyzing	them.	
	
	
2.3	Fabulas	
The	narrative	 structures	 that	emerge	 in	 textual	 configurations	of	events	across	news	 texts	have	
certain	trajectories,	structures,	and	temporal	properties.	“Narrative	structure”	has	been	used	a	little	
loosely	until	 now.	 In	order	 to	 clarify	 the	distinction	between	a	 shared	narrative	 structure	and	a	
surface	manifestation	of	such	a	structure	(actual	texts),	and	to	disambiguate	the	word	“structure,”	
I	will	briefly	introduce	the	narratological	terminology	of	Mieke	Bal.	Above,	I	have	in	certain	places	
used	“narrative	structure”	to	mean	either	a	generic	structure	or	specific	variations	coined	from	the	
generic	type.	In	principle,	any	given	narrative	of	the	type	“politician-commits-a-corrupt-act-and-is-
indicted-but-denies-everything”	is	built	up	in	the	same	way.	Now,	I	want	to	specify	the	terminology	
so	as	to	distinguish	between	surface	manifestations,	specific	intertextually	emergent	narratives,	and	
generic	 types	 of	 narratives.	 Bal’s	 terminology,	 which	 expands	 formalist	 (Shklovsky	 1925)	 and	
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structuralist	 (Genette	1980)	categories	of	narrative	 layers,	provides	a	useful	 tool	 for	making	this	
distinction	between	(news)	texts,	specific	story-tellings	of	shared	event	structures,	and	the	shared	
event	 structures	 in	 themselves.	 An	 on-going	 discussion	 of	 levels	 of	 text	 analysis	 in	 the	 field	 of	
narratology	 gave	 birth	 to	 these	 distinctions:	 In	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s,	 structural	 narratologists	
understood	narrative	in	a	strict	sense	as	a	text-type	(and	the	associated	activity	of	narration	that	
produces	this	text-type).	Benveniste,	to	take	one	example,	suggested	a	narrow	concept	of	narrative,	
based	on	linguistic	criteria,	limited	“by	a	certain	number	of	exclusions	and	restrictive	conditions”	
(Genette	1976:11).	After	such	exclusions,	narrative	meant	to	Benveniste	only	texts	told	in	the	past	
tense	with	no	personal	pronouns,	but	through	an	absent	third	person	narrator	(ibid.:8)	so	that	in	
narrative,	no	one	speaks	and	the	text	is	free	of	its	utterance.		
	
Benveniste’s	contemporary	Gerard	Genette	was	wary,	however,	of	the	linguistic-technical	definition	
that	limited	narrative	to	narrator-free	narration	(ibid.:10),	and	equally	wary	of	the	common-sense	
formulation	that	took	narrative	to	be	any	written	or	spoken	representation	of	a	series	of	events	(be	
they	real	or	fictitious).	Instead,	Genette	suggested	a	definition	of	story	(histoire	in	French)	as	“the	
signified	or	narrative	content”	while	narrative	discourse	(discours	or	recít)	was	the	specific	layer	of	
the	spoken	or	written	text	itself	that	narrates	(ibid.,	Genette	1980:27).	To	Genette	(who	did	not	take	
up	Foucault’s	usage	of	the	term),	discourse	meant	something	closer	to	“utterance,”	the	broadest	
possible	mode	of	 language,	 open	 to	 all	 forms.	 The	 distinction	 of	histoire	 and	 narrative	discours	
helped	 to	 uncover	 the	 different	 ways	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 recite	 or	 tell	 the	 same	 narrative	 in	 very	
different	ways	without	changing	the	underlying	causal-historical	structure	of	events	(the	histoire)	
by	way	of	temporal	shifts	(flashbacks,	divinations,	etc.)	or	changing	viewpoints	of	the	narrators.	A	
similar	 distinction	was	 used	 by	 Russian	 formalists,	 one	 of	whom	 coined	 the	 terminological	 pair	
fabula-syushet	with	fabula	being	the	raw	material,	a	purely	abstract	sequence	(the	analytical	ground	
zero),	 and	 syushet	 being	 the	 sequence	 that	 actually	 happens	 to	 be	 narrated	 and	 realized	 in	 a	
particular	way	(Shklovsky	1925).		
	
Once	 the	 fabula-syushet	 distinction	 was	 introduced,	 it	 became	 possible	 to	 analyze	 the	 formal	
features	 of	 emplotment,	 that	 is,	 the	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 causal	 sequences	 of	 events	 can	 be	
reshuffled	in	the	narration.	Bal’s	later	standard	work	on	narratology	keeps	narrative	as	a	general	
term,	but	avoids	using	the	term	for	specific	analytical	levels	of	narratives	(Bal	1997).	Bal	argued	for	
a	 triple	 division	 (instead	 of	 the	 dichotomy)	with	 the	 terminology	 fabula-story-text.	 The	 Russian	
formalists’	concept	of	fabula	is	preferred	in	Bal	over	Genette’s	concept	of	story	(but	retains	basically	
the	same	meaning),	while	“story”	moves	position	 in	 the	model	and	now	designates	 the	realized	
account	 of	 events.	 Finally,	 by	 introducing	 the	 extra	 subdivision,	 that	 of	 text,	 Bal	 highlights	 that	
research	also	could	and	should	take	into	account	what	different	configurations	of	the	actual	word	
sequence	means	to	narratives,	even	when	story	and	fabula	remain	identical.	Identical	story-fabula	
levels	can	be	found	in	simplified	versions	of	the	same	narrative	-	say,	versions	for	children,	or	when	
translations	render	different	texts	from	identical	stories	and	fabulas,	or	in	the	surface	variations	of	
folklore	myths	with	the	same	content.	Even	if	told	in	the	same	chronological	sequence	and	with	the	
same	moral	conclusion,	fairy	tales	or	folk	tales	like	Snow	White	can	still	be	considered	as	distinct	in	
different	narrative	media	and	in	different	tellings,	because	the	texts	of	these	instances	are	distinct.	
Schematically,	in	the	context	of	news,	the	tripartite	distinction	of	Bal	could	be	expressed	thus:	
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Mieke	Bal's	three	levels	of	narratological	analysis	–	in	the	context	of	news	
Text:	The	concrete	text,	unfolded	with	a	specific	grammar,	choice	of	words,	and	quotes		
Story:	The	sequential	deployment	of	events;	the	alignment	and	relations	of	characters		
Fabula:	The	abstract-causal	thrust	of	events;	chronology;	the	attributes	of	actants	
	
This	trichotomy	calls	attention	to	the	distinct	textures	of	storytelling	media	and	storytelling	styles,	
and	I	adapt	it	here	to	analysis	of	news,	so	that	“news	text”	henceforth	means	the	concrete	surface	
manifestation,	while	a	“news	story”	is	taken	to	be	an	ordered	sequence	of	events	(not	necessarily	
chronological)	 and	actants.	 Fabula,	 then,	 is	 found	 intertextually	 (as	 in	 Fairclough	1992)	and	 in	a	
distributed	manner	(see	Walker	2004)	as	a	trajectory	of	emplotted	events	that	forms	a	resource	and	
pattern	for	each	re-telling	of	a	news	story.	
	
Let	me	 provide	 one	 compact	 example	 of	 how	 this	 distinction	 could	work:	 Three	media	 outlets	
produce	texts	on	the	same	event,	and	in	doing	so	they	are	reporting	the	same	story	(actor	A	said	or	
did	 X	 in	 public,	 provoked	 by	 disclosure	 Q).	 Given	 the	 characterizations	 and	 intertextual	 links,	
however,	the	ultimate	“meaning”	of	the	reported	events	may	shift,	generating	different	ideas	about	
the	underlying	fabula	(what	is	the	veracity	of	Q,	what	did	actor	A	really	mean,	and	why	did	he	say	
or	do	what	he	did).	So,	while	the	same	event(s)	can	be	expressed	differently	at	the	textual	level,	it	
would	still	generate	the	same	story.	In	some	cases,	the	reader	could	be	left	with	the	work	of	linking	
a	story	to	a	general	fabula;	however,	a	text	also	provides	an	“invitation”	for	the	reader	(van	Gorp	
2007:63)	to	connect	the	story	to	a	fabula,	and	a	text	could	even	deploy	several	events	totally	similar	
at	the	level	of	the	text,	but	through	the	emplotment	of	the	story	connect	them	to	different	fabulas	
through	more	elaborate	narrative	entwinements.		
	
The	tripartite	distinction	of	text,	story	and	fabula	is	of	further	interest	when	reading	news	texts	as	
narratives,	because	it	 is	useful	for	generating	insights	into	the	effects	at	the	level	of	narration	of	
direct/indirect	 speech,	 truth	 claims,	 effects	 of	 narrated	 or	 authorial	 interference	 (or	 rather,	
journalistic	and	editorial),	as	well	as	embedding	of	narratives	into	other	narratives.	I	will	return	to	
these	aspects	below,	and,	to	the	extent	that	space	permits,	in	Chapter	4.	
	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 distributed	 fabula,	 intertextually	 cohering	 across	 many	 texts,	 has	 interesting	
temporal	implications,	because	each	text	is	situated	in	media	res,	and	only	“tells”	part	of	the	story	
and	contributes	only	a	fragment	to	the	fabula.	This	brings	me	to	the	first	of	the	methodological	tools	
from	narratology	that	have	importance	for	analysis	of	news	texts	and	fabulas	emerging	across	news	
texts:	temporality,	futures,	pasts,	and	conjunctives.	
	
	
2.4	Land	of	the	Future	Tense:	Temporality	in	Brazilian	News	on	Scandals	
While	 news	 is	 normally	written	 in	 the	 past	 tense,	 news	 that	 deals	with	 scandals	 features	more	
complex	temporal	structures.	In	this	section,	I	will	show	that	it	is	crucial	to	understand	the	tempus	
of	 news	 texts	 in	 order	 to	 see	 how	 narrative	 desire	 drives	 the	 plot	 of	 these	 texts	 towards	 the	
endpoints	of	fabulas,	that	is,	towards	closure	of	story	arcs.	Again,	the	narratological	tools	of	Genette	
and	Bal	are	brought	to	bear	on	news	texts.	
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Analyzing	 the	 pseudo-autobiographical	 complexity	 of	À	 la	 recherche	 du	 temps	 perdu	 by	Marcel	
Proust,	 Genette	 created	 fine-grained	 categories	 of	 temporal	 analysis	 across	 the	 fabula-syushet	
divide,	 and	 his	 narratology	 thus	 provides	 a	 good	 starting	 point	 for	 analyzing	 temporality	 in	
narratives.	The	crucial	point	in	Genette	is	the	observation	that	“to	study	the	temporal	order	of	a	
narrative	[text]	is	to	compare	the	order	in	which	events	or	temporal	sections	are	arranged	in	the	
[story]	with	the	order	of	succession	these	same	events	or	temporal	sections	have	in	the	[fabula]”	
(1980:35)	(for	the	ease	of	reading,	 I	have	here	aligned	Genette’s	wording	with	Bal’s	terminology	
above).	The	various	 types	of	discordance	between	the	orderings	of	 fabula	and	story	are	 termed	
anachronies.	 Anachrony	 is	 a	 very	 important	 temporal	 feature	 of	 scandal	 texts,	 and	 not	 just	 for	
stylistic	reasons,	or	because	the	anachrony	sets	scandal	news	apart	from	say,	a	sports	report	in	the	
simple	past	tense.	The	way	that	events	are	organized	in	the	story-line	of	news	texts,	in	the	shuffling	
and	juxtaposition	of	past	and	future	events	next	to	reported	events,	crucially	contributes	to	creating	
doubt	or	claiming	facticity.		
	
Brooks	 have	 observed	 (using	 the	 Russian	 formalist	 terminology)	 that	 ”the	 fabula	 –	 'what	 really	
happened'	–	is	in	fact	a	mental	construction	that	the	reader	derives	from	the	sjuzet	[sic],	which	is	
all	 that	 he	 ever	 directly	 knows”	 (1992:13).	 Seen	 this	way,	 the	 fabula	 as	 such	 is	 an	 unreachable	
signified.	 For	 practical	 analytical	 purposes,	 however,	 this	 theoretical	 difficulty	 is	 generally	
disregarded;	so,	according	to	Genette:	”[We]	implicitly	assume	the	existence	of	a	kind	of	zero	degree	
that	 would	 be	 a	 condition	 of	 perfect	 temporal	 correspondence	 [between	 story	 and	 fabula]”	
(1980:36).	Working	with	the	fabula/story	distinction	allows	for	a	crucial	observation	concerning	the	
mental	work	involved	in	the	sense-making	and	writing	practices	described	above.	This	observation	
concerns	 the	 plot	 directionality,	 storytelling	 orientation,	 or	 emplotment,	 of	 the	 news	 texts	 in	
scandals:	 audience	members	 (and	 journalists	 or	 researchers)	 construct	 knowledge	 about	 'what	
really	happened'	on	the	basis	of	the	texts	they	encounter	and	the	stories	that	are	emplotted	in	the	
texts.	 To	 follow	 a	 story	 means	 “understanding	 the	 successive	 actions,	 thought,	 and	 feelings	 in	
question	 insofar	 as	 they	 present	 a	 certain	 directedness”	 (Ricoeur	 1981:170).	 In	 this	way,	 as	we	
gradually	comprehend	the	plot,	“we	are	pushed	ahead	by	this	development	and	[…]	we	reply	to	its	
impetus	with	expectations	concerning	the	outcome”	(ibid.).	
	
In	the	process	of	turning	textual	representations	into	mental	constructions,	various	considerations	
of	credibility	and	fit	with	extant	knowledge	are	taken	into	account	by	audience	members.	The	goal	
of	this	cognitive	activity,	i.e.	the	goal	of	any	audience	member's	process	of	construction,	as	Genette	
almost	but	not	quite	implies,	is	this	zero	degree,	this	perfect	correspondence	–	knowledge	of	what	
really	 happened.	 That	 narrative	 desire,	 in	 which	 we	 indulge	 when	 reading	 detective	 stories,	 is	
mirrored	 in	 the	production	and	consumption	of	 journalistic	 texts	about	secrecy,	corruption,	and	
political	plots.	While	 the	 reader	wants	 to	know	what	happened,	 the	 literary	plot	plays	with	 this	
desire.	The	mental	construction	of	knowledge	about	the	fabula	of	a	crime	plot	is	not	aimless,	but	
rather	oriented	towards	resolution	–	“who	did	it?”,	as	it	were.	The	disclosure	is	suspended	by	the	
literary	author	to	create	resolution,	and	the	same	resolution	is	delayed	in	corruption	scandals,	but	
in	 other	ways.	 The	 accumulation	of	multiple	 news	 items,	weeks	 and	months	of	 revelations	 and	
disclosed	information,	presumably	brings	the	public	closer	to	the	zero	degree	–	total	transparency,	
perfect	knowledge	of	what	really	happened.	The	confusion	and	amount	of	dis/misinformation	might	
however	be	larger	after	weeks	of	denunciations	and	leaks;	the	readers	might	wrongly	assume	that	
they	know	more,	simply	because	of	the	volume	of	news,	and	not	through	any	qualitative	measure.	
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To	arrive	at	the	zero	degree,	to	acquire	“knowledge”	of	the	actual	events,	is	notoriously	difficult	in	
corruption	 scandals.	 Because	 of	 this,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 narrative	 closure	 is	 (almost)	 always	
delayed	in	the	unfolding	scandalous	news	events	(as	well	as	reporting	on	natural	disasters,	wars,	
and	other	ultimately	unscripted	“live”	events	–	even	if	such	events	are	increasingly	mediatized	and	
premediated,	i.e.	Grusin	2010,	Liebes	and	Katz	2007,	Stepinska	2010).	Unlike	other	unfolding	here-
and-now	events	such	as	natural	disasters,	 the	past	of	corruption	scandals	 is	 furthermore	always	
doubled,	in	the	sense	that	two	(or	even	more)	conflicting	emplotments	exist	to	account	for	the	past.	
Disclosure	 of	 corruption	 affirms	 one	 previously	 unsuspected	 past,	 and	 this	 is	 generally	 denied	
through	alternative	orderings	of	events	and	different	interpretations.	
	
Grammatically,	news	items	that	report	on	disclosure	and	contradiction	exhibit	far	more	sentences	
in	the	conditional	and	subjunctive	than	normally	seen	in	the	news.	There	are	many	reasons	for	this.	
At	least	a	part	has	to	do	with	the	professional	ideology,	guidelines	of	reporting,	and	the	rituals	of	
objectivity	which	 constrain	newsworkers	 (Albuquerque	and	da	Silva	2009:389,	Biroli	 and	Miguel	
2012,	Tuchman	1972).	Statements	that	are	difficult	to	fact-check	and	future	horizons	must	always	
be	treated	delicately	by	 journalists	so	as	to	stay	within	the	normally	accepted	limits	of	objective	
reporting	 and	 the	 taken-for-granted	 web	 of	 facticity.	 The	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 past,	 due	 to	 the	
contesting	 claims	 discussed	 above,	 is	 also	 a	 cause	 of	 textual	 doubt/non-factuality,	 and	 this	 is	
compounded	by	the	problems	that	inhere	from	the	sourcing	of	revelations	and	disclosure.	The	most	
important	problems	of	sourcing	include:	
	
• incomplete	information	
• not-completely	verified	witness	accounts	
• obviously	biased	sources	
• debatable	credibility	of	information	
• construction	of	inferrals,	based	on	or	executed	by	one	or	more	of	the	above.		
	
All	 of	 this	 requires	 (mainstream)	 journalists	 to	 emphasize	 that	 statements	 and	 predictions	 are	
merely	 possibly	 true	 in	 order	 to	 stay	 on	 safe	 professional	 ground.	 Such	 grammatical	 and	
hypothetical	 hedging	 means	 that	 revelations	 and	 corruption	 stories	 branch	 into	 the	 territory	
discussed	in	literary	theory	of	the	fictional.	In	terms	of	temporality	and	narratology,	this	produces	
several	kinds	of	retrospective	tense,	zig-zag,	ellipsis	and	heterodiegetic	analepses	that	goes	back,	
forth,	and	beyond	the	 immediate	context	and	past	horizon	of	the	reported	event	 itself	 (Genette	
1980:35-78).	Sources	may	reach	back	into	past	decades	to	explain	or	deny	allegations.	Furthermore,	
the	“inverted	pyramid”	style	and	satellite-structure	of	news	(Bell	1991:150-155)	yield	phrases	and	
paragraphs	that	are	linked	not	by	chronology	but	by	reverse	causality:	“The	result	is	placed	before	
the	action	which	caused	it”	(ibid.:153).	
	
If	 the	 past	 is	 complex	 and	 fundamentally	 in	 doubt,	 the	 present	 tempus	 of	 news	 reporting	 on	
corruption	scandals	seems	more	straightforward.	The	“now”	of	daily	newspapers	is	conventionally	
established	by	the	media	format	itself.	Anderson	argued	(and	I	return	to	this	below)	that	the	“date	
at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 newspaper,	 the	 single	 most	 important	 emblem	 on	 it,	 provides	 the	 essential	
connection	-	the	steady	onward	clocking	of	homogeneous,	empty	time.	Within	that	time,	'the	world'	
ambles	sturdily	ahead”	(Anderson	1983:33).	The	emblematic	date	is	then	unfolded	in	the	present	
of	 the	headlines,	 contradicting	 the	usual	past	 tense	of	 reports	 (Tuchman	1978:106).	Connecting	
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present	headlines	to	the	past-tense	reports,	 the	 lead	usually	continues	the	temporal	and	spatial	
deixis,	determining	the	“when”	and	the	“why”	(Bell	1991:175-85).	The	lead,	in	the	words	of	Carey,	
is	a	 “distinctive	and	 tyrannical	aspect	of	daily	 journalism	 [:]	 the	 injunction	 that	 the	elements	be	
assembled,	arrayed,	and	accounted	for	in	the	lead,	the	topic	sentence,	or	at	best	–	here	is	where	
the	 inverted	 pyramid	 comes	 in	 –	 the	 first	 paragraph”	 (Carey	 1987:148).	 Leads	 have	 a	 specific	
equivalent,	 as	 shown	 below,	 in	 broadcast	 news,	 but	 both	 kinds	 of	 news	 in	 principle	 strives	 to	
account	for	all	or	most	of	the	central	facts	in	the	lead,	defined	sometimes	as	the	five	W’s	–	the	what,	
who,	when,	where,	and	why.	In	newscasts,	visual	cues	are	important	in	establishing	spatial	deixis	
and	also	contemporaneity	or	present-timeliness,	which	is	a	lead-like	function.	By	showing,	rather	
than	telling,	the	deictic	 function	 locates	stories	at	a	 live	or	recent	“now”	and	at	a	tangible	place	
(Montgomery	2007:104).	
	
The	 medium	 of	 television	 is	 fundamentally	 attuned	 to	 “the	 essential	 temporal	 structure	 and	
dynamic	 of	 the	 living	 moment”	 (Scannell	 2014:174-175).	 Emulating	 this,	 and	 transgressing	 the	
somewhat	more	historical	“now”	of	the	newspapers’	date-line	and	the	live-cast	visual	cues,	web	
media	are	becoming	just	as	obsessed	with	temporality	and	liveness	as	television.	This	has	meant	
shorter	 news	 cycles	 (Barnhurst	 2011)	 and	 acceleration	 of	 production	 in	 a	 no-deadline	 climate	
(Bødker	2016).	Taking	advantage	of	the	no-print,	always-updatable	format	of	news	on	the	internet,	
online	news	platforms	have	re-invigorated	the	“live”	feel	of	print	media	in	a	way	comparable	to	live	
television	by	breaking	away	from	a	fixed	publication	schedule.	Live-streaming	journalism	and	tight	
integration	with	Twitter	and	other	social	media	are	two	modes	of	providing	timely	and	updated	
news.	Some	examples	from	the	context	at	hand	include	the	live-update	feature	sites,	found	at	most	
of	the	mainstream	media	outlets’	sites,	reporting	on	important	roll-call	votes	in	Congress	and	trials	
in	Brazil’s	Supreme	Court.	
	
Foreshadowing	(in	Genette’s	terms:	temporal	prolepsis)	is	not	as	frequent	in	literature	as	analepsis	
(Genette	1980:40,	67),	but	 in	analysis	of	scandal	reporting,	the	future	tense	 is	as	rich	an	area	 in	
temporal	complexity	as	the	past	tense.	Since	narrative	closure	is	usually	delayed	in	scandals,	the	
two	main	kinds	of	prolepses	 -	anticipation	and	expectation	 -	are	very	present	 in	such	 texts.	The	
distinction	 between	 anticipation	 and	 expectation	 extends	 Genette’s	 vocabulary.	 These	 two	
temporal	 categories	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	of	 horizons	 for	 political	 agency	 and,	 crucially,	 to	
defining	the	immediate	future	of	political	action.	News	create	a	horizon	for	understanding	political	
action	in	two	ways:	by	evaluating	and	analyzing	the	current	events	covered	in	relation	to	coming	
events,	and	by	locating	certain	points	in	the	future	as	central	for	interpreting	the	current	events.	At	
a	glance,	these	two	possibilities	look	similar,	but	their	temporal	direction	features	inverse	causality:	
In	the	first	case	(an	expectation),	for	example,	the	revelation	of	A	is	reported	to	be	of	importance	
to	a	later	event	B;	while	the	second	case	(an	anticipation)	could	be	a	report	stating	that	due	to	the	
future	event	B,	actor	X	has	just	now	performed	action	A.	An	anticipation	builds	up	inverse	causality,	
starting	from	the	future	and	going	back	to	the	present.	
		
Future	temporality	 	 	 	 (Direction	of	Causality	)	 	 	 	
Expectation:	 	 	 rA	 	 e	---->		 	 	 	 eB	
Anticipation:	 	 	 eA	 	 <----	e	 	 	 	 eB	 	
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By	setting	up	specific	[event	B	will	be	affected	by	revelation	A]	as	well	general	sets	of	expectations	
[the	government	will	be	weakened	henceforth	by	revelation	A],	and	by	anticipating	political	and	
judicial	events	[the	likelihood	of	event	B	caused	actor	X	to	reveal	A],	the	contingencies	and	many	
possible	horizons	of	the	political	future	are	constrained	in	the	narration.		
	
The	 expected	 and	 anticipated	 future	 temporality	 of	 news	 in	 corruption	 scandals	 contribute	 to	
defining	political	reality	and	the	space	of	agency,	even	when	the	events	are	still	virtual,	waiting	to	
happen.	The	virtual	existence	of	future	events	in	the	mediascape	is	a	curious	phenomenon	that	has	
much	to	do	with	the	questions	of	ascription	and	prediction	 (see	above),	and	which	 furthermore	
provides	political	actors	with	cues	with	which	to	decide	amongst	possible	actions.	When	journalists	
tend	 to	 cluster	 their	 reports	 and	 questions	 around	 a	 shared	 set	 of	 events	 on	 the	 horizon,	 the	
common	prediction	of	 the	 future	 comes	 to	 constitute	 the	de	 facto	political	 reality	 that	decision	
makers	need	to	address	(even	if	the	electorate	has	other	concerns).	Thus,	though	not	yet	realized,	
even	the	virtual	existence	of	future	realities	defines	political	space.	Admittedly,	the	gap	between	
journalistic	predictions	and	actual	events	can	be	minimal	at	times;	but	sometimes,	the	reality	of	
politics	escapes	even	the	most	oracular	political	experts	in	the	Brazilian	media.	In	this	way,	reporters	
and	political	pundits	act	as	producers	of	narrative	desire.		
	
Narrative	desire,	then,	is	not	only	about	acquiring	certain	knowledge	of	a	contested	past,	but	also	
about	arriving	to	the	point	of	understanding	“the	whole”	of	a	narrative	to	recognize	the	trajectory	
of	the	plot	(as	in	Aristotle,	see	Ricoeur	1984:38).	In	this	view,	there	is	a	theoretical	affinity	between	
the	concept	of	narrative	desire	I	import	from	literary	theory	and	the	notion	of	framing	discussed	in	
the	previous	chapter.	Combined,	they	can	be	used	to	understand	how	textual	elements	 in	news	
discourse	construct	specific	 frames	for	 the	 interpretation	of	 reported	events	and,	crucially,	 their	
consequences.	Some	news	frames	make	future	events	salient	in	order	to	let	the	reader	perceive	the	
likely	 resolution	of	conflict,	 say,	or	political	 struggles.	A	 framing	of	 struggle	may	be	 linked	 to	an	
intertextual	fabula.	For	example,	in	news	texts	on	scandals,	the	story	arcs	deployed	to	make	sense	
of	denunciations	and	consequences	 invoke	certain	futures	for	the	political	arena.	These	possible	
futures,	 in	 turn,	 are	 interesting	 to	 research	 because	 they	 are	 textual	 phenomena	 -	 objectively	
present	-	that	shape	the	condition	of	something	much	less	tangible,	namely	the	reception	and	the	
possible	cognitive	schemas	used	by	audience	members	for	interpretation.		
	
Neither	journalist	nor	pundit	are	creating	the	suspense	out	of	nowhere,	as	this	is	already	provided	
by	the	event	structure	of	the	scandal.	Any	journalist	reporting	on	corruption,	however,	knows	that	
the	reader	would	like	to	find	out	what	happened,	and,	in	all	likelihood,	wants	to	get	to	the	bottom	
herself.	The	implied	reader	of	such	journalistic	texts	is	presupposed,	by	and	through	the	journalistic	
oeuvre,	 to	want	 resolution.	Although	many	possible	patterns	of	media	 text	consumption	can	be	
imagined,	 and	 no	 single	 consumption	 pattern	 exhaustively	 determines	 the	 meaning-carrying	
possibilities	of	the	text	(Hall	1980[1973]),	the	fulfilment	of	that	desire	is	certainly	a	significant	aim	
for	consumption	when	producing	texts	that	reveal	secret	information.	If	a	news	report	on	corruption	
sometimes	reads	like	a	detective	novel,	it	is	no	coincidence.		
	
Whereas	 literature,	 according	 to	 Bal,	 has	 some	 structural	 limitations	 regarding	 anticipation	 and	
foreshadowing	 (because	 anticipation	 kills	 suspense),	 news	media	 are	more	 attuned	 to	 the	 live	
moment	and	even	to	prediction	about	futures	(see	the	section	1.5	on	pundits):	The	journalists	and	
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especially	commentators	are	thrown	in	to	the	here-and-now	but	may	venture	informed	guesses	in	
order	 to	 present	 coherency	 and	 legitimize	 claims	 of	 newsworthiness.	 Conjecture	 enters	 the	
journalistic	 production	 of	 apparent	 facts,	 although	 the	 guess-work	 is	 hedged	 through	 various	
modalities	and	linguistic	inflections	(Montgomery	2007:125).	This	is	one	of	the	major	implicit	claims	
of	news	media,	but	one	that	is	rarely	acknowledged	and	needs	to	be	unpacked:	When	standing	in	
the	stream	of	time,	gauging	the	flow,	anticipating	the	future,	newsworkers	perform	a	service	to	the	
public	 by	 structuring	 expectations	 of	 the	 event	 horizon.	 The	 prerogative	 and	 competence	 of	
journalists	and	pundits	to	anticipate	futures	are	rarely	questioned,	however.	
	
In	television	news,	the	prediction	and	conjecture	is	furthermore	ultimately	sanctioned	by	the	whole	
media	 organization	 in	 the	 metonymical	 form	 of	 the	 anchor,	 who	 occupies	 and	 embodies	 the	
authoritative	position	of	the	whole	media	institution.	As	Montgomery	(ibid.:129)	notes,	the	anchor	
always	duly	thanks	the	on-site	reporter	or	commentator,	as	if	they	had	not	in	advance	agreed	to	the	
exact	 insights	presented.	Even	more	than	the	two-way	with	on-site	reporters,	 the	two-way	with	
pundits	 allows	 for	 this	 exchange	 of	 authority	 and	 conjecture:	 Assessments	 of	 political	 strength,	
intentionality,	 space	 for	 agency	 etc.	 is	 discussed	 with	 the	 commentator,	 as	 are	 the	 possible	
consequences	 of	 transpired	 events.	 Through	 these	 two-ways,	 the	 behind-the-scenes	 are	
represented	and	the	“real”	intentions	of	the	actors	are	described	and	evaluated.		
	
The	 combination	 of	 uncertain	 pasts,	 conjectural	 interpretations	 and	 contested	 readings	 of	 the	
future	means	that	each	event	may	be	reported	as	a	phase	in	an	on-going	process	(and	this	may	be	
represented	in	any	number	of	ways:	through	contest	frames,	sports	match	metaphors,	or	structures	
from	a	quest	fabula,	to	mention	a	few).	The	way	that	trials	are	covered	by	Brazilian	media	tend	to	
take	on	the	form	of	a	power	struggle,	as	does	the	maneuvers	executed	by	Congressmen	to	delay	or	
enact	bills,	votes,	or	reforms.	Because	reporting	is	done	in	media	res,	narrative	closure	is	delayed,	
but	some	moments	of	closure	do	exist	which	are	often	institutionally	defined.	I	will	demonstrate	
the	desire	for	closure,	and	the	staging	of	political	trench-warfare	at	work,	in	the	following	chapters,	
in	the	reporting	and	commentary	surrounding	the	trial	of	the	Mensalão	scandal,	the	impeachment	
proceedings,	and	the	disciplinary	process	of	Eduardo	Cunha.		
	
The	desire	for	narrative	closure	is	the	point	where	temporality	is	connected	to	characters,	invested	
with	values.	Most	story	arcs	on	corruption	point	towards	an	endpoint	-	usually	an	ending	with	either	
the	fall	of	the	accused	(through	impeachment,	removal	from	office,	or	sentence	and	prison	time),	
or,	 inversely,	 the	 accused	 politician’s	 success	 in	 overcoming	 the	 legal	 processes	 and	 political	
problems.	
			
	
2.5	Characters,	Focalization,	and	Value	Systems	
The	description	of	individual	actors	is	usually,	but	not	exclusively,	limited	to	the	factual	in	the	news	
–	titles,	positions,	relations,	party	allegiance.	This	doesn't	rule	out	that	readers	might	infer	a	range	
of	information	from	the	actions	described	in	the	news,	especially	from	the	modality	and	vocabulary	
used	 to	 describe	 them.	Minimal	 characterizations	 are	 sometimes	 colored	 by	 verbs	 and	 adverbs	
describing	actions	or	speech	acts	–	e.g.	calm	and	purposeful,	or	heated	and	furious	–	fitting	both	
with	the	emplotment	and	the	“clustered	conventions	of	news	story	genres”	(Cornfield	1992:50).		
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When	 quoting	 direct	 speech	 or	 reproducing	 (textual)	 public	 statements,	 news	 texts	 may	 allow	
sources	to	impose	their	self-evaluations	upon	the	reader:	Letting	a	source	express	a	”vehement”	
rebuttal	of	allegations,	or	citing	the	president's	”laments”	about	the	condition	of	Brazilian	politics.	
Such	quotes	combine	with	the	rest	of	the	news	discourse	to	produce	representations	of	the	subject	
that	partly	overlap	with	the	self-presentation	(Goffman	1959).	This,	in	some	cases,	has	the	effect	of	
focalizing	 the	 text.	 The	 notion	 of	 focalization	 in	 narratology	 designates	 the	 point-of-view,	 in	
common	parlance,	or	the	perceiving	and	representing	angle	of	vision	(Bal	1997:142).	This	notion	in	
principle	has	no	room	in	journalistic	texts,	but	even	though	the	style	of	news	reports	ideally	dictates	
an	external	narrator,	some	news	items	are	actually	focalizing	the	view	of	characters	–	the	witnesses,	
the	investigators,	the	defenders.	Thus,	”the	personalization	of	politics”	(Vliegenthaart,	Boomgarden	
and	Boumans	2011),	a	term	in	common	discourse	that	carry	derogatory	connotations,	is	partly	an	
effect	of	certain	focalization	styles	used	in	news	media,	ascribing	agency	to	individuals	rather	than	
the	political	system	as	a	whole.	In	Brazilian	reporting	on	scandals,	this	style	is	frequently	used.	While	
the	daily	newspapers	of	Brazil	rarely	”peek	over	the	shoulder”	of	a	character	by	reframing	individual	
narratives	of	corruption	or	innocence,	the	weekly	magazines	often	use	a	more	explicitly	narrative	
style,	recounting	how	certain	decisions	were	made	and	events	transpired	(see	for	example	section	
4.1,	quotes	E#889	and	F20/6).	
	
In	the	media	narration	of	scandals,	just	like	in	oral	storytelling,	the	continuous	circulation	of	story	
elements	and	actors	explores	and	expresses	societal	values:	
	
…	scholars	assume	that	those	stories	with	a	long	“shelf-life”	are	significant	in	some	larger	sense:	They	speak	to	
the	moral	values,	fears	or	fantasies	of	the	people.	Media	scandals,	or	any	media	story	that	has	staying	power,	
should	be	explored	in	the	same	way,	for	the	values	and	boundaries	they	are	expressing	(Bird	1997:107).		
	
Scandals	 thus	 allocate	 value	 to	 the	actants	 and	 the	 social	 space	described.	Political	 scandals	 (in	
contrast	to	financial	or	sexual-political	scandals),	“are	based	on	the	disclosure	of	activities	which	
infringe	the	rules	governing	the	acquisition	and	or	exercise	of	political	power	as	such”	(Thompson	
2000:121).	Corruption	scandals	do	not	play	out	solely	in	the	legal	field,	however,	and	thus	do	not	
only	explore	the	legal	aspects	of	transgression	in	public	office:	
	
…	corruption	cannot	be	seen	strictly	as	a	legal	concept.	In	the	tangled	web	of	legality	and	morality,	the	concept	
of	corruption	often	goes	beyond	the	category	of	the	criminal.	We	can	observe	this	when	a	public	servant	has	
juggled	a	bit	too	deftly	with	principles	and	codes	of	conduct,	or	when	a	politician	has	grafted	or	embezzled,	
but	still	slid	through	the	cracks	of	the	legal	system:	The	condemnations	of	the	act	and	the	outrage	displayed	in	
press	and	visual	media	shows	that	transgression	is	not	only	perceived	in	relation	to	a	legal	framework.	Laws,	
whether	bendable	or	clear-cut,	are	just	one	set	of	configurations	enacting	a	moral	order	of	justification.	Other	
values	can	be	at	stake,	and	critique	of	perceived	corruption	frequently	invokes	extra-legal	moralities	(although	
such	moral	frames	may	very	well	be	implicit).	Thus,	in	many	cases	people	perceive	a	corrupt	act	to	be	offensive,	
even	if	the	act	is	not	strictly	illegal.	Why?	Because	a	corrupt	act	constitutes	a	transgression	relative	to	several	
ideas	about	the	common	good	and	their	associated	modes	of	justifying	or	criticizing	actions.	
	
This,	of	course,	makes	 for	good	television	as	well	as	 flaming	headlines:	As	 the	scandal	breaks,	critique	and	
condemnation	forms	the	bulk	of	the	news	material	until	(if	ever)	evidence	is	produced	and	a	juridical	process	
is	 initiated.	 Across	 a	 range	 of	 positions,	 including	 economic,	 liberal-democratic,	 juridical,	 institutional,	
developmental	and	moral	standpoints,	the	normative	condemnation	of	corruption	is	agreed	upon.	But	every	
position	in	this	repertoire	hinges	upon	a	particular	notion	of	the	common	good:	for	the	sake	of	equality	before	
the	law,	for	mutual	economic	benefit,	for	the	quality	of	public	institutions…	(Damgaard	2015b:414)		
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Thus,	scandals	do	not	simply	deal	with	a	hegemonic	public	morality,	but	bring	forth	a	range	of	value	
judgements	 from	 multiple	 perspectives.	 An	 unjustifiable	 action	 that	 harms	 the	 common	 good	
demands	some	kind	of	reaction	that	enforce	the	boundary,	but	a	scandal	does	not	automatically	or	
necessarily	bring	about	punishment.	Loopholes,	political	and	legal	tactics	may	save	the	transgressor.	
In	this	way,	the	problem	of	 justice	appears	 in	scandals	overlaying	the	motif	of	transgression	and	
infringement,	and	the	rule	of	law	(whether	effective	or	fraught)	is	interwoven	into	the	set	of	themes	
and	values	that	are	actualized	in	scandals.		
	
The	fabulas	found	in	news	on	scandal	locate	individual	actants	in	such	complex	systems	of	values.	
The	 actants	 are	 not	 necessarily	 locked	 in	 the	 corners	 of	 such	 a	 system,	 but	may	move	 around,	
depending	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 scandal	 (see	 for	 example	Gronbeck	 1997	 on	 the	 Clinton	
couple’s	skilled	management	of	the	Lewinsky	affair).	Before	I	consider	the	dynamic	possibilities	of	
developing	 and	 permutating	 fabulas,	 I	 will	 sketch	 out	 a	 view	 of	 actantial	 value	 positions	 in	
emplotment	from	classic	narratology.		
	
Even	if	though	the	subject-actants	of	narratives	are	not	explicitly	characterized	through	qualifying	
attributes,	their	location	in	the	plot	still	endows	them	with	qualities.	To	the	Russian	formalist	Propp,	
characters	 were	 reducible	 to	 their	 narrative	 functions;	 the	 hero	 of	 a	 quest	 tale	 was	 never	 a	
psychological	subject	like	in	a	novel,	but	a	vehicle	for	the	development	of	the	story	(Propp	1928).	In	
the	 later	French	structuralism	of	Lévi-Strauss	and	especially	Greimas,	 the	characters	came	to	be	
seen	 as	 invested	with	 values.	 To	be	more	precise,	 to	Greimas	 a	 character	 “is	 defined,	 in	 a	way	
analogous	to	society,	by	the	assumption	of	contents	in	which	he	invests	and	which	constitute	his	
personality,	and	by	the	disclaiming	of	contents	which	he	rejects”	(Greimas	and	Rastier	1968:95-96).	
Greimas	 worked	 out	 the	 logical	 limits	 of	 categories	 of	 social	 values,	 based	 on	 Lévi-Strauss’	
anthropological	analysis	of	sexual	relations.	With	several	overlaid	systems	of	values	–	for	example,	
basic	economic	value	combined	with	a	schema	of	socially	sanctioned	or	prohibited	sexual	relations	
–	Greimas	could	pin	down	the	complex	relationship	characteristics	of	Balzac’s	characters.		
	
Figure	2.1.	Three	value	schemas	of	sexual	relations	(Greimas	and	Rastier	1968)		 	
	
	 	 Social	system	 (Lévi-Strauss)	 	 	 	 Individual	system	
Permitted	and	unacceptable	sexual	relations	 	 Desired	and	feared	sexual	relations	
(matrimonial)	 	 (abnormal)	
Prescribed									 forbidden	 	 	 	 desired	 	 feared	
		 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X	
permitted	 	 not	prescribed	 	 	 not	feared	 	 not	desired	
(normal)	 	 (non-matrimonial)	
	
Economic	model	of	sexual	relations	
Profitable	 	 Harmful	
	 	 X	
Non-harmful	 	 Unprofitable	
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I	will	here	attempt	to	create	similar	schemas	of	values,	relevant	to	political	scandals.	First,	a	schema	
identical	to	the	first	Lévi-Straussian	schema	above,	that	maps	out	a	field	of	political	transgression:	
	
Figure	2.2.	A	double	value	schema	of	prescribed	and	forbidden	political	behavior	
	
Political	system	
Politically	sanctioned	and	transgressive	behavior	
(Obligations)	 	 (Transgression)	
Prescribed	 	 Forbidden	
	 	 X	
Permitted	 	 Not	prescribed	
(non-transgressive)	 (Non-obligations)	 	
	
Dutifully	complying	with	the	obligations	of	public	office,	a	politician	is	expected	to	stay	within	the	
left-side	zone,	but	she	or	he	can	also	in	some	cases	act	as	a	private	person	(in	contradiction	to	their	
role	in	public	office)	as	long	as	this	does	not	transgress	the	obligations	of	office.	A	politician	may	still	
vote	at	elections,	for	example,	or	hold	aesthetic	opinions	and	promote	personal	causes	in	their	off-
time.	The	area	of	transgression	increases	with	the	importance	of	office,	so	that	presidents	have	very	
limited	 space	 to	 be	 “private,”	 while	 state	 representatives	 in	 Congress	 in	 some	 situations	 are	
expected	to	think	of	their	local	constituencies	first,	and	the	common	good	second.	
	
Such	 a	 schema	of	 political	 transgressions	 could	 be	overlaid	 in	 scandals	with	 another	 schema	of	
sanctions	 and	 justice.	 In	 this	 second	 schema,	 we	 see	 the	 logical	 possibilities	 of	 impunity	 and	
miscarriage	of	justice,	as	well	as	the	legally-normatively	desired	zones	of	innocent	and	sentenced	
individual	positions:		
	
Figure	2.3.	A	double	value	schema	of	guilt	and	punishment	
	
Legal	system	
Individual	object	positions	in	judicial	processes	
	
No	sanction	 	 Impunity	
Innocent	 	 Guilty	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 X	
Not	guilty	 	 Not	innocent	
Punished	 	 Punished	 	
	
In	other	words,	once	political	 transgression	 is	observed	and	made	public,	 the	transgressor	shifts	
status	or	position	in	the	schema:	the	upper-left	position	is	changed	for	the	upper-right.	If	a	trial	finds	
the	transgressor	guilty,	this	action	shifts	the	position	again,	this	time	to	the	bottom-right	position.	
A	miscarriage	of	justice,	then,	is	the	bottom-left	corner,	where	no	crime	has	been	committed,	but	
punishment	still	has	been	enacted.	This	maps	out	the	logically	possible	oppositions	of	culpability	
and	punishment	of	antagonists.		
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In	 a	 narrative	 about	 a	 corruption	 investigation	 and	 consequent	 trial,	 the	 logical	 protagonists	 of	
would	 be	 judges	 and	 prosecutors	 (or	 to	 be	 more	 precise,	 if	 the	 fabula	 as	 endpoint	 a	 final	
confrontation	in	court,	it	inevitably	lends	protagonism	to	judicial	actors).	A	separate	schema	could	
govern	the	value	system	pertaining	to	these	authorities	as	they	strive	to	establish	truth	and	make	
correct	judgments:	
	
Figure	2.4.	A	double	value	schema	of	prescribed	behavior	of	judicial	actors	
	
Legal	system	
Individual	subject	positions	in	judicial	world	
(Truthful)	 	 (Biased)	
Competent	 	 Partisan	 	 	 	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Non-partisan	 	 Incompetent	 	 	 	
(Non-biased)	 	 (Deceitful)	
	
Journalists	might	also	be	thought	of	as	the	protagonists,	in	the	sense	that	they	expose	wrong-doing,	
bring	 about	 political	 pressure	 and	 even	 trigger	 purifying	 events	 such	 as	 hearings	 in	 the	 Ethics	
Commission	of	Congress.	Both	journalistic	and	judicial	protagonists'	roles	are	thus	ideally	located	at	
one	far	end	of	a	continuum	between	disclosure	and	occultation,	transparency	and	secrecy.	Logically,	
their	quest	for	truth	could	be	corrupted	by	partisan	interests	or	incompetence.	
	
It	should	be	noted,	with	Jameson,	that	even	if	Greimas’	schemas	appear	as	static	as	Propp’s	actant-
functions,	the	advantage	in	Greimas’	model	of	actants	is	that	the	manifest	characters	do	not	need	
to	“fit”	1:1	with	the	values	found	in	the	corners	of	the	model:			
	
From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 what	 is	 problematical	 about	 Propp's	 character-functions	 (hero,	 donor,	 villain)	 or	
Greimas'	more	 formalized	 actants	 emerges	when	 it	 turns	out	 that	we	are	merely	being	 asked	 to	drop	 the	
various	elements	of	the	surface	narrative	into	these	various	prepared	slots...	this	method	celebrates	its	true	
triumphs,	and	proves	to	be	a	methodological	improvement	over	Propp,	precisely	in	those	moments	in	which	
Greimas	is	able	to	show	a	disjunction	between	the	narrative	surface	and	the	underlying	actantial	mechanisms.	
Actantial	reduction	is	indeed	particularly	revealing	in	those	instances	in	which	the	surface	unity	of	"character"	
can	be	analytically	dissolved,	by	showing,	as	Greimas	does	in	certain	of	his	readings,	that	a	single	character	in	
reality	conceals	the	operation	of	two	distinct	actants.	(Jameson	1981:112)	
	
Non-person	 actors	 are	 possible	 within	 a	 fabula,	 according	 to	 Bal.	 Immaterial	 concepts	 are	
sometimes	 implied	 as	 actors	 -	 Justice	 could	 be	 an	 object,	 and	 the	 justice	 system	 could	 be	 an	
opponent,	just	as	groups	(parties,	coalitions,	populations,	judicial	or	media	professionals)	should	be	
considered	as	actors.	The	Constitution	of	1988	frequently	emerges	as	a	factor	in	discussions	and	
editorials	 (e.g.	 Guazina,	 Araújo	 and	 Prior	 2017:14),	 viewed	 as	 a	 non-person	 actor,	 either	 as	 an	
obstacle	(opponent)	or	guarantee	of	justice	(helper).			
	
While	the	analytical	tools	of	narratology	pertained	originally	to	works	of	fiction,	the	same	tools	may	
generate	insights	into	the	textual	functions	of	news	texts.	Chief	among	these	functions,	as	described	
above,	is	the	function	of	focalization,	which	centers	the	plot	around	a	person	or	even	a	non-person	
actor,	and	the	investment	of	values	in	the	actants	of	a	story.	The	values	are	structured	in	systems,	
and	 I	have	argued	above	that	 the	structural	 theories	of	Lévi-Strauss	and	Greimas	may	engender	
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insights	into	the	value	systems	expressed	in	news	texts.	However,	these	theories	may	also	be	used	
to	question	the	unsaid	and	unsignified	of	such	texts.		
	
	
2.6	The	Political	Unconscious	of	the	Brazilian	Mediascape	
In	his	seminal	1981	book,	The	Political	Unconscious,	Fredric	Jameson	revisited	the	structuralist	ideas	
and	 methods	 of	 Lévi-Strauss	 and	 Greimas	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 an	 imminently	 political	 (and	
Althusserian	 Marxist)	 reading	 of	 literature.	 This	 came	 just	 at	 the	 moment	 where	 French	 post-
structuralism	 (from	 Derrida,	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 to	 Baudrillard	 and	 Lyotard)	 had	 gained	
prominence	in	 international	 literature	and	cultural	studies.	Jameson	however	 insisted	that	 it	still	
made	 sense	 to	 search	 for	 structures	 in	 the	 socially	 symbolic	 acts	of	 literature,	 although	he	 (like	
Deleuze)	balked	at	the	idea	of	reducing	all	such	acts	to	one	set	of	meaning	through	the	application	
a	 previously	 given	 master	 code	 or	 master	 narrative	 (1981:6-7).	 Such	 “master	 narratives	 have	
inscribed	themselves	in	the	texts	as	well	as	in	our	thinking	about	them”	(ibid.:19).		
	
Instead,	Jameson	developed	the	notion	that	everything	is	political	(ibid.:5),	as	the	conceptual	act	of	
hedging	 off	 the	 private	 and	 psychological	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 reification	 of	 the	 symptom	 of	
contemporary	life.	His	project,	in	The	Political	Unconscious,	is	to	detect	the	traces	of	class	struggles	
in	the	“single	vast	unfinished	plot”	of	human	history,	and	to	restore	“to	the	surface	of	the	text	the	
repressed	 and	 buried	 reality	 of	 this	 fundamental	 history”	 (ibid.:4).	 Paraphrasing	 Lévi-Strauss,	
Jameson	urged	researchers	to	recover	the	pensée	sauvage	of	various	historical	moments	in	order	
to	unearth	the	contradictions	of	the	particular	political	struggles	upon	which	any	text	work.	Unlike	
some	Marxist	scholars	of	the	period,	Jameson	was	wary	of	equaling	social	structures	and	cultural	
products,	and	he	denounced	several	theoretical	concepts	(such	as	“mediation”	and	“homology”)	
that	to	him	simplified	the	relation	between	text	and	Umwelt	(ibid.:20-30).		
	
Having	paved	the	way,	he	suggested	a	method	for	analyzing	“the	structure	of	a	particular	political	
fantasy”	(ibid.:33)	that	sets	out	from	Greimasian	semiotics,	with	the	caveat	that	his	method	should	
not	produce	a	totalizing	system	of	ultimate	meaning	in	the	text,	but	instead	show	how	ideological	
closure	is	projected	(sometimes	realized,	sometimes	unrealized)	in	particular	symbolic	systems	that	
underpin	texts.	Semiotic	structures,	like	the	systems	of	values	described	by	Greimas,	are	immanent	
in	human	cultures,	but	not	necessarily	complete	at	any	given	point:	
	
…	the	various	superposed	and	homologous	quadrants—e.g.,	for	sexual	relations,	the	four	logical	possibilities	
of	marital	relations,	normal	relations,	abnormal	relations	and	extramarital	relations;	for	rule	systems,	those	of	
prescriptions,	taboos,	nonprescriptions,	nontaboos—far	from	designating	the	concrete	kinship	or	legal	systems	
of	 any	 specific	 and	 historical	 human	 community,	 on	 the	 contrary	 constitute	 the	 empty	 slots	 and	 logical	
possibilities	 necessarily	 obtaining	 in	 all	 of	 them,	 against	 which	 the	 content	 of	 a	 given	 social	 text	 is	 to	 be	
measured	and	sorted	out.	 In	this	sense,	the	semantic	or	semiotic	structures	articulated	in	Greimas'	scheme	
seem	to	map	out	what	he	takes	to	be	the	 logical	structure	of	reality	 itself,	and	stand	as	the	fundamental	
categories	of	that	reality,	whatever	its	particular	historical	form;	if	this	 is	the	case,	then	his	would	be	what	
Umberto	Eco	has	termed	an	"ontological	structuralism,"	one	for	which	structure	is	transhistorical	and	endowed	
with	at	least	the	being	and	the	permanence	of	the	categories	of	logic	or	mathematical	thought.		
…	[Greimas’]	apparently	static	analytical	scheme,	organized	around	binary	oppositions	rather	than	dialectical	
ones…	can	be	re-appropriated	for	a	historicizing	and	dialectical	criticism	by	designating	it	as	the	very	locus	and	
model	of	ideological	closure.	Seen	in	this	way,	the	semiotic	rectangle	becomes	a	vital	instrument	for	exploring	
the	semantic	and	ideological	intricacies	of	the	text—not	so	much	because,	as	in	Greimas'	own	work,	it	yields	
the	objective	possibilities	according	to	which	landscape	and	the	physical	elements,	say,	must	necessarily	be	
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perceived,	as	rather	because	it	maps	the	limits	of	a	specific	ideological	consciousness	and	marks	the	conceptual	
points	beyond	which	that	consciousness	cannot	go,	and	between	which	it	is	condemned	to	oscillate.	(ibid.:31-
32,	emphasis	mine)	
	
In	Chapter	6,	I	return	to	this	instrument	for	an	analysis	of	the	intricacies	of	Brazilian	scandal	fabulas.	
With	Jameson,	I	will	hypothesize	that	the	fabulas	are	solutions	to	contradictions;	or	rather	that	the	
fabulas	must	set	in	motion	contradictions	of	the	social	world	from	which	they	emerge,	acting	out	or	
attempting	to	act	out	possible	solutions	to	these	contradictions.	As	expressions	of	the	same	socio-
political	dilemmas,	or	as	proposed	solutions	to	such	dilemmas,	fabulas	emerging	from	news	stories	
are	 also	 bound	 to	 certain	 story	 logic,	 trapped	 within	 logical	 boundaries	 and	 contradictions	
embedded	in	the	material	and	social	world.	This	move	also	decenters	 individual	newsworkers	as	
authors:	their	texts	should	be	understood,	in	their	totality	and	intertextuality,	as	acts	of	storytelling,	
but	the	site	of	the	tribe’s	campfire	is	now	relocated	to	so	many	instances	of	textual,	audio-visual,	
printed	or	online	sites	of	narration.	Like	premodern	narrators	until	Homer,	the	narrators	of	news	
partake	in	a	shared	storytelling	practice,	bound	to	oscillate	within	the	limits	of	a	certain	political	
unconsciousness.	 Like	 premodern	 narrators,	 the	 journalistic	 storytelling	 voice	 is	 a	 cultural,	 non-
individualistic	 point	 of	 enunciation.	 The	 news	 report,	 evolved	 in	 the	 course	 of	 two	 centuries	 of	
gradually	developing	genre	conventions	of	objectivity	and	fact-centricity,	(Schudson	1978),	however	
preserves	some	of	the	mythical	in	its	format,	narratives,	and	ideology	(Silverstone	1981).	
	
	
2.7	Imagining	the	Nation,	the	State,	and	Culture	
Not	coincidentally,	the	journalistic	conventions	and	public	consciousness	of	the	Nation	emerged	in	
tandem.	The	act	of	imagining	national	community,	according	to	Benedict	Anderson,	was	in	fact	tied	
to	the	development	of	quintessential	media	formats	such	as	newspaper	and	novel.		The	imagined	
national	 community	 is	 partly	 constructed	 by	 the	 media	 practices	 that	 invoke	 this	 community	
textually	 (Anderson	 1983:28-46)	 or,	 to	 be	 more	 precise,	 practices	 that	 invoke	 this	 community	
intertextually.	Media	discourse	articulating	concepts	of	nation	and	nationality	groups	together	and	
organizes	 individuals	 in	specific	ways,	all	 the	while	excluding	other	groupings	and	other	ways	of	
belonging	 together.	 “The	 Nation,”	 imagined	 to	 be	 co-extant	 with	 the	 community	 of	 readers,	
emerges	as	an	intertextual	construct	from	the	practice	and	everyday	sense-making	and	reading	of	
news	and	literature.	Anderson	considers	
	
the	basic	structure	of	two	forms	of	 imagining	which	first	flowered	in	Europe	in	the	eighteenth	century:	the	
novel	 and	 the	 newspaper.	 For	 these	 forms	 provided	 the	 technical	 means	 for	 're-presenting'	 the	 kind	 of	
imagined	community	that	is	the	nation.	[…The	novel]	is	clearly	a	device	for	the	presentation	of	simultaneity	in	
'homogeneous,	empty	time,'	or	a	complex	gloss	upon	the	word	'meanwhile'.	(ibid.:24-25)	
	
The	emergence	of	national	communities,	and	with	them	notions	of	“nationhood,”	are	symptoms	of	
abrupt	discontinuities	of	consciousness,	similar	to	the	discontinuity	between	Classical	thought	and	
modern	discourse	formations	uncovered	by	Foucault.	It	is	an	evolving	global	consciousness,	with	a	
“conception	of	 the	newspaper	 [that]	 implies	the	refraction	of	even	 'world	events'	 into	a	specific	
imagined	world	of	vernacular	readers”	(ibid.:63).	Anderson	connects	the	imagination	of	a	national	
readership	to	the	national	subject,	through	a	literary	example	from	Indonesia.	The	example	features	
an	embedding	of	a	fictional	newspaper	quote,	which	Anderson	characterizes	as	fitting,		
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for,	if	we	now	turn	to	the	newspaper	as	cultural	product,	we	will	be	struck	by	its	profound	fictiveness.	What	is	
the	essential	literary	convention	of	the	newspaper?	If	we	were	to	look	at	a	sample	front	page	of,	say,	The	New	
York	Times,	we	might	find	there	stories	about	Soviet	dissidents,	famine	in	Mali,	a	gruesome	murder,	a	coup	in	
Iraq,	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 rare	 fossil	 in	 Zimbabwe,	 and	 a	 speech	 by	 Mitterrand.	 Why	 are	 these	 events	 so	
juxtaposed?	What	 connects	 them	 to	 each	 other?	 Not	 sheer	 caprice.	 Yet	 obviously	 most	 of	 them	 happen	
independently,	without	the	actors	being	aware	of	each	other	or	of	what	the	others	are	up	to.	The	arbitrariness	
of	their	inclusion	and	juxtaposition	(a	later	edition	will	substitute	a	baseball	triumph	for	Mitterrand)	shows	that	
the	linkage	between	them	is	imagined.	This	imagined	linkage	derives	from	two	obliquely	related	sources.	The	
first	is	simply	calendrical	coincidence.	The	date	at	the	top	of	the	newspaper,	the	single	most	important	emblem	
on	it,	provides	the	essential	connection	-	the	steady	onward	clocking	of	homogeneous,	empty	time.	Within	
that	time,	'the	world'	ambles	sturdily	ahead.	The	sign	for	this:	if	Mali	disappears	from	the	pages	of	The	New	
York	Times	after	two	days	of	famine	reportage,	for	months	on	end,	readers	do	not	for	a	moment	imagine	that	
Mali	has	disappeared	or	 that	 famine	has	wiped	out	all	 its	 citizens.	The	novelistic	 format	of	 the	newspaper	
assures	 them	 that	 somewhere	 out	 there	 the	 'character'	 Mali	 moves	 along	 quietly,	 awaiting	 its	 next	
reappearance	in	the	plot.	(ibid.:33)	
	
Nations	may	 thus	 appear	 as	 quasi-characters,	 historical	 entities	moving	 forward	 in	 time,	 in	 the	
newspaper	 imaginaries.	 Here,	 the	 manifest	 characters	 deployed	 in	 the	 fabula	 –	 police	 agents,	
judges,	politicians,	money-launderers,	and	journalists	–	could	be	considered	as	tokens	or	avatars	of	
specific	parts	of	the	nation,	as	allegories	of	collective	subject-actants	within	the	nation	in	a	larger	
system	of	class	discourse	(Jameson	1981:72).		
	
The	media	exposé	of	power,	or	something	similar	to	it,	has	been	a	feature	of	public	life	since	the	
very	start	of	the	structural	transformation	of	the	bourgeoisie	public	spheres	described	by	Habermas	
(1989[1962]).	 Disclosure	 of	 the	 vices	 of	 power	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 very	 start	 of	 the	 industrial	
revolution,	to	Elizabethean	England	and	France	under	Louis	XIV,	where	pamphleteers	lampooned	
members	of	political	and	royal	elites	for	their	moral	sins	(Thompson	2000:42-50,	Adut	2008:75-6).	
The	scandal	today	is	a	cultural	semiotic	production	that	is	publicly	available	(if	you	know	the	code),	
common	to	practically	all	societies	of	the	modern	global	world;	a	cultural	production	that	speaks	of	
power,	and	against	power.		
	
Scandalous	coverage,	like	news	coverage	and	news	media	in	general,	functions	as	mediator	of	value	
systems	(Martín-Barbero	2006:281),	and	indeed	the	very	possibility	of	hegemonic	national	culture	
in	 Latin	 America	was	 tied	 to	 the	 projects	 of	 establishing	modern	media	 (Martín-Barbero	 1997).	
According	 to	 Martín-Barbero,	 scandal	 and	 sensationalist	 coverage	 in	 popular	 newspapers	 was	
always	a	mix	of	news,	poetry,	and	popular	narratives	(ibid.:245),	displaying	celebrities	and	the	elite	
as	cultural	heroes	or	villains	in	melodramas.	Thus,	the	roots	of	scandal	in	Latin	America	runs	deep	
into	the	soil	of	myth.	In	this	sense,	scandal	at	large	may	be	thought	of	as	Text	(in	the	sense	of	Kristeva	
1980:37),	a	semiotic	practice	within	general	culture	that	exists	as	permutations	of	an	intertextuality.	
A	 particular	 instance	 of	 scandal	 –	 a	 news	 report,	 say	 –	 is	 merely	 one	 utterance	 among	 many	
utterances,	sharing	the	same	function	in	the	literary	play	of	forms	(Jameson	1981:61).	
	
Even	the	State	itself	could	be	an	actant	of	fabulas,	sometimes	protecting,	sometimes	leeching	off	
the	Nation.	The	imaginary	of	the	corrupt	State	was	explored	by	Akhil	Gupta,	who	pointed	out	that	
the	Indian	state	appeared	as	an	imagined	entity	that	people	made	sense	of	by	telling	and	reading	
stories	about	corruption.	Given	the	theme	of	this	thesis,	a	combination	of	Gupta’s	and	Anderson’s	
insights	may	provide	clues	as	to	how	the	story-telling	and	media	coverage	dealing	with	the	Lava-
Jato	case	can	also	be	construed	as	textual	constructions	of	“Brazil”	or	“the	Brazilian	State.”		
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Gupta	 noted	 that	 the	 state	 was	 becoming	 “implicated	 in	 the	 minute	 texture	 of	 everyday	 life”	
through	“the	everyday	practices	of	local	bureaucracies	and	the	discursive	construction	of	the	state	
in	public	culture.”	Gupta,	like	Anderson,	saw	that	nations	and	states	do	not	“map	unproblematically	
onto	different	spaces,”	but	emerges	from	public	cultural	practices	that	are	enacted	in	a	contested	
space	(Gupta	1995:375-377).	In	his	research,	Gupta	unfolded	the	practices	that	enable	a	discourse	
of	 the	 State	 which	 was	 interlaced	 constantly	 with	 a	 discourse	 of	 corruption.	 Both	 discourse	
formations	were	informed	by	and	cast	in	the	language	of	media	texts,	even	if	individuals	have	first-
hand	knowledge	of	corrupt	practices,	so	that	the	stories	that	people	tell	about	state	corruption	take	
on	forms	and	utilize	structures	found	in	media	coverage.	Thus,	if	“culture	is	ordinary,”	as	Raymond	
Williams	 argued	 (1989[1958]),	 the	 everyday	 recycling	 of	 stories	 about	 corruption	 is	 no	 less	 an	
everyday	cultural	production	of	meaning	about	the	nation-state	(Billig	1995:114).		
	
The	industry	of	news	media,	I	believe,	contributes	to	and	engages	in	“complex	strategies	of	cultural	
identification	and	discursive	address	that	function	in	the	name	of	‘the	people’	or	‘the	nation’	and	
make	them	immanent	subjects	of	a	range	of	social	and	literary	narratives”	(Bhabha	1994:140).	So,	
with	Hall	I	think	that	“we	make	an	absolutely	too	simple	distinction	between	narratives	about	the	
real	and	the	narratives	of	fiction”	(Hall	1984:6),	and	the	claim	to	facticity	of	news	obfuscates	the	
representational	and	story-telling	aspects	of	this	cultural	production.		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	argued	that	even	if	news	seems	to	be	treating	real	events,	the	many	authors	
involved	in	the	production	of	news	seem	unable	to	resist	narrativity,	and	students	of	news	must	
take	this	into	account	when	analyzing	news	texts	(Hall	1984).	I	propose	that	news	be	understood	in	
a	 distributed	 or	 decentered	 way,	 as	 fragments	 of	 a	 veritably	 un-authored	 cultural	 production.	
Narrativity	 function	 to	 structure	 semantic	 spaces	 temporally	 and	 causally	 by	 locating	 actors,	
contexts	and	frames	in	plots.	Narratives	are	assemblages	of	not	only	problems	and	solutions,	but	
integrated	ontologies	of	the	social.	Connecting	agency	and	characters	through	emplotment	(Somers	
1994:616),	narratives	possess	temporally	configurative	capacities	that	enable	meaning-making	and	
project	 identity-formation	 (Polletta	 1998:139).	 Because	 news	 texts	 partake	 in	 intertextually	
emergent	 narrative	 structures,	 narrative	 analysis,	 especially	 the	 temporal	 and	 value-thematic	
aspects	of	narratology,	can	be	deployed	to	generate	insights	into	the	structural	limits	of	meaning	
constructed	in	news.		News	on	scandals,	specifically,	partake	in	a	cultural	form	that	can	be	traced	
back	centuries,	wherein	hidden	truths	are	unmasked	and	the	machinations	of	power	are	revealed	
in	plots	featuring	political	elites	and	even	Nations	and	States	moving	along	on	story	arcs.		
	
Before	 I	 can	commence	such	an	analysis	of	 the	Lava-Jato	case,	however,	 I	will	 first	describe	 the	
Brazilian	mediascape	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 contemporary	 political	 journalism,	 the	 recent	
textual	 production	 concerning	 scandals	 in	 Brazil,	 and	 present	 the	 arguments	 for	 restricting	my	
sampling	of	journalistic	texts	on	scandals	to	a	subset	of	the	Brazilian	media	outlets.	
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Chapter	3	
The	Brazilian	Media	System	
	
The	 first	 sections	of	 this	chapter	provide	background	knowledge	 for	 readers	unfamiliar	with	 the	
Brazilian	media	 system.	 First,	 I	will	 outline	 the	 basic	 descriptive	 parameters	 used	 by	Hallin	 and	
Mancini	(2004,	2011)	in	their	comparative	analysis	of	media	systems.	Several	scholars	of	Brazilian	
media	 have	 criticized	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 parameters	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 context	 (Albuquerque	
2011),	as	well	as	the	way	that	the	model	of	media	systems	categorizes	national	media	systems	(ibid.,	
Miguel,	Biroli	and	Mota	2012).	In	this	thesis,	at	least	three	of	the	four	main	parameters	compared	
in	Hallin	and	Mancini’s	original	work	-	Development	of	mass	media,	Political	parallelism,	and	Role	of	
the	state	–	have	a	direct	bearing	on	the	media	environment	that	produced	the	scandals	analyzed	in	
the	following	chapters.	These	three	parameters	are	crucial	factors	in	the	production	and	texture	of	
political	journalism.		
	
The	first	of	the	three	parameters	cover	how	media	outlets	of	different	kinds	and	through	various	
technologies	 have	 grown	 historically	 and	 found	 audiences.	 As	 I	 describe	 this	 parameter	 of	 the	
Brazilian	media	system,	I	mostly	focus	on	the	print	and	television	news	industries,	identify	the	key	
actors,	and	assess	their	relative	strengths	and	salience	in	the	population.	The	second	parameter,	
political	parallelism,	deals	with	the	relationship	between	media	outlets	and	specific	societal	sectors	
and	political	 bases,	while	 the	parameter	 third	 covers	 the	 relationship	between	 state	and	media	
industry.	These	two	parameters	can	be	thought	of	as	explanatory	factors	for	textual	phenomena	
such	as	advocacy	journalism,	political	instrumentalization	and	ideological	bias,	which	are	discussed	
extensively	 among	 Brazilian	 scholars	 as	 the	 background	 of	 the	 latest	 decade	 of	 scandals	 (e.g.	
Lattman-Weltman	 and	 Chagas	 2016,	 Nascimento	 2013,	 Feres	 Júnior	 2016:284).	 The	 latter	 two	
parameters	 (concerning	 political	 parallelism	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state)	 are	 described	 here	 with	
emphasis	on	the	coverage	of	parties	and	governments,	and	the	ideological	leanings	of	the	central	
media	outlets	in	Brazil.	I	have	opted	not	to	discuss	the	parameter	of	professionalization,	and	the	
reader	 may	 instead	 refer	 to	 (Albuquerque	 and	 Silva	 2009,	 Herscovitz	 2012)	 for	 more	 on	 this	
parameter.	With	a	map	describing	the	lay	of	the	land,	we	might	get	a	sense	of	the	particular	ground	
that	shook	during	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.		
	
Finally,	I	will	unfold	three	key	examples	of	interaction	between	the	Brazilian	media	and	politics:	the	
electoral	coverage	of	the	last	decades,	the	coverage	of	the	Mensalão	scandal	2005-2012,	and	the	
coverage	 of	 the	 protests	 in	 June	 2013.	 These	 examples	 constitute	 the	 historical	 precedents	
immediately	 leading	up	 to	 the	political	 scandals	of	2014-2018,	but	 they	also	 illustrate	 the	 three	
parameters	of	the	media	systems	model.		
	
This	 chapter	 also	 explains	 the	 choice	 and	 limits	 of	 the	 empirical	 scope	 in	 this	 dissertation.	One	
important	starting	point	for	this	chapter	(and	for	the	sampling	strategy	chosen	for	this	thesis)	is	the	
concentration	of	ownership	and	vertical	integration	of	Brazilian	media,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	strong	
public	 broadcasting	 media	 (Lima	 2006,	 Matos	 2008,	 2012a).	 Because	 of	 the	 integration	 and	
concentration,	the	same	kinds	of	news	are	recycled	and	similar	media	agendas	propagate	through	
chains	of	news	outlets.	The	 largest	media	conglomerate,	the	Grupo	Globo,	controls	much	of	the	
regional	media	in	both	TV,	radio,	and	print,	as	well	as	the	most-viewed	national	channel,	the	second-
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most	viewed	news	channel,	the	third-largest	newspaper	(O	Globo)	and	weekly	magazine	(Época)	
and	the	largest	financial	newspaper	(Valor)	(Porto	2012,	Newman	et	al.	2015:40).		
	
The	Grupo	Globo	 is	 owned	 by	 one	 family,	 like	 the	 rest	 of	 large	 Brazilian	media	 conglomerates.	
Globo’s	 owners	 are	 brothers	 who	 inherited	 the	 executive	 positions	 from	 their	 father,	 Roberto	
Marinho,	 who	 held	 much	 political	 influence	 since	 the	 dictatorship	 period	 and	 throughout	 the	
transition	(Lima	2004).	Today,	the	media	business	empire	of	the	Marinhos	mostly	faces	challenges	
on	 the	 market	 for	 news	 production	 from	 the	 evangelical	 bishop	 Edir	 Macedo	 (who	 owns	 the	
broadcasting	network	Rede	Record),	by	the	Saad	family	running	the	Bandeirantes	network,	by	the	
Mesquita	family	(owning	the	newspaper	Estado	de	S.	Paulo	and	the	news	agency	Broadcast),	by	the	
Frias	brothers	(controlling	the	newspaper	Folha	de	S.	Paulo	and	the	UOL	online	platform),	and	by	
the	Civita	family	managing	the	Abril	group	with	the	flagship	weekly	Veja	(which	is	traditionally	the	
most-read	weekly	magazine,	ahead	of	IstoÉ	and	Grupo	Globo’s	Época).		
	
Currently,	all	of	the	broadcasting	networks	refashion	their	news	content	for	internet	platforms:	The	
current	market	leader	is,	again,	Globo	(Newman	et	al.	2017:107),	with	the	online	news	service	G1	
and	the	web	version	of	Globo	News	(the	conglomerate’s	24-hour	news	channel).	For	national	and	
regional	political	news,	G1	mostly	relies	on	the	journalistic	content	produced	in	Brasília	and	regional	
affiliated	newsrooms.	Many	commentary	spots	from	the	Globo	news	program	Jornal	das	Dez	and	
news	reports	from	Jornal	Nacional	are	shovelled	(a	term	defined	as	“repackaging	content	produced	
for	other	media,”	Paterson	and	Domingo	2008:7)	unto	the	G1	platform.	The	journal	O	Globo	also	
shovels	most	material	unto	the	site	oglobo.globo.com,	and	Época	does	the	same.	Like	Globo,	Rede	
Record	produces	shovelware	on	the	platform	R7.com	by	recycling	material	from	their	repertoire	of	
programs,	as	does	SBT	(at	their	site	Jornal	do	SBT	online)	and	Bandeirantes	(at	BandNews	Online).	
	
The	rest	of	the	Brazilian	regional	and	metropolitan	newspapers,	news	sites,	and	broadcasts	get	their	
national	political	news	mainly	from	three	news	agencies	and	mother-organizations	behind	those	
news	outlets.	
	
Not	only	the	penetration	of	[Rio-	and	São	Paulo-based]	newspapers	is	much	higher	[sic]	than	the	press	from	
other	regions,	but	they	also	tend	to	dominate	what	the	other	newspapers	publish.	Upon	analyzing	the	credited	
sources	of	stories	published	by	the	newspapers	(about	14%	of	stories	are	credited	to	news	agencies),	it	is	found	
that	 the	news	agencies	 associated	with	 two	newspapers	 (Folha	 and	Estado)	 are	 responsible	 for	 90%	of	 all	
agency-credited	news	published	by	the	newspapers…	Adding	the	Globo	agency,	the	percentage	is	95%.	This	
does	 not	 count	 news	 items	 that	 are	 simply	 appropriated	 by	 a	 newspaper	without	 credit,	 a	 very	 common	
phenomenon.	(Abramo	2007:99)	
	
In	Abramo’s	study,	the	power	of	the	vertically	integrated	media	organization	structure	is	apparent:	
News	emerges	in	the	regional	and	local	spheres	of	media	according	to	the	organizational	links	to	
national	media	organizations	and	news	agencies.	However,	according	to	Abramo,	the	coverage	is	
then	modified	by	local	relevance	and	political	ties,	so	that	regional	media	will	publish	material	on	
national	 corruption	 if	 a	 local	 politician	 is	 implicated,	 but,	 in	many	 cases,	will	 actively	 omit	 such	
information	because	of	personal	ties	to	media	owners	(ibid.:101).	The	same	tendency	is	especially	
salient	in	the	area	of	radio	broadcasting	(Boas	and	Hidalgo	2011:871).		
	
Given	the	vertical	integration	of	news	media	organizations	online,	in	print,	radio,	and	broadcasting,	
the	media	system	is	highly	concentrated,	dominated	by	a	few	family-owned	conglomerates,	with	a	
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few	 centrally	 placed	 newsrooms	 of	 what	 may	 be	 termed	 legacy	 media	 that	 produce	 news	 on	
national	politics.	In	the	following	three	subsections,	I	will	describe	how	this	media	system	structure	
emerged,	how	it	currently	relates	to	political	interests	and	state	regulation,	and	how	this	structure	
is	reflected	in	the	sampling	of	material	for	the	following	chapter.	
	
	
3.1	Development	of	mass	media	in	Brazil	
The	historical	development	of	a	mass	press	is	a	defining	parameter	of	a	media	system.	The	printing	
press	was	banned	in	Brazil	until	1808,	and	even	after	this,	the	crown	maintained	prerogatives	for	
restricting	freedom	of	press	(Sodré	1977).	In	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century,	Brazilian	newspapers	
were	tied	to	individual	political	projects,	as	the	bourgeoisie	was	small	and	literacy	very	restricted.	
In	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century,	 (relatively)	 large-scale	 industrial	print	runs	of	newspapers	
emerged	 in	 the	Southeastern	state	capitals	 (such	as	Estado	de	São	Paulo,	 founded	 in	1875	as	A	
Província	 de	 São	 Paulo;	 Jornal	 do	 Brasil,	 founded	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 1891;	 and	Correio	 do	 Povo,	
founded	in	Porto	Alegre	in	1895).	O	Globo	and	Folha	de	São	Paulo	(then	Folha	da	Manhã)	were	both	
founded	in	1925	(Azevedo	2006:93).	The	relative	circulation	of	such	newspapers	reached	an	apogee	
in	 the	1950’s	but	declined	 soon	after:	 “In	 the	early	 fifties,	 the	newspaper	 industry	 in	Brazil	was	
selling	 110.6	 copies	 per	 1,000	 people,	 a	 penetration	 figure	 that,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960’s,	 had	
declined	to	45.4	copies	and	then	went	further	down	to	36.7	copies	in	2014”	(Carro	2016:4).		
	
An	alternative	press	emerged	as	a	reaction	to	the	censorship	of	the	military	regime,	with	O	Pasquim,	
Opinião,	 Repórter,	 Movimento,	 and	 Pif-Paf	 as	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 and	 most	 read	
publications	 (Kucinski	1991).	During	the	transition	to	democracy	 (1985-88),	 the	alternative	press	
mostly	faded	away,	as	did	a	number	of	newspapers	(Jornal	do	Commercio,	A	Notícia,	and	Correio	da	
Manhã)	and	weeklies	 (such	as	Revista	da	Semana,	Fon-Fon,	O	Cruzeiro,	and	Manchete)	 that	had	
been	important	in	the	middle	of	the	century	(ibid.,	Sodré	1977).	By	1996,	the	UNESCO	figures	of	
newspaper	 circulation	 had	 dropped	 to	 40	 per	 1,000	 adult	 citizens,	 the	 lowest	 of	 the	 countries	
considered	in	Hallin	and	Papathanassopoulos	(2002:177).	This	figure	partly	disguises	the	fact	that	
Brazil’s	weekly	magazines	are	perhaps	the	only	print	media	which	could	be	properly	termed	“mass”	
media,	reaching	much	larger	print	runs	than	the	daily	newspapers.	The	leader,	Veja,	was	printed	in	
around	1	million	copies	in	2015,	and	at	various	points	of	modern	media	history	the	magazine	saw	
print	runs	of	more	than	one	million	copies.	Veja	is	published	by	the	Abril	group	and	was	founded	in	
1968	in	the	format	of	the	US	weekly	magazine	Time.	The	Veja	editor	and	founder	Mino	Carta	left	
the	magazine	in	1976	to	launch	the	competing	magazine	IstoÉ		for	the	Editora	Trés	(Porto	2010:114).	
The	Globo	conglomerate	launched	Época	as	another	rival	to	Veja	in	1998,	and	this	dominant	trio	of	
weeklies	 (Nascimento	2013)	has	taken	strong	anti-PT	stances	 in	the	 last	 two	decades	 (Biroli	and	
Miguel	2012:39ff).	CartaCapital,	 founded	as	a	monthly	magazine	by	Mino	Carta	 in	1994	 (weekly	
since	2001),	provides	a	counterpoint	to	the	three	mainstream	weeklies	for	a	left-wing	audience.	In	
2014-2016,	CartaCapital	 had	 only	 a	 few	 competitors	 competing	 for	 that	 target	 audience,	most	
prominently	the	printed	magazines	Caros	Amigos	and	Revista	Piauí,	(Damgaard	2018b:26).		
	
Since	 the	 transition,	with	a	growing	population,	growth	 in	 the	middle-class	and	 the	economy	 in	
general,	the	media	industry	expanded	(Nielsen	and	Levy	2010:12)	as	did	the	“vibrant	print	media	
sector”	(Porto	2010:113).	However,	the	three	quality	papers	that	are	normally	considered	national	
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publications	(despite	their	regional	character)	began	see	to	declining	circulation	around	the	time	of	
the	financial	crisis,	coinciding	with	improved	internet	access	in	the	Brazilian	middle-class:		
	
The	years	of	decline	of	already	low-circulation	papers	have	left	Brazil	with	three	traditional,	prestigious,	quality	
newspapers	with	national	outreach:	Folha	de	São	Paulo	and	Estado	de	São	Paulo	(located	in	the	ideological	
space	between	liberal	and	conservative	viewpoints),	and	the	Rio-based	Jornal	O	Globo,	culturally	liberal	but	
orthodox	in	its	economic	editorial	opinions	(Fonseca	2005,	Lattman-Weltman	and	Chagas	2016).	In	practice,	
relatively	few	newsstands	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	offer	the	São	Paulo	papers	and	vice-versa.	The	economy-oriented	
Valor	 Econômico,	 created	 in	 2000	 by	 Folha	 and	 the	 Globo	 group	 (but	 recently	 bought	 out	 by	 Globo),	
accompanies	this	trio	nationally,	with	a	distinct	appeal	to	the	business	elite	(thus,	 it	has	considerably	lower	
circulation	of	40	thousand	printed	copies).	In	an	already	small	market	by	global	standards,	the	print	runs	of	the	
national	newspapers	have	in	effect	been	cut	in	half	in	the	last	two	decades.	The	São	Paulo-based	newspapers	
have	also	cut	staff	 lately	 in	 their	newsrooms	 in	consequence	of	 the	 revenue	 loss	 from	direct	sales	and	the	
accompanying	declining	revenue	from	advertisement	sales	(Becker	and	Waltz	2017:119,	note	9).	(Damgaard	
2018b:25-6)	
	
Table	3.1	provides	the	circulation	figures	relevant	to	the	case	at	hand	plus	some	of	the	key	figures	
of	the	last	decades	in	five-year	intervals	(2005,	2010	and	2015),	for	the	three	traditional	“quality	
papers”	 and	 two	 of	 their	main	 competitors,	 based	 on	 data	 from	 IVC	 (the	 Brazilian	 Institute	 for	
Verification	of	Circulation.		
	
Table	3.1:	Print	runs	of	Brazilian	newspapers,	2005-2016	
	
Newspaper	 2005	 2010	 2015	 2016	
Folha	de	S.	Paulo	 309383	 295558	 175441	 154700	
O	Globo	 276385	 257262	 183404	 181000	
Extra	 267225	 248119	 136000	 128000	
Estado	de	S.	Paulo	 231165	 212844	 149241	 146000	
Zero	Hora	 174617	 No	data	available	 144191	 122365	
	
Sources:	2005	figures	reported	in	Albuquerque	2011:78;	2010	figures	reported	in	Porto	2010:113;	2015	and	2016	figures	
reported	in	Instituto	Verificador	de	Circulação	2016.	Figures	for	Extra	in	2015	and	2016	reported	in	Rocha	Filho	2016.		
	
In	addition	to	the	trio	of	nationally	distributed	newspapers,	many	daily	newspapers	are	printed	and	circulated	
in	regional	capitals	or	states.	These	newspapers	are	often	purely	advertisement-financed,	or	very	subsidized,	
and	are	referred	to	as	“popular	papers”	by	most	scholars,	because	the	focus	of	these	papers	are	sports	and	
celebrity	content	(Lattman-Weltman	and	Chagas	2016:341).	The	 landscape	of	regional	newspapers	changes	
frequently,	and	in	2016	comprised	Extra,	Super	Notícia,	Meia	Hora,	Zero	Hora,	Aqui,	Destak,	Agora	São	Paulo,	
Diário	 Gaucho,	 Expresso	 and	Metro	 São	 Paulo.	 Though	 these	 papers	 account	 for	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 total	
national	 circulation,	 they	 rarely	produce	content	about	national	politics	 themselves,	but	 instead	 reproduce	
material	from	the	news	agencies	of	Folha,	Estado	and	Globo	(Damgaard	2018b:26)	
	
Brazilians	with	internet	access	(68	percent	of	the	population	in	2017)	habitually	consume	news	via	
online	 news	 sites,	 but	 news	 consumption	 via	 social	media	 (especially	 Facebook	 and	WhatsApp)	
recently	saw	a	decline	after	years	of	growth	(Newman	et	al.	2017:107).	The	leading	newspapers	are	
also	leaders	on	the	online	market	for	news	(ibid.),	with	the	Folha-affiliated	UOL	platform	slightly	
ahead	of	G1	 and	O	Globo	Online,	 followed	by	 Folha’s	 news	 site.	Folha	 also	 boasted	 the	 largest	
number	of	page	views	at	the	height	of	the	political	crisis	in	2016,	according	to	IVC	research	–	just	
below	100	million	page	views	in	each	week	of	March,	with	an	apogee	of	155	million	weekly	page	
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views	for	the	third	week.	That	week	(described	in	detail	in	section	4.4),	the	closest	competitors	were	
Estado’s	page	Estadão,	at	47	million	page	views,	ClicRBS	at	42	million,	and	O	Globo	at	39	million.		
	
Online	 consumption	 of	 news	 has	 not	 dethroned	 television,	 so	 prime-time	 newscasts	 remain	 a	
central	news	source	for	many	Brazilians,	and	has	been	so	for	five	decades	(Porto	2010).	During	the	
period	of	the	dictatorship	(1964-1985),	the	military	authorities	actively	subsidized	and	groomed	the	
growing	television	industry	as	an	ideological	 instrument	(I	return	to	the	role	of	the	state	below).	
Even	though	the	news	were	filtered	heavily	by	censorship	restrictions	and	collusion	between	the	
regime	and	editors,	the	newscast	Jornal	Nacional	of	TV	Globo,	the	main	broadcaster,	was	ubiquitous	
in	the	political	arena	(Lima	2004,	Porto	2012).	TV	Globo’s	hegemony	was	established	 in	the	 late	
1960s	and	1970s,	but	was	challenged	by	Silvio	Santos’s	Sistema	Brasileiro	de	Televisão	(SBT)	in	the	
early	1980s,	while	 the	older	Rede	Record	reappeared	as	a	contender	on	 the	scene	 in	 the	1990s	
(Matos	2012a,	Porto	2012:70).	Record’s	newscast	conquered	some	of	the	audience	in	the	evening	
news	 slot,	 going	 from	4	 percent	 of	 the	 audience	 in	 1996	 to	 17	 percent	 in	 2008,	 but	 the	 Jornal	
Nacional	 has	 remained	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 broadcast	market,	while	 SBT’s	 and	Records	 newscasts	
compete	for	the	second	place	(ibid.:72).	Today,	Jornal	Nacional	usually	captures	two	to	three	times	
the	 audience	 of	 Jornal	 da	 Record	 and	 about	 five	 times	 the	 audience	 of	 Jornal	 do	 SBT	 (Ribeiro	
2017:113),	and	the	newscast	was	usually	the	most	watched	or	the	second-most	watched	program	
in	2015-2016,	only	 surpassed	by	hit	 telenovelas	 and	 semi-global	 entertainment	 formats	 like	Big	
Brother.		
	
Apart	 from	Globo,	SBT	and	Record,	 five	broadcasting	groups	dominate	 regional	 television:	Rede	
Brasil	Sul,	affiliated	with	Globo,	 in	the	South;	TV	Anhanguera	and	Organizações	Jaime	Câmara	 in	
Central	and	Eastern	regions;	the	Rede	Amazônica	de	Rádio	e	Televisão	to	the	North;	Northeastern	
Brazilian	television	is	locally	provided	by	Sistema	Verdes	Mares;	and	the	Grupo	Zahran	broadcasts	
in	the	large	states	of	Mato	Grosso	and	Mato	Grosso	do	Sul	(Cabral	2017:51).	In	the	domain	of	24-
hour	newscasts,	Globo’s	GloboNews	channel	(which	is	paid-for)	has	recently	surpassed	RecordNews	
in	terms	of	audience,	even	though	the	latter	is	an	open	channel.	Even	in	urban	Brazil,	where	most	
citizens	tend	to	reject	traditional	media	as	news	source,	reliance	on	TV	is	still	almost	the	world’s	
highest,	 with	 81	 percent	 using	 TV	 as	 source	 of	 news	 on	 a	 weekly	 basis	 –	 despite	 the	 self-
identification	of	the	majority	of	these	respondents	as	mainly	digital	(Newman	et	al.	2015:54).	For	
non-digital	users	and	for	vast	rural	areas,	reliance	on	TV	for	news	can	be	assumed	to	be	even	higher,	
given	 the	 limited	 print	 media	 circulation	 and	 internet	 coverage.	 Of	 the	 total	 advertisement	
expenditure	in	Brazil,	60	percent	was	located	in	television	in	2009	(Porto	2010:116),	and	for	these	
reasons,	researchers	such	as	Porto	have	previously	concluded	that	“broadcast	television	remains	
the	 dominant	medium”	 (ibid.:110)	 –	 although	 the	 advertising	market	 is	 shifting	 towards	 global	
internet	players	(Carro	2016:20).		
	
In	 sum,	 despite	 a	 diverse	 regional	 media	 market	 and	 increasing	 internet	 access,	 information	
concerning	the	national	political	arena	in	Brasília	is	still	filtered	initially	through	very	few	newsrooms	
–	a	triumvirate	of	broadcasters,	a	handful	of	quality	newspapers,	and	a	few	weekly	magazines	and	
tabloids.	 This	 configuration	 of	 the	media	 system	motivates	 the	 sampling	 strategy	 of	 the	 thesis,	
discussed	in	the	following.	
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3.2	Methodological	Implications	for	Sampling	Strategy	
The	Brazilian	media	system	at	a	glance	presents	a	complex	and	diversified	mediascape,	but	with	
some	delimitations,	this	thesis	may	still	arrive	at	a	reasonably	manageable	empirical	corpus:	I	will	
limit	the	scope	of	the	thesis	to	the	legacy	media	outlets	with	the	most	influence	on	the	national	
political	agenda,	with	special	attention	paid	to	those	newsrooms	that	set	off	political	scandals.	The	
daily	 news	 on	 politics	 flow	 primarily	 from	 newsrooms	 and	 agencies	 connected	 to	 the	 Globo	
conglomerate,	Folha	and	Estado	de	S.	Paulo	(Abramo	2007:99),	and	these	“quality”	newspapers	are	
especially	 important	 to	 include	 as	 their	 newsrooms	 are	 close	 to	 the	 national	 political	 circles.	
Television,	in	particular	TV	Globo’s	newscast	-	as	the	news	source	with	most	agenda-setting	power	
(Porto	2010,	2012)	–	will	also	be	included	to	capture	the	televised	aspects	of	the	mediascape.	Since	
the	weekly	press	was	and	still	is	extremely	attuned	to	coverage	of	scandals	(Nascimento	2013),	the	
largest	weeklies	should	also	be	included	in	the	sampling,	while	radio	outlets,	less	researched,	and	
with	 less	resources	and	no	national	outreach,	are	omitted	for	the	sake	of	coherency	 in	research	
design	and	reasons	of	space.		
	
Because	 the	 newsrooms	 of	 the	 legacy	 newspapers	 are	 usually	 first	 to	 report	 on	 disclosure	 of	
corruption,	and	their	news	are	subsequently	filtered	down	to	affiliated	regional	media	and	spill	over	
to	broadcast	media,	I	consider	their	journalistic	productions	to	be	the	most	relevant	starting	point	
to	explore	the	news	narratives	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	and	the	impeachment	of	President	Rousseff.	
The	discourse	found	in	these	media	outlets’	coverage	of	the	scandals	is	likely	to	be	echoed	in	the	
vertically	integrated	media	ecology.	As	the	agenda-setters	and	top	of	the	agency-news	chain	(Aguiar	
2014),	the	quality	papers	are	instrumental	in	influencing	the	agenda	of	associated	media,	be	it	radio	
or	the	“popular”	newspapers	(Lattman-Weltman	and	Chagas	2016).	Combining	this	with	weeklies	
Época,	IstoÉ,	and	Veja	and	several	editions	of	TV	Globo’s	main	newscast	Jornal	Nacional,	I	am	able	
to	 cross	 several	 flows	of	 the	Brazilian	mediascape	and	 see	how	elite	media,	 tabloid	media,	 and	
newscasts	mutually	 constitute	and	manage	 the	narrative-based	accounts	of	 reality	presented	 to	
their	 audiences.	 The	more	or	 less	 independent	media	outlets	 that	 have	emerged	online	usually	
reflect	and	offer	counterpoints	to	the	coverage	of	scandals	provided	in	the	legacy	media	(Carvalho	
and	 Albuquerque	 2017,	 Becker	 and	Waltz	 2017:124-5).	With	 emphasis	 on	 the	 so-called	 quality	
papers	O	Globo,	Folha	and	Estado	de	S.	Paulo,	one	might	object	that	the	thesis	focus	on	material	
that	is	not	representative	of	all	Brazilian	media,	nor	of	the	average	Brazilian’s	news	consumption.	
More	 likely,	 the	material	 sampled	 reflects	what	 the	members	 of	 the	 nation’s	 political	 elite	 are	
reading	and	watching.	This	delimitation	is	perfectly	in	tune	with	the	overall	argument	of	the	thesis,	
however,	concerned	as	it	is	with	the	narrative	structures	that	shape	and	constrain	the	agency	of	the	
political	elite.	
	
The	key	factor	for	choosing	quality	papers	and	weeklies	as	starting	point	 is	the	special	access	to	
information	that	journalists	of	these	traditional	news	media	have.	The	concentration	of	access	and	
gatekeeping	 power	 is	 potentially	 problematic,	 because	 biased	 coverage	 may	 rapidly	 propagate	
down	the	chain	of	vertically	 integrated	media;	 from	a	news	agency	to	media	platforms,	regional	
newspapers	and	 sites,	or	 from	a	national	broadcast	 to	a	 range	of	affiliated	 radio	and	broadcast	
stations,	 for	 example.	 In	 the	 following	 subsection,	 I	will	 go	 into	more	 detail	 on	 the	 question	 of	
political	influence,	bias,	and	parallelism	in	the	Brazilian	media.	
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3.3	Political	parallelism	
The	 work	 of	 Hallin	 and	 Mancini	 builds	 partly	 on	 Seymour-Ure’s	 (1974)	 concept	 of	 parallelism	
between	 media	 organizations	 and	 political	 parties	 or	 movements.	 Party-press	 parallelism,	 or	
political	 parallelism,	 concerns	 the	 coincidence	 not	 only	 of	 formal	 structures,	 but	 also	 the	
overlapping	of	audiences	and	voters	or	members,	of	career	paths	across	the	media/politics	divide,	
and	of	course	parallels	in	the	media	content	and	party	discourse	(Hallin	and	Mancini	2004:27-33).	
	
Hallin	suggested	that	the	Southern	European	press	tradition	of	a	media	system	basically	provides	a	
good	model	of	understanding	how	print	media	evolved	in	Brazil.	In	Southern	European	countries,	in	
contrast	to	Northern	Europe	and	North	America,	printed	news	media	“never	developed	as	a	cultural	
industry	 with	 a	 mass	 market	 sufficient	 to	 provide	 an	 independent	 economic	 base”	 (Hallin	 and	
Papathanassopoulos	2002:183).	Instead,	media	organizations	were	harnessed	by	local	oligarchs	and	
specific	 political	 interests,	 often	 in	 competition	 with	 other	 similar	 organizations.	 This	 model	 is	
termed	“polarized	pluralist”	by	Hallin	and	Mancini,	and	advocacy	journalism	and	political	control	of	
media	 outlets	 are	 its	 two	 key	 features.	 Papathanassopoulos	 (2007)	 connects	 the	 model	 to	
clientelistic	socio-political	relationships,	and	suggests	that	the	late	development	of	democratic	and	
rational-legal	institutions	in	the	Mediterranean	is	linked	to	the	instrumentalization	of	media.		
	
However,	 in	Brazil,	 the	polarized	pluralist	model	of	the	Mediterranean	 is	only	applicable	up	to	a	
certain	point.	While	dependent	on	private	patronage	throughout	the	19th	and	first	half	of	the	20th	
century,	stable	relationships	between	print	media	and	parties	did	not	develop	in	Brazil	at	a	national	
scale.	Eventually,	the	newspaper	market	turned	to	a	catch-all	business	model	reminiscent	of	North	
America,	skipping	the	process	of	untangling	press	and	parties.	Thus,	“political	parallelism	does	not	
apply	 easily	 to	 the	 Brazilian	media,	 both	 because	 political	 parties	 do	 not	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	
presidential	countries	such	as	Brazil	and	because	the	leading	media	organizations	have	adopted	a	
catch-all	 attitude	 regarding	 their	 public”	 (Albuquerque	 2011:73).	 Brazilian	 scholars	 therefore	
contend	that	the	liberal	media	system	model	in	Hallin	and	Mancini	(2004:75)	would	be	a	better	fit	
for	the	Brazilian	case,	although	
	
It	is	possible	to	understand	the	Brazilian	case	by	making	use	of	the	three	models	of	media	systems	elaborated	
by	 Hallin	 and	 Mancini	 for	 Western	 European	 countries	 and	 North	 America,	 namely	 polarized	 pluralist,	
democratic	corporatist	and	liberal.	These	authors	suggest	that	Latin	American	countries	will	come	close	to	the	
polarized	pluralist	model	(Hallin	and	Mancini	2004,	p.	306;	also	Hallin	and	Papathanassopoulos	2002),	which	is	
marked,	among	other	aspects,	by	a	significant	political	parallelism	–	which	is	to	say	that	the	media	mirrors	the	
party	 system.	 It	would	be	better,	 though,	 to	define	Brazilian	media	as	 a	manifest	 adherence	 to	 the	 liberal	
model,	 of	media	 neutrality	 and	 independence	 vis-à-vis	 political	 interests,	 although	 this	 is	 only	 imperfectly	
accomplished.	(Miguel,	Biroli	and	Mota	2012:138)	
	
Furthermore,	 “instrumentalization	 is	 most	 evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 regional	 media:	 regional	
newspapers	and	broadcasting	companies	are	typically	owned	by	local	oligarchs	who	use	them	to	
solidify	their	political	control”	(Hallin	and	Papathanassopoulos	2002).	In	Brazil,	radio	was	especially	
prone	to	political	capture	and	instrumentalization,	and	local	bosses	owning	radio	stations	are	nick-
named	coronéis	eletrônicos,	literally	electronic	colonels	or	patrons,	in	the	literature	(Lima	and	Lopes	
2007,	 Nunes	 Leal	 1997,	 Motter	 1994).	 The	 finer	 points	 of	 the	 conceptual	 relation	 between	
instrumentalization	 of	 media	 and	 political	 parallelism	 notwithstanding	 (Albuquerque	 2013:748,	
Mancini	2012),	there	is	ample	evidence	of	a	“media	opening”	in	Brazil	at	the	national	level	after	the	
first	 free	 elections	 of	 1989	 (Porto	 2012).	 Like	 TV	Globo,	Folha	and	O	Globo	 strove	 to	 present	 a	
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balanced	coverage	of	elections	 in	2002	 (Azevedo	2006:108),	which	of	 course	did	 little	 to	hinder	
regional	oligarchs	maintaining	their	influence	in	local	media	(Abramo	2007).		
	
The	academic	perception	of	liberal,	catch-all	media	outlets	(such	as	the	view	expressed	above	by	
Miguel,	Biroli	and	Mota)	however	began	to	face	serious	challenges	after	2005,	and	especially	since	
2012.	Brazilian	researchers	have	pointed	out	that	the	newspapers	have	lately	been	taking	stronger	
positions	regarding	economic	policy	(pro-austerity)	and	engaged	in	extensive	coverage	of	national	
scandals	 in	 the	Worker’s	Party,	with	negative	 framings	and	bias	complementing	 the	 increasingly	
outspoken	anti-socialist	discourse	of	mainstream	news	media	in	the	recent	decade	(Albuquerque	
2017:9,	Feres	Júnior	and	Sassara	2016,	Mont’Alverne	and	Marques	2013).	This	reflected	both	the	
changing	economic	realities	of	the	media	market	as	well	as	the	changing	role	of	media	in	the	political	
landscape.	The	few	national	newspapers	left	have	faced	pressure	by	different	popular	and	paid-by-
ads	 newspapers	 in	metropolitan	 areas.	 To	 counter	 the	 economic	 pressures	 on	 this	 news	media	
market,	the	three	large	daily	papers	have	strengthened	their	political	profile	in	the	last	decade	or	
so,	bringing	about	what	 Lattman-Weltman	has	 termed	 repartidarização	 –	 the	 resurgence	of	 the	
party	press	(Lattman-Weltman	and	Chagas	2016).	With	a	stronger	focus	on	political	news,	Estado,	
Folha	and	O	Globo	have	tried	to	distinguish	themselves	from	popular	newspapers	with	more	focus	
on	 celebrity,	 sports	 and	 quotidian	 news.	 This	move	 has	 been	 to	 secure	 the	 share	 of	 the	 news	
consumers	actually	willing	to	pay	for	quality	news,	since	the	advertisement	is	moving	towards	other	
online	 channels	 (Carro	 2016:26),	 and	 the	 revenue	 of	 advertisement	 is	moving	 from	 the	 quality	
newspapers	to	new	mediating	companies	in	the	value	chain	of	the	advertisement	industry.		
	
The	 concept	 of	 political	 parallelism	 does	 not	 describe	 the	 contemporary	 Brazilian	 mediascape	
accurately,	then.	No	doubt,	the	legacy	print	press	favor	economically	orthodox	positions	and	anti-
socialist	rhetoric,	with	Estado	de	São	Paulo	being	the	most	openly	conservative	and	Folha	de	São	
Paulo	the	most	explicitly	balanced	in	the	op-ed	section	(Albuquerque	2011:81,	Biroli	and	Mantovani	
2014:207,	Goldstein	2016,	Mont’Alverne	and	Marques	2013:98).	Three	of	the	largest	broadcasting	
networks	 (apart	 from	Globo	also	Bandeirantes	and	SBT)	exhibit	 the	 same	 tendency	as	 the	print	
media,	being	supposedly	catch-all	but	employing	various	commentators,	experts,	and	even	news	
anchors	with	high-profiled	right-wing	or	anti-PT	views	(examples	of	this	include	Rachel	Sheherazade	
of	SBT	newscasts,	and	Merval	Pereira	of	O	Globo	and	Globo	News).	Given	the	fragmented	landscape	
of	Brazilian	parties,	it	is	hard	to	say	exactly	which	party	line	these	mainstream	media	reflect.	On	the	
left-wing,	it	is	arguably	more	obvious,	where	CartaCapital,	Caros	Amigos	and	revista	Piauí	provide	
counterpoints	to	the	ideological	leanings	of	the	mainstream	media,	bolstered	by	a	few	independent	
online	 sources	 and	 blog	 sites:	 Jornal	 GGN,	 CartaMaior,	 Brasil247,	 Diário	 do	 Centro	 do	 Mundo	
(Carvalho	and	Albuquerque	2017),	the	citizen-journalist	platform	Midia	NINJA,	and	a	number	of	pro-
PT	blogs	(Becker	and	Waltz	2017:124).		
	
Because	 the	 mainstream	 outlets	 have	 increased	 their	 negative	 coverage	 of	 the	 PT,	 and	 since	
regional	media	and	radio	stations	are	allied	to	or	owned	by	exactly	these	media	organizations,	one	
might	 think	 that	 the	Brazilian	case	still	 fits	 the	polarized	pluralist	model.	However,	Albuquerque	
(2011)	 has	 provided	 another	 grid	 for	 interpreting	 the	 situation,	 adding	 another	 set	 of	 sub-
parameters,	namely	the	strength	of	the	ideological	positions	and	party	lines	(clear/unclear)	and	the	
strength	of	media	activism	in	politics	(active/passive).	This	re-fits	Hallin	and	Mancini’s	model:	
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Table	3.2:	Media	activism	and	Party	lines	
	
Party	lines	–	Activism:	 Politically	active	media	 Politically	passive	media	
Party	lines	
Clear	
	 Polarized	pluralist	
(Political	parallelism)	
Democratic	corporatist	
(Public	service	ethos)	
Party	lines	
Unclear	
	 Moderating	role	of	media	
(Media	as	active	agent)	
Liberal		
(“Objective,”	non-opinion	news)	
	
Adapted	from	Albuquerque	2011:93.	
	
The	mainstream	media	outlets	of	Brazil	are	not	exactly	located	inside	the	advocacy	tradition	of	the	
polarized	 pluralist	model,	 but	 rather	 present	 a	mix	 of	 “objective”	 news	 in	 the	 North	 American	
tradition	 and	 more	 or	 less	 one-sided	 interpretive	 journalism	 and	 commentary	 from	 a	 distinct	
political	perspective.	With	28	different	parties	in	Congress	on	one	hand,	and	a	hegemonic	system	of	
news	media	outlets	dominated	by	one	political	ideology	on	the	other,	parallelism	doesn’t	do	justice	
as	a	concept.	Rather,	the	media	conglomerates	should	be	understood	as	an	institution	or	an	active	
agent	in	their	own	right	(Albuquerque	2011,	Cook	2006).	Interpreting	the	political	environment	and	
expressing	the	ideas	in	similar	ways,	Brazilian	mainstream	news	mostly	validate	itself	recursively,	as	
“they	constitute	a	web	of	facticity	by	establishing	themselves	as	cross-referents	to	one	another”	
(Tuchman	1972:86).	Although	some	counter-hegemonic	news	outlets	have	emerged	online	(Becker	
and	Waltz	2017),	this	coherent	worldview	in	the	media	system	is	another	argument	for	the	sampling	
strategy	sketched	out	above:	The	textual-ideological	redundancy	makes	it	possible	to	treat	the	total	
textual	production	as	one	system,	decentering	individual	journalistic	voices	or	editorial	positions.		
	
	
3.4	Role	of	the	State	in	the	Brazilian	Media	System		
During	the	dictatorship	years,	the	Brazilian	state	exerted	political	control	and	censorship	of	media,	
as	many	Latin	American	military	regimes	did,	and	the	state	supported	and	invested	in	the	media	
infrastructure	 of	 telecommunications	 (Matos	 2012a:50).	 Since	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy,	
Brazilian	governments	have	maintained	a	model	of	regulation,	subsidies,	and	allowed	the	vertical	
integration	of	media	groups	 to	continue,	 thus	concentrating	media	 in	a	 few	conglomerates.	The	
media	policy	that	resulted	in	concentration	of	media	ownership	mostly	had	the	aim	of	reinforcing	
governmental	 powers,	 rather	 than	 promoting	 democratic	 forms	 of	 communication.	 After	 the	
transition	to	democracy,	the	Brazilian	state	maintained	the	role	of	the	regulator,	but	governments,	
at	different	times	since	1988,	have	utilized	the	concession	rights	and	“the	distribution	of	radio	and	
television	licenses	as	a	form	of	political	patronage”	(ibid.:	51).	The	archaic	press	law	that	dates	back	
to	1967	has	not	been	effectively	updated	(Porto	2011a:122),	and	“broadcasting	industry	regulation	
has	been	notoriously	designed	around	private	companies’	demands	to	expand	consumer	markets”	
(Guedes-Bailey	and	Jambeiro	2008:53).	Despite	the	constitutional	legislation	(article	54)	prohibiting	
media	 ownership	 for	 elected	politicians,	 senators	 and	 representatives	 frequently	 do	own	major	
shares	of	local	broadcasting	networks,	because	the	law	is	rarely	enforced	(Lima	2001:107).	
	
The	traditional	media	policies	that	had	fostered	the	concentration	of	ownership	as	well	as	private	
and	political	control	of	media	outlets	were	challenged	during	the	Lula	government.	Media	subsidies,	
which	 in	 the	 90s	 went	 to	 a	 few	 hundred	 outlets	 in	 only	 182	municipalities,	 were	 split	 up	 and	
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redistributed	 to	 thousands	 of	 smaller	 outlets	 across	 the	 country	 (Biroli	 and	 Miguel	 2013:89).	
Augmenting	 this	 shift,	 the	 government	 initiated	 a	 new	 phase	 of	 state-media	 relations	with	 the	
creation	of	 centralized,	 federal	public	 service	broadcasting:	The	Empresa	Brasil	de	Comunicação	
(EBC)	was	founded	in	2007	by	a	provisory	decree,	ratified	in	2008	in	order	to	fuse	the	Radiobrás	
with	 TVE	 Brasil	 and	 develop	 a	 public	 service	 news	 agency	 (Matos	 2012a,	 2012b).	 It	 has	 not	
conquered	large	shares	of	the	national	audience,	however	(Becker	and	Waltz	2017:118).	In	the	2010	
elections,	debate	arose	concerning	the	possible	pro-PT	bias	of	EBC	(Matos	2012a:57).	In	addition	to	
the	EBC,	both	chambers	of	Parliament	broadcast	through	respective	channels	(TV	Câmara	and	TV	
Senado)	 in	 different	 formats	 (interviews,	 studio	 news	 on	 politics,	 as	 well	 as	 transmission	 of	
parliamentary	debates	and	votes).	The	Supreme	Court	followed	suit	in	2002	and	now	broadcasts	
most	of	its	plenary	sessions	through	the	TV	Justiça	and	its	YouTube	channel.			
	
The	state-led	opening	of	the	media	sector	did	little	to	change	the	ways	of	the	established	media	
conglomerates,	however.	The	process	of	opening	in	the	Globo	conglomerate	slowed	as	Ali	Kamel	
was	appointed	General-Director	in	2009	(Porto	2012:172),	and	the	relationship	between	the	state	
and	the	media	conglomerates	such	as	Globo	has	been	increasingly	conditioned	by	the	clash	between	
the	PT-led	governments	and	editorial	focus	on	scandals.	As	is	the	pattern	in	much	of	Latin	America,	
PT	leaders	have,	through	the	last	two	decades,	increasingly	perceived	and	denounced	a	threat	from	
non-state	 media	 organizations	 and	 actors	 (Kitzberger	 2014,	 2016).	 Admittedly,	 the	 PT	
administrations	acted	less	aggressively	through	policy	than	in	Venezuela	or	Argentina,	but	it	is	true	
for	 all	 three	 cases	 that	 “governments	have	 frequently	 clashed	with	dominant	media	 companies	
identified	with	conservative	economic	and	political	 interests.	Presidents	have	 regularly	 criticized	
leading	 media	 companies	 for	 representing	 anti-popular	 interests	 and	 conspiring	 to	 overthrow	
them”	(Waisbord	2013:134).	 Instead	of	paraphrasing	this	critique,	 I	will	now	unfold	some	of	the	
important	moments	of	 recent	history	where	Brazilian	 governments	 and	political	 parties	 felt	 the	
presence	of	media	organizations	–	in	the	coverage	of	elections,	scandals,	and	popular	protests.	
	
	
3.5	Elections,	TV	Globo,	and	the	Charge	of	Political	Bias	
The	problems	arising	 from	political	parallelism	and	vested	 interests	of	media	conglomerates	are	
best	 exemplified	 by	 a	 brief	 review	of	 the	 scholarly	 debate	 concerning	 political	 bias	 of	 coverage	
during	elections	in	Brazil.	The	presidential	elections,	free	since	1989,	have	provided	researchers	with	
a	microcosm	of	data	for	exploring	the	patterns	of	coverage	and	assess	the	possible	impact	of	media	
attention	upon	the	votes	cast.	In	some	instances,	politically	skewed	coverage,	especially	of	certain	
presidential	 candidates,	 has	been	 interpreted	 as	 a	 general	 political	 bias	 in	Brazilian	mainstream	
media.	In	this	section,	I	will	describe	how	that	charge	gradually	evaporated,	but	then	reappeared.	
Starting	in	the	period	2005-2012	with	the	coverage	of	the	Mensalão	scandal	(discussed	next),	and	
increasingly	since	then,	TV	Globo	has	been	denounced	by	actors	in	both	scholarly	and	political	fields	
for	adopting	a	role	opposing	PT	government	with	pronounced	consequences	for	the	coverage	and	
public	agenda.		
	
TV	 Globo’s	 historical	 dominance	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 political	 project	 of	 the	 military	 governments	
(Guedes-Bailey	and	Jambeiro	2008:58,	Matos	2012b:867,	Lima	2004:51).	In	the	1980s,	the	charge	
of	political	bias	 lingered,	but	with	a	 twist.	Already	before	the	 first	 free	elections,	 the	censorship	
institution	was	abolished,	and	this	led	to	an	explosion	of	corruption	scandals	during	the	presidency	
		 63	
of	José	Sarney.	Sarney	was	civilian,	and	had	been	elected	Vice-president	by	an	Electoral	College	in	a	
restricted	election,	 taking	 the	mantle	before	 the	dying	president-elect	Tancredo	Neves	could	be	
sworn	in	(Skidmore	and	Smith	2001:174).	The	explosion	of	exposés	under	Sarney	was	attributable	
both	to	high	incidence	of	political	corruption	and	the	newfound	freedom	of	press.	The	problems	of	
political	 bias	 in	 political	 coverage	 (and,	 especially,	 in	 scandals),	 however,	 is	 normally	 located	by	
researchers	 after	 Sarney’s	 term.	 Even	 so,	 Porto	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 Sarney	was	 friends	with	
Roberto	Marinho,	 leader	 of	 the	 Globo	 conglomerate	 (Porto	 2012:106).	 This,	 according	 to	 Lima	
(2004:53),	eventually	resulted	in	situations	going	far	beyond	bias	in	news	coverage,	when	Sarney	at	
the	 end	 of	 his	 term	 needed	Marinho’s	 blessing	 before	 appointing	ministers.	 Thus,	 the	 oligarch	
Marinho	exerted	a	 remarkable	but	opaque	 influence	on	national	politics	via	his	powerful	media	
organization,	 distorting	 the	 democratic	 potential	 of	 vertical	 accountability	 inherent	 in	 media	
(Smulovitz	and	Peruzzotti	2000).	
	
Bias	 in	news	can	be	more	or	 less	precisely	defined,	but	 for	each	 free	presidential	election	since	
Sarney’s	presidency,	the	kind	of	bias	emphasized	and	criticized	by	scholars	has	changed.	For	this	
reason,	 it	 makes	 little	 sense	 to	 try	 to	 establish	 an	 exact	 definition	 here.	 Political	 bias	 in	 news	
coverage	is	demonstrably	a	moving	target,	at	least	in	the	presidential	elections	(Porto	2012,	ch.	4).	
But	it	is	worthwhile,	as	context	for	this	thesis,	to	have	a	brief	look	at	the	ways	in	which	Globo	exerted	
influence	in	election	situations.	
	
The	first	free	and	direct	presidential	elections	saw	the	young	Alagoas	governor	Fernando	Collor	de	
Mello	 project	 an	 image	 as	 a	 “Hunter	 of	Maharajas,”	 fighting	 the	 fat	 cats	 of	 the	 corrupt	 public	
bureaucracy.	The	Collor	candidacy,	(especially	Collor’s	image	and	program	statement)	was	perhaps	
favored	indirectly	through	the	political	discourse	embedded	in	the	telenovelas	Vale	Tudo,	Que	Rei	
Sou	Eu?	and	O	Salvador	da	Pátria	of	1988	and	1989	that	aired	on	TV	Globo	(Porto	2011b:61,	Lima	
1993,	Rubim	1989,	Weber	1990).	However,	the	news	coverage	of	Globo	did	not	favor	Collor	in	the	
first	round,	according	to	a	content	analysis	of	Jornal	Nacional	coverage	(Porto	2012:79-86).	In	the	
lead-up	to	the	1989	elections,	TV	Globo	covered	PSDB	and	PMDB	candidates	Covas	and	Guimarães	
more	than	other	candidates.	Without	much	party	support	behind	him,	Collor	won	the	second	round	
of	elections	over	Lula,	but	ironically,	his	administration	and	the	president-elect	quickly	fell	victim	to	
investigative	 journalism	 through	 disclosure	 of	 corruption.	 Exposés	 in	 Veja,	 IstoÉ,	 and	 Folha	
eventually	brought	enough	scathing	evidence	to	light	that	the	governing	coalition	behind	him	fell	
apart,	and	he	resigned	just	prior	to	an	impeachment	vote	on	December	29,	1992.	The	exposés	of	
this	era	have	been	considered	the	”heyday	of	Brazilian	investigative	journalism,”	when	newsroom	
began	establishing	structures	for	investigations	(Matos	2012a:108).	
	
Other	 researchers	 have	 argued	 that	 investigative	 journalism	 in	 Brazil	 was	 really	 replaced	 by	
denuncismo	 (Abreu	 and	 Lattman-Weltman	 2000:3,	 Fernandes	 2011:197,	 Miguel	 and	 Coutinho	
2007),	which	 loosely	 translates	 into	exposés	based	on	unsubstantiated	allegations,	 fueled	by	 “a	
journalistic	 culture	 obsessed	 about	 the	 dealings	 of	 government	 and	 that	 consistently	 applies	
identical	patterns	to	unveil	wrongdoing”	(Waisbord	2000:88).	Waisbord	observed	that	“closeness	
between	 journalists	and	official	 sources	 is	also	 indispensable	 for	 the	media	 to	delve	 into	official	
wrongdoing,”	 and	 that	 this	 proximity	 “results	 from	 the	 organization	 of	 news-making	 and	 a	
journalistic	culture	that	highly	prizes	official	news”	(ibid.:93).		
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The	 collusion	 between	 Brazilian	 journalists	 and	 their	 official	 sources	 gives	 rise	 to	 problems	 of	
counter-denunciations:	 “Journalists’	 dependence	 on	 officials	 also	 allows	 some	 sources	 to	 avoid	
denunciation,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	ensuring	 that	 the	media	will	 publicize	accusations	against	
rivals”	(Porto	2011a:111).	Institutional	actors,	such	as	the	public	prosecutors,	are	well	aware	of	the	
journalistic	interest	in	juicy	bits	from	investigations,	and	have	been	known	to	give	interviews	and	
disclose	 information	 to	media	 that	would	 benefit	 their	 court	 strategies	 (Arantes	 2002:157-162,	
Chaia	and	Teixeira	2000).	Since	 this	 thesis	 is	not	a	newsroom	study,	and	since	 I	have	elsewhere	
accounted	for	the	journalist-source	relationships	in	the	Lava-Jato	case	(Damgaard	2018b,	Chapter	
3),	 I	 will	 not	 expand	 on	 the	 problems	 of	 doing	 “politics	 by	 other	 means”	 through	 denuncismo	
(Peruzzotti	2006:256),	but	only	note	that	the	political	power	of	denunciations	and	scandals	in	the	
Brazilian	 political	 system	 seemed	 to	 wane	 in	 the	 mid-90s,	 following	 the	 exposés	 of	 Collor’s	
corruption	and	a	parliamentary	budget	graft	scandal	in	1993	(Nobre	2013a:9).	
	
Collor’s	vice-president	Itamar	Franco	stepped	in	after	Collor	resigned,	but	Franco	did	not	run	for	the	
1994	 elections,	 launching	 instead	 his	 minister	 of	 Finances,	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso,	 as	 the	
incumbent	candidate.	With	balanced	coverage,	TV	Globo	could	not	be	faulted	in	the	1994	elections	
for	uneven	distribution	of	airtime,	but	rather	for	the	unilateral	praise	of	the	financial	rescue	program	
Plano	Real,	masterminded	in	1993	by	Cardoso	(Azevedo	2006).	Since	this	praise	would	be	associated	
with	Cardoso,	one	could	argue	that	 the	coverage	of	 the	economy	by	proxy	supported	Cardoso’s	
ideas	and	results	(Porto	2012:87).		
	
In	the	1998	elections,	the	political	coverage	was	reduced	to	a	minimum	in	the	months	that	preceded	
election	day	(Azevedo	2006:108,	Miguel	1999,	Porto	2008:258,	2012:89).	Social	problems	and	high	
unemployment	 in	some	regions	were	also	allegedly	under-reported	 in	newscasts	 (Kucinski	1998,	
Miguel	 2000:68),	 while	 economic	 issues	 were	 largely	 framed	 in	 a	 pro-government	 way	 (Porto	
2012:90-91).	Thus,	the	coverage	leading	up	to	the	election	of	Cardoso	was	biased	by	omission	of	
any	critical	stance	or	coverage	of	competing	candidates.		The	charge	of	bias	was	finally	(although	
only	temporarily)	silenced	in	the	2002	elections,	as	TV	Globo	in	its	newscasts	created	a	policy	to	
ensure	impartiality	in	coverage	(ibid.).	In	contrast	to	the	three	preceding	elections,	Lula	and	PT	(in	
his	fourth	bid	for	presidency)	were	not	at	a	disadvantage	through	the	evasion	of	social	issues	on	the	
media	agenda,	negative	framings,	or	limited	air-time.	In	his	first	period,	however,	Lula	came	under	
media	scrutiny	with	the	disclosure	of	the	Mensalão	case,	to	which	I	now	turn.		
	
	
3.6	The	Mensalão	Scandal	
The	scandal	known	as	the	Mensalão	case	was	characterized	as	a	watershed	for	many	reasons.	The	
scandal	(named	for	the	neologism	used	to	describe	the	big	monthly	payments	to	parliamentarians)	
ended	with	prison	sentences	to	top-level	politicians,	 rather	than	the	 impunity	to	which	Brazilian	
politicians	are	accustomed.	The	case	first	drew	headlines	throughout	the	country	in	2005	and	2006,	
and	ignited	anew	the	conflict	between	President	Lula	and	the	media	conglomerates.	In	his	winning	
campaign	in	2002	and	in	the	first	half	of	the	period,	Lula	had	managed	to	establish	a	truce	with	the	
mainstream	media	(Kitzberger	2016:453),	except	perhaps	Veja.	The	truce	broke	down	once	these	
media	 alleged	 that	 money	 had	 been	 pulled	 from	 slush	 funds	 of	 Lula’s	 PT	 and	 dealt	 out	 to	
Congressmen	 in	 order	 to	 sway	 votes.	While	 Lula’s	mandate	 remained	 unscathed,	 and	while	 he	
succeeded	in	getting	re-elected	in	2006,	central	members	of	his	inner	circle	in	government	and	the	
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party	were	indicted	and	went	on	trial,	after	many	delays,	in	2012.	In	this	section,	I	will	describe	the	
scandal,	 how	 it	 was	 interpreted	 in	 the	media,	 and	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	
political	actors	and	media	organizations.		
	
The	case	started	with	a	minor	disclosure:	An	undercover	journalist	posing	as	a	lawyer	recorded	with	
a	hidden	camera	how	a	bribe	money	-	a	relatively	small	amount	of	3000	R	$	-	changed	hands	in	the	
Brazilian	 Postal	 Service	 (Vasconcellos	 2006:15).	Veja	 put	 it	 on	 the	 front	 page	on	May	 18,	 2005,	
exposing	the	way	that	bribes	for	contracts	with	the	Postal	Service	eventually	resulted	in	kickbacks	
to	the	government-supporting	party	PTB	(Junior	2005).	The	scandal	then	snowballed,	and	the	first	
to	roll	with	 it	was	the	party	 leader	of	PTB,	Roberto	Jefferson.	On	the	secret	recordings	from	the	
Postal	Service,	Jefferson	was	named	as	the	responsible	for	receiving	money	in	exchange	for	securing	
public	procurement	deals.	In	response,	in	June	2005,	Jefferson	chose	to	ignore	the	unspoken	rule	
of	silence	governing	corrupt	networks,	revealing	far	more	than	the	minor	incident	disclosed	in	Veja	
(Lo	 Prete	 2005).	 Interviewed	 by	 Folha,	 Roberto	 Jefferson	 denounced	 the	 PT	 treasurer	 Delúbio	
Soares	for	channeling	monthly	payments	to	parliamentarians	of	the	parties	PP,	PL	and	Jefferson’s	
PTB,	in	return	for	political	support	in	decisive	congressional	votes.	The	government’s	coordinator,	
chief	of	staff	and	minister	José	Dirceu	(PT),	a	former	student	union	leader	and	revolutionary,	had	in	
2004	listened	to	Jefferson’s	internal	whistle-blowing,	and	even	promised	him	to	end	the	corruption,	
but	nothing	happened,	according	to	Jefferson.	
	
The	 disclosure	 prompted	 further	 revelations	 and	 extensive	 criticism	 of	 President	 Lula.	 Dirceu	
became	the	first	 to	resign	 in	consequence	of	the	case,	at	a	press	conference	on	June	16.	Dirceu	
rejected	the	charges	but	stated	that	he	would	resign	from	office,	head	held	high,	in	order	to	“return	
to	the	grassroots”	and	fight	for	the	party	against	"those	who	want	to	interrupt	the	democratic	and	
political	process,	and	those	who	want	to	destabilize	the	government	of	Lula”	(Dirceu	2005).	A	month	
later,	on	 July	14,	Lula	 for	 the	 first	 time	responded	to	 the	case	 in	public,	 in	an	 interview	with	an	
independent	 journalist.	Here,	Lula	acknowledged	that	his	party	had	made	mistakes,	but	had	not	
done	 anything	 that	wasn’t	 usual	 in	 Brazilian	 politics	 (Monteiro	 2005).	 Lula’s	 alleged	 role	 in	 the	
scandal	 made	 the	 media	 compare	 the	 situation	 with	 Collor	 case,	 and	 floated	 the	 idea	 of	
impeachment	once	again	(Barreiros	and	Amoroso	2008,	Anderson	2011:5).	Soares,	the	PT	treasurer,	
resigned	from	office	on	July	6,	and	PT	party	president	Genoino	resigned	three	days	later.		
	
Dirceus's	denials	were	belied	by	confessions	 from	the	 inner	circle	of	 the	president:	Lula’s	media	
adviser	Duda	Mendonça,	whose	PR	strategy	was	regarded	as	the	decisive	factor	for	the	election	
victory	in	2002,	confessed	to	having	received	payment	in	tax	havens	for	the	entire	2002	campaign	-	
10,5	million	R$	in	a	Bahamas	offshore	company	(Souza	2011:80,	Anderson	2011:2).	On	August	12,	
President	 Lula	 appeared	 on	 national	 television,	 ostensibly	 to	 present	 a	 cabinet	 reshuffle	 in	
consequence	 of	 Dirceus's	 resignation.	 During	 the	 speech,	 Lula	 finally	 made	 a	 planned,	 public	
statement	 concerning	 the	case,	as	he	apologized	 to	 the	nation	and	 took	 the	 first	 steps	 towards	
rejuvenating	the	PT	leadership	(da	Silva	2005).	Mendonça,	Soares	and	Genoino	were	indicted	by	the	
federal	police	in	late	August,	as	was	the	businessman	Marcos	Valério.		
	
The	case	was	opened	as	a	corruption	investigation	under	the	Supreme	Court	by	the	MPF	(the	federal	
public	prosecutor)	in	July	2005,	which	meant	relocating	the	jurisdiction	from	the	federal	court	of	
the	state	of	Minas	Gerais	to	the	Supreme	Court	in	Brasília.	The	Congress	set	up	parallel	investigative	
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commissions	 that	 interviewed	various	 involved	 in	 the	 following	months.	 In	April	5,	2006,	a	 joint	
congressional	 committee	published	a	 report	about	 the	 case	 (Pereira,	Power	and	Raile	2011:34),	
while	 the	 Prosecutor-General	 indicted	 40	 individuals,	 describing	 José	Dirceu	 as	 the	mastermind	
behind	the	bribe	and	kickback	scheme	in	Congress,	and	Valério	as	the	man	commanding	the	money	
laundering	and	distribution	system.		
	
The	media	 reveled	 in	 the	 investigations,	 committees,	and	denunciations.	The	Mensalão	exposés	
initiated	a	significant	general	rise	in	the	scandal	coverage	found	in	the	weekly	press,	so	that	“the	
average	 number	 of	 stories	 containing	 denunciations	 almost	 tripled	 since	 2002”	 (Nascimento	
2013:68),	going	from	a	weekly	total	average	of	0,3	denunciation	items	in	Veja,	IstoÉ	and	Época,	to	
1,3	and	1,5	items	by	the	end	of	2010	(ibid.:72).	Like	the	rest	of	the	press	(Rubim	and	Colling	2007),	
TV	Globo	presented	the	2006	presidential	campaign	under	the	sign	of	scandals	relating	to	the	PT	
(Porto	2012:95),	as	the	conclusion	of	“16	uninterrupted	months	of	negative	coverage	of	the	Lula	
government”	(Biroli	and	Miguel	2013:78),	from	May	2005	to	October	2006,	with	an	emphasis	on	
corruption	exposés.	Despite	having	his	image	tarnished,	Lula	managed	to	pull	off	a	win	in	the	second	
round	of	the	presidential	elections	in	October	that	year	(Porto	2012:117).		
	
That	President	Lula	remained	popular	with	voters	did	not	help	PT	in	the	legal	trials.	By	the	end	of	
2006,	the	eleven	judges	of	the	Supreme	Court	decided	in	their	plenary	session	not	to	divide	the	case	
between	the	different	arms	of	the	organization	behind	the	bribe	scheme.	The	case	thus	continued	
as	a	rather	unwieldy	and	complex	judicial	case,	with	scores	of	lawyers	involved.	For	this	reason,	it	
took	until	July	2007	for	the	Supreme	Court	to	schedule	the	initial	hearing	in	the	case,	and	on	August	
28,	 the	 charges	 against	 the	 40	 politicians	 and	 businessmen	 were	 accepted,	 turning	 them	 into	
defendants	 and	 starting	 the	 trial	 called	 Ação	 Penal	 470.	 The	 court	 established	 a	 schedule	 for	
obtaining	witness	statements	for	the	defendants,	a	process	that	lasted	one	and	a	half	years.	In	the	
meantime,	 Lula	had	 left	 the	presidential	Palácio	do	Planalto	and	 succeeded	 in	getting	his	hand-
picked	successor,	former	minister	of	Mines	and	Energy,	Dilma	Rousseff,	elected	in	October	2010	
(Magalhães,	da	Silva	and	Dias	2015).	She	commenced	her	term	with	a	tough-on-corruption	stance,	
quickly	sacking	seven	ministers	suspected	of	wrongdoing	(Chaia	2015:13,	Araujo	et	al.	2016).		
	
It	was	not	until	June	2011	that	the	Supreme	Court	judge	responsible	for	the	process,	ministro	relator	
Joaquim	Barbosa,	finished	the	instruction	phase	of	the	process,	demanding	preliminary	statements	
from	the	defense	lawyers	and	the	prosecutors.	In	December	2011,	Barbosa	presented	his	account	
of	 the	 investigation,	 but	 the	 case's	 legal	 auditor	 in	 the	 court,	ministro	auditor	 Supreme	 Justice	
Ricardo	Lewandowski,	delayed	another	half	year	in	releasing	the	process	from	processual	audit	and	
putting	it	on	the	agenda	of	the	Supreme	Court	Plenary.	Thus,	seven	years	passed	from	the	initial	
disclosure	to	the	start	of	the	trial	process.		
	
As	 the	 trial	 started,	 in	August	2012,	 three	 interpretations	of	 the	 case	had	 coalesced	 (Damgaard	
2015a).	In	Globo’s	publications,	as	in	those	of	Veja,	the	case	was	hailed	as		
	
a	watershed	in	Brazilian	society.	Piloted	by	staunch	judges,	the	trial	changed	the	rules	of	the	national	political	
game,	making	it	clear	that	the	law	henceforth	is	upheld	for	common	citizens	and	aloof	politicians	alike.	This	
narrative	 postulates	 a	 basic	 discontinuity	 effected	 by	 the	 mensalão	 trial.	 Operating	 within	 a	 progressive	
temporality,	the	Brazilian	nation	has	come	to	be	prosperous	but	pestered	by	corruption	and	other	forms	of	
dysfunctional	governing.	This	narrative,	 in	 turn,	 relies	on	several	other	narratives	and	conceptions,	each	of	
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those	 projecting	 certain	 ideals	 and	 beliefs	 about	 the	 actors	 and	 institutions	 involved	 in	 this	 “milestone”	
narrative.	The	journalists	and	editors	in	several	instances	use	the	case	to	emphasize	the	role	of	investigative	
media	 as	 the	 fourth	branch	of	 government,	monitoring	 the	quality	 of	 democracy	on	behalf	 of	 the	people.	
(ibid.:213)	
	
The	 trial	 lasted	 six	 months	 and	 ended	 with	 hitherto	 unseen	 severe	 sentences	 to	 most	 of	 the	
involved,	including	Jefferson.	Dirceu	was	sentenced	to	more	than	10	years	of	prison,	while	Marcos	
Valério	was	sentenced	to	40	years.	In	the	left-wing	media	such	as	CartaCapital,	the	stiff	sentences	
and	the	remarkable	media	attention	was	interpreted	as	
	
a	farce,	constructed	by	the	media	and	executed	by	the	judiciary	branch.	Certain	business	leaders,	standing	to	
gain	from	the	displacement	of	attention,	hover	behind	the	conspiracy,	and	the	inconsistencies	of	the	mensalão	
trial	are	due	to	the	forged	origin	of	the	case.	In	this	version,	the	sinister	motives	and	corrupt	networks	can	be	
traced	to	the	top	of	the	STF	and	the	boards	of	the	media	conglomerates	(ibid.:215-6)	
	
Folha	and	Veja,	in	some	instances,	also	represented	the	trial	as	incomplete,	but	inverted	the	notion	
of	the	cover-up.	In	this	inversion,	
	
the	trial	has	not	reached	the	root	of	the	problem,	which	stems	from	the	former	president	himself.	A	select	
cadre	from	the	PT	and	their	pater	familia	Lula	are	responsible	for	framing	Valerio	and	other	of	the	defendants,	
while	escaping	conviction	themselves.	(ibid.)	
	
This	interpretation	–	as	we	shall	see	–	would	linger	and	crop	up	again	in	the	Lava-Jato	case.	Another	
important	interpretation	highlighted	the	growing	independence	of	the	judiciary	and	the	Supreme	
Court,	even	with	a	majority	of	PT-appointed	 judges	(apart	 from	Barbosa,	the	 judges	Fux,	Toffoli,	
Lewandowski,	Weber,	Lúcia,	and	Peluso,	who	was	substituted	by	Teori	Zavascki	in	September	2012).	
Based	on	research	reported	in	my	master’s	thesis,	I	have	characterized	this	variant	as	a	narrative	in	
which	
	
the	judiciary	branch	has	initiated	a	tectonic	movement	in	the	power	bases	of	society.	In	a	dramatic	struggle	for	
political	power	between	the	Congress	and	the	STF,	the	scale	has	tipped	in	favour	of	the	judiciary	branch.	This	
shift	strikes	a	new	balance	between	the	democratic	institutions,	by	founding	the	legitimacy	of	government	not	
on	elections	but	 rather	on	 juridical	and	constitutional	processes.	Distinct	 from	the	 first	narrative,	 this	 third	
narrative	entertains	the	idea	of	several	possible	configurations	of	power	and	the	oscillation	between	them.		
	
This	narrative	of	conflict	follows	a	classic	and	easily	constructed	narrative	schema	(Polletta	2006:13)	in	media	
texts,	involving	two	opponents	and	some	contested	ground.	In	this	case,	it	concerns	legitimacy	in	government.	
Dramatizing	a	political	question	in	this	way	has	consequences,	however.	First	of	all,	the	personification	of	the	
contesting	state	powers	reduces	it	to	a	question	of	supporting	one	or	the	other	contestant.	The	individuals	
eclipse	the	system	in	this	mode	of	representing	the	workings	of	political	and	juridical	institutions,	resulting	in	
a	 clear-cut	 story	 of	 conflict…	 Secondly,	 this	 narrative’s	mediatization	 of	 the	mensalão	 trial	 as	 a	 conflict	 of	
government	 branches	 supersedes	 the	 issue	 of	 corruption.	 The	 rampant	 corruption	 and	 impunity,	 already	
mentioned	in	narrative	1,	turns	out	to	be	a	symptom	of	the	struggle	for	power	and	legitimacy.	
	
The	struggle	between	power	bases	and	upturning	of	the	usual	pattern	contains	racial	elements	as	well.	The	
shift	in	power	is	alluded	at	in	Estado,	but	clear	in	the	issue	of	Veja	hailing	Barbosa’s	triumph,	emphasizing	his	
concern	for	the	democracia	racial	of	Brazil	(Marques	&	Diniz	2012:72).	As	the	first	black	president	of	the	STF,	
his	ascent	through	the	courts	might	spell	not	merely	justice	for	corrupt	politicians,	but	also	a	visual	shift	in	the	
image	 of	 legitimate	 power,	 adding	 more	 skin	 hues	 to	 the	 palette,	 and	 framing	 the	 typical	 white	 elite	
parliamentarians	as	villains.		
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Finally,	 the	 increased	 focus	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 STF	 in	 Brazilian	 politics	 underscores	 the	 process	 of	
judicialization,	 the	 society-wide	 tendency	 for	 resolving	 conflicts	 through	 legal	 action	 (Porto	 2012:150,	
Cavalcanti	2006:40,	Kapiszewski	2010:52,	Werneck	Vianna	et	al.	2007).	Represented	by	Veja	and	Estado	as	the	
rightful	locus	of	order	and	democratic	progress,	the	STF	gains	legitimacy,	and	ferments	this	itself	by	feeding	
into	the	news	media's	hunt	for	more	news	items,	interviewees	and	comments.	(ibid.:219-20)	
	
Several	 important	 traits	of	 the	Mensalão	scandal	should	be	highlighted	 in	conclusion;	 traits	 that	
seem	to	have	contributed	to	the	coverage	of	the	Lava-Jato	case.	Similar	to	what	has	happened	in	
European	scandals	(Adut	2004,	Mandel	1995),	the	figure	of	an	independent	and	media-savvy	judge	
ascended	to	stardom	in	the	Brazilian	media,	with	judge	Barbosa	filling	out	the	role	of	the	protagonist	
to	the	utmost	(see	section	4.5.1	in	the	next	chapter).	Second,	the	conflict	between	the	Supreme	
Court	 and	 the	 government	 was	 also	 a	 focus	 of	 the	 coverage.	 Third,	 while	 path-dependency	 is	
perhaps	too	strong	a	word,	the	way	that	the	Mensalão	trial	became	an	exception	to	the	pattern	of	
impunity	certainly	created	an	expectation	for	future	trials	of	political	corruption.	Finally,	the	idea	
lingered	that	Dirceu	and	other	PT	leaders	covered	for	Lula,	and	the	narrative	desire	to	finally	bring	
Lula	to	justice	was	reflected	in	some	texts	appearing	in	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.		
	
	
3.7	Jornadas	de	Junho:	The	Giant	Awakens,	Confused	
The	topic	of	corruption,	which	had	been	predominant	on	front	pages	during	the	six	months	of	the	
Mensalão	trial	in	2012,	was	not	initially	the	topic	of	protests	starting	in	2013.	In	June,	however,	the	
mainstream	media	revived	the	issue	of	corruption	on	the	national	agenda	by	deliberately	sifting	the	
heterogeneous	calls	for	action	observed	in	the	protests	that	came	to	be	known	as	the	Jornadas	de	
Junho,	or	Jornadas	de	2013.		
	
Smaller	protests	against	bus	 fare	hikes	occurred	early	 in	2013:	200	people	united	 in	February	 in	
Porto	Alegre	protesting	augmented	public	 transportation	 fares,	 and	 similar	protests	occurred	 in	
Manaus	 (March	 30),	 in	Natal,	 Rio	Grande	 do	Norte	 (May	 15)	 and	 in	Goiânia	 the	 following	 day.	
Salvador	da	Bahia	saw	protests	on	June	2	(Cardoso	and	Di	Fatima	2013:159,	Peralva	et	al.	2017),	but	
it	was	the	movement	called	Movimento	Passe	Livre	(MPL),	arguing	for	free	public	transport,	that	
triggered	the	avalanche	(Mendonça	2018:9),	starting	in	São	Paulo	on	June	3	and	June	6.	
	
The	MPL	demonstration	 in	Avenida	Paulista,	São	Paulo’s	main	thoroughfare,	where	the	 largest	enterprises,	
banks	and	business	associations	are	based,	was	criticized	by	the	press	 for	disrupting	the	 flow	of	 traffic,	 for	
vandalism,	 and	 for	making	unrealistic	 demands.	 The	demonstration	was	 attacked	by	 the	police,	 and	many	
arrests	followed.	(Saad-Filho	2013:658)	
	
At	this	moment,	TV	Globo	framed	the	protests	in	a	clearly	negative	way	(Avritzer	2016a:70),	with	
one	 commentator	 framing	 the	 protesters’	 motives	 as	 “politically	 ignorant	 stupidity	 mixed	 with	
rancor”	 (Alzamora	 and	 Arce	 2014:6).	Minor	 street	 protests	 ensued	 on	 June	 10,	 and	 11	 (Singer	
2013:24),	and	the	São	Paulo	protests	on	June	11	and	13	were	again	violently	repressed	by	the	police	
(ibid.).	 The	 violence	 galvanized	 Brazilians	 online,	 and	 was	 denounced	 on	 social	 media	 (and	 in	
alternative	media	 such	 as	Midia	NINJA,	 see	Avritzer	 2016a:74	 and	Gomes	 2016:383).	 The	word	
about	follow-up	protests		
	
spread	through	social	media	and	gathered	over	one	million	people	on	the	streets	of	São	Paulo	on	the	16th	and	
17th	of	June,	with	similar	results	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	on	the	20th	of	June.	In	spite	of	the	massive	participation	
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online	and	offline,	as	well	as	the	presence	of	different	causes	and	ideologies,	no	official	leaders	appeared	and	
no	public	speeches	were	given.	Information	would	circulate	on	Facebook	pages	and	through	Twitter	accounts,	
displaying	sometimes	a	very	high	number	of	followers	and	comments,	as	well	as	shared	 images	and	videos	
about	the	ongoing	events.	(Pischetola	2016:168)	
	
In	spite	of	the	lack	of	central	themes	for	the	protests,	”press	coverage	pushed	the	rapidly	growing	
mobilizations	towards	a	cacophony	loosely	centred	on	civic	issues	and,	especially,	state	inefficiency	
and	corruption,	in	order	both	to	drown	out	the	left	and	to	delegitimize	the	federal	government”	
(Saad-Filho	 2013:659).	 This	 cacophony	 has	 been	 analyzed	 based	 on	 corpora	 of	 interviews	
(Mendonça	2018),	protester	profiles	(Singer	2013,	Avritzer	2016a:68)	hashtags	(Malini	et	al.	2016),	
and	themes	(Avritzer	2016a:75ff).	The	online	reflections	of	the	protests,	particularly	on	Twitter,	has	
been	analyzed	in	order	to	assess	the	weight	of	the	different	issues	on	the	protest	agenda.	Malini	et	
al.	(2016:403ff)	categorized	the	hashtags	as	either	convocations,	(geo-)informations,	demands,	or	
critique.	The	last	category	included	hashtags	against	Rousseff,	Lula,	the	FIFA	president	Sepp	Blatter,	
the	World	Cup,	and	the	Globo	conglomerate.	Many	online	expressions	of	protests	simply	called	for	
change	and	for	mobilization	(under	the	slogan	“Vem	pra	rua”	-	a	slogan	with	a	genealogy	going	back	
well	 before	 2013,	 ibid.:394).	 The	 slogan	 #OGiganteAcordou,	 the	 Giant	 Awoke,	 also	 took	 off	 on	
Twitter	in	this	period.	But	what	was	the	effect	of	this	supposed	awakening	and	mobilization?	
	
MPL	pulled	out	of	the	amorphous	mega-protests,	and	Globo	changed	their	stance	to	a	more	positive	
one,	even	as	the	network	itself	was	the	object	of	protests	(Alzamora	and	Arce	2014).	June	20	saw	
dozens	of	large-scale	protests	across	the	country,	covered	extensively	by	mainstream	media,	with	
some	violent	 incidents	and	a	brief	occupation	of	 the	Congress	by	protesters	 in	Brasília	 (Avritzer	
2016a:72,	Singer	2013:26).	In	the	third	week	of	June,	the	slogans	for	change	and	protests	against	
transportation	fare	hikes	were	supplanted	by	political	topics	concerning	public	expenditure,	health	
and	 security	 (ibid.:78).	 The	 topic	of	 corruption	and	discontent	with	 the	Rousseff	 administration,	
around	June	20,	began	to	claim	the	spotlight	 in	the	Twittersphere	and	 in	the	mainstream	media	
coverage	of	the	same	period	(Avritzer	2016a:81,	92).	On	national	TV,	Rousseff	announced	the	need	
for	 political	 reform,	 suggesting	 a	 new	Constitutional	 process,	 and	 again	 pledged	 to	 a	 tough-on-
corruption	policy	(ibid.:78,	Singer	2013:26).	Not	much	reform	resulted,	however.		
	
As	the	protest	wave	petered	out,	a	plunge	in	Rousseff’s	approval	ratings	became	apparent	(Singer	
2013:34).	While	street	protests	disappeared	in	the	second	half	of	2013	(Peralva	et	al.	2017:5),	the	
online	mobilization	remained	vigorous	in	some	sectors,	especially	 in	groups	that	emphasised	the	
problems	 of	 corruption	 (Singer	 2013:36).	 Facebook	 groups	 such	 as	 Revoltados	 Online	 and	
Mobilização	Patriota	 remained	active	after	 the	 street	protests	 and	even	grew.	The	 “contents	of	
these	pages	are	extremely	right-sided,	nationalist	and	very	critical	to	the	government	and	the	party	
represented	by	president	Dilma”	(Pischetola	2016:169).	The	Vem	Pra	Rua	slogan	coalesced	as	the	
name	of	an	organizing	and	mobilizing	group	in	the	later	protests	of	2015	and	2016,	emphasizing	the	
fight	against	corruption,	while	the	abbreviation	MPL	(from	Movimento	Passe	Livre)	was	hi-jacked	
and	 turned	 into	MBL,	 the	Movimento	Brasil	 Livre,	again	with	 strongly	 liberal	and	mostly	anti-PT	
views.		
	
The	shift	of	political	emphasis	in	the	digital	public	spheres	and	the	Globo	turn-around	in	relation	to	
the	protests	were	two	symptoms	of	a	new	discursive	alliance	–	between,	on	one	hand,	discontented	
younger	citizens	 in	street	protests	 (traditionally	a	 left-wing	symbol),	now	endowed	with	anti-left	
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wing	views	endorsed	by	new	online	mobilizing	groups,	and	on	the	other	hand	a	conservative	elite	
interested	in	channeling	the	discontent	into	negative	coverage	of	the	PT	governments	prior	to	the	
2014	 elections	 (Avritzer	 2016a,	 Peralva	 et	 al.	 2017:27,	 Souza	 2016:106).	 Springing	 from	 the	
transport	protests,	the	heterogeneous	critique	of	the	political	system	and	the	attempts	to	claim	a	
space	for	direct	and	radical	democracy	were	quickly	superseded	by	a	media	agenda	emphasizing	
misuse	of	public	funds	and	corruption	(Mendonça	2018,	Nobre	2013b:145).	News	concordant	with	
this	frame	was	recycled	by	the	new	right-wing	online	groups,	while	attempts	at	reinvigorating	the	
democratic	 system	withered.	 In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 I	 return	 to	 examples	 of	 coverage	 of	 protests	
spinning	off	from	events	in	the	Lava-Jato	case,	with	characteristics	similar	to	those	discussed	above.	
The	underlying	motif	of	the	discontent	and	the	outrage,	according	to	Singer	(2013:37),	was	a	critique	
of	bloated	and	corrupt	state	institutions	dominated	by	an	establishment	who	are	not	working	in	the	
best	 interest	of	 the	citizens.	 I	 return,	 in	Chapter	6,	 to	 the	 identification	of	 the	State	with	PT;	an	
identification	that	became	a	central	semiotic	link	of	the	scandals	in	the	following	years.		
	
In	sum,	several	important	events	preceded	the	Lava-Jato	case,	and	the	pattern	of	their	coverage	in	
Brazilian	mainstream	media	partly	spelled	out	the	fate	of	the	coverage	to	come.	These	media	outlets	
increasingly	 became	 polarized	 and	 politicized	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 (Lattman-Weltman	 and	 Chagas	
2016,	Feres	Júnior	and	Sassara	2016:210),	and	scandals	and	exposés	grew	to	be	the	main	material	
of	 the	 weeklies	 and	 the	 “quality”	 newspapers.	 The	 events	 highlighted	 in	 this	 chapter	 set	 the	
standard	for	the	coverage	of	the	Lava-Jato	case,	analyzed	in	the	next	chapter.	First,	the	election	of	
Lula	as	the	first	left-wing	president	since	the	return	to	democracy	shifted	media	attention	to	the	
increasingly	 established	 left-wing	 political	 elite,	 primarily	 organized	 around	 PT.	Whereas	media	
exposés	in	his	predecessor’s	government	had	been	less	effective,	the	first	scandal	involving	Lula’s	
ministers	quickly	led	to	resignations,	and	the	public	prosecutors	accumulated	independence	in	his	
presidential	 periods	 (Arantes	 2011),	 especially	 at	 the	 top-level,	 as	 became	 apparent	 during	 the	
Mensalão	 trial	 (Michener	 and	Pereira	 2016).	 The	expectation	 that	 the	negative	 coverage	of	 the	
scandal	would	undermine	Lula’s	support	and	the	re-election	chances	of	involved	parliamentarians	
was	not	met	in	the	2006	elections,	however	(Pereira,	Rennó	and	Samuels	2011:94,	Rennó	2011).		
	
Because	of	the	academic	perception	of	increasing	denuncismo	and	propensity	for	scandals,	groups	
of	scholars	began	to	measure	the	valency	of	news	on	parties	and	candidates	leading	up	to	the	2014	
elections,	 arguing	 that	 such	 negative	 coverage	 of	 well-known	 candidates	 should	 have	 negative	
electoral	 results	 (Feres	 Júnior	 2016:282).	 This	 implicit	 critique	 of	 political	 bias	 in	 the	 media	
conglomerates,	which	could	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	political	parallelism	in	the	Hallin-Mancini	
model,	has	been	challenged	by	Miguel,	who	argued	that	if	it	is	even	possible	to	measure	slant	as	
such	(and	eventually	aggregate	news	items	by	ignoring	relative	weight	of	importance),	negative	or	
positive	coverage	must	be	still	decoded	by	audiences	(Miguel	2015:174,	drawing	upon	Hall	1980).	
Negative	 coverage	 does	 not	 translate	 uniformly	 nor	 directly	 into	 political	 preferences,	 in	 other	
words.	In	any	case,	the	media	conglomerates’	attention	to	scandals	made	Lula’s	successor	Rousseff	
keenly	 aware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 signaling	 zero-toleration	 for	 corruption	 suspicions,	 but	 her	
administration	was	nonetheless	caught	up	in	(and	caught	off-guard	by)	the	wave	of	protests	in	June	
2013.	After	barely	winning	the	2014	elections,	Rousseff	immediately	faced	calls	for	impeachment,	
but	it	was	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	that	created	the	narrative	conditions	for	her	impeachment.	In	the	
next	chapter,	I	show	how	these	scandals	and	processes	intertwined	in	news	texts.	
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Chapter	4	
Unfolding	the	Lava-Jato	Scandal	
	
Before	commencing	an	analysis	of	news	texts	and	newscasts,	I	will	make	three	preliminary	remarks	
regarding	my	way	of	referencing	the	selected	news	texts,	the	organization	of	the	material,	and	the	
presented	emplotment.	First,	the	examples	are	referenced	in	an	unconventional	way,	in	order	to	
give	the	reader	as	many	clues	about	the	context	as	possible	with	a	minimum	of	reference-checking	
needed.	Instead	of	author	names	and	years,	I	give	the	media	outlet	and	date	of	quoted	daily	papers,	
sites,	and	newscasts,	and	the	edition	number	for	the	weekly	magazines,	in	the	following	manner:	
	
Abbreviation	list:	
	
Abbreviation	of	Newspaper	 Magazine	 Newscast	
E2/3		
	
Estado	de	S.	
Paulo	(March	2)	
V#2500	 Veja,	edition	
2500	
JN24/5	 Jornal	Nacional	
Webpage	
F18/1	2015	 Folha	de	S.	Paulo	
(January	18,	2015)	
I#2465	 IstoÉ	 G1-19/1	 g1.globo.com	
G25/9	 O	Globo	
(September	25)	
E#870	 Época	 V-2/12	 Veja.abril.com.br	
	
	
Second,	 the	 news	 texts	 are	 organized	 in	 order	 provide	 the	 reader	 with	 a	 coherent	 reading	
experience.	To	create	cohesion	across	the	more	than	one	hundred	quoted	texts	is	by	itself	a	kind	of	
literary	practice;	or	at	 least	theoretically	 informed	emplotment	in	action.	By	bringing	forth	plots,	
admittedly,	I	engage	in	the	rewriting	of	already	“contested	codes	and	representations”	(Clifford	and	
Marcus	 1986:2),	 and	 like	 writing	 cultures,	 this	 is	 a	 hermeneutic	 endeavor	 with	 political	
consequences.	“Literary	processes…	affect	the	ways	cultural	phenomena	are	registered”	(ibid.:4)	in	
cultural	anthropology	as	well	as	in	the	news	media	narratology	pursued	here.	
	
The	 hermeneutic	 endeavor	 of	 this	 chapter	 poses	 certain	 ethical	 choices	 concerning	 selection,	
validity,	 and	 representation.	 First	 of	 all,	 I	 use	 each	 bit	 of	 text	 to	 exemplify	 and	 thus	 articulate	
narrative	elements	such	as	plot	structures	or	focalization	of	actants.	This,	however,	also	means	that	
for	every	text	presented	and	unfolded	here,	I	have	de-selected	numerous	texts	covering	the	same	
event,	and	sometimes,	this	means	ignoring	less	salient	or	marginalized	textual	accounts	of	the	same	
event.	 These	 are	 contingent	 analytical	 choices	 and	 other	 researchers	 might	 pick	 out	 different	
variations	within	a	group	of	texts.	The	organization	of	the	empirical	material	here	aims	to	do	justice	
to	the	salience	of	material	in	the	sampled	segment	of	the	mediascape	–	highlighting	the	material	
which	was	highly	visible	and	explaining	it,	as	far	as	space	permits,	in	its	complexity.	The	de-selection,	
then,	smoothens	the	reading	experience	as	it	levels	or	flattens	the	ruptures	found	across	news	texts.	
However,	to	counter	this	inevitable	reduction	of	complexity,	I	return,	in	Chapter	6,	to	investigate	
the	margins	of	the	corpus	and	the	political	unconscious	governing	it.		
	
While	I	attempt	to	let	the	texts	speak	for	themselves	as	much	as	possible,	this	representation	of	
representations	nevertheless	doubly	reflects	the	political	situation	of	Brazil,	caught	between	the	
voices	of	journalistic	texts	and	my	backgrounded	strategy	for	reading,	selecting,	and	re-representing	
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them.	This	is	a	double	reflection,	I	believe,	because	my	strategy	is	undoubtedly	informed	by	what	I	
more	or	less	consciously	consider	to	be	“the	real	story”	behind	the	news	texts.	I	will	strive	not	to	let	
my	assumption	of	the	“real	story”	 influence	this	part	of	the	analysis,	but	I	acknowledge	that	the	
production	of	a	persuasive	(or	at	least	coherent)	interpretation	demands	the	imposition	of	some	
kind	of	literary	order	on	the	material.	This	goes	for	the	pundit	as	well	as	the	academic	writer,	but	
the	academic	writer	is	obliged	to	declare	the	terms	of	engagement.		
	
This	leads	me	to	a	third	and	final	remark	concerning	emplotment.	In	the	analysis,	I	will	bring	out	
moments	of	emplotment	 shared	between	a	 range	of	news	 texts.	While	 I	 follow	 the	 intertextual	
trajectories	in	order	to	present	and	analyze	them,	while	not	supposing	them	to	be	the	“real”	or	the	
only	explanations	for	the	political	events	-	far	from	it.	Only	by	mapping	out	the	shared	plot	structures	
is	 it	 possible	 to	 discover	 what	 such	 plot	 structure	 means	 to	 the	 organization	 of	 material	 and	
interpretation	of	events,	and	ultimately	how	the	plot	structure	is	deployed	as	catalyst	for	political	
action	and	speech	acts.		
	
To	guide	the	reader,	I	will	start	by	briefly	outlining	the	six	sections	in	this	chapter.	In	the	first	section	
of	 analysis,	 I	 will	 present	 selected	 passages	 from	 the	 sampled	 weekly	 magazines	 and	 daily	
newspapers	that	deal	with	the	Petrobras	directors	and	businessmen	of	the	construction	sector	who	
were	 initially	 arrested	by	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 in	2014-2015.	 In	 some	 texts,	 the	 cartel	 of	
subcontractors	 appears	 as	 the	 obvious	 antagonist	 of	 the	 plot,	 but	 in	 several	 examples	 the	
businessmen	took	on	the	role	of	scapegoats,	or	pawns	 in	a	 larger	scheme	led	by	PT.	 In	order	to	
prepare	for	a	fabula	that	emerged	somewhat	later,	I	also	present	the	weeklies’	emplotment	of	the	
arrest	of	Marcelo	Odebrecht,	the	heir	to	the	Odebrecht	construction	company,	as	the	final	example.	
While	the	position	of	antagonist	in	the	narratives	of	the	Lava-Jato	was	split	in	news	texts	between	
political,	criminal	and	financial	or	business	actors,	depending	on	the	occasion	for	any	particular	news	
text,	the	protagonist	role	was	firmly	established	early	on.	In	the	second	section	of	analysis,	I	analyze	
the	characterizations	of	the	protagonists	–	judge	Sérgio	Moro	and	the	Prosecutor-General	Rodrigo	
Janot	in	particular	-	facing	the	corrupt	businessmen	and	politicians.		
	
From	these	crude	baseline	observations	of	antagonists	and	protagonists,	I	begin	to	unfold	the	more	
complex	role	played	by	various	politicians	in	the	third,	fourth,	and	fifth	sections	of	analysis.	In	the	
first	half	of	2015,	the	corruption	scandal	of	Petrobras	was	threatening	to	embroil	most	of	Congress	
and	the	Rousseff	administration	–	with	the	latter	focalized	as	responsible	for	the	Petrobras	graft.	In	
the	second	half	of	2015,	the	government	coalition	began	to	break	up,	and	impeachment	of	President	
Rousseff	was	discussed	with	increasing	intensity;	both	of	these	political	developments	were	tied	to	
the	polemical	figure	of	Eduardo	Cunha,	then	President	of	the	Câmara.	Through	examples	from	news	
texts	found	in	Estado	and	Folha,	these	events	take	up	the	third	section	of	analysis,	which	shows	not	
only	 how	 the	media	 increasingly	 covered	Cunha	negatively,	 but	 also	 the	media’s	 narration	 of	 a	
complex	coalitional	power	game	that	ended	with	most	of	the	government	coalition	jumping	ship.	
	
In	the	fourth	section,	I	analyze	TV	Globo’s	Jornal	Nacional	newscasts	from	March	4	and	March	16	in	
depth.	 I	 selected	 these	 two	 newscasts	 because	 they	 contain	 crucial	material	 that	 established	 a	
narrative	 link	 between	 Rousseff	 and	 Lula	 and	 contributed	 to	 a	 common	 emplotment	 of	 the	
impeachment	and	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.	These	newscasts	also	contain	material	that	demonstrates	
the	apogee	of	the	symbolic	power	of	Sérgio	Moro,	as	well	as	an	articulation	of	the	value	axis	pitting	
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Lula	(as	the	antagonist)	against	members	of	the	judiciary.	The	two	newscasts	are	prime	examples	
for	showing	how	postulates	of	proximity	between	Lula	and	the	Petrobras	scandal	were	seemingly	
enough	to	discredit	him	or	indeed	any	member	of	PT.	This	association	contaminated	(Adut	2008:24)	
the	Rousseff	presidency	entirely	in	the	second	newscast,	while	the	strands	of	the	corruption	probe	
investigating	other	central	political	actors	were	ignored;	even	on	the	very	day	when	Cunha	faced	
charges	in	the	STF,	this	news	item	and	its	relevance	to	the	impeachment	case	was	relegated	to	the	
margin	of	the	newscast.	Finally,	this	section	relates	to	section	3.7	above	concerning	the	protests	of	
June	2013,	by	discussing	the	contrasting	representation	of	“legitimate	street	protests”	and	“acts	of	
violence.”		
	
The	 fifth	 section	 of	 analysis	 unpacks	 examples	 sampled	 from	 the	 complex	 corpus	 of	 news	 on	
impeachment,	going	back	to	the	coverage	found	in	the	daily	newspapers	and	their	online	platforms	
in	early	2015,	skipping	 the	backstage	events	already	described	 in	 the	 third	section,	 instead	 fast-
forwarding	 to	 the	 moments	 when	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 came	 to	 influence	 and	 boost	 the	
impeachment	process.	In	this	section,	I	also	show	the	transfer	of	narrative	desire	from	the	Lava-Jato	
to	the	impeachment	process,	as	well	as	the	patterning	from	earlier	scandals	involving	PT.	The	sixth	
and	final	section	provides	examples	of	an	imagined	end	to	the	political	elite	as	a	whole,	transcending	
the	focus	on	PT	demonstrated	in	the	previous	sections.	
	
	
4.1	Doleiro,	Delator,	Scapegoat	
On	March	17,	2014,	the	police	operation	code-named	Lava-Jato	(or	Lava	Jato	without	hyphen)	was	
launched.	That	morning,	the	doleiro	 (money	launderer)	Alberto	Youssef,	working	out	of	Curitiba,	
Paraná,	was	apprehended	by	federal	police	officers.	Youssef	had	been	identified	as	a	key	actor	in	a	
criminal	network	linked	to	the	gas	station	Posto	da	Torre	in	the	hotel	sector	of	central	Brasília.	The	
police	operation	was	code-named	Lava-Jato,	 literally	 “Jet	Wash,”	 referencing	both	 the	car	wash	
(lava	a	jato	in	Portuguese)	in	that	gas	station	and	implying	that	the	amounts	of	money	laundered	
surpassed	the	value	of	a	jet	(Netto	2016:28).		
	
The	 operation	 that	 apprehended	 Youssef	 did	 not	 quite	 catch	 the	 eye	 of	 the	 national	 media,	
however.	While	the	case	was	covered	briefly	on	March	18,	it	was	not	linked	to	Petrobras	before	it	
became	 known	 that	 a	 former	 director	 of	 Petrobras,	 Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa,	 was	 in	 cahoots	 with	
Youssef.	 Costa,	who	 had	 headed	 the	 oil	 giant’s	 Supply	Department	 until	 2014,	 happened	 to	 be	
arrested	in	a	follow-up	operation	a	few	days	later.	On	March	20,	Costa	was	apprehended	by	the	
Federal	Police,	because	he,	on	the	morning	of	Youssef’s	arrest,	had	called	on	his	family	to	destroy	
evidence	in	his	office	and	remove	large	amounts	of	money.	The	ex-director’s	family	members	were	
nearly	caught	red-handed	by	the	police,	who	rapidly	accessed	surveillance	tapes	from	the	very	same	
morning	and	eventually	stopped	the	destruction	of	evidence	(ibid.).		
	
From	March	and	until	September	2014,	the	investigation	of	large-scale	corruption	in	Petrobras	was	
in	an	embryonic	state,	and	the	jurisdiction	of	the	case	was	questioned	in	the	Supreme	Court.	In	the	
media,	 a	 few	political	 pundits	 discussed	 the	 possible	 ramifications	 of	 the	 investigation,	 and	 the	
astonishing	 figure	 of	 R$	 10	 billion	 -	 the	 financial	 damage	 inflicted	 by	 the	 corruption	 –	 was	
mentioned.		
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The	 first	 politician	 caught	 up	 in	 the	media	 scandal,	 André	 Vargas,	 actually	 had	 little	 to	 do	with	
Petrobras.	Vargas,	a	PT	parliamentarian	in	the	Câmara	(and	vice-president	of	the	Câmara	at	that	
time)	had	texted	Youssef	about	Youssef’s	façade	company	Labogen,	and	about	the	loan	of	a	private	
jet.	The	text	messages	were	leaked	to	Folha	(F1/4	2014).	In	return	for	the	access	to	Youssef’s	jet,	
Vargas	supposedly	helped	Labogen	obtain	contracts	with	the	Ministry	of	Health.	Vargas	asked	for	a	
temporary	leave	from	the	Câmara	and	avoided	the	process	of	expulsion	from	PT	by	leaving	the	party	
himself	(Netto	2016:180).	Through	a	disciplinary	process	 in	the	Ethics	Council	of	the	Câmara,	his	
mandate	was	annulled	on	the	10th	of	December	that	year.	Vargas	was	not	the	only	one	to	benefit	
personally	from	knowing	Youssef;	the	doleiro	had	generously	bestowed	a	Land	Rover	upon	Paulo	
Roberto	Costa,	which	led	the	police	to	Costa.	In	an	op-ed	piece	penned	by	Eliane	Cantanhêde	(F4/4),	
Costa’s	bribe-taking	configured	a	link,	however	opaque,	between	President	Dilma	Rousseff	and	the	
corruption	of	Petrobras.	Cantanhêde	here	works	explicitly	with	implicature	and	with	the	expected	
denial	of	a	relation	between	Rousseff	and	Costa:	
	
No	mínimo,	a	turma	[de	Petrobras]	é	ruim	de	fazer	negócios.	O	pior	é	que	a	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	está	no	
centro	das	discussões.	[…]	Para	complicar,	um	mesmo	doleiro,	Alberto	Youssef,	deu	um	Land	Rover	para	Paulo	
Roberto	Costa,	outro	ex-diretor	da	Petrobras	enrolado	com	Pasadena,	e	emprestou	seu	jatinho	para	o	petista	
André	Vargas,	vice-presidente	da	Câmara,	e	seus	familiares.	Youssef	e	Costa	foram	presos	na	Operação	Lava	
Jato,	da	PF.	Vargas	tenta	justificar	o	injustificável.	Nada	a	ver?	Sim,	pode	ser.	Mas	está	tudo	muito	embolado.	
(F4/4	2014)	
	
In	news	reports	of	the	same	period	dealing	with	a	congressional	investigative	committee	looking	
into	Petrobras	(the	CPI	de	Petrobras),	similar	implicature	is	used.	Another	example	(a	Folha	news	
report)	unfolds	the	implication	through	of	Costa’s	interrogation	in	the	CPI	session	on	June	9:	The	
headline	and	lead	from	the	interrogation	of	Costa	in	Congress	is	drawn	from	a	direct	quote	of	Costa:	
“Petrobras	não	era	balcão	de	negócios,	diz	ex-diretor	que	esteve	preso.”		The	quote	is	presented	in	
its	entirety	 in	the	third	paragraph	of	the	report:	“Repudio	com	veemência	que	a	[Petrobras]	era	
organização	criminosa.	 [A	Petrobras]	não	era	balcão	de	negócios,	uma	casa	de	negócios”	 (F10/6	
2014).	The	question	posed	by	an	unnamed	senator	implies	an	emplotment	similar	to	the	pundit’s	
above	-	a	corrupt	ex-director	of	a	state	company	trying	to	cover	his	tracks.	Just	as	in	the	column	
cited	above,	Costa’s	apparent	corruption	is	then	taken	as	evidence	of	a	larger	problem	in	Petrobras.	
This	is	organized	textually	by	juxtaposing	corruption	and	criminal	networks	in	the	management	of	
Petrobras	 to	 the	 story	 of	 the	 Pasadena	 deal.	 After	 Costa’s	 quotes	 and	 his	 history	 of	 arrest	 and	
release	from	prison,	the	problems	of	the	Pasadena	buy-out	are	summarized.	Quoting	Rousseff,	the	
report	describes	the	buy-out	as	“a	bad	deal	and	a	loss	to	Brazil”:	“a	compra	de	Pasadena	acabou	
sendo	um	mau	negócio	com	prejuízo	para	o	Brasil.”	The	juxtaposition	of	the	corruption	of	Petrobras	
and	the	Pasadena	deal	was	introduced	in	Chapter	2,	but	here,	it	is	more	apparent	that	the	senators	
of	the	CPI	(and	journalists	reporting	on	it)	are	looking	for	a	causal	connection	between	the	Pasadena	
scandal	and	Costa’s	alleged	corruption.	However,	the	link	 is	absent	from	the	surface	level	of	the	
text:	
	
Costa	é	acusado	de	participar	de	esquema	comandado	por	doleiros	que	movimentou,	de	forma	suspeita,	R$	
10	 bilhões.	 A	 Polícia	 Federal	 afirma	 que	 o	 esquema	 pode	 ter	 desviado	 R$	 400	milhões.	 Em	 resposta	 aos	
senadores,	Costa	também	comentou	a	polêmica	compra	da	refinaria	de	Pasadena,	nos	Estados	Unidos.	(F10/6	
2014)	
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Like	 other	 news	 and	 columns	 in	 this	 early	 phase	 of	 the	 scandal,	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 corruption	 is	
localized	 and	 contained	 to	 the	doleiro	 Youssef,	 Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 the	 PT	
politician	Vargas,	but	an	implicit	wider	scope	lingers	in	some	of	the	texts.	In	most	cases,	it	is	“the	
Rousseff	government”	that	is	implicated,	although	a	few	examples	can	be	found	in	which	several	
governing	parties	are	mentioned:	
	
Zavascki	determinou	a	soltura	de	12	investigados	na	Operação	Lava	Jato,	que	apura	um	vultoso	esquema	de	
lavagem	de	dinheiro	com	ramificações	em	partidos	como	PT,	PP,	PMDB	e	Solidariedade.	Segundo	a	Polícia	
Federal,	essa	organização	criminosa,	da	qual	participaria	o	doleiro	Alberto	Youssef,	movimentou	mais	de	R$	
10	bilhões.	(F21/5	2014)		
	
Youssef,	in	August	2014,	signalled	that	he	would	reveal	the	scope	of	the	corruption	in	Petrobras	to	
reduce	his	expected	total	prison	sentence	of	one	hundred	years.	A	plea	bargain	is	commonly	known	
as	 delação	 premiada	 in	 Brazilian	 news	 (although	 the	 legal	 term	 is	 colaboração	 premiada,	 see	
Damgaard	2018b:7),	and	the	testifying	individual	is	then	known	as	delator.	The	word	delator	carries	
the	connotations	of	informer,	snitch,	and	whistleblower.	In	the	article	“Preso	desde	março,	doleiro	
Alberto	Youssef	quer	colaborar	com	a	Justiça,”	reporting	Youssef’s	expected	plea	bargain	(F10/8	
2014),	 the	 strategy	of	 snitching	 is	disapproved	by	Youssef’s	 lawyer,	Antonio	Augusto	Figueiredo	
Basto.	He	argued	 that	 Youssef	was	 really	 just	 a	 scapegoat	 in	 the	grander	 scheme	of	 things:	 “’O	
Alberto	é	mero	bode	expiatório	num	esquema	muito	maior,	sobre	o	qual	não	há	nenhum	interesse	
em	investigar.	Você	acha	que	ele	teria	 feito	tudo	de	que	é	acusado	sem	um	parlamentar?’”	The	
figure	of	a	scapegoat	 for	 the	political	elite	 is	 interesting,	as	 it	expands	the	scope	of	 the	scandal,	
building	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 large	 corruption	 scheme	 that	 involves	 the	 Congress.	 The	 scapegoat	
figure,	furthermore,	was	also	used	for	characterizing	all	businessmen	that	attempted	to	negotiate	
plea	bargains,	as	we	shall	see	below.		
	
Some	of	the	names	involved	in	the	corruption	scheme	were	disclosed	a	few	weeks	later,	providing	
the	shadow	menace	with	faces	and	positions	-	in	the	top	tier	of	Congress.	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	had	
successfully	negotiated	a	plea	bargain	shortly	after	Youssef	began	his	negotiations,	on	August	27,	
2014,	and	this	was	revealed	by	Veja	on	September	5.	In	the	report	“O	Delator	Fala”	(V#2390,	see	
appendix	A,	figure	A.3)	penned	by	Rodrigo	Rangel,	many	prominent	politicians	are	named	by	Costa	
as	“participants	in	the	corruption	scheme”:	Congress	leaders	Henrique	Eduardo	Alves	(President	of	
the	Câmara)	and	Renan	Calheiros	(President	of	the	Senate),	minister	of	Mines	and	Energy	Edison	
Lobão,	and	“the	eternal	government	spokesperson	of	any	government,”	senator	Romero	Jucá	(all	
four	from	PMDB).	The	PMDB	governor	of	Maranhão,	Roseana	Sarney,	the	PMDB	ex-governor	of	Rio	
Sérgio	Cabral,	and	several	PP	politicians	are	also	mentioned,	as	well	as	PT	Congressman	Cândido	
Vaccarezza.	 This	 already	 impressive	 list	of	political	 actors	was	eclipsed	 completely	 the	 following	
month,	 however.	 In	October,	 several	weeklies	 cut	 to	 the	 chase	 and	 cast	 PT	 as	 the	mastermind	
behind	the	corruption	scheme	that	Youssef	and	Costa	disclosed.	In	the	IstoÉ	report	“Campanha	de	
Dilma	sob	suspeita,”	Costa	is	indirectly	quoted,	dragging	the	president	into	the	scandal:		
	
O	ex-diretor	foi	assertivo	ao	apontar	o	PT	como	o	maior	beneficiário	dos	desvios...	a	idealização	e	a	montagem	
da	 rede	 de	 corrupção	 remetem	 a	 2004,	 com	 a	 nomeação	 de	 Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa	 para	 a	 Diretoria	 de	
Abastecimento.	 Na	 cúpula	 da	 estatal,	 ele	 teve	 grande	 importância	 na	 ampliação	 do	 poder	 do	 cartel	 das	
empreiteiras	e	na	geração	de	mais	divisas	para	a	ala	de	políticos	da	quadrilha.	Por	isso,	contou	com	o	lobby	de	
fortes	lideranças	do	cenário	nacional	para	chegar	ao	posto,	com	o	aval	do	[governo].	(I#2342)	
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Leaked	details	 from	Youssef’s	testimony	were	also	published	 in	Veja.	 In	a	 lightning-strike	special	
issue	out	of	the	normal	publication	schedule,	the	Friday	before	the	second	round	of	election,	Veja‘s	
front-page	headline	read	“They	knew	it	all”	-	printed	on	top	of	the	faces	of	Rousseff	and	ex-president	
Lula,	 both	 looking	 pale	 and	desperate	 against	 a	 black	 and	 foreboding	 background	 (V#2397,	 see	
appendix	A,	figure	A.4).	In	the	feature	report,	the	corruption	in	the	Petrobras	and	the	losses	to	the	
state	were	denounced.	The	PT	leaders	lashed	out	against	Veja	for	what	they	saw	as	an	attempt	to	
sway	the	voters	by	publishing	unproven	allegations	(Baptista	2017:125,	Chaia	2015:20,	Goldstein	
2016:8),	and	Rousseff	won	the	election	with	3,46	million	more	votes	than	runner-up	Aécio	Neves	
(PSDB)	that	Sunday,	October	26.		
	
Even	if	Youssef’s	claims	were	not	backed	up	by	much	evidence	at	the	time,	the	information	disclosed	
by	Costa	and	Youssef	led	to	a	large-scale	arrest	warrant	issued	by	judge	Moro,	executed	in	the	aptly	
titled	 7th	 phase	 of	 Lava-Jato	 “Juízo	 Final”	 –	 the	 “Final	 Judgment.”	 27	 preventive	 and	 temporary	
arrests	were	made	on	November	14,	 2014,	 as	well	 as	 nine	 compulsory	 testimonies.	With	 these	
arrests,	Época	foresaw	an	earthquake	about	to	destroy	Rousseff’s	next	government:		
		
Escândalo	da	Petrobras:	Partidos	e	empreiteiras	no	juízo	final	
Em	um	ataque	à	corrupção	de	proporções	inéditas,	a	Justiça	prende	empreiteiros	e	um	ex-diretor	que	operava	
na	Petrobras	sob	as	ordens	do	PT.	A	ação	deverá	provocar	um	terremoto	para	o	governo	Dilma.	(E#859)	
	
The	businessmen	were	publicly	shamed	on	front	pages	following	the	arrests	(G15/11	2014).	O	Globo	
had	by	then	begun	to	designate	the	disclosure	of	corruption	in	Petrobras	as	a	serialized	event,	with	
the	overarching	headline	“Escândalos	em	série”	encompassing	the	various	sub-items	of	the	front	
page	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.1).	This	mark	of	seriality	(Bødker	2016)	remained	on	the	O	Globo	
front-pages	 the	 following	 years,	 signalling	 spin-offs	 from	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 After	 six	
months’	worth	of	coverage,	weekly	magazines	and	daily	newspapers	alike	had	settled	on	the	same	
emplotment,	 featuring	 the	 Petrobras	 directors	 and	 subcontractor	 CEOs	 as	 the	 footmen	 of	 a	
government-led	corruption	scheme,	and	the	judge	of	the	case	as	central	protagonist.	
	
	
4.1.1	The	Businessmen	–	corrupted	and	betrayed	by	political	allies		
The	weekly	magazines	continued	to	cover	the	imprisoned	business	elite	in	2015,	and	the	plot	that	
cast	PT	as	 the	mastermind	 in	 the	corruption	 scheme	persisted	 there.	 In	a	 report	 in	Veja	 on	 the	
imprisoned	members	of	the	subcontractor	cartel,	the	former	jet-borne	freedom	and	luxury	of	the	
members	of	this	billion-dollar-club	is	contrasted	to	the	Curitiba	prison	cell:	
	
Eles	são	acusados	de	integrar	um	cartel	que	dividia	entre	si	os	contratos	bilionários	da	Petrobras	em	troca	do	
pagamento	de	propinas	para	os	políticos	que	lhes	abriam	caminho	na	estatal.	Na	carceragem	da	Polícia	Federal	
em	Curitiba,	 capital	 em	que	 correm	os	 processos	 da	 Lava-Jato,	 tem	 sido	 dura	 a	 rotina	 dos	 integrantes	 do	
chamado	 clube	 do	 bilhão,	 que	 até	 recentemente	 cruzavam	 os	 céus	 do	 país	 a	 bordo	 de	 jatos	 particulares.	
(V#2408)	
	
The	 cartel,	 organized	 in	 a	 self-styled	 “club”	 of	 subcontractors,	 had	 expanded	 from	 nine	 to	 17	
member	organizations	in	the	decade	following	Lula’s	election.	According	to	Veja,	they	are	merely	
scapegoats,	and	this	metaphor	again	locates	PT	as	the	real	force	behind	the	cartel	activities	of	the	
businessmen:	
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fica	evidente	o	desconforto	dos	empreiteiros	de	estarem	sendo,	pelo	menos	até	agora,	os	bodes	expiatórios	
da	complexa	rede	de	corrupção	armada	na	Petrobras.	Eles	têm	razão.	Nas	denúncias	oferecidas	pelo	Ministério	
Público	Federal	e	aceitas	pelo	juiz	Sergio	Moro,	o	esquema	de	corrupção	na	Petrobras	parece	ser	apenas	o	
conluio	de	empreiteiros	gananciosos	com	meia	dúzia	de	diretores	venais	da	Petrobras.	Nada	mais	 longe	da	
verdade.	 Como	Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa	 revelou	 com	 toda	 a	 clareza,	 tratava-se	 de	 um	esquema	de	 desvio	 de	
dinheiro	para	partidos	e	campanhas	políticas	organizado	[sic]	pelo	partido	no	poder,	o	PT.	(V#2408)	
	
Scapegoats	 are	 less	 to	 blame	 than	 the	 transgressors	 who	 designated	 the	 scapegoats;	 the	
characterization	thus	establishes	a	hierarchy.	The	hierarchy	of	transgression	is	also	marked	out	by	
the	qualifying	phrase	that	states	that	the	corruption	could	appear	to	be	“only	the	collusion	of	greedy	
contractors,”	 but	 “nothing	 could	 be	 farther	 from	 the	 truth.”	 The	 cartel	 is	 not,	 in	 this	 view,	 as	
important	as	political	corruption	of	PT	–	and	this	implicitly	motivates	the	focus	of	the	news	report,	
despite	the	lack	of	evidence	against	PT	available	at	that	point.		
	
The	businessmen	are	represented	as	betrayed	by	their	political	allies,	but	they	will	not	accept	their	
scapegoat	role:	“Os	empreiteiros	presos	repetem	aos	visitantes	que	não	estão	dispostos	a	figurar	
como	únicos	vilões	do	megaesquema	de	corrupção.”	One	central	member	of	 the	cartel,	Ricardo	
Pessoa	(ex-CEO	of	the	company	UTC),	“arose	to	dizzying	heights”	as	friend	of	Lula,	and	the	report	
affirms	that	he	is	now	making	“veiled	threats”	against	president	Rousseff:	
	
Foi	a	partir	do	primeiro	governo	Lula	que	a	UTC	Engenharia,	a	principal	empresa	de	Pessoa,	experimentou	uma	
ascensão	 vertiginosa.	 O	 empreiteiro	 considera-se	 amigo	 do	 ex-presidente,	 com	 quem	 conversava	
regularmente	até	ser	preso,	no	fim	do	ano	passado,	na	sétima	etapa	da	Operação	Lava-Jato.	…	[Anotações	
feitas	por	Pessoa	contêm]	queixas	contra	os	antigos	parceiros	de	negócios	e	ameaças	veladas	a	políticos.	Em	
um	dos	trechos,	o	empreiteiro	liga	os	contratos	sob	suspeita	assinados	entre	as	empreiteiras	e	a	Petrobras	ao	
caixa	de	campanha	eleitoral	da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff.	(V#2408)	
	
Ricardo	Pessoa	is	not	the	only	businessman	represented	by	Veja	as	betrayed	by	Lula.	Leo	Pinheiro,	
the	 president	 of	 the	 large	 Brazilian	 construction	 company	 OAS,	 was	 arrested	 with	 the	 other	
businessmen	in	November	2014,	and	his	relations	to	Lula	came	under	even	closer	scrutiny	(V#2423,	
see	appendix	A,	figure	A.2).	The	bribes	and	corruption	stemming	from	this	relationship	was	what	
eventually	became	the	basis	of	the	legal	trial	ending	in	Lula’s	incarceration	in	2018.		
	
In	April	2015,	a	year	before	the	MPF	even	indicted	Lula	for	corruption,	Veja	denounced	Lula	and	Léo	
Pinheiro’s	“loyal	friendship”	(V#2423).	An	exposé	detailed	how	a	ranch	in	Santa	Bárbara,	Atibaia	(in	
the	interior	region	of	greater	São	Paulo)	was	also	under	scrutiny,	because	the	ranch	and	the	rapid	
renovation	of	the	site	possibly	constituted	kickbacks	for	Lula.	A	pool	had	been	enlarged,	a	porch	
added,	and	so	on,	allegedly	at	Lula’s	request,	despite	the	fact	the	estate	was	not	actually	owned	by	
Lula,	but	by	friends	of	his.	According	to	the	investigation,	the	total	value	of	the	renovation	amounted	
to	around	R$1	million.	Furthermore,	the	front	page	and	the	report	revealed	how	OAS	had	built	a	
few	 select	 beachside	 apartments	 in	 a	 larger	 construction	 project	 originally	 planned	 by	 a	 bank	
employee	association	named	Bancoop.	The	real	estate	project,	located	in	Guarujá,	São	Paulo,	was	
co-owned	by	the	shareholders	of	Bancoop,	with	the	imprisoned	PT	treasurer	João	Vaccari	Neto	also	
having	a	share	–	as	well	as	a	commanding	position	in	Bancoop.	Although	many	apartments	were	
never	 build,	 Pinheiro	 had	 the	 beachside	 apartment	 built,	 allegedly	 at	 Lula’s	 request.	 In	 Veja’s	
account	of	 the	OAS	director’s	 testimony,	Bancoop	had	actually	been	used	as	a	 façade	 to	 funnel	
money	into	PT	campaigns:	
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Léo	Pinheiro	fez	um	segundo	favor	ao	ex-presidente	no	ramo	imobiliário.	O	empreiteiro	conta	que,	a	pedido	
do	 ainda	 presidente	 Lula,	 a	 OAS	 incorporou	 prédios	 inacabados	 da	 Cooperativa	 dos	 Bancários	 (Bancoop),	
entidade	ligada	ao	PT	que,	em	2006,	deu	o	golpe	em	3	000	mutuários	em	São	Paulo.	Durante	anos,	dezenas	de	
famílias	que	pagaram	fielmente	suas	mensalidades	à	Bancoop	tiveram	seu	suado	dinheirinho	desviado	para	as	
campanhas	eleitorais	do	PT.	(V#2423)	
	
When	Bancoop	went	bankrupt	in	2009,	OAS	never	completed	constructing	the	apartments	it	was	
supposed	to	provide	for	the	Bancoop	shareholders.	This	information,	however,	was	merely	a	repeat	
of	an	O	Globo	article	from	December	2014	(G7/12	2014),	detailing	how	Lula’s	wife	had	acquired	a	
share	 in	 the	 association	 and	 the	 rights	 to	 an	 apartment.	After	 the	bankruptcy	of	Bancoop,	OAS	
merely	executed	the	construction	of	some	of	the	buildings,	in	the	end	only	providing	apartments	to	
5,000	of	 the	8,000	 shareholders,	 Lula’s	wife	amongst	 them.	The	apartment	 (known	as	a	 triplex)	
allegedly	intended	for	Lula’s	wife,	moreover,	had	an	elevator	fitted,	separate	from	the	rest	of	the	
building.	The	case	of	the	Bancoop	bankruptcy	and	 its	alleged	role	as	 façade	for	PT	and	Lula	was	
brought	before	the	prosecutors	of	São	Paulo	state	in	August	2015.	The	sale	of	the	apartment	was	
ultimately	never	finalized,	as	Lula	and	his	wife	declined	to	buy	it	in	November	2015.		
	
The	 intimate	 friendship	between	 Lula	 and	Pinheiro	 is	 described	 in	 the	 second	paragraph	of	 the	
report:	
	
De	todos	os	empresários	presos	na	Operação	Lava-Jato,	Léo	Pinheiro	é	o	único	que	se	define	como	simpatizante	
do	 PT.	 O	 empreiteiro	 conheceu	 Lula	 ainda	 nos	 tempos	 de	 sindicalismo,	 contribuiu	 para	 suas	 primeiras	
campanhas	e	tornou-se	um	de	seus	mais	 íntimos	amigos	no	poder.	Culto,	carismático	e	apreciador	de	boas	
bebidas,	ele	integrava	um	restrito	grupo	de	pessoas	que	tinham	acesso	irrestrito	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto	e	ao	
Palácio	da	Alvorada.	Era	 levado	ao	"chefe",	como	ele	se	referia	a	Lula,	sempre	que	desejava...	essa	relação	
evoluiu	para	o	patamar	da	extrema	confiança	—	a	ponto	de	Lula,	ainda	exercendo	a	Presidência	e	depois	de	
deixá-la,	recorrer	ao	amigo	para	se	aconselhar	sobre	a	melhor	maneira	de	enfrentar	determinados	problemas	
pessoais.	Como	é	da	natureza	do	capitalismo	de	estado	brasileiro,	as	relações	amigáveis	são	ancoradas	em	
interesses	mútuos.	Pinheiro	se	orgulhava	de	jamais	dizer	não	aos	pedidos	de	Lula.	(V#2423)	
	
Veja	 continued	 to	publish	on	 the	 case,	 and	 reported	 that	 Lula	had	been	 seen	at	 the	apartment	
several	times.	Footage	of	this	only	surfaced	in	March	the	following	year,	however.	Similar	exposés	
were	published	in	Veja	about	Pinheiro,	and	these	reports	recycled	the	same	content:	
	
O	 empreiteiro	 Léo	 Pinheiro,	 ex-presidente	 da	 construtora	OAS,	 foi	 durante	muitos	 anos	 um	dos	mais	 fiéis	
amigos	de	Lula	no	poder.	Ao	longo	dos	dois	governos	do	petista,	transformou	a	construtora	em	um	império	
com	milhões	de	dólares	do	BNDES	em	investimentos	no	Brasil	e	no	exterior.	A	proximidade	entre	os	dois	era	
tal	que	Lula	ficava	à	vontade	para	pedir	toda	sorte	de	favor.	Preso	em	novembro	do	ano	passado,	Pinheiro	
sentiu-se	abandonado	e	começou	a	rascunhar	o	esboço	do	que	seria	uma	possível	delação	premiada.	Essas	
anotações	revelaram	como	era	lucrativa	a	amizade	de	Lula	com	o	empreiteiro.	Logo	depois	de	deixar	o	governo,	
Lula	ocupou	um	sítio	em	Atibaia,	no	interior	de	São	Paulo.	O	empreiteiro	também	construiu	o	tríplex	de	Lula	
no	Guarujá	(SP).	A	pedido	do	petista,	Léo	Pinheiro	realizou	uma	reforma	de	luxo	na	propriedade	de	Atibaia	sem	
cobrar	do	ex-presidente	um	único	tostão.	(V#2435)	
	
In	the	above	examples	drawn	from	the	first	half	of	2015,	we	see	a	consistent	emphasis	on	intimate	
relations	between	the	construction	sector	magnates	and	PT	leaders,	in	particular	Lula.	Substantial	
parts	 of	Veja’s	 reports	 are	 devoted	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 the	 close	 relations.	Why	 is	 the	 friendship	
stressed,	and	where	is	this	placed	in	the	plot?	I	will	argue	that	this	particular	representation	of	the	
relation	between	the	businessmen	and	specific	political	actors	accomplishes	several	things.	First	of	
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all,	the	assertion	of	friendship	pre-empts	a	contrary,	but	equally	valid	narrative	(given	the	available	
information	at	that	moment)	that	the	cartel	of	subcontractors	and	the	Petrobras	directors	acted	for	
their	 own	 enrichment.	 Some	 reports	 in	 the	 same	 period	 account	 for	 the	 exorbitant	 riches	 that	
businessmen	 and	 directors	 confess	 to	 having	 siphoned	 off;	 such	 confessions	 and	 the	 “hard”	
numerical	evidence	however	lacked	in	the	case	of	politicians.	Thus,	in	lieu	of	scathing	evidence	that	
attested	directly	to	the	benefits	gained,	the	alleged	close	relationships	to	imprisoned	businessmen	
connote	 corruption	 and	 transgression.	 Blame	 is	 assigned	by	 association,	 in	 short,	 or	 rather,	 the	
narrative	 of	 long-standing	 friendship	 moves	 blame	 from	 the	 cartel	 to	 the	 supposed	 political	
masterminds	behind	the	corruption.		
		
Furthermore,	the	emphasis	on	friendly	relations	localizes	the	corruption	to	a	handful	of	companies	
and	 Lula	 in	 particular;	 thereby	 the	 systemic	 dimensions	 of	 corruption	 in	 Brazil	 are	 denied	 as	 a	
relevant	 factor,	 and	 other	 political	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 Petrobras	 graft	 are	 backgrounded	 (a	
containment	strategy	common	to	many	of	the	coming	examples).	The	suspicion	clinging	to	personal	
relations	draws	upon	the	commonplace	discourse	that	describes	corruption	in	Brazilian	bureaucracy	
as	 related	primarily	 to	 influence	networks	 (Johnston	2007,	 Power	 and	Taylor	 2011).	 Finally,	 the	
emplotment	here	locates	specific	decision-making	power	(e.g.	the	power	to	direct	investments	in	
the	 state	 investment	 bank	 BNDES)	 solely	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 president,	 and	 the	 emplotment	
associates	the	rise	of	certain	companies	with	their	ability	to	corrupt	public	office-holders	(rather	
than	other	factors).		
	
To	avoid	redundancy,	I	will	not	exemplify	the	coverage	of	other	arrested	Petrobras	directors	and	
CEOs	 such	 as	 Nestor	 Cerveró	 or	 Renato	 Duque,	 nor	 expand	 on	 the	 shifts	 in	 coverage	 of	 Paulo	
Roberto	Costa	over	 the	 course	of	 the	 investigations.	 Instead,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 coverage	of	 the	
magnate	Marcelo	Odebrecht.	
	
	
4.1.2	Marcelo	Odebrecht	–	the	prince	of	business	
Even	if	Leo	Pinheiro	was	regarded	as	especially	close	to	Lula,	the	arrest	of	the	magnate	Marcelo	
Odebrecht	 resulted	 in	more	 front-pages	 in	 the	weeklies,	 headlines	 and	 news	 reports.	 Although	
numerous	 CEOs	 had	 already	 been	 incarcerated	 for	 months	 at	 that	 point,	 the	 ramifications	 of	
Marcelo	Odebrecht’s	arrest	were	represented	as	extraordinary.	On	June	19,	2015,	Folha	reported	
that	his	unexpected	arrest	constituted	a	“trophy	for	the	investigators	of	Lava	Jato.”	The	newspaper	
characterized	him	as	a	man	of	strong	opinions,	perceived	as	arrogant:		
	
Marcelo	 achava	 muito	 remota	 a	 possibilidade	 de	 ser	 preso,	 embora	 outros	 executivos	 do	 grupo	 não	
mostrassem	tanta	certeza…	é	uma	pessoa	de	opiniões	fortes.	Esse	traço	de	personalidade	lhe	custou	a	antipatia	
da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff,	que	achava	Marcelo	arrogante	desde	que	era	ministra…	Por	causa	da	fama	de	
pavio	curto,	Marcelo	também	enfrentou	alguma	desconfiança	da	parte	dos	funcionários	mais	antigos	quando	
assumiu	a	empresa.	(F19/6	2015)	
	
Jornal	Nacional	(JN20/6	2015),	on	the	following	day,	highlighted	the	codename	of	the	operation	-	
“erga	omnes”	–	rendering	this	as	“the	law	applies	to	everyone”	–	pointing	out,	through	one	of	many	
quotes	 attributed	 to	 Sérgio	Moro,	 that	 Odebrecht	 had	 especially	 sophisticated	 ways	 of	 paying	
kickbacks.	The	emplotment	in	Jornal	Nacional	and	Folha	is	similar,	as	it	combines	the	notion	of	a	
trophy	or	ultimate	target	and	the	idea	that	Odebrecht	had	escaped	by	being	clever,	but	that	the	
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rule	of	law	prevails	in	the	end.	Época	likens	Marcelo	Odebrecht	to	his	father,	Emílio,	the	patriarch	
of	 the	 family’s	 business	 empire,	 and,	 like	 Folha,	 characterizes	 Marcelo	 as	 having	 explosive	
temperament:		
	
...	o	patriarca	tem	temperamento	forte,	volátil	e	não	tolera	ser	contrariado.	Também	repetia	constantemente	
que	o	filho	não	“tinha	condições	psicológicas	de	aguentar	uma	prisão”.	Marcelo	Odebrecht	parece	muito	com	
o	 pai.	 Nas	 últimas	 semanas,	 segundo	 fontes	 ouvidas	 por	 ÉPOCA,	 teve	 encontros	 secretos	 com	 petistas	 e	
advogados	próximos	a	Dilma	e	a	Lula.	Transmitiu	o	mesmo	recado:	não	cairia	sozinho.	Ao	menos	uma	dessas	
mensagens	foi	repassada	diretamente	à	presidente	da	República.	Que	nada	fez.	
	
Quando	os	policiais	amanheceram	em	sua	casa,	Marcelo	Odebrecht	se	descontrolou.	Por	mais	que	a	iminência	
da	prisão	dele	fosse	comentada	amiúde	em	Brasília,	o	empresário	agia	como	se	fosse	intocável.	Desde	maio	do	
ano	passado,	quando	ÉPOCA	revelara	as	primeiras	evidências	da	Lava	Jato	contra	a	Odebrecht,	o	empresário	
dedicava-se	a	desancar	o	trabalho	dos	procuradores.	Conforme	as	provas	se	acumulavam,	mais	virulentas	eram	
as	respostas	do	empresário	e	da	Odebrecht.	Antes	de	ser	levado	pela	PF,	ele	fez	três	ligações.	Uma	delas	para	
um	amigo	que	tem	interlocução	com	Dilma	e	Lula	–	e	influência	nos	tribunais	superiores	em	Brasília.	“É	para	
resolver	 essa	 lambança”,	 disse	Marcelo	 ao	 interlocutor,	 determinando	que	o	 recado	 chegasse	 à	 cúpula	de	
todos	os	poderes.	“Ou	não	haverá	República	na	segunda-feira”.	(E#889)		
	
With	this	characteristic	of	the	powerful,	well-connected	choleric	business	leader,	Época	hints	that	
the	Odebrecht	dynasty	presented	a	threat	to	the	entire	republic	(see	section	4.6	below).	Eventually,	
as	Marcelo	Odebrecht	received	a	19-year	prison	sentence,	Veja	referred	to	him	as	the	“convicted	
prince”	(V#2469).	
	
According	to	one	of	Folha’s	leading	political	commentators,	Mônica	Bergamo,	Marcelo	himself	had	
an	alternative	view	of	 the	scandal:	An	unidentified	source	relates	that	Odebrecht	 felt	personally	
betrayed	by	President	Rousseff	herself,	as	she	left	him	to	his	fate	at	the	hands	of	the	federal	judge	
Moro.	 Bergamo’s	 short-form	 column	 focalizes	Marcelo	 and	 his	 reactions	 in	 two	 short	 narrative	
paragraphs,	 and	 it	 points	 out	 that	Marcelo	 Odebrecht	 was	 recently	 seen	 socializing	 with	 PSDB	
leaders,	under	the	provoking	sub-headline	“All	the	Teams.”	The	sentences	under	this	subheading	
thus	explicitly	provides	an	alternative	view	of	the	emplotment	of	PT	as	the	only	party	in	the	circles	
of	power:	
	
A	 pergunta	 recorrente	 ontem	entre	 advogados	 e	 políticos	 era:	 qual	 a	 chance	 de	Marcelo	Odebrecht	 fazer	
delação	premiada?	"Zero",	diz	um	dos	advogados	da	equipe	do	empreiteiro.	 [...]	Pouco	antes	de	ser	preso,	
Marcelo	Odebrecht	não	escondia	sua	contrariedade	com	Dilma	Rousseff.	Ele	afirmou	a	mais	de	um	interlocutor	
que	 a	 presidente,	 acreditando	 que	 ao	 juiz	 Sergio	Moro	 só	 interessaria	 punir	 as	 empreiteiras,	 poupando	 o	
governo,	teria,	digamos,	se	desinteressado	do	caso.	
	
A	VÍTIMA	
Na	visão	de	Odebrecht,	Moro	evita	aprofundar	o	envolvimento	de	políticos	para	que	o	caso	não	saia	de	suas	
mãos	 -quando	alguma	pessoa	com	cargo	público	é	citada,	a	 investigação	tem	que	ser	encaminhada	ao	STF	
(Supremo	Tribunal	Federal).	Ao	juiz	restaria	condenar	as	empreiteiras	por	cartel,	em	que	o	governo	é	vítima.	
	
FORA	DE	CONTROLE	
Neste	raciocínio,	só	um	fio	estaria	até	então	"desencapado":	o	do	empreiteiro	Ricardo	Pessoa,	da	UTC,	que	fez	
acordo	de	delação	premiada	em	Brasília.	Ele,	sim,	poderia	envolver	políticos	do	mais	alto	escalão	do	governo	
no	escândalo	da	Lava-Jato.	
	
VERSÃO	DA	VERSÃO	
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A	tensão	no	governo	Dilma,	por	sinal,	já	vinha	aumentando	nos	últimos	dias	justamente	por	causa	da	delação	
premiada	de	Pessoa.	De	acordo	com	versões	que	circulam	no	alto	escalão	do	governo,	ele	teria	citado	ministros	
da	cota	pessoal	da	presidente.	A	informação	não	é	confirmada.	[...]	
	
TODAS	AS	TURMAS	
Ainda	Marcelo	Odebrecht:	muito	próximo	de	Lula	e	do	PT,	o	empreiteiro	foi	também	estrela	de	eventos	que	
reuniram	a	nata	do	PSDB	nos	últimos	meses.	Num	jantar	oferecido	a	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	em	maio,	ele	
se	sentou	na	mesa	principal,	ao	lado	do	ex-presidente	e	do	governador	Geraldo	Alckmin,	de	SP.	Houve	discursos	
mas,	por	educação,	ninguém	tocou	no	tema	de	corrupção	nem	citou	a	Lava-Jato...	
	
NOTA	FISCAL	
E	 notas	 fiscais	 da	 Polis	 Digital,	 encontradas	 na	 contabilidade	 da	 Odebrecht,	 chamaram	 a	 atenção	 de	
investigadores.	 Eles	 imaginavam	 ter	 encontrado	 pagamentos	 ao	marqueteiro	 de	 Dilma,	 João	 Santana.	 Na	
verdade,	a	empresa	é	da	enteada	dele,	que	presta	serviços	de	internet.	Os	valores,	em	dois	anos,	somaram	R$	
98	mil.	(F20/6	2015)		
	
It	is	also	noteworthy	that	according	to	Bergamo’s	source	close	to	Odebrecht,	the	testimony	of	the	
cartel	 leader	Ricardo	Pessoa	could	counter	the	government’s	claim	that	the	cartel	acted	without	
political	support,	and	that	the	government	is	the	real	victim.	Above,	we	saw	that	this	was	exactly	
the	claim	that	was	pre-empted	in	Veja	(#V2408).	Now,	we	learn	that	there	is	a	hierarchy	of	degrees	
of	proximity	to	the	current	president,	and	that	Odebrecht	had	been	closer	to	Lula	than	to	Rousseff.	
Both	 texts	 anticipate	 future	 legal	 steps	 in	 a	 trial.	 Bergamo’s	 final	 paragraph,	 describing	 the	
confiscation	 of	 evidence	 at	 the	 Odebrecht	 headquarters	 which	 turned	 up	 documents	 linking	
Odebrecht	to	Rousseff’s	marketing	expert,	is	even	more	prophetic,	as	it	foreshadows	the	suspicions	
of	bribes	and	the	arrest	of	Santana	eight	months	later	(see	section	4.5.1).	
	
In	the	examples	above,	drawn	from	weekly	magazines	in	the	period	from	August	2014	till	June	2015,	
I	have	highlighted	the	emplotment	of	characters,	consistent	across	the	three	weeklies.	In	this	plot,	
a	 chain-of-command	starting	at	 the	presidential	palace	 in	Brasília	has	extended	 to	 the	 top-floor	
offices	 of	 Petrobras	 and	 the	 private	 construction	 sector.	 In	 face	 of	 the	 imprisonment	 of	 the	
businessmen,	the	PT	government	is	expected	to	succumb	to	an	imminent	earthquake,	threatening	
the	very	Republic.	Lula,	in	particular,	has	been	abusing	his	status	and	gained	privately	and	illicitly	
from	his	friendships	with	elite	businessmen,	but	 is	now	ignoring	his	erstwhile	friends	behind	the	
bars	in	Curitiba.	Although	some	news	reports	mention	other	parties,	it	is	either	“the	party	in	power”	
–	PT	en	toto	–	or	Lula	himself	that	is	cast	as	the	antagonist	of	the	plot.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	turn	
to	 the	 main	 protagonists	 of	 this	 plot.	 The	 looming	 earthquake	 provoked	 by	 the	 scapegoats’	
disclosure	of	corruption	works	like	a	prophecy,	in	that	it	predicts	a	future	crisis	for	the	government;	
a	crisis	that	might	either	end	in	the	fall	of	the	Republic	(E#889),	or	with	a	triumph	of	justice.	The	
desire	for	justice	and	an	end	to	impunity	is	especially	evident	in	the	texts	of	the	same	period	that	
deal	with	the	protagonism	of	the	federal	judge	in	Curitiba,	Sérgio	Moro.		
	
	
4.2	Protagonist:	Sérgio	Moro	
In	order	to	understand	the	importance	of	the	federal	judge	Sérgio	Moro,	we	need	to	reconstruct	his	
trajectory	in	the	public	imagination	-	 	or	rather,	the	trajectory	of	the	fabulas	that	represent	him.	
Although	a	counter-narrative	eventually	emerged,	I	will	initially	only	consider	the	character	of	Moro	
in	 the	position	of	 the	protagonist.	 In	 the	weeklies,	Moro	was	 characterized	as	an	 “iron	 fist,”	 an	
“invincible”	“leader	of	a	revolution”	of	Brazilian	justice,	poised	to	“end	impunity	of	the	corrupted”:	
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No	braço	de	ferro	com	os	acusados,	Moro	não	apenas	continua	invicto.	Com	passos	estudados,	vem	ganhando	
terreno	 e	 vencendo	 obstáculos	 que	 antes	 pareciam	 irremovíveis,	 como	 a	 lentidão	 da	máquina	 da	 Justiça.	
(V#2411)	
	
Época	also	featured	Moro	on	the	front-page	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.5):		
	
Nada	vai	pará-lo	
O	juiz	Sergio	Moro	empareda	políticos	e	empresários	poderosos	–	e	lidera	uma	revolução	que	tem	tudo	para	
pôr	fim	à	impunidade	dos	corruptos	brasileiros	(E#891)	
	
Under	the	headline	“Nothing	can	stop	him,”	the	lead	affirms	that	Moro	directs	a	revolution	in	the	
fight	against	corruption:	“The	unstoppable	impetus	of	Lava-Jato	relocates	the	center	of	power	from	
Brasília	to	Curitiba,	where	judge	Sergio	Moro	leads	a	revolution	in	Brazil’s	fight	against	corruption.”	
In	the	same	news	report,	after	several	oracular	digressions	concerning	the	next	plea	bargains	to	
come,	we	 learn	that	Moro,	 like	some	of	public	prosecutors	on	the	task	 force,	 is	a	man	of	moral	
virtue,	strategic	vision,	and	disciplined	work	ethic:	
	
Nenhum	gabinete,	portanto,	concentra	tanto	poder	neste	momento	no	Brasil	quanto	aquele	no	2°	andar	na	
Avenida	Anita	Garibaldi,	888.	É	de	 lá	que	despacha	Sergio	Moro,	o	cérebro	e	centro	moral	da	Lava	 Jato.	A	
Operação,	na	verdade,	envolve	dezenas	de	procuradores	da	República,	delegados	e	agentes	da	PF,	equipes	na	
Procuradoria-Geral	da	República,	em	Brasília,	além	do	ministro	do	Supremo	Teori	Zavascki.	Todos	têm	poder	
para	definir,	em	alguma	medida,	os	rumos	das	centenas	-	isso,	centenas	-	de	casos	de	corrupção	investigados	
na	Lava	Jato.	Alguns	casos	tramitam	em	Brasília	-	aqueles	que	envolvem	políticos	com	foro	no	Supremo.	Mas	
a	maioria	 fica	 em	 Curitiba	 e	 de	 lá	 não	 sai.	Moro	 alia	 virtudes	 raríssimas	 para	 a	missão:	 preparo	 jurídico,	
pensamento	estratégico,	inflexibilidade	de	princípios,	coragem	moral	e	disciplina	de	trabalho.	Entra	cedo,	sai	
tarde	e	prossegue	na	lida	mesmo	de	casa.	Alguns	dos	procuradores	da	força-tarefa	compartilham,	em	maior	
ou	menor	 grau,	 as	mesmas	 características.	 Estudaram	muito,	 trabalham	 sem	parar	 e	 entendem	que	estão	
fazendo	história.	
Após	mais	de	um	ano	de	Lava	Jato,	já	está	claro	que	esses	homens	e	mulheres	-	pelo	tamanho	dos	presos,	pela	
força	das	provas,	pelos	nomes	envolvidos	e	pelo	dinheiro	recuperado	-	estão	promovendo	uma	revolução	na	
luta	contra	a	grande	corrupção	no	Brasil.	(E#891)	
	
A	hierarchy	of	morally	good	actors	in	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	is	unfolded	here,	with	Moro	focalized	as	
he	organizes	the	Lava-Jato	investigation,	characterizing	him	as	both	the	brain	and	moral	center	of	
the	 case.	Moro	 stands	 over	 and	 above	 the	 police	 agents	 that	 investigate,	 the	 prosecutors	 that	
conduct	the	legal	parts	of	the	cases,	and	the	teams	allocated	from	the	Prosecutor-General’s	office.	
Moro	could	even	be	construed	here	as	superior	to	the	remote	Supreme	Court	judge	Zavascki.		
	
The	 daily	 newspapers	 rarely	 have	 the	 space	 for	 such	 extended	 descriptions,	 but	 examples	 of	
characterization	there	aligns	with	the	weeklies’	description	above,	e.g.	“Sérgio	Moro,	the	magistrate	
who	rigorously	conducts	the	Lava-Jato”	(E19/1	2016).	In	2014,	when	his	name	was	less	familiar	to	
readers,	Folha	characterized	Moro	in	the	same	way,	as	a	hardliner	judge;	tough-but-fair	and	highly	
competent:	“Moro	is	considered	a	very	tough	judge,	but	with	unexcelled	technical	qualifications	in	
the	legal	field	of	financial	crimes	and	money	laundering”	(F10/8	2014).		
	
In	late	2015,	it	was	obvious	to	readers	who	Moro	was,	and	his	name	barely	needed	introduction;	by	
then,	 a	 suspicion	 had	 emerged	 in	 public	 that	 political	 forces	 would	 try	 to	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	
investigation.	As	a	response,	on	November	24,	2015,	Moro	was	quoted	(with	little	variation)	on	the	
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front-pages	of	all	three	major	newspapers	(E/F/G	24/11	2015)	utilizing	a	biblical	metaphor	of	a	voice	
that	preaches	in	the	desert	to	characterize	the	Lava	Jato	investigations.		
	
Moro:	Lava	Jato	é	‘voz	no	deserto’	contra	corrupção	
Condutor	das	ações	da	Lava	 Jato,	o	 juiz	Sérgio	Moro	disse	que	a	operação	é	“voz	pregando	no	deserto”	e,	
sozinha,	não	vai	livrar	o	País	da	corrupção.	Ele	afirma	não	ver	mudanças	por	parte	do	Congresso	e	do	governo.	
(E24/11	2015)	
	
The	metaphor	both	invokes	a	biblical	narrative	and	prophecy,	while	at	the	same	time	referencing	
the	 possible	 threats	 to	 the	 investigation.	 Originally	 found	 in	 Isaiah	 40,	 an	 apocalyptic	 vision	 of	
Kingdom	Come,	the	same	image	of	the	voice	in	the	wilderness	appears	initially	in	both	Mark’s	and	
Matthew’s	accounts	of	John	the	Baptizer,	preaching	in	the	desert.	By	drawing	upon	this	metaphor,	
the	Lava-Jato	task	force	is	located	as	herald	of	the	end-times,	and	as	the	lone	guardian	of	the	country	
in	 a	 fight	 against	 corruption.	 Alone	 in	 the	 desert,	 the	 preacher	 or	 apocalyptic	 prophet	 calls	 for	
repentance	and	conversion.	As	 implied	 in	 the	Estado	quote	above,	 it	might	be	a	vain	hope	 that	
government	or	Congress	will	 repent;	 in	 the	 front-page	 teaser	 in	Folha,	Moro	 is	quoted	as	being	
disappointed	in	Congress	and	in	the	government	(F24/11).		
	
Moro’s	authority	is	underscored	by	the	tacit	understanding,	common	to	all	three	front-pages,	that	
Moro	was	newsworthy,	and	in	a	position	to	legitimately	comment	on	corruption	in	the	government	
and	Congress.	Even	more	interesting,	Moro	is	endowed	with	a	religious-moral	position	from	which	
he	 may	 both	 preach	 and	 denounce	 the	 Brazilian	 authorities	 for	 being	 corrupt	 like	 the	 Roman	
authorities	running	Jerusalem	in	biblical	times.	The	reader	may	also	infer	an	implicit	appeal	for	help	
from	civil	society,	since	the	lone	preacher	cannot	“free	the	country	from	corruption”	alone.		
	
Since	Sergio	Moro	did	not	have	jurisdictional	competency	to	investigate	public	office-holders,	but	
only	 businessmen,	 doleiros,	 and	 ex-politicians,	 it	 was	 perhaps	 surprising	 that	 he	 arose	 to	 the	
position	of	 a	national	 icon.	O	Globo	named	Moro	 the	person	of	 the	 year	 in	March	2015	 (Netto	
2016:169),	and	his	name	and	face	were	on	display	in	street	protests	against	corruption	and	against	
PT.	 The	 uncommon	 celerity	 of	 the	 trials	 in	 his	 Curitiba	 court,	 and	 the	 stiff	 sentences	 delivered	
certainly	set	his	processes	and	sentences	apart	from	many	trials	against	members	of	the	political	
elite.	 This	 was	 only	 possible,	 however,	 because	 a	 division	 of	 labour	 and	 jurisdiction	 emerged	
between	 Moro’s	 court	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Brasília.	 In	 the	 Brazilian	 system	 of	 political	
privileges	 and	 court	 prerogatives,	 every	 politician	 in	 office	 holds	 the	 so-called	 foro	 privilegiado,	
which	 can	be	 translated	as	 the	 right	 to	be	 judged	before	a	 court	of	 a	higher	 tier	 than	 common	
citizens.	Ex-parliamentarians	hold	no	such	privilege,	however,	and	so	with	the	authorization	judge	
Moro,	the	federal	police	could	apprehend	ex-Congressmen	–	or	ex-presidents.	The	foro	also	extends	
to	 the	 right	 of	 denunciation,	 so	 that	 duty	 of	 investigating	 and	 eventually	 indicting	 politicians	 in	
federal	office	 falls	 to	 the	Prosecutor-General	of	 the	Republic	 (abbreviated	PGR).	Because	of	 this	
jurisdictional	split,	Rodrigo	Janot,	Prosecutor-General	in	2013-2017,	also	took	center	stage	in	the	
narratives	of	corruption,	and	I	will	now	turn	to	the	most	salient	characterizations	of	Janot.	
	
	
4.2.1	Protagonist:	Prosecutor-General	Rodrigo	Janot	
For	the	above-mentioned	reasons	of	jurisdiction,	the	testimonies	of	Youssef	and	Costa	could	only	
be	 used	 legally	 for	 investigations	 of	 government	 leaders	 and	 federal	 representatives	 if	 the	 PGR	
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chose	to	pursue	the	 inquiry,	and	only	 if	 the	Supreme	Court	 then	authorized	 investigations.	This,	
effectively,	delayed	investigations	of	politicians	in	public	office.	Even	so,	already	by	the	end	of	2014,	
rumors	floated	in	the	weekly	magazines	about	the	likelihood	of	such	investigations.	Many	names,	
supposedly	 involved	 in	 the	 Petrobras	 graft,	 leaked	 from	 Youssef	 and	 Costa’s	 testimonies,	 as	
described	above.	In	February	2015,	the	rumors	of	Brasília	had	it	that	the	PGR’s	office	was	close	to	
requesting	 authorization	 to	 open	 investigations	 against	 a	 long	 list	 of	 parliamentarians	 (see	 also	
quote	from	E#874,	next	chapter,	and	appendix	A,	figure	A.6).	The	list	constituted	the	third	major	
step	in	the	Lava-Jato	investigations,	after	the	imprisonment	of	money	launderers	and	cartel	leaders.	
The	list	compiled	in	the	Prosecutor-General’s	office	was	dubbed	“Lista	de	Janot”	by	the	press:	
	
…	despertou	no	meio	 político	 nesta	 semana	um	 sentimento	batizado	por	 alguns	 de	 “tensão	pré-Janot”.	O	
motivo	é	que	dezenas	de	nomes	de	parlamentares	apareceram	nos	depoimentos	dos	delatores,	entre	eles	os	
dos	presidentes	da	Câmara	dos	Deputados	e	do	Senado,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ)	e	Renan	Calheiros	(PMDB-
AL),	que	negam	as	acusações.	Conforme	revelou	o	Estado	em	dezembro,	só	na	lista	de	Costa	são	ao	menos	28	
políticos	mencionados.	Assim,	o	clima	nos	últimos	dias	foi	de	apreensão	nos	corredores	do	Congresso.	(E28/2	
2015)	
	
Janot’s	list	metonymically	stands	in	for	range	of	investigations,	while	also	personalizing	the	entire	
office	 of	 public	 prosecutors	 (the	 MPF).	 Janot,	 as	 Prosecutor-General,	 becomes	 a	 symbol	 that	
generated	“tension”	and	“fear”	in	Congress.	The	list	was	eventually	finalized	on	March	3,	2015,	and	
sent	to	the	Supreme	Court,	where	the	Supreme	Justice	Teori	Zavascki	authorized	and	publicized	the	
inquiries	 on	 March	 6.	 The	 list,	 based	 on	 requests	 for	 28	 inquiries,	 included	 the	 names	 of	 49	
individuals,	47	of	them	in	public	office	or	formerly	in	office.	Two	non-parliamentarians,	the	doleiro	
Fernando	“Baiano”	Soares	and	the	treasurer	of	PT,	João	Vaccari	Neto,	were	included	on	this	list	in	
virtue	of	their	political	ties.	The	PGR	decided,	at	that	point,	to	archive	the	inquiries	pertaining	to	
senator	(and	presidential	runner-up)	Aécio	Neves	and	senator	Delcídio	do	Amaral,	and	the	federal	
deputies	Alexandre	Santos	and	Henrique	Eduardo	Alves,	as	well	as	dropping	one	of	two	inquiries	
dealing	with	 senator	 Romero	 Jucá.	 The	 PGR	 also	 requested	 inquiries	 opened	 to	 investigate	 the	
governors	of	Rio	and	Acre,	Luiz	Fernando	Pezão	and	Tião	Viana,	but	these	requests	were	sent	to	the	
Supreme	 Tribunal	 of	 Justice	 (STJ),	 the	 court	 with	 jurisdictional	 competency	 in	 cases	 involving	
governors.	
	
Throughout	2015,	the	news	reports	continued	to	consider	Janot	in	opposition	to	the	political	elite,	
primarily	as	opponent	of	Eduardo	Cunha	-	even	when	the	PGR	did	actually	not	mention	Cunha:		
	
À	frente	da	Operação	Lava	Jato,	o	procurador-geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	mandou	nesta	sexta-feira,	23,	
um	recado	aos	políticos	brasileiros...	o	chefe	do	Ministério	Público	Federal,	afirmou,	sem	citar	diretamente	o	
peemedebista	[Cunha]:	“Não	adianta	esconder	bens	fora	do	Brasil	porque	a	cooperação	internacional	intensa	
permite	identificar	esses	valores	e	a	recuperação	desses	valores”.	O	recado	do	procurador-geral	elevou	o	grau	
de	 apreensão	 em	 Brasília,	 principalmente	 entre	 os	 parlamentares	 e	 demais	 políticos	 citados	 na	 operação	
(E23/10	2015)	
	
The	 above	 example	 illustrates	 how	 the	 coverage	 of	 corruption	 investigations,	 even	 when	
acknowledging	that	many	politicians	were	under	suspicion,	kept	returning	to	a	limited	set	of	actors.	
I	will	return,	in	Chapter	6,	to	the	implications	of	this	focalization	of	political	actors,	while	I	turn	now	
to	a	prominent	antagonist	in	the	news	reports	on	corruption,	namely	Eduardo	Cunha.	
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4.3	Eduardo	Cunha:	Ascendant,	Warmonger,	Pariah		
Although	it	might	appear	so	by	judging	from	the	weekly	magazines’	front	pages	in	2015,	PT	was	not	
the	 only	 political	 actor	 under	 scrutiny	 in	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 In	 particular,	 the	 recently	
elected	President	of	the	Câmara,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB),	 found	himself	 in	the	eye	of	the	storm	
from	June	2015.	In	the	first	half	of	2015,	Cunha	had	been	treated	gingerly	by	the	weeklies,	and	daily	
papers	even	treated	him	reverently	until	a	crucial	leak	spilled	from	the	Lava-Jato	investigations.		
	
The	general	elections	of	2014	had	resulted	in	a	fragmented	Congress,	more	so	than	ever	before;	this	
time,	the	updated	party	roster	of	the	Lower	House	of	Parliament	registered	28	parties.	However,	
there	 was	 a	 discernible	 pattern	 in	 the	 apparent	 chaos	 of	 party	 monikers,	 because	 a	 growing	
proportion	 of	 parliament	 was	 agglutinating	 in	 certain	 issue-centred	 conservative	 groups	 across	
party	divides.	The	most	influential	groupings	were	commonly	referred	to	en	bloc	as	the	bancada	
BBB	(bíblia,	bala	e	boi)	-	the	parliamentary	group	of	bullets,	bulls,	and	bibles.	This	fused	group	of	
evangelic	politicians,	land-owners	and	firearm	supporters	in	many	cases	took	parliamentary	seats	
from	the	workers’	unions	and	syndicates	(Chaia	2016:52).	Eduardo	Cunha,	PMDB	leader	from	Rio	
de	Janeiro,	was	at	the	helm	of	the	evangelical	group.	Cunha	had	been	in	Congress	for	quite	some	
time,	and	amassed	a	lot	of	power	through	conservative	cross-party	networks	in	Congress.		
	
On	January	7,	2015,	Folha	revealed	that	one	of	the	charged	persons	in	the	case,	the	doleiro	Jayme	
Alves	”Careca,”	had	identified	Cunha	as	benefactor	of	the	corruption	in	Petrobras	(F7/1	2015).	Paulo	
Roberto	Costa’s	plea	bargain	had	also	implicated	Cunha,	but	weekly	magazine	IstoÉ	had	evaded	this	
through	reticence,	as	the	report	in	October	2014	did	not	state	his	name	outright:		
	
Mesmo	sem	poder	citar	nomes,	o	ex-diretor	[Costa]	forneceu	informações	que,	de	forma	indireta,	tiram	o	sono	
de	muitas	autoridades.	O	delator	descreveu,	por	exemplo,	uma	consultoria	prestada	a	um	político	fluminense	
candidato	a	cargo	majoritário,	que	queria	fazer	um	plano	de	governo	direcionado	ao	setor	de	energia	para	
captar	recursos	de	financiamento	de	campanha	das	empresas	da	área.	(I#2342,	emphasis	added)	
	
Similar	leaked	claims	relating	Cunha	explicitly	or	implicitly	to	the	Petrobras	graft	made	Cunha	deny	
that	PMDB	was	ever	 involved	 in	the	Petrobras	scandal,	 in	Folha	 (F29/12	2014)	as	well	as	 in	Veja	
(V#2400).	During	February,	Cunha’s	name,	however,	was	rumored	to	be	on	the	list	of	investigation	
requests	that	the	Prosecutor-General	Rodrigo	Janot	was	compiling.	The	rumors	were	eclipsed	in	the	
news	media	 by	 Cunha’s	 bid	 for	 presidency	 of	 the	 Câmara,	 a	 position	 previously	 held	 by	 his	 ally	
Henrique	Eduardo	Alves	(also	of	the	PMDB)	and	by	his	party	president	and	Vice-President	of	the	
Republic,	Michel	Temer.	In	fact,	PMDB	held	that	position	in	at	least	one	half	of	every	presidential	
term	since	the	1989	elections.	On	February	5,	2016,	Cunha	took	the	central	seat	of	the	Lower	House,	
successfully	outmaneuvering	the	PT	candidate	Arlindo	Chinaglia	with	267	votes	against	Chinaglia’s	
136.	 Assuming	 the	 presidency	 of	 the	 Câmara,	 Cunha	 installed	 parliamentary	 investigative	
commissions,	including	a	commission	targeted	at	the	Petrobras	case	(the	third	special	commission	
since	2009,	in	fact,	to	investigate	corruption	in	the	state	company).			
	
His	victory,	and	the	perception	that	he	had	a	solid	grip	on	proceedings	in	Congress,	was	the	theme	
of	the	first	of	the	news	items	dealing	with	Cunha	that	will	be	analyzed	here.	From	this	first	example	
and	 through	 the	 following	21	examples	analyzed,	one	may	notice	 that	Cunha	gradually	 changes	
actantial	status;	he	shifts	from	being	represented	as	“powerful”	to	“aggressive,”	a	“commander”	of	
“shock	troops,”	and	in	November	2015,	a	few	days	before	starting	the	impeachment	proceedings,	
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as	negotiating	a	“cease-fire”	with	the	government.	Eventually,	Cunha	was	expelled	and	became	a	
political	pariah,	had	his	mandate	cancelled	and	became	incarcerated	in	October	2016.	
	
	
O	Poderoso	Cunha	
On	March	21,	2015,	Veja’s	front	page	headline	read:	“The	sudden	force	of	Eduardo	Cunha,”	and	the	
title	of	the	article	inside	Veja	was	“O	Poderoso	Cunha,”	or	“Cunha	the	Powerful”	(V#2418).	The	force	
or	 power	 projected	 in	 these	 titles	 are	 demonstrated	 early	 in	 the	 article:	 Cunha	 succeeded	 in	
removing	one	of	the	President’s	ministers,	Cid	Gomes,	because	Gomes	had	referred	to	Congress	as	
“three	 or	 four	 hundred	 blackmailers”	 (achacadores).	 Cunha,	 then,	 “flexed	 his	 muscles”	 and	
announced	that	the	minister	would	resign	before	any	governmental	announcement	had	been	made	
public.	This	demonstration	of	force	is	contrasted	to	the	impotence	of	President	Rousseff,	textually	
positioning	Cunha	and	Rousseff	as	opponents.		
	
Despite	 appearing	 on	 the	 recently-publicized	 “Lista	 de	 Janot,”	 the	 article	 points	 out	 that	
“Congressman	Eduardo	Cunha	appears	to	be	the	one	stable	point	of	reference	in	a	political	world	
melting	away.”	As	background,	the	report	in	Veja	recounts	his	career	in	the	Collor	administration,	
his	rapid	ascension	and	resignation	from	public	administration	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	the	mid-90s,	and	
finally	asks	“how	such	a	nebulous	past	could	produce	such	a	meteoric	career?”	only	to	reply	thus:	
In	 spite	 of	 his	 past,	 “not	 a	 monument	 of	 ethics,”	 Cunha	 always	 “escaped	 the	 tsunami	 of	
investigations”	and	“none	of	the	accusations	made	 in	the	 judicial	arena	had	any	consequences.”	
Thus,	the	text	inserts	Cunha’s	power	not	only	in	courtrooms	and	in	politics	but	also	in	the	domain	
of	morals	 and,	 in	 effect,	 asserts	 that	 his	 staying	 power	 and	 political	 relations	 have	 secured	 his	
impunity	hitherto.		
	
	
Cunha	on	the	Stand	
The	article	on	“Cunha	the	Powerful”	did	not	mention	a	very	central	incident	in	the	Lava-Jato	case.	
Having	himself	authorized	the	opening	of	a	parliamentary	investigative	committee	(CPI)	in	the	case,	
Cunha	appeared	on	the	stand	voluntarily	and	non-scheduled	on	March	12.	The	journalists	of	the	
political	beat	all	perceived	this	moment	as	yet	another	demonstration	of	force.	
	
Estado	reported	on	the	event	with	a	headline	that	contrasted	suspicions	of	corruption	to	the	praise	
of	his	peers:	“Under	suspicion,	Cunha	goes	to	CPI	and	receives	eulogies	from	colleagues”	(E12/3	
2015).	In	the	line	following	the	lead,	the	text	reports	that	“practically	all	parties	lauded	Cunha,”	but	
the	authoring	journalists	interpret	this	not	so	much	as	a	favour	to	Cunha	as	a	strategy	for	protecting	
the	 parliamentarians	 named	 on	 Janot’s	 list	 the	 preceding	 week.	 The	 reporters	 go	 on	 to	 quote	
Cunha’s	critique	of	the	Prosecutor-General’s	“fragile”	allegations,	and	Cunha’s	assertion	that	the	list	
is	merely	the	government’s	attempt	to	“transfer	the	crisis	from	one	side	of	the	road	[the	Presidential	
palace	of	Planalto]	to	the	other”	(where	the	Congress	is	situated).	Then,	a	paragraph	establishes	the	
accusations	of	Cunha’s	corruption,	mentioning	the	testimonies	given	by	Alberto	Youssef	and	the	
doleiro	 Careca.	However,	 the	 report	 states	 that	Careca’s	 testimony	had	been	withdrawn	by	 the	
defendant	 himself.	 A	 PT	 spokesperson,	 Sibá	 Machado,	 is	 then	 quoted	 for	 saying	 that	 nothing	
connects	Cunha	to	the	list,	despite	“the	open	conflict	between	PT	and	PMDB	the	preceding	weeks.”	
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Three	different	parliamentarians	criticize	Cunha,	including	Clarissa	Garotinho	(daughter	of	Cunha’s	
former	political	mentor	Anthony	Garotinho),	in	the	final	paragraph	of	the	report.		
	
The	CPI	session,	according	to	Folha’s	lead,	turned	into	“an	act	of	redress”	with	“applause	and	words	
of	solidarity”	directed	at	Cunha	(F12/3	2015).	The	lead	is	followed	by	two	sentences	establishing	his	
relation	to	the	Petrobras	investigations,	through	the	testimony	of	Alberto	Youssef.	Cunha’s	critique	
of	the	inclusion	of	his	name	on	the	Prosecutor-General’s	list	and	the	quote	about	the	government’s	
transfer	 of	 the	 crisis	 is	 included	 next,	 followed	 by	 quotes	 from	 both	 PSDB	 and	 PT	 spokesmen.	
Critique	of	Cunha	is	given	ample	coverage	in	the	end,	with	four	quotes	of	two	paragraphs,	under	
the	heading	of	“Dissonant	voices.”	In	both	the	print	version	and	the	online	version,	the	article	 is	
accompanied	by	a	flow-chart	graph	showing	the	route	of	the	kickbacks	from	Petrobras	sub-contracts	
to	political	actors.	
	
O	 Globo’s	 headline	 the	 same	 day	 echoed	 Folha’s:	 “Eduardo	 Cunha’s	 testimony	 in	 the	 CPI	 of	
Petrobras	 turns	 into	 act	 of	 redress“	 (G12/3	 2015).	 The	 lead	 of	 O	 Globo’s	 online	 news	 report	
establishes	the	circumstances	of	the	CPI	session	much	as	Folha,	but	instead	ends	the	lead	sentence	
with	the	critique	levied	by	Clarissa	Garotinho.	The	second	sentence	continues	with	a	direct	quote	
from	Garotinho,	in	which	she	connects	Cunha	not	only	to	Alberto	Youssef,	but	also	to	the	doleiros	
Lúcio	Funaro	and	Fernando	Soares.	The	next	paragraph	echoes	this	one,	with	a	four-line	quote	from	
PSOL’s	Ivan	Valente.	Only	then,	as	the	fourth	paragraph,	are	Cunha’s	statements	reported,	followed	
by	a	 statement	by	Sibá	Machado	of	PT	 -	 the	same	quote	 reported	 in	Estado.	 In	O	Globo,	 this	 is	
interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 “to	 clear	 out	 a	 tense	 ambience	 between	 Cunha	 and	 the	 Planalto.”	
Machado	is	furthermore	quoted	for	his	critique	of	the	use	of	plea	bargains.	The	reporters	interpret	
this	 as	 an	 indirect	 reference	 to	 the	 testimonies	 against	 the	PT	 treasurer	Vaccari	Neto,	who	had	
recently	been	arrested.	Three	more	“eulogies”	praising	Cunha	round	off	this	article.		
	
In	each	of	these	reports,	the	responses	to	Cunha’s	statements	are	the	focus	of	attention,	and	the	
story	 is	 framed	 around	 the	 politicians’	 repudiation	 of	 the	 Prosecutor-General’s	 list.	 Cunha	 thus	
comes	to	be	presented	as	the	leader	of	parliamentary	majority,	and	the	Prosecutor-General	Janot	
is	 located	as	opposing	them.	The	O	Globo	account	 is	clearly	more	critical	of	Cunha,	giving	much	
space	to	direct	quotes	from	his	political	opponents,	and	virtually	no	direct	quotes	of	Cunha’s	own.	
This	 text,	 in	effect,	 contains	 two	different	 stories	 (in	 the	 sense	of	Bal	1997).	Estado	 includes	an	
emphasis	on	the	inconsistency	of	one	testimony,	an	emphasis	that	is	absent	in	the	other	reports,	
and	this	underscores	the	conflicting	truth	claims.		
	
What	 is	 missing	 from	 each	 of	 these	 accounts,	 however,	 is	 Cunha’s	 statement	 concerning	 bank	
accounts.	The	accounts	are	obliquely	mentioned	in	the	broadcast	report	of	the	same	evening:	In	TV	
Globo’s	 Jornal	Nacional,	 a	news	 report	 starts	off	with	Cunha’s	defense,	which	 in	 the	 voice-over	
reporter	words	consisted	of	reading	out	each	mention	of	his	name	in	the	investigation	petition,	and	
pointing	out	the	contradictions	(JN12/3	2014).	However,	these	contradictions	are	not	detailed	then,	
as	 the	 reportage	 goes	 on	 to	 show	 the	 PGR	headquarters	 and,	 still	 in	 voice-over,	 describing	 the	
suspicions	of	the	prosecutors.	A	picture	of	the	doleiro	(and	supposed	PMDB	henchman)	Fernando	
“Baiano”	 Soares	 is	 shown,	while	 the	 voice-over	 finishes	 the	 allegations	 of	 Cunha’s	 and	 PMDB’s	
corruption.	Then,	 the	report	 turns	 to	 footage	of	Cunha	 in	 the	CPI.	Cunha,	seated	 in	 front	of	 the	
session	room,	denies	Baiano’s	relation	to	PMDB	in	two	sentences.	The	voice-over	then	resumes	and	
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quotes	Cunha	indirectly,	saying	that	Cunha	also	denied	Careca’s	testimony	about	delivering	money	
to	Cunha’s	home	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	on	Youssef’s	orders.	The	footage,	meanwhile,	shows	more	shots	
from	the	CPI	session	and	then	turns	to	(older)	footage	of	Youssef’s	arrest,	as	he	taken	into	custody	
by	the	federal	police.	Returning	to	the	CPI	footage,	Cunha	points	out	that	Careca	had	changed	his	
testimony.	The	voice-over	then	summarizes	Cunha’s	critique	of	the	Prosecutor-General	(showing	
Janot	in	a	press	conference),	and	mentions	the	omission	of	senator	Delcídio	do	Amaral	on	the	list	of	
investigated	names,	accompanied	by	first	footage	of	the	senator	and	then	Cunha	explaining	how	
this	omission	(and	the	inclusion	of	his	own	name	on	the	list)	was	politically	motivated.	
	
The	newscast	reporter,	Júlio	Mosquera,	then	appears	as	on-site	reporter	in	the	CPI	conference	room	
inside	Congress,	narrating	the	events	of	the	CPI	and	the	eulogies	made	by	“the	majority”	in	session.	
Footage	of	Carlos	Sampaio’s	(PSDB)	and	Sibá	Machado’s	quotes,	also	featured	in	the	print	news,	are	
shown,	followed	by	a	summary	of	the	critique	made	by	Ivan	Valente,	identified	as	“one	of	the	few	
who	 questioned	 Cunha.”	 Valente,	 amongst	 other	 issues,	 asked	 that	 Cunha’s	 bank	 accounts	 be	
subjected	to	investigation.	While	Valente	is	only	 indirectly	quoted,	the	answer	given	by	Cunha	is	
shown	directly,	and	Cunha	at	this	point	states	that	he	“has	no	problem	with	giving	access”	to	the	
bank	accounts.	Finally,	the	anchor	Renata	Vasconcellos,	back	in	the	studio,	informs	that	PGR	Janot	
declines	 to	 comment	 on	 Cunha’s	 accusations	 of	 politically	 motivated	 investigation.	 The	 exact	
moment	in	the	session	where	Cunha	denies	having	hidden	funds,	being	partner	in	corporations,	or	
having	bank	accounts	overseas,	was	not	picked	up	by	the	media	at	this	point.	This	response	came	
during	a	phase	of	questions	 from	 the	CPI	members.	 The	denial	would,	however,	 turn	out	 to	be	
crucial.	
	
In	 any	 case,	 minute	 differences	 between	 the	 framings	 in	 the	 texts	 and	 representations	 are	
discernible:	O	Globo’s	report	gives	more	emphasis	to	the	critical	questions	than	TV	Globo’s	evening	
broadcast.	 The	 broadcast	 report	 and	 Folha	 demonstrates	 the	 link	 between	 Cunha	 and	 Alberto	
Youssef,	and	the	broadcast	report	and	Estado	mentions	the	retraction	of	the	testimony	of	Careca.	
All	of	the	reports	mention,	quote	or	show	footage	of	the	PT	spokesperson	supporting	Cunha.	The	
visibility	and	weight	given	to	the	corruption	probe	authorized	by	the	PGR	varies:	The	denunciations	
of	Youssef	and	the	corruption	mechanism	are	graphically	present	in	Folha,	by	way	of	the	flow	chart,	
presenting	the	kickbacks	as	factual	in	the	explanatory	text,	rendered	in	the	imperfect	past	tense.	In	
the	Jornal	Nacional,	the	prosecutor’s	suspicions	are	given	emphasis	by	the	location	in	the	first	part	
of	the	report,	and	their	suspicions	are	here	put	in	the	conjunctive	and	conditional	tense,	in	line	with	
Portuguese	journalistic	conventions:	“A	Procuradoria-Geral	da	República	suspeita	que	Cunha	tenha	
recebido	propina	da	cota	de	PMDB,	que	na	Petrobras	seria	representado	pelo	operador	Fernando	
Soares…”	
	
The	variations	and	differences	between	the	reports	also	exhibit	more	or	less	tightly	knit	webs	of	
facticity	(Tuchman	1978)	–	in	Estado,	for	instance,	the	doubts	about	plea	bargains	open	for	more	
doubt	about	the	denunciations	against	Cunha,	while	the	text	of	Folha	presents	more	information	as	
facts	and	thereby	implies	that	something	is	missing	in	Cunha’s	defense	which	casts	doubt	upon	the	
eulogies	of	his	colleagues.	“Facts,”	quotes,	and	voices	are	distributed	differently	across	the	texts.	
For	instance,	the	voice	of	left-wing	Valente	is	omitted	in	Estado,	indirectly	presented	in	the	Jornal	
Nacional,	but	very	present	in	the	text	of	Folha.	In	effect,	the	veracity	of	statements	made	by	multiple	
political	 actors	 is	 positioned	 in	 several	 layers	 of	 conflicts	 through	 the	 textual	 location	 and	
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interpretation	offered	by	journalists:	Not	just	Cunha	versus	his	denouncers,	but	also	the	Prosecutor-
General’s	office,	the	PT	playing	a	double	game	to	appease	Cunha	and	to	avoid	persecution,	and	the	
dissonant	PSOL	parliamentarians	unwilling	to	play	along	in	the	CPI	with	the	critique	of	the	corruption	
probe.	Though	not	present	at	the	surface	level,	there	is	a	general	tension	between	the	Lava-Jato	
investigation,	represented	here	through	the	PGR,	and	the	responses	of	the	investigated	politicians,	
represented	in	the	flesh	like	Cunha	or	through	proxies	such	as	Sibá	Machado.	This	tension	flows	
along	with,	on	 the	hand,	 the	narrative	of	 conflict	between	PT	and	Cunha,	and	on	 the	other	 the	
Garotinho-Valente	attacks	on	Cunha.		
	
As	the	months	of	April,	May	and	June	went	by,	most	media	interest	stayed	with	the	CPI	and	the	new	
phases	of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations,	 leaving	Cunha	 to	his	work	 leading	Congress.	While	 some	
news	concerning	Cunha	appeared,	they	created	little	hubbub	in	Congress	or	 in	the	social	media.	
One	example	is	the	scoop	of	O	Globo,	repeated	and	extended	in	Folha	(F18/6	2015,	G18/6	2015),	
concerning	Cunha's	relations	to	the	doleiro	Funaro	and	the	ways	in	which	Cunha	and	his	political	
ally	Solange	Almeida	had	put	pressure	on	companies	 from	the	Petrobras	cartel	 in	 the	preceding	
years.	 According	 to	 these	 reports,	 Cunha	 had	 ghost-written	 two	 of	 Almeida’s	 requests	 for	
clarification	and	interrogation	in	Congressional	hearings;	this	was	allegedly	Cunha’s	way	of	inserting	
himself	into	the	graft	schemes	by	way	of	threats	and	blackmailing.	The	June	disclosure	of	Cunha’s	
backstage	manoeuvres	was	only	one	of	many	to	come;	the	next	leak	reached	the	front-pages	in	mid-
July.	
	
	
The	Leaked	Testimony	
On	July	15,	O	Globo	published	leaked	contents	from	a	plea	bargain	in	the	Lava-Jato	investigations.	
The	testifying	witness,	Júlio	Camargo,	had	negotiated	a	plea	bargain	with	the	public	prosecutors	in	
December	2014,	and	he	testified	to	judge	Sérgio	Moro	in	July.	The	video	of	this	testimony	was	made	
public	by	Moro’s	court	on	July	16,	but	O	Globo	anticipated	this	the	day	before	(G15/7	2015),	leaking	
contents	 of	 Camargo’s	 testimony	 and	 highlighting	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Camargo	 implicated	 Cunha.	
Despite	having	previously	testified	to	the	opposite,	the	former	Samsung	representative	and	then	
Toyo	Setal	consultant	Júlio	Camargo	testified	to	Sérgio	Moro	that	he	had	accepted	paying	kickbacks	
to	Eduardo	Cunha	–	 to	be	rid	of	an	old	debt	 to	PMDB	that	secured	Samsung	the	contracts	with	
Petrobras	for	drillship	construction.	
	
The	lead	of	the	news	report	reveals	that	in	2006,	Cunha	asked	for	the	release	of	10	million	US$	in	
kickbacks	in	order	to	close	a	1,2	billion	deal	on	drilling	ships	for	Petrobras’	explorations	in	the	deep-
sea	 areas.	 Half	 of	 the	 US$	 10	 million	 were	 to	 be	 Cunha’s	 personal	 prize.	 Following	 the	 first	
paragraph,	the	report	quotes	only	a	single	word	of	Cunha’s	reply:	“mentiroso”	–	“liar.”	Then,	in	a	
paragraph-length	direct	quote,	Cunha	expands	on	this	by	pointing	out	that	Camargo	had	previously	
denied	paying	bribes	to	him.	The	next	sections	confirm	this	point,	and	the	article	then	goes	on	to	
describe	another	part	of	Camargo’s	testimony,	involving	a	secret	meeting	with	the	then-minister	of	
Mines	and	Energy	Edison	Lobão	(PMDB)	in	order	to	avoid	a	congressional	audit	of	the	Petrobras	
contracts.	Several	parts	of	this	narrative	are	direct	quotes	taken	from	the	testimony	session	before	
Sérgio	Moro.	In	the	next	part	of	this	article,	a	new	characterization	of	Cunha	appears.	Whereas	he	
was	depicted	in	Veja	in	March	as	“powerful,”	he	is	now	depicted	by	O	Globo,	through	an	indirect	
quote,	as	aggressive,	fearsome,	and	dangerous:		
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Júlio	 Camargo	 afirmou	 que	 Cunha	 teria	 lhe	 dito	 que	 estava	 “no	 comando	 de	 260	 deputados”	 e	mostrado	
“agressividade”	na	conversa.	Ao	ser	questionado	por	que	não	havia	revelado	esses	fatos	antes,	o	consultor	
afirmou	que	tinha	medo	de	possíveis	retaliações	às	empresas	que	ele	representava	e	à	sua	própria	pessoa.	
(G15/7	2015)	
	
	
Cunha’s	backlash	after	the	Camargo	leak		
What	was	crucial	 in	this	 leak	and	subsequent	publishing	was	not	so	much	the	disclosure	but	the	
political	aftermath.	Camargo’s	testimony	against	Cunha	stirred	far	more	interest,	visible	in	the	social	
media	statistics,	 than	did	Cunha's	denials	 three	months	before.	 In	response	to	this,	Cunha	again	
criticized	the	Prosecutor-General's	office,	stating	that	the	timing	was	suspicious.	On	the	next	day,	a	
pre-recorded	statement	aired	nationally,	in	which	Cunha	declared	his	break	with	the	government,	
and	in	a	follow-up	press	conference,	Cunha	claimed	that	PT	had	ordered	the	PGR	to	leak	this	to	the	
muckraking	press.	
	
That	weekend	 (July	 20),	Época	 highlighted	 that	 Cunha’s	 break	with	 the	 Rousseff	 administration	
would	be	instrumental,	if	not	sufficient	for	impeachment.	An	official	Congressional	rejection	of	the	
state	accounts	would	also	be	needed:		
	
A	insurreição	de	Cunha	não	é	suficiente	para	levar	ao	impeachment	de	Dilma.	Mas,	se	o	cenário	político	piorar	
e	se	as	contas	do	partido	forem	rejeitadas	pelo	Tribunal	de	Contas	da	União	[...],	Cunha	estará	muito	mais	
predisposto	a	encaminhar	um	pedido	de	impeachment	na	Câmara	do	que	estaria	há	uma	semana.	Antes	ele	
pensaria	dez	vezes;	agora	talvez	pense,	no	máximo,	duas.	Claro	que,	paralelamente	a	isso,	Cunha	terá	de	lidar	
com	as	acusações	(E#893)	
	
Veja,	in	the	commentary	“Escalão	superior”	(“Higher	echelon”)	penned	by	Daniel	Pereira	on	July	22,	
offered	the	same	view:	
	
Cunha	 acusou	 Camargo	 de	 ser	 mentiroso.	 O	 deputado	 alega	 que	 o	 lobista	 [Camargo]	 sofreu	 pressão	 do	
procurador-geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	e	do	governo	para	emendar	sua	delação	premiada	e	citar	seu	
nome.	 Na	 sexta-feira	 passada,	 Cunha	 reagiu	 anunciando	 o	 rompimento	 com	 a	 presidente	 Dilma	 e	 a	 base	
governista:	"Tem	um	bando	de	aloprados	no	Planalto".	Ele	se	disse	agora	parte	da	oposição	e	informou	que	a	
Câmara	abrirá	CPIs	para	apurar	desmandos	no	BNDES	e	nos	 fundos	de	pensão.	Na	quinta-feira	de	manhã,	
Cunha	 disse	 que	 rechaçaria	 tentativas	 de	 cassação	 de	 Dilma	 com	 base	 em	 decisões	 tomadas	 por	 ela	 no	
mandato	anterior,	caso	das	"pedaladas	 fiscais".	Menos	de	24	horas	depois,	ele	estava	com	outro	ânimo.	A	
aliados,	disse	que	vai	encomendar	pareceres	de	juristas	renomados	para	sustentar	a	tese	de	que	a	reprovação	
das	contas	do	governo	em	2014	pode,	sim,	levar	ao	impedimento	de	Dilma.	"Agora,	é	guerra",	disse	Cunha.	
(V#2435)	
	
Cunha’s	 “declaration	 of	 war”	 also	 identifies	 the	 weapon	 of	 choice	 in	 this	 war:	 the	 so-called	
pedaladas	fiscais.	I	will	return,	in	section	4.5,	to	these	fiscal	manoeuvres	or	delays.	For	now,	it	is	
enough	to	register	that	an	eventual	impeachment	process	based	in	these	delays	was	perceived	by	
the	Veja	reporter	as	Cunha’s	retaliation	against	PGR	Janot.	
	
The	 break	 from	 government	was	 similarly	 interpreted	 by	Estado	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 Camargo	
testimony:	“Late	in	the	morning,	Cunha	announced	that	he	joined	the	opposition.	It	was	the	first	
response	to	the	allegation,	made	by	the	lobbyist	Júlio	Camargo,	that	Cunha	had	demanded	a	bribe	
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of	US$	5	million”	(E17/7	2015).	While	Cunha	broke	from	government,	or	rather,	from	PT,	and	urged	
PMDB	to	do	the	same,	the	party	simply	stated	in	a	press	announcement	that	they	respected	his	
personal	political	choice,	which	was	not	the	party's.	Immediately	afterwards,	Cunha	prepared	the	
process	 of	 impeachment	 as	 another	 response	 to	 the	 allegations	 of	 corruption	 against	 him.	 10	
“citizens”	were	asked	to	revise	their	petitions,	and	Cunha	declared	that	he	was	expecting	a	clarifying	
report	from	the	Câmara’s	legal	advisors	on	the	matter:		
	
O	deputado	ainda	encaminhou	ofício	ao	deputado	Jair	Bolsonaro	(PP-RJ)	e	a	outros	dez	“cidadãos”	para	que	
refizessem	em	dez	dias,	por	erro	de	 formatação,	 seus	pedidos	de	 impeachment	contra	a	presidente	Dilma	
Rousseff.	Nesta	sexta,	via	redes	sociais,	Cunha	informou	que	vai	receber	“em	30	dias	parecer	jurídico	sobre	
pedido	de	impeachment”	de	Dilma.	(E17/7	2015)	
	
Another	Estado	 journalist	 interpreted	the	rapid	establishment	of	 two	 investigative	congressional	
committees	as	a	sign	that	Cunha	knew	what	was	coming	from	the	investigations	in	Curitiba,	and	
that	he	had	prepared	his	exit	and	consequential	entry	in	the	opposition	coalition:	
	
...os	 tucanos	 [PSDB]	 vão	 aguardar	 os	 desdobramentos	 da	 crise	 desencada	 na	 última	 quinta-feira	 com	 o	
depoimento	do	 lobista	Julio	Camargo,	que	acusa	Cunha	de	ter	cobrado	US$	5	milhões	de	propina.	O	efeito	
imediato	foi	uma	aproximação	dele	com	a	oposição,	o	que	resultou	na	criação	das	CPIs	do	BNDES	e	dos	Fundos	
de	Pensão…	(E19/7	2015)	
	
Even	 if	 the	media	 attention	was	 drawn	 to	 the	 impeachment	 petitions,	 to	 new	 committees,	 the	
government	crisis,	and	the	national	fiscal	situation,	Cunha	remained	under	scrutiny	in	the	Lava-Jato	
investigation.	 Júlio	Camargo’s	plea	bargain	became	 the	basis	of	 the	 first	 formal	denunciation	of	
Cunha.	On	August	20,	 the	PGR	 indicted	Cunha	and	Solange	Almeida	 for	extortion	and	graft	 in	a	
Petrobras	 contract	 process	 where	 Samsung	 eventually	 won	 the	 bid	 for	 constructing	 two	 new	
exploration	vessels	(the	case	revealed	on	June	18).	On	the	same	day,	the	PGR	also	indicted	the	ex-
president,	senator	Fernando	Collor	de	Mello,	and	four	other	persons	in	the	corruption	case	related	
to	the	Petrobras	subsidiary	BR	Distribuidora.	
	
	
Outmaneuvering	the	Ethics	Council	
After	 the	 indictment,	 however,	 Cunha’s	 process	 stalled	 in	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 and	 it	 took	eight	
months	before	he	was	charged	before	the	Court	(in	a	session	on	March	3	the	following	year).	Before	
that	happened,	another	indictment	and	several	other	investigations	of	Cunha	had	been	initiated	by	
the	 PGR.	When	 evidence	 of	 Swiss	 bank	 accounts,	 in	 Cunha’s	 name,	 was	 leaked	 soon	 after	 the	
denunciation,	the	minor	left-wing	party	PSOL	filed	for	a	disciplinary	action	in	the	Câmara.	Cunha	had	
specifically	denied	having	accounts	in	the	exterior	during	the	March	CPI	session.	This	bald-faced	lie	
against	peers	was	a	clear	breach	of	decorum,	enough	to	annul	a	mandate	in	Congress.	The	internal	
disciplinary	 commission	 of	 the	 Câmara,	 the	 Ethics	 Council,	 moved	 somewhat	 faster	 than	 the	
Supreme	Court,	but	the	resulting	disciplinary	process	was	restarted	multiple	times,	because	Cunha	
was	able	 to	command	 the	Board	of	 the	Câmara	and	 the	 institutional	 resources	even	before	 the	
process	began.		
	
The	media	reported	extensively	upon	the	disciplinary	process	during	October	and	November	2015.	
During	 these	 two	 months,	 the	 formal	 process	 was	 not	 even	 opened,	 but	 postponed	 through	
different	procedural	loopholes.	Only	on	November	4	did	the	Ethics	Council	get	to	appoint	a	speaker	
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(relator)	on	the	case.	The	daily	press	depicted	half	of	the	Ethics	Council	as	Cunha’s	“shock	troop”	
and	his	“allies,”	helping	him	obstruct	the	very	act	of	reading	reports	in	the	Council	and	thereby	avoid	
the	case	on	formal	grounds	(E20/11	2015).	These	war	metaphors	align	with	Cunha’s	declaration	of	
war	against	Rousseff	 (V#2435).	The	bellicose	metaphors	and	frames	had	a	tangible	side,	as	well:	
Several	meetings	in	the	Ethics	Council	were	highly	agitated,	featuring	everything	from	verbal	abuse	
to	physical	infight.		
	
Through	 the	 delay	maneuvers,	 the	 elected	 speaker	 of	 the	 case,	 Fausto	 Pinato,	was	 hindered	 in	
reading	 his	 preliminary	 report	 on	 the	matter	 because	 Cunha	 had	 the	 Câmara	 plenary	 convene,	
obstructing	meetings	of	sub-commissions.	However,	towards	the	end	of	November,	it	became	clear	
that	the	Council	president	and	a	small	majority	in	the	Council	would	not	dismiss	the	case,	and	the	
day	of	voting	for	opening	the	case	was	set	for	December	1.	In	the	week	leading	up	to	the	session,	
deliberations	within	PT	were	reported	by	the	press.	The	three	PT	members	of	the	Ethics	Council	
could,	in	principle,	add	their	votes	to	the	Cunha’s	shock	troops,	letting	him	off	the	hook.	Implicitly	
or	explicitly,	depending	on	the	report,	that	would	mean	that	Rousseff	and	Cunha	had	agreed	to	a	
truce,	 protecting	 him	 from	 disciplinary	 action	 and	 her	 from	 impeachment.	 However,	 the	 PT	
congressman	Zé	Geraldo	stated	outright	that	this	was	blackmail,	“a	knife	to	the	throat,”	and	that	he	
and	 his	 two	 colleagues	 in	 the	 Ethics	 Council	 were	 less	 than	 happy	 holding	 the	 trigger	 for	 the	
impeachment	 (de	 Almeida	 2016:105-106).	 According	 to	 several	 media,	 Rousseff’s	 ministers,	 or	
sometimes	even	Lula,	had	negotiated	a	ceasefire	with	Cunha:	
	
...emissários	 do	 governo	 [foram	 mandados]	 para	 buscar	 uma	 trégua.	 Foram	 necessárias	 ao	 menos	 duas	
tentativas	frustradas	dos	dois	ministros	para	que	Cunha	desse	algum	sinal	de	que	estava	disposto	a	dialogar	
com	o	governo.	A	divulgação	de	encontros	e	telefonemas	entre	os	dois	lados	alimentou	equivocados	rumores	
de	que	um	"acordão"	seria	costurado.	Tanto	o	governo	quanto	o	presidente	da	Câmara	negam	com	veemência	
a	existência	e	a	possibilidade	de	um	acordo.	Cunha	nega,	simplesmente,	porque	não	precisa	fazer	um	acordo	
com	o	governo.	Com	os	 seguidores	que	 tem	na	Câmara,	está	 confiante	em	que	conseguirá	ver	o	processo	
contra	si	arquivado	no	Conselho	de	Ética.	(E#906)	
	
If	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 truce	 were	 in	 fact	 negotiated,	 the	 ceasefire	 was	 never	 enacted:	 The	 PT	
representatives	looked	hesitant	in	the	session	of	the	Ethics	Council	on	December	1,	and	deliberated	
in	hushed	voices,	following	the	debate.	As	the	meeting	dragged	out,	the	national	president	of	PT	
tweeted	(and	media	promptly	reported)	that	PT	had	demanded	that	the	Congressmen	should	vote	
for	opening	a	case	against	Cunha	(F2/12a	2015).	The	meeting	ended,	but	the	members	never	got	
around	to	vote,	postponing	the	process	yet	another	day.	However,	December	2	was	the	day	of	the	
Congress	 vote	 on	 a	 revised	 state	 budget	 for	 2015.	 The	 president	 of	 the	 Ethics	 Council	 again	
postponed	the	council	meeting	in	Cunha’s	case	to	the	following	week,	while	the	PT	deputies	finally	
settled	the	vote	intention:	The	three	representatives	would	vote	with	Pinato,	opening	a	disciplinary	
process	against	Cunha	that	could	eventually	lead	to	his	removal	from	office.	
		
A	 few	hours	 later,	 the	National	Congress	 (Senate	 and	Câmara	 in	 conjunction)	had	accepted	 the	
government’s	proposal	of	a	state	budget	deficit	for	2015	of	119,9	billion	R$.	The	impact	of	paying	
back	debt	created	by	the	TCU’s	verdict	on	the	pedaladas	amounted	to	57	billion	R$,	almost	half	the	
total	deficit.	Opposition	parliamentarians	maintained	that	the	law	of	fiscal	responsibility	had	been	
transgressed	by	the	government.	While	Renan	Calheiros,	as	President	of	the	Senate,	closed	the	joint	
parliamentary	session	he	had	conducted,	Eduardo	Cunha	stepped	out	of	his	office	and	announced	
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that	he	would	accept	one	of	the	petitions	for	impeachment	of	president	Rousseff.	Already	in	the	
first	reports,	the	start	of	the	impeachment	is	interpreted	as	Cunha’s	retaliation:	
	
Eduardo	Cunha	acata	pedido	de	impeachment	contra	Dilma	Rousseff.	Em	retaliação	ao	PT	e	ao	Planalto,	que	
não	 asseguraram	 votos	 para	 enterrar	 seu	 processo	 de	 cassação,	 o	 presidente	 da	 Câmara	 dos	 Deputados,	
Eduardo	Cunha	 (PMDB-RJ),	 anunciou	 às	 18h38	desta	 quarta-feira	 (2)	 a	 deflagração	 do	 principal	 pedido	 de	
impeachment	contra	Dilma	Rousseff.	(F2/12b	2015)	
	
The	same	evening,	Rousseff	gave	a	televised	speech,	flanked	by	many	ministers	(but	symbolically	
without	the	Vice-President	(de	Almeida	2016:113).	Jornal	Nacional	and	the	other	evening	news	all	
livecast	Rousseff’s	speech,	in	which	she	denied	having	committed	wrongdoings,	affirmed	that	the	
petition	 was	 not	 founded	 in	 any	 legal	 base,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 not	 her	 having	 secret,	 Swiss	 bank	
accounts,	alluding	to	Cunha’s	case	(JN2/12	2015).			
	
The	 motif	 of	 Cunha’s	 revenge	 is	 a	 focalization	 of	 the	 Cunha-Rousseff	 (or	 Cunha-PT)	 conflict.	
Effectively,	 it	eclipses	agency	of	the	person	who	stood	to	gain	the	most	from	impeachment:	the	
vice-president.	As	the	media	had	already	uniformly	portrayed	the	political	negotiations	relating	to	
the	 disciplinary	 process	 as	 the	 cause	 of	 Cunha’s	 choice,	 the	 pressure	 from	 other	 actors	 within	
government	or	 in	 the	opposition	 is	not	considered	as	cause.	 Impeachment,	 in	 the	news	texts	of	
December	2015,	is	emplotted	as	the	resolution	and,	in	consequence,	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	
between	 Cunha	 and	 PT.	 Even	 in	 the	 openly	 pro-impeachment	 editorial	 universe	 of	Estado,	 this	
emplotment	appeared	several	times:	
	
Eduardo	Cunha	é	alvo	de	inquérito	no	STF,	que	pode	evoluir	para	denúncia	aceita,	tornando-o	réu.	Isto	poderá	
gerar	uma	mudança	no	atual	cenário	de	forças	para	o	impeachment,	sobretudo	quando	pairam	suspeitas	que	
a	abertura	do	 impeachment	se	dá	como	vingança	a	uma	possível	cassação	pela	Comissão	de	Ética.	 (E3/12c	
2015)	
	
The	above	quote	 is	 from	 the	political	 commentary	 “Supremo	Em	Pauta,”	 co-written	by	 a	 group	
academics	led	by	Eloísa	Machado.	The	same	suspicion	of	vengeance	as	the	driving	force	appeared	
across	 the	 board	 of	 the	media	 studied	 here:	 PT	members	 denounced	 it	 as	 “explicit	 blackmail”	
(E3/12a	2015),	an	interpretation	repeated	by	the	Estado	pundit	Marco	Aurélio	Nogueira	(E3/12b	
2015)	and	the	political	analyst	Otávio	Amorim,	and	in	a	translated	Economist	editorial	on	December	
5	 reproduced	 in	 Estado	 (E5/12	 2015).	 However,	 the,	 Estado	 editors	 later	 explicitly	 denied	 the	
vengeance	motif:	
	
Como	 primeiro	 ponto	 a	 ser	 difundido	 pela	 militância,	 o	 governo	 federal	 tenta	 vincular	 o	 pedido	 de	
impeachment	 ao	 deputado	 Eduardo	 Cunha	 (PMDB-RJ),	 presidente	 da	 Câmara	 dos	 Deputados.	 Trata-se	 da	
primeira	falácia.	O	impeachment	não	nasceu	da	vontade	de	Cunha,	como	se	fosse	um	ato	de	vingança	pessoal	
do	presidente	da	Câmara	contra	a	presidente	da	República.	(E18/1	2016)		
	
By	denying	the	focalization	and	personal	vested	interest,	this	editorial	argues	that	the	impeachment	
is	really	all	about	the	compliance	with	the	fiscal	responsibility	law.	I	will	return	to	the	impeachment	
below.	Now,	 I	will	 focus	 on	 another	 emplotment	 of	 Cunha’s	 antagonistic	 relations,	 this	 time	 in	
opposition	to	the	PGR	Janot.	
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During	the	STF	sessions,	several	other	events	worked	towards	weakening	the	position	of	Cunha.	On	
December	15,	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	visited	the	homes	and	offices	of	Cunha	and	his	ally	and	
predecessor	 in	 the	Câmara	 leader	 role,	Minister	of	Tourism	Henrique	Eduardo	Alves,	along	with	
many	other	prominent	PMDB	names	(among	these	were	Celso	Pansera,	newly	appointed	minister	
of	Science,	and	senator	Edison	Lobão,	former	minister	of	Mines	and	Energy).	Though	this	phase	had	
no	arrests,	cellular	phones	and	documents	were	apprehended	at	all	 searched	 locations.	The	STF	
denied	the	police	warrant	for	searching	the	home	of	Renan	Calheiros,	in	contrast	to	the	extensive	
searches	in	locations	related	to	Cunha.	The	offices	of	PMDB	in	Calheiros’	home	state	Alagoas	were	
also	searched,	and	the	subsidiary	of	Petrobras	Transpetro	was	investigated	in	the	operation	as	well.	
The	operation	was	dubbed	“Catilinarias,”	referencing	a	series	of	speeches	by	Cicero,	in	which	the	
Roman	consul	denounced	the	senator	Catiline’s	attempt	at	a	coup	d’état	(see	appendix	B).		
	
The	following	day,	the	PGR	finalized	a	request	to	the	STF	for	removing	Cunha	from	office,	arguing	
that	he	abused	the	powers	of	his	position	in	the	Ethics	Council,	in	the	CPI	de	Petrobras,	but	above	
all	 abuse	 of	 public	 office	 for	 criminal	 and	 corrupt	 activity.	 The	 same	 day,	 Cunha	 evaded	 public	
servants	trying	to	present	the	document	of	the	Ethics	Council,	stating	that	he	was	officially	on	trial	
for	breach	of	parliamentary	decorum.			
	
The	 Prosecutor-General’s	 request	 for	 removing	 Cunha	 was	 expected.	 Both	 Folha	 and	 Veja	
columnists	had	speculated	that	Cunha	wanted	to	initiate	impeachment	proceedings	before	the	PGR	
made	such	a	request,	to	reinforce	the	argument	that	PGR	Janot	was	in	reality	not	independent,	but	
acting	as	a	henchman	for	the	Rousseff	government:	
	
Nos	 bastidores	 da	 Câmara,	 deputados	 creditam	 a	 decisão	 de	 Cunha	 de	 dar	 seguimento	 ao	 processo	 de	
impeachment	 de	Dilma	 Rousseff	 a	 rumores	 de	 que	 a	 Procuradoria-Geral	 da	 República	 (PGR)	 pode	 pedir	 o	
afastamento	dele	da	presidência	da	Câmara	a	qualquer	momento.	Desde	o	início	da	semana,	essa	possibilidade	
vem	 sendo	 ventilada	 pelos	 corredores	 da	 Casa.	 Representantes	 da	 base	 e	 da	 oposição	 ingressaram	 no	
Ministério	Público	pedindo	a	saída	de	Cunha	sob	o	argumento	de	que	ele	estaria	usando	a	estrutura	da	Câmara	
para	 atrapalhar	 as	 investigações	 contra	 ele	 no	 esquema	 de	 corrupção	 da	 Petrobras...	 Caso	 o	 pedido	 de	
afastamento	se	confirme,	o	peemedebista	tem	um	argumento	na	ponta	da	língua:	deve	dizer	que	a	PGR	agiu	
em	retaliação	a	ele,	reforçando	sua	tese	de	que	Rodrigo	Janot	atua	em	benefício	do	Planalto.	(V-2/12	2015)	
	
The	 intertextual	 shift	 demonstrated	 across	 these	 texts	 dislocated	 Cunha	 from	 the	 role	 of	 the	
conservative	 protagonist	 that	 could	 overcome	 the	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 administration	 to	 the	 role	 of	
embarrassing	midwife	in	the	transfer	of	power	to	Michel	Temer,	a	liability	that	resides	menacingly	
at	the	margin	of	the	impeachment	process.		
	
The	 shift	 is	 visible	 in	 the	 characterizations	 of	 Cunha’s	 actions:	 his	 retaliation,	 his	 threats,	 his	
blackmailing,	the	knife	to	the	throat,	and	his	shock	troops	–	all	of	them	invoking	the	story	of	warring	
mafia-like	factions	within	Congress.	Reports	on	Cunha’s	lie	in	the	CPI	and	subsequent	disclosure	of	
Swiss	bank	accounts	paved	the	way	for	reports	on	backstage	deals,	blackmail	and	a	ceasefire	that	
gave	way	to	metaphors	and	statements	about	outright	war;	and	with	these	unfolding	plotlines,	the	
seed	 of	 the	most	 discussed	 narrative	 of	 all	 –	 that	 of	 a	 coup	 d’état,	 or	Golpe	 –	 was	 sown.	 The	
metaphors	and	characterizations	that	changed	the	meteorically	rising	Cunha	to	the	Roman	senator	
Catiline	made	this	alternative	emplotment	possible,	because	they	moved	Cunha	into	the	position	of	
the	antagonist,	and	thus	fed	into	the	counternarrative	launched	by	PT	supporters	(see	section	4.5.3	
below).	
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In	the	first	days	of	March,	Cunha’s	corruption	cases	took	a	decisive	step	forward,	as	he	was	charged	
before	 the	 STF	 (on	March	3)	 and	 indicted	 a	 second	 time	by	 the	PGR	 (on	March	4).	However,	 a	
massive	testimony	leak	appeared	on	the	website	of	in	IstoÉ	on	March	3,	and	on	March	4,	news	on	
Cunha	were	also	completely	eclipsed	by	a	new	phase	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	to	which	I	now	
turn.	
	
	
4.4	The	Apogee	of	the	Political	Crisis:	Lula	and	Rousseff	Conjoined	
March	3	and	4	marked	the	onset	of	an	infostorm	that	engulfed	both	Rousseff	and	Lula	(Damgaard	
2018b),	 joined	 them	 together	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task	 force,	 and	 preceded	 the	
impeachment	vote	in	the	Câmara.	This	period	was	characterized	in	the	media	as	a	period	of	tension	
and	crisis,	combining	new	instances	of	corruption	disclosure,	the	leak	of	the	incarcerated	Senator	
Delcídio	do	Amaral’s	plea	bargain	testimony,	a	wave	of	street	protests,	and	the	dramatic	coercive	
witness	interrogation	of	Lula.		
	
In	the	following	two	sections,	I	describe	in	detail	how	the	figure	of	crisis	was	presented	and	how	TV	
Globo	marked	out	this	moment	of	crisis	as	the	apex	(or	point-of-no-return)	of	an	on-going	narrative.	
Introductorily,	 I	will	briefly	provide	the	contours	of	the	narrative	that	brought	together	Lula	and	
Rousseff.	 While	 the	 media	 as	 little	 as	 three	 months	 earlier	 had	 been	 keen	 on	 exposing	 the	
differences	and	disharmony	between	the	current	and	the	former	ex-president	(e.g.	G1-29/10	2015),	
this	pattern	changed	in	February	and	March	2016.	Crucially,	Lula’s	alleged	corruption	in	these	two	
real	 estate	 cases	 then	became	Rousseff’s	 problem,	 because	 a	 narrative	 developed	 around	 their	
close	 relationship	 and	 combined	 efforts	 to	 stop	 the	 Lava-Jato	 probe,	 or	 at	 least	 to	 obstruct	 it.	
Historically,	 the	metaphors	 of	 criador/criatura	 (creator	 and	 creation)	 or	mentor	 and	 pupil	were	
common-place	descriptions	of	the	relationship	between	Lula	and	Dilma.	This	metaphor-set	was	now	
reinvigorated	 as	 Dilma	 considered	 the	 idea	 of	 nominating	 Lula	 for	 the	 powerful	 position	 of	
presidential	chief	of	staff,	ministro	da	Casa	Civil.		
	
The	background	of	the	events	on	March	4	can	be	traced	to	the	real	estate	cases	that	implicated	Lula	
as	recipient	of	kickbacks:	Exposés	in	Veja	and	Folha	(e.g.	F29/1	2016,	V#2463)	pointed	out	that	two	
locations	 frequented	by	Lula	after	his	period	as	president	was	 in	 fact	connected	to	the	cartel	of	
construction	 companies	 that	 grew	 enormously	 in	 his	 presidency	 (aligning	 with	 earlier	 exposés	
concerning	OAS	and	Odebrecht	in	2015,	e.g.	V#2423).	The	ties	between	Lula	and	the	construction	
company	OAS	 had	 been	 pursued	 by	 journalists	 of	 all	 the	main	media	 in	 January	 and	 February,	
gradually	 turning	 up	 pieces	 of	 documentary	 evidence,	 witness	 accounts	 and	 archive	 files	 that	
showed	how	OAS	had	worked	on	two	real	estate	sites	linked	to	Lula.	None	of	this	seemed	to	leak	
from	investigations,	but	turned	up	through	investigative	journalism.		
	
Based	on	this	evidence,	Cassio	Conserino,	a	public	prosecutor	of	the	São	Paulo	state,	had	stated	on	
January	22	in	an	interview	in	Veja	(V#2462)	that	he	would	indict	Lula.	Conserino	argued	that	Lula	
was	corrupted	by	OAS,	and	that	he	tried	to	hide	that	he	was	the	owner	of	the	renovated	beachside	
“triplex”	 apartment	 in	 Guarujá.	 A	 few	 days	 later,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 searched	 the	
apartment	and	the	whole	building,	linking	the	imprisoned	PT	treasurer	Vaccari	to	the	lawyer	Nelci	
Warken,	who	appeared	to	have	connections	to	the	Panamanian	law	firm	Mossack	Fonseca	(the	firm	
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that	went	 on	 to	 be	 exposed	 in	 the	 Panama	 Papers).	 Despite	 Conserino’s	 statement	 in	Veja,	 or	
perhaps	because	of	 it,	Lula’s	 lawyers	succeeded	 in	challenging	the	competency	of	the	São	Paulo	
prosecutors,	 starting	 a	 series	 of	 legal	 struggles	 in	 February	 about	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 case.	 The	
question	was	which	 prosecuting	 body	 had	 the	 right	 to	 indict	 Lula,	 and	which	 court	 that	would	
adjudicate	the	eventual	trial	of	the	triplex.		
	
Since	the	2015	exposés,	Lula	had	testified	in	 investigation	processes	three	times,	but	no	footage	
appeared	of	this	in	the	media.	In	contrast,	due	to	the	visibility,	the	events	of	March	4	were	reported	
with	great	urgency	and	cast	in	extraordinary	terms.	Premonitions	of	Lula’s	indictment	and	perhaps	
preventive	 arrest	 had	 been	 part	 of	 the	 mediascape	 for	 six	 weeks	 by	 then.	 It	 was	 not	 entirely	
surprising	then,	that	Lula	was	forced	to	testify	on	March	4,	being	escorted	from	his	home	in	São	
Paulo	at	dawn.	The	Globo	news	team	was	ready	with	cameras	at	the	ex-president’s	house	before	
the	police	arrived,	which	suggests	a	leak	in	either	the	local	police	force	or	in	the	task-force.		
	
	
4.4.1	Analysis	of	Jornal	Nacional,	March	4,	2016	
TV	 Globo’s	 evening	 newscast	 that	 night	 compressed	 the	 many	 elements	 of	 coverage	 that	 had	
unfolded	during	the	day’s	live	coverage	(on	GloboNews	and	the	competing	news	channels).	Rather	
than	 the	 usual	 two	 or	 three	 political-oriented	 “hard	 news”	 reports,	 the	 first	 hour	 of	 the	 Jornal	
Nacional	comprised	nine	different	news	reports,	all	accounting	for	the	ex-president’s	case	and	the	
repercussion	of	the	so-called	coercive	testimony.	The	reader	may	consult	appendix	D	for	a	transcript	
of	this	and	the	next	newscast	analyzed.	Here,	I	will	deal	with	the	following	themes:	
	
• Hierarchy	and	Integration	of	Elements;	Distribution	of	Attention	
• Urgency	and	Uncommonness	
• Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression		
• Actors:	Protesters,	Protagonists	and	Antagonists	
• Graphics	
• Narrative	Emplotment	in	Uncertain	Conjunctive	
	
Hierarchy	and	Integration	of	Elements;	Distribution	of	Attention	
I	start	out	from	the	assumption	that	the	ordered	sequence	and	various	timeslots	allotted	to	sections	
of	a	newscast	reflect	editorial	choices.	While	viewers	may	drop	in	and	out	of	a	newscast,	that	does	
not	mean	that	the	newscast	is	not	a	carefully	crafted	product,	and	this	may	be	even	more	true	in	
situations	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 nationally	 important	 and	 historically	 exceptional.	 By	 describing	 the	
overall	 structure	 of	 this	 particular	 newscast,	 I	will	 unpack	 the	 sequence,	 implicit	 hierarchy,	 and	
emplotment	and	integration	of	events.	
	
The	 Jornal	 Nacional	 newscast	 on	 March	 4	 starts	 off	 with	 a	 complex	 escalada	 (initial	 headline	
sequence,	 see	Montgomery	and	Feng	2016)	 that	outlines	 the	events	of	 the	day	and	 the	coming	
content.	 Unlike	 most	 other	 editions,	 the	 escalada	 on	 this	 day	 only	 covered	 one	 issue	 –	 the	
interrogation	of	Lula.	The	escalada,	like	the	following	sequence	of	news	reports,	foregrounds	the	
street-level	protests,	and	characterize	them	as	violent	(but	the	escalada	elides	the	protests	in	front	
of	PT’s	headquarters).	This	initial	script	is	read	alternatingly	by	the	two	anchors:	
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A	operação	Lava	Jato	chega	ao	ex-presidente.	Policiais	federais	obrigam	Lula	prestar	depoimento	numa	sala	no	
aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	A	ação	policial	atrai	manifestantes	pro	e	contra	a	o	ex-presidente,	e	as	provocações	
de	lado	a	lado	terminam	em	violência.	
	
During	the	first	two	minutes,	the	escalada	summarizes	the	day’s	events,	the	prosecutors’	suspicions,	
and	Lula’s	 response.	The	 first	 report	of	 the	newscast	consists	 in	 five	minutes	of	on-site	 footage,	
shifting	 between	 helicopter	 shots,	 street-level	 shots	 from	 protests,	 20	 seconds	 of	 on-site	
explanation	by	a	reporter,	30	seconds	of	footage	from	a	police	press	conference	(both	explaining	
the	unusual	location	of	the	testimony),	and	a	final	sequence	of	helicopter	shots	with	a	short	indirect	
quote	of	denial	from	Lula,	related	through	an	interview	with	PT	Congressman	Paulo	Teixeira.	The	
first	protests	covered	are	those	in	front	of	Lula’s	house,	followed	by	protests	in	front	of	and	inside	
the	São	Paulo	airport	Congonhas.	The	focus	of	this	news	report	is	violence	in	the	protest,	which	was	
also	highlighted	in	the	escalada.		In	the	section	on	“Discrediting	actors”	below,	I	will	detail	how	the	
so-called	“pro-Lula”	protesters	are	discredited	through	the	attribution	of	violence.	Very	few	hurt	
people	are	seen	in	the	images,	and	the	only	wound	displayed	is	demonstrated	by	an	individual	in	
the	national	football	shirt,	while	the	most	violent	person	filmed	wears	an	orange-red	shirt,	possibly	
alluding	to	his	left-wing	sympathies.		
	
While	the	first	report	consists	of	on-site	elements,	the	following	two	reports	(from	7:16	to	20:00	
minutes)	 are	 remarkably	 static.	 In	 total,	 13	 minutes	 are	 devoted	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	 sacerdotal	
coverage,	Blumler	and	Gurevitch	2002:55)	to	long	quotes	from	a	police	press	conference	in	Curitiba,	
interspersed	with	quotes	from	the	interrogation	warrant	justifying	the	quasi-arrest	of	Lula.	There	is	
much	more	direct	quoting	than	“reporting,”	i.e.	journalistic	meta-text,	with	22	quotes	lasting	a	full	
10	minutes.	10	(slightly	edited)	quotes	from	the	documents	containing	the	judicial	warrant	and	12	
direct	quotes	with	footage	the	press	conference.	These	direct	quotes	are	made	up	of	10	statements	
by	the	Lava-Jato	task	force	prosecutor	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima	and	two	statements	made	
by	a	tax	auditor.	The	ample	space	given	to	the	task	force	imbues	its	members	with	actantial	agency.		
	
The	initial	key	quotes	are	centered	around	the	suspicions	of	corruption.	The	anchor,	William	Bonner,	
quotes	 the	 investigators,	 affirming	 that	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 (“proofs	 and	 evidence”)	 for	
investigating	 the	 ex-president,	 and	 the	 following	 footage	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 Lima	 explicates	 the	
suspicion	 of	 a	 “criminal	 organization	 within	 the	 government,	 utilizing	 Petrobras	 and	 other	
companies	for	political	financing	and	personal	gain	as	well.”	This	moral	and	political	transgression	
is	then	explained	through	a	patchwork	of	elements	from	press	conference	footage	and	voice-over	
quotes	of	the	investigation’s	judicial	warrant	for	interrogating	Lula.	The	second	news	report	in	this	
section	quotes	the	tax	auditor’s	impression	of	the	cash	flow	between	Lula’s	company,	his	institute,	
and	 his	 sons’	 companies.	 However,	 this	 new	 set	 of	 document	 quotes	 is	 displayed	 on	 a	 graphic	
background	of	Petrobras	oil	pipes,	implying	the	connection	between	the	cash	flow	and	the	original	
transgression	of	Lula’s	criminal	organization	within	the	government.		
	
The	fourth	and	fifth	news	report	(from	21:25	to	32:05)	summarize	the	investigation’s	accumulated	
evidence	pertaining	to	the	two	real	estate	cases.	Here,	intertextuality	to	earlier	events	and	exposés	
is	clear:	The	anchor	references	the	scoop	that	was	presented	in	the	Jornal	Nacional	the	previous	
day	(images	of	Lula	and	Leo	Pinheiro	of	OAS	together	inside	the	Guarujá	apartment),	and	reporters	
refer	to	the	disclosure,	published	in	January,	that	the	landscaping	redesign	of	the	Atibaia	ranch	was	
paid	by	Odebrecht.	The	Aloprados	scandal	of	2006	is	also	referenced	(at	26:00).		
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The	sixth	news	report	shows	footage	from	other	arrests	and	interrogations,	as	well	as	one	interview	
that	 also	 took	 place	 that	 day,	 related	 to	 the	 24th	 phase	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 Paulo	
Okamotto,	director	of	Instituto	Lula	(the	quasi-political	organization	founded	by	Lula	after	stepping	
down),	is	interviewed	after	testifying,	and	a	list	of	interrogated	individuals	is	then	presented	on	a	
new	graphic	background:	An	animation	of	oil	pipes	spilling	out	stacks	of	money	bills.	The	background	
animation	is	again	making	a	symbolic	reference	(common	to	other	newscasts	of	TV	Globo)	to	the	
scandal	of	Petrobras’	leaky	economy	and	grafted	subcontracts.		
	
The	 seventh	 news	 report	 returns	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 violent	 protests,	 this	 time	 in	 front	 of	 the	 PT	
headquarters.	The	violence	is	this	time	reported	to	be	directed	at	journalists,	and	an	interview	with	
the	ex-minister	Gilberto	Carvalho	(PT)	is	cut	short	by	angry	protesters,	presumably	demonstrating	
the	violent	attitude	of	PT	partisans.	The	angry	attitudes	are	not	explained	or	framed	as	an	attitude	
specifically	directed	at	Rede	Globo,	although	many	Brazilians	would	 infer	as	much.	Similarly,	 the	
chorus	of	protesters	chanting	“não	vai	 ter	golpe!”	 is	 shown,	but	not	explained	or	 related	 to	 the	
political	events.			
	
Only	in	the	eight	news	report,	after	two	commercial	breaks	and	39	minutes	of	newscast,	does	Lula	
himself	make	an	appearance.	Lula’s	voice	is	only	presented	at	two	moments	until	then,	in	two	brief	
quotes:	A	15-second	shot	in	the	escalada	and	a	30-second	sequence	in	the	seventh	report,	culled	
from	a	cell	phone	video	recordings	made	by	a	PT	member	and	posted	on	Facebook.	Lula’s	speech	is	
reported	in	nine	sections	of	quotes,	for	a	total	of	seven	minutes	of	raw	footage,	interspersed	with	
shorter	sequences	 in	the	newscast	studio.	Relegating	his	statements	to	the	end	of	the	newscast	
could	 be	 critically	 interpreted	 as	 a	 characterization	 of	 relevance	 or	 truth	 value,	 or	 simply	 as	 a	
necessary	 sequence	 of	 representing	 an	 accusation	 and	 the	 consequent	 defense.	 However,	 by	
splitting	each	denunciatory	claim	from	the	counterclaim,	it	is	not	at	all	times	clear	how	these	relate,	
and	half	of	 the	 sequences	 from	Lula’s	press	 conference	are	preceded	by	an	 introduction	by	 the	
newscast	anchors	 that	disqualifies	or	 throws	 into	doubt	Lula’s	explanations.	Thus,	 in	 four	out	of	
seven	subsections	of	this	nine-minute	report	on	the	conference,	the	anchors	start	by	pointing	out	
the	flaws	and	omissions	of	the	argument	presented	by	the	ex-president.	 In	this	conference,	Lula	
made	a	 simile	 that	Veja	 turned	 into	 a	 front	page	 collage	 (see	appendix	A,	 figure	A.24),	 likening	
himself	to	an	arrowhead	viper.	The	final	two	news	reports	treat	the	support	for	Lula	expressed	by	
the	president	Rousseff,	and,	in	the	very	last	minutes,	it	is	related	that	Eduardo	Cunha	was	indicted	
again	by	the	public	prosecutors.			
	
The	overall	organization	of	material	emphasizes	the	integration	of	the	judiciary	actors’	statements	
by	contextualizing	them	extensively,	while	focalizing	on	these	actors	and	the	truth	claims	they	make.	
Hierarchical	priority	 is	given	 to	 the	 investigation	rather	 than	 the	ex-president,	 locating	authority	
rather	strongly	with	the	Lava-Jato	task	force.	Aside	from	the	ex-president,	a	number	of	PT	members	
are	discredited,	and	the	violent	aggression	is	more	clearly	attributed	to	the	supporters	of	this	party	
than	 the	more	 diffuse	 “other	 side,”	 at	 one	 point	 symbolically	 identified	 simply	 as	 “Brazil.”	 The	
criminal	organization	is	the	central	narrative	nucleus,	and	this	notion	makes	much	of	the	text	and	
quotes	cohere,	so	that	it	can	be	interpreted	not	just	as	amassed	facts	of	alleged	favors	benefiting	
the	ex-president	and	his	family	bestowed	by	at	least	eight	different	named	agents	(OAS,	Odebrecht,	
Fernando	Bittar,	Jonas	Suassuna,	José	Carlos	Bumlai,	Granero	Transportes,	Trés	Poderes	Mudanças,	
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and	Cinco	Estrelas).	Rather,	the	organization	keeps	returning	to	the	graft	in	Petrobras	in	order	to	
qualify	each	of	the	favors	as	evidence	of	Lula	being	involved	in	the	large-scale	corruption	-	as	actual	
corrupt	behavior	in	an	intelligible	historical	narrative.	The	actual	act	of	office	that	would	constitute	
a	causal	 link	between	Lula’s	post-presidential	period	and	the	subcontractors	 is	backgrounded	or	
missing	from	the	text,	however,	so	that	it	remains	unclear	if	these	companies	gained	anything	in	
return	from	channeling	money	and	favors	to	Lula	through	real	estate	renovations,	transportation	
and	storage	of	the	presidential	archive,	and	contracts	for	public	talks.		
	
Urgency	and	uncommonness	
This	newscast	signaled	that	the	situation	was	extraordinary	and	urgent	in	various	ways.	From	the	
outset,	urgency	was	evident	in	the	way	that	the	newscast’s	initial	headline	sequence	was	completely	
oriented	to	the	situation	of	Lula,	thus	departing	from	the	standard	practice	of	the	escalada.	Only	
the	final	phrase	of	the	escalada	(at	1:50)	refers	to	another	event	(the	second	indictment	of	Cunha).		
	
The	first	of	the	headlines	in	the	escalada	is	introduced	by	the	anchor	Bonner:	”the	operation	Lava-
Jato	arrives	at	the	ex-president.“	This	is	followed	immediately	by	footage	from	Lula’s	house,	with	
police	agents	leading	Lula	out	of	the	garage	and	into	a	black	car.	The	extraordinariness	of	the	images	
–	an	ex-president	seemingly	being	arrested	–	is	underscored	by	the	unusual	position	of	the	footage,	
right	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 escalada,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 initial	 headline	 sequence	 that	 would	
normally	be	mostly	located	in	the	studio.	By	leaving	the	standard	pattern	of	the	introduction,	and	
by	making	a	cutaway	to	on-site	footage	immediately,	a	sense	of	urgency	is	established	at	the	formal	
level,	 matching	 the	 content.	 Similarly,	 several	 of	 the	 news	 reports	 are	 uncommonly	 long	 and	
repetitive,	lasting	between	six	and	nine	minutes	a	piece	with	few	shifts	in	the	material,	in	passages	
of	up	to	two	uninterrupted	minutes,	and	the	overall	elimination	of	all	other	news	items	is	significant	
as	 well.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 production	 testifies	 to	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	 events	 by	 selecting	 an	
uncommon	amount	of	almost	raw	footage.	
	
Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression	
Moving	on	 to	 the	 scripted	 text	 of	 the	newscast,	 the	 apparent	 arrest	 of	 Lula	 is	motivated	 a	 few	
seconds	after	the	first	headline,	indirectly	quoting	the	prosecutors	of	the	Lava-Jato	task	force,	who	
“affirmed	 that	 the	 institute	 and	 the	 company	 received	 payments	 and	 donations	 from	 the	 five	
Petrobras	contractors	most	involved	in	the	graft	(desvio)	of	money	from	Petrobras.”	This	is	the	first	
mention	 of	 wrong-doing,	 supplemented	 a	 little	 later	 (at	 0:58)	 by	 “pagamento	 de	 vantagem	
indevida,”	meaning	“payment	for	an	illicit	advantage,”	and	the	mention	of	the	company	OAS	having	
paid	for	storage	for	Lula's	“objects.”	The	objects	referred	to	are	gifts	of	public	office,	which	had	been	
bestowed	 upon	 Lula	 during	 his	 presidency.	 The	 word	 corruption	 is	 not	 used	 initially,	 but	 the	
synonym	“desvio”	and	the	juridical-technical	term	“vantagem	indevida”	is	used	instead,	both	clearly	
signaling	transgressions.		
	
Moreover,	an	intertextual	link	is	established	that	signals	transgression:	the	footage	of	the	president	
being	escorted	into	a	car	by	police	officials,	immediately	followed	by	pictures	of	the	two	real	estate	
locations	that	had	been	the	topic	of	headlines	during	February.	The	combination	of	these	elements	
prompts	the	interpretation	that	the	earlier	suspicions	of	corruption	had	now	been	proved,	traced	
to	 Lula,	 and	 that	 justice	 arrived,	 literally	 and	 figuratively,	 at	 the	 ex-president’s	 doorstep	 –	 as	
declared	 in	 the	 first	 sentence	 of	 the	 headline	 sequence:	 “A	 operação	 Lava	 Jato	 chega	 ao	 ex-
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presidente.”	The	transgression	is	initially	shown	even	more	clearly	than	it	is	labelled	or	described:	
The	 ranch,	 the	 pool	 area,	 the	 beachfront	 apartment	 –	 three	 seemingly	 concrete	 proofs	 of	
corruption.	
	
Actants:	Protesters,	Protagonists,	Antagonists	
The	 most	 visible	 actors	 in	 the	 newscast	 are	 the	 participants	 from	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task-force	
investigating	the	ex-president,	with	the	federal	prosecutor	Carlos	dos	Santos	Lima	as	the	principal	
face	 of	 the	 task-force.	 Three	 other	 investigators	 (Igor	 Romário	 de	 Paula,	 Roberto	 Leonel,	 and	
Eduardo	Mauat)	receive	much	less	on-screen	time.	Towards	the	end	of	the	newscast,	Lula	makes	
his	entry	in	a	long	news	report,	and	the	president	Rousseff	appears	briefly	at	the	very	end.	A	number	
of	 unnamed	 actors	 should	 also	 be	 mentioned,	 because	 several	 protesters	 in	 various	 stages	 of	
conflict	are	highlighted	 in	the	first	and	seventh	news	report.	While	 judge	Sergio	Moro	 is	quoted	
indirectly	and	implicitly	several	times,	the	only	footage	of	him	(at	4:00)	lasts	two	seconds.		
	
The	public	prosecutor	Lima	is	established	from	the	very	beginning	as	the	protagonist,	a	righteous	
republican.	Already	 in	 the	escalada,	 in	 his	 first	 appearance,	 he	 exhorts	 the	 equal	 application	of	
justice.	The	operation	code-name	is	rendered	from	Greek	by	the	anchor	Bonner	as	“the	search	for	
the	truth.”	Lima	returns	as	truth-seeking	protagonist	at	several	points	in	the	newscast,	starting	with	
the	 introduction	 by	 the	 anchor	 Vasconcellos	 (at	 7:22),	 who	 quotes	 Lima	 for	 saying	 that	 the	
”suspicions	are	based	in	proofs	and	testimonies,”	linked	to	”the	criminal	scheme	in	Petrobras.”		
	
The	truth	claims	of	Lima	(standing	in	for	all	the	prosecutors	and	the	investigation	in	general)	are	
presented	by	anchors	in	the	unmarked	form,	in	contrast	to	the	representation	of	claims	made	by	
Lula	 (see	 below).	 In	 this	 way,	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 legitimate	 newsmakers	 is	 constructed	 and	 the	
differences	 of	 legitimacy	 marked	 out	 linguistically,	 in	 order	 to	 dismantle	 the	 common-sense	
perception	of	presidents	as	responsible	public	office-holders	(Tuchman	1978:86-87),	and	specifically	
to	call	into	question	Lula’s	status	as	trustworthy.		
	
A	 few	other	 sources	 are	 present	 directly	 in	 the	newscast.	 In	 the	 fifth	 news	 report,	 two	 citizens	
interviewed	 on-site	 affirm	 facts	 that	 attest	 to	 Lula’s	 relation	 to	 the	 Atibaia	 site.	 Immediately	
afterwards,	through	 indirect	quotes	enunciated	by	the	anchors,	several	defense	 lawyers	and	the	
press	office	of	Instituto	Lula	deny	wrongdoing	in	a	short	sequence.	Affirmations	of	facts	are	shown	
directly	(a	 locksmith,	a	citizen	of	Atibaia,	and	especially	the	investigators),	while	denials	are	only	
quoted.	The	exceptions	are	the	10-second,	rather	incoherent	statement	by	PT	Congressman	Paulo	
Teixeira	(at	06:55),	who	states	that	it	is	“beyond	the	purview	of	the	police	and	public	prosecutors,”	
as	well	as	a	20-second	interview	with	the	Instituto	Lula	director	Paulo	Okamotto	(at	32:46-33:06),	
and,	finally,	the	footage	from	Lula’s	press	conference	towards	the	end	of	the	newscast.		
	
The	 absence	 of	 any	 political	 commentators,	 of	 experts	 on	 legal	 issues,	 of	 the	 São	 Paulo	 state	
prosecutor	Conserino	and	of	judge	Sérgio	Moro	is	noteworthy.	Ignoring	the	larger	question	of	the	
political	situation,	eliding	the	uncertain	legal	situation	of	the	São	Paulo	indictment,	and	relegating	
news	about	the	second	indictment	of	Cunha,	the	newscast	(almost)	contains	and	limits	the	issue	to	
a	question	of	Lula’s	corruption	revealed	by	the	virtuous	investigation.		
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The	contrast	between	Lula	and	the	task-force	is	mirrored	vicariously	in	the	footage	of	conflicting	
protests,	expanded	through	the	strategy	of	discrediting	protesters	who	support	Lula.	Protests	were	
mentioned	already	in	the	first	seconds	of	the	escalada	-	“the	provocations	from	both	sides	ended	
in	violence”	-	and	in	the	first	report	of	the	newscast,	violence	is	covered	again,	for	an	entire	minute,	
from	05:00	to	06:00.	In	this	time,	eight	or	nine	instances	of	violence	is	depicted,	and	in	the	majority	
of	 the	 situations,	 it	 is	depicted	and	described	as	being	a	 conflict	between	 two	“sides.”	 In	a	 few	
situations,	police	are	also	involved.	The	interpretation	of	“sides”	is	prompted	by	the	introduction	in	
the	escalada:	“A	ação	policial	atrai	manifestantes	pro	e	contra	o	ex-presidente,	e	as	provocações	de	
lado	a	lado	terminam	em	violência.”	Thus,	the	question	for	the	protesters	is	not	reported	to	be	the	
Lava-Jato	 investigations,	 or	 the	 coercive	 interrogation	 of	 Lula,	 but	 the	 person	 of	 the	 president	
himself.	The	emphasis	on	this	division	–	a	pro/contra,	or	us/them	dichotomy	–	runs	parallel	to	the	
deployment	of	protagonist/antagonist	roles.		
	
The	violence	in	the	streets	and	the	need	for	surprising	Lula	at	home	and	moving	him	to	Congonhas	
is	linked.	Two	motivations	for	the	moving	of	the	interrogation	to	Congonhas	are	presented	in	the	
very	start	of	the	first	news	report.	Given	the	claims	of	violence	presented	in	the	escalada,	the	claim	
made	by	an	on-site	reporter,	that	Congonhas	would	be	a	safer	place	to	do	the	interrogation	(“mais	
protegida”)	implies	that	security,	public	order,	and	possibly	the	execution	of	the	interrogation	was	
in	danger.	A	strip	of	images	from	the	federal	police	press	conference	(at	3:25),	with	direct	quotes	of	
the	police	detective	Igor	Romário	de	Paula,	explicates	the	warrant	for	this	type	of	quasi-arrest	called	
“conducão	coercitiva,”	or	 “coercive	apprehension.”	The	agent	 states	 that	persons	 linked	 to	 Lula	
would	 try	 to	 hinder	 the	 interrogation,	 a	 claim	 that	 works	 as	 a	 premonition	 of	 the	 violent	 PT	
supporters	depicted	at	Congonhas	in	the	following	footage	sequence.	Thus,	the	necessity	and	claim	
to	legality	for	the	coercive	apprehension	hinges	upon	the	claim	of	violence;	or,	put	another	way,	
without	 violent	protests,	 it	would	have	made	no	 sense	make	a	quasi-arrest.	Without	 the	quasi-
arrest,	the	protests	wouldn’t	have	happened	as	they	did,	however.		
	
A	second	reason	for	the	coercive	measure	is	given	in	voice-over,	quoting	the	judicial	warrant	(at	
4:33).	Here,	the	justification	for	moving	the	interrogation	refers	to	the	previous	interrogation	of	Lula	
(ordered	by	the	prosecutor	Conserino).	This	interrogation	which	was	voluntary,	but	Lula	ended	up	
not	testifying	due	to	protests.	In	voice-over,	the	reporter	quotes	the	document	(supposedly	signed	
by	Sergio	Moro),	saying	that	the	earlier	“tumultuous”	protests	resulted	in	people	being	wounded.4		
	
All	the	instances	of	violence	shown	are,	in	a	way,	rather	petty.	In	a	nation	with	very	high	homicide	
rates	and	serious	public	security	 issues,	 it	 is	peculiar	that	pushing	and	yelling	between	groups	of	
non-armed,	aging	protesters	would	merit	a	minute	of	prime-time	television.	However,	the	intention	
of	emphasizing	violence	 in	protests	can	be	 interpreted	as	a	way	of	 robbing	the	protests	of	 their	
democratic	merit.	But	the	violence	is	not	depicted	equally	among	both	“sides,”	and	one	“side”	is	
thus	 clearly	more	 discredited	 through	 this	 contrast:	While	 one	 protester,	 in	 a	 red	 shirt	 (visibly	
decoded	as	PT	supporter)	is	shown	as	violent,	attacking,	another	protester	clothed	in	the	national	
football	team	shirt	is	shown	as	wounded	–	it	could	probably	be	the	other	way	around,	but	it	is	hardly	
coincidental	 that	 these	 images	have	been	chosen	so.	Aggressive	violence	 is	attributed	 to	 the	PT	
supporters,	while	the	Brazilians	at	large	(denoted	by	the	national	team	shirt)	are	the	victims.		
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It	is	never	explained	exactly	why	protesters	in	SP	are	angry	with	(Globo)	journalists,	although	it	is	
the	central	problem	of	the	protests.	Similarly,	while	in	one	instance	the	protest	slogan	“Não	vai	ter	
golpe”	–	there	will	not	be	a	coup	–	is	shown	(at	the	protest	in	front	of	the	PT	headquarters),	the	
political	 situation	of	 impending	 impeachment	 and	 the	 contested	 interpretations	of	 this	 is	 never	
discussed.	The	audience	members	must	either	know	about	the	historical	and	contemporary	critique	
of	Globo	(see	sections	3.4	and	3.6)	or	else	suspect	that	people	are	hell-bent	on	destruction	of	the	
hapless	journalists.	The	violent	mob	is	supporting	Lula,	and	this	also	discredits	Lula.	
	
Just	after	 Lima's	 first	appearance	 in	 the	escalada,	 footage	of	 Lula's	 spontaneous	post-testimony	
press	conference	was	shown.	This	juxtaposition	underscored	the	opposition	of	actors.	Lula,	at	first	
indirectly	 quoted	 by	 both	 anchors	 in	 rapid	 succession,	 ”refutes	 the	 accusations,	 criticizes	 the	
coercive	apprehension,	 and	 says	 that	he	would	have	given	 clarifications	 if	 invited	 to	 testify”	 (at	
1:08).	Since	Lula	was	in	fact	not	accused	formally	then,	the	word	“accusation”	is	ascribed	to	Lula	
himself	via	an	indirect	quote.	Then,	the	voice-over	of	anchors	give	way	to	a	short	bit	of	Lula's	speech.	
In	 the	 footage,	 Lula	 looks	 disconcerted	 and	 indignant.	 The	 selected	 quotes	 continue	 Lula’s	
condensed	 critique	 of	 the	 coercive	 apprehension:	 “Lamentably,	 they	 preferred	 to	 use	 the	
superiority,	arrogance,	in	a	spectacle	of	pyrotechnics”	(at	1:22).	
	
Later	(and	lengthier)	passages	in	the	newscast	further	establishes	Lula	as	the	antagonist:	Between	
8:37	 and	 9:40,	 PGR	 Lima	 speaks	 at	 length,	 in	 two	 sections	 of	 footage,	 about	 the	 “criminal	
organization”	installed	in	the	federal	government,	orchestrated	through	a	“chain	of	command”	(at	
8:42)	that	had	previously	revealed	the	transgressions	of	ex-minister	José	Dirceu	(convicted	in	the	
Mensalão	 scandal,	 preventively	 arrested	 in	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case)	 and	 the	 treasurer	 Vaccari	 Neto	
(convicted	in	the	Lava-Jato	case).	The	implication	is	that	Lula	was	at	the	top	of	this	chain,	as	he	was	
the	political	leader	of	both	convicts.	Lima	does	not	say	as	much,	however,	but	instead	phrases	it	this	
way:	
		
Fazemos	 uma	 investigação	 da	 continuidade	 dessa	 cadeira	 de	 comando.	 Hoje,	 nós	 estamos	 analisando	
evidências	de	que	o	ex-presidente	e	sua	família	receberam	vantagens	para	-	eventualmente	-	consecução	de	
atos	dentro	do	governo	(9:13-39).		
	
A	 bit	 later,	 the	warrant	 for	 arrest	 and	 search	 is	 quoted	 in	 a	 voice-over,	making	 the	 connection	
between	Lula	and	the	Petrobras	graft	clear:	
	
O	ex-presidente	Lula,	além	de	líder	partidário,	era	o	responsável	final	pela	decisão	de	quem	seriam	os	diretores	
da	Petrobras	e	foi	um	dos	principais	beneficiários	dos	delitos.	De	fato,	surgiram	evidências	de	que	os	crimes	o	
enriqueceram	e	financiaram	campanhas	eleitorais	e	o	caixa	de	sua	agremiação	política.	(10:52)	
	
Immediately	before	 this,	 two	other	parties	are	mentioned	–	PMDB	and	PP	 (at	9:50)	–	but	 these	
parties	are	not,	apparently,	considered	among	the	main	antagonists,	since	they	are	only	mentioned	
very	briefly	here	(and	again	at	14:40).	Not	surprisingly,	these	parties	deny	everything.5		
	
Lula’s	 spontaneous	 press	 conference	 was	 only	 covered	much	 later	 in	 the	 newscast	 than	 other	
events.	Apart	from	the	short	sequence	in	the	escalada,	Lula’s	voice	is	only	heard	again	at	36:38-
37:05,	as	he	criticizes	Sérgio	Moro.	A	cell	phone	footage	of	Lula	speaking	about	the	interrogation	is	
included	in	the	seventh	report,	and	then	better	quality	footage	takes	up	most	of	the	eight	news	
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report.	This	report	starts	off	with	an	uninterrupted	two-minute	quote	Lula	denying	the	necessity	of	
coercive	interrogation	and	the	redundancy	of	the	questions	posed	to	him.	Then,	the	anchor	Bonner	
points	out	that	Lula	did	not	comment	on	the	investigator’s	reasons	for	searching	the	homes	of	his	
sons,	setting	up	a	35-second	sequence	where	Lula	states	that	there	 is	no	good	reason	for	those	
search	warrants.	With	 the	 preemptive	 discrediting	 of	 Lula’s	 interpretation	of	 the	 situation,	 Lula	
appears	to	be	evading	the	questions	posed	by	the	prosecutors.		
	
The	following	sections	has	the	same	structure:	The	anchor	Vasconcellos	highlights	that	Lula	spoke	
of	“unnamed	persons”	who	wants	to	destroy	his	 legacy,	and	this	makes	the	following	20-second	
footage	 of	 Lula’s	 declarations	 seem	 slightly	 conspiratorial.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 Vasconcellos	
introduces	the	public	talks	that	Lula	gave	after	his	presidency,	quoting	Lula	for	saying	that	these	
talks	were	“results	of	the	successes	of	his	government.”	In	the	50-second	sequence	of	footage,	Lula	
points	out	that	people	want	to	hear	about	the	miraculous	results	that	changed	the	country,	and	due	
to	these	results,	he	could	be	the	“most	well-paid	public	speaker	in	the	world	next	to	Bill	Clinton.”	
The	 anchor	 Bonner	 then	 points	 out	 that	 Lula	 avoided	 mentioning	 OAS	 and	 the	 suspicion	 of	
corruption	when	speaking	about	the	presidential	archive,	again	setting	up	the	following	footage	of	
Lula.	 Vasconcellos	 then	 introduces	 Lula’s	 explanations	 about	 the	 Atibaia	 site	 by	 establishing	 a	
conflict	between	the	Lava-Jato	task	force	and	the	ex-president:	“Lula	again	said	that	it	is	his	friends’	
estate,	 and	 he	 sought	 to	 disqualify	 what	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigators	 consider	 indications	 of	 his	
ownership.”	Next,	Bonner	re-introduces	Lula’s	explanations	about	the	public	talks,	stating	that	Lula	
“defended	the	subcontractors	of	Petrobras	that	payed	for	the	talks”	and	that	he	“downplayed	the	
fact	that	they	were	involved	in	the	grafting	off	of	Petrobras.”	In	sum,	Lula’s	arguments	are	presented	
by	the	anchors	as	covering	for	the	facts	of	corruption.		
	
Two	 more	 sequences	 of	 footage	 from	 Lula’s	 press	 conference	 are	 presented	 by	 Bonner	 and	
Vasconcellos	through	simple	summaries,	rounding	off	 the	nine	minutes	of	news	report	 from	the	
conference	with	indirect	quotes	from	the	decision	by	Supreme	Justice	Rosa	Weber,	who	denied	a	
petition	to	cancel	the	investigations.		
	
In	the	newscast,	a	general	pattern	discredits	PT	members	by	association.	Syntactically,	this	works	
by	locating	sentences	describing	PT	leaders	in	conjunction	with	sentences	that	calls	their	authority	
into	question	(just	as	in	the	above	examples).	Early	in	the	escalada	read	by	the	anchors,	President	
Rousseff	is	discredited	by	being	linked	to	a	plea	bargain:	“President	Dilma	Rousseff	expresses	her	
solidarity	with	ex-president	Lula	and	deny	affirmations	in	the	plea	bargain	made	by	Senator	Delcídio	
do	Amaral”	(at	1:35).		
	
Right	after	 the	coverage	of	violence	 in	 the	protests,	another	PT	member,	 Luiz	Carlos	da	Silva,	 is	
linked	to	the	violent	protests	(by	proximity)	but	also,	explicitly,	to	the	Mensalão	scandal:	“Professor	
Luizinho,	founding	member	of	PT,	was	in	the	airport.	He	was	investigated	in	the	Mensalão	case	and	
was	 acquitted”	 (at	 5:53).	 Right	 after	 this	 intertextual	 link	 to	 the	 earlier	 mega-scandal,	 the	 ex-
politician	is	depicted	rambling	on	to	another	protester	(presented	not	as	such,	but	as	a	“passenger”	
in	the	airport),	while	brandishing,	for	no	apparent	reason,	male	undergarments.	The	reporter,	 in	
voice-over,	notes	 that	 “he	discussed	with	a	passenger;	demonstrated	a	pair	of	underpants;	 and	
formed	 the	 letter	 ‘L’,	 for	 Lula,	with	his	hand”	 (6:03).	 The	 laconic	presentation	of	 Luizinho’s	 acts	
demonstrates	them	as	incoherent,	and	this	function	is	a	form	of	distancing,	by	making	his	side	(Lula’s	
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side,	in	effect)	seem	abnormal.	The	gesture	of	the	empty	undergarment	was	supposedly	meant	as	
a	 contrasting	 reference	 to	 a	 2005	 case	 where	 a	 PT	 congressman’s	 aide	 tried	 to	 hide	 that	 he	
transported	US	dollars	unto	an	airplane	in	his	underpants.	
	
In	 another	 intertextual	 reference	 to	 the	Mensalão	 scandal,	 the	 figure	 of	 ex-minister	 of	 PT	 and	
convict	in	the	Lava-Jato	case	José	Dirceu	provides	a	link	that	demonstrates	Lula’s	guilt:	“the	criminal	
organization	certainly	had	a	leadership.	This	was	verified	and	we	are	here	making	the	accusation	
that	the	ex-minister	Zé	Dirceu	was	part	of	this	leadership…”	-	“we	know	that	José	Dirceu	was	really	
harnessing	Petrobras	to	siphon	off	resources”	(8:56).		
	
Finally,	although	the	PT	politician	Paulo	Teixeira	 is	 indirectly	quoted	at	 length,	which	works	as	a	
summary	of	Lula’s	actual	testimony,	his	direct	quote	is	less	felicitous	as	a	speech	act.	In	the	end	of	
the	quote	(6:55),	Teixeira	speaks	to	a	number	of	journalists,	giving	a	non-answer	to	the	(implied)	
question	of	ownership	of	the	Atibaia	ranch	and	the	swan	boats	of	the	lake	by	the	ranch.	This	non-
answer,	 supposedly	 reproducing	 Lula’s	 non-answer,	 is	 that	 the	 ex-president	 “was	 indignant”	 in	
response	to	the	question.	PT	actors	and	Lula	supporters	are	not	covered	favorably,	in	sum:	They	are	
either	 violent	 (street-level	 supporters),	 incoherent	 and	 choleric	 (Luizinho),	 denounced	 and	
discredited	(Dilma),	or	evasive	(Teixeira).		
	
Graphics	
Throughout	the	months	of	covering	Lava-Jato,	the	graphic	designers	of	TV	Globo	had	developed	a	
number	 of	 life-like	 computer-animated	 backgrounds	 on	which	 official	 documents	 and	 pieces	 of	
evidence	could	be	demonstrated.	The	backgrounds	carried	significant	symbolic	weight,	by	showing	
Petrobras	(and	sometimes	BR	Distribuidora,	the	gas	station	retail	branch	of	Petrobras)	icons	next	to	
oil	pipes	leaking	stacks	of	Brazilian	reais.	The	leaky	oil	pipe	graphic	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.7)	is	
first	deployed	in	this	newscast	at	04:30	minutes,	exactly	to	underscore	and	legitimate	the	police	
action:		
	
A	justificativa	de	Ministério	Público	para	a	condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	é	que		
[official	document	appears,	parts	of	text	sections	are	highlighted	and	swoop	to	the	center	of	the	screen]	
a	medida	é	necessária	por	evitar	tumultos	políticos,	
	
The	deixis	of	the	leaky	pipe	graphic	works	by	symbolically	linking	24th	Lava-Jato	phase	(the	operation	
being	signified	by	the	graphic)	to	the	verbal	cue	that	refers	to	the	ex-president.	
	
Narrative	emplotment	in	uncertain	conjunctive	
If	we	consider	all	of	the	mentions	of	transgression,	we	might	conclude	as	to	whether	Lula	is	framed	
as	guilty	(of	corruption)	or	not	–	or	whether	the	newscast	avoids	arbitrating	the	case.	
	
I	 have	 already	 shown	 the	 example	 of	 the	 motivation	 for	 the	 coercive	 apprehension,	 in	 which	
expected	violence	of	PT	supporters	provides	the	grounds	for	taking	Lula	away.	Another	example	of	
the	emplotment	of	transgression	is	the	very	first	quote	from	the	prosecutor	Lima,	who	states	(at	
1:00)	that	this	is	a	“Republican	moment”	and	that	no-one	should	be	exempt	from	investigation	in	
this	country.	That	statement	implies	that	Lula	had	been	kept	out	of	investigations	before.	That	Lula	
had	 in	 fact	 testified	before	 is	only	mentioned	30	minutes	 later,	 in	 the	 footage	 from	Lula’s	press	
conference.	However,	the	selection	of	that	quote	supports	the	police	action	not	only	by	indicating	
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that	 it	was	about	time	that	the	ex-president	was	 investigated,	but	also	that	what	had	happened	
until	then	was	not	“Republican,”	that	is,	supposedly	contrary	to	the	will	of	the	Brazilian	people.	
	
A	 third	 example	 exhibits	 differing	 degrees	 of	 certainty	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 transgression	 and	
culpability.	Lima	includes	the	qualifying	injection	“eventualmente,”	introducing	uncertainty	into	the	
otherwise	clear	causality	of	his	phrase:	“We	are	today	analyzing	evidence	that	the	ex-president	and	
his	family	received	benefits	for	eventually	securing	acts	within	the	government”	(at	9:18,	quoted	
above).	This	qualifier	is	not	in	the	selected	sentences	from	the	warrant,	however,	where	a	simple	
past	imperfect	tense	states	that	“the	ex-president	was	responsible,	in	the	end,	for	whom	should	be	
director	of	Petrobras,	and	was	one	of	the	primary	beneficiaries	of	the	crimes”	(at	10:54,	quoted	
above).	The	prosecutor	makes	two	potential	statements,	and	a	dependent	clause	(and	here	I	will	
quote	in	Portuguese	for	precision’s	sake):	“…	se	ele	conhecia	as	vantagens	indevidas	pagas,	e	se	ele	
recebeu	vantagens	 indevidas,	nós	estamos	ainda	em	 investigação”	 (at	10:00).	The	uncertainty	 is	
restated	in	other	terms	at	10:18,	but	quickly	negated,	as	the	prosecutor	then	states	that	“evidence	
has	accumulated”	pointing	to	the	fact	that	Lula	“clearly	benefitted”	(at	10:32).	After	this,	Lima	and	
the	voice-over	reporter	explicates	the	connection:	Lima	is	quoted	directly	for	saying	that	that	the	
“benefit	[…]	need	not	be	directly	linked	to	the	act	[of	governance]…”	(12:08),	and	the	voice-over	
concludes	(12:47-13:02)	that	“when	the	ex-president	was	exercising	his	mandate	[…]	his	influence	
was	possibly	used	before	and	after	his	mandate	–	and	that	is	the	object	of	this	investigation	–	to	
make	the	scheme	exist	or	continue.”	
	
This	 pattern	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	whole	 newscast:	 Causality,	 and	 thus	 culpability,	 is	 at	 times	
reported	 to	 be	 clear,	while,	 seconds	 later,	 reported	 to	 be	 only	 potential	 or	merely	 possible;	 in	
general,	denials	and	accusations	are	kept	distant	in	the	organization	of	material.	In	a	nutshell,	the	
editors	 are	 technically	 beyond	 reproach,	 because	 the	 doubtful	 or	 non-verifiable	 is	 hedged	
linguistically.	On	 the	other	hand,	 these	doubts	 are	never	presented	 in	 a	 consistent	 fashion,	 but	
consistently	located	next	to	sentences	demonstrating	evidence,	proof,	or	referring	to	such.			
	
Summing	up,	the	text	and	footage	of	the	March	4	edition	of	Jornal	Nacional	was	produced	in	a	way	
that	underscores	the	concern	for	establishing	the	urgency	of	the	situation.	The	protests	surrounding	
the	coercive	apprehension	of	Lula	(covered	in	the	first	report)	implicitly	justifies	the	severity	of	the	
situation	and	the	choice	to	skip	all	other	news	in	order	to	focus	on	a	string	of	background	reports	
on	Lula,	which	were	essentially	non-urgent	past	events	(reports	2	through	5).	Then,	short	reports	
on	the	police	operation	of	that	morning	(report	6)	and	the	impromptu	press	conference	(report	7	
and	8)	 in	 the	PT	headqarters	 continues	 the	more	 “live”	part	 of	 the	newscast.	 Substantially,	 the	
primary	issue	at	stake	is	the	problem	of	establishing	the	legal	foundation	for	the	police	operation	
that	morning,	 and	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 long	 sequences	 devoted	 to	 description	 of	 potentially	
criminal	 transgressions	 committed	 by	 Lula.	 The	 ex-president’s	 counterpoints	 to	 the	 various	
background	 sections	 that	 describe	 the	 evidence	 of	 these	 transgressions	 are	 presented	 by	 the	
anchors	with	various	degrees	of	distrust	 and	hedging,	while	no	other	 voices	are	 represented	 to	
comment	on	the	situation,	although	the	entire	situation	was	discussed	widely	and	intensely	across	
Brazil	and	 in	other	media	outlets.	The	other	 important	omission	 in	 the	reports	 is	 the	causal	 link	
between	the	alleged	kickbacks	and	the	“political	benefit”	gained	by	the	companies	mentioned.	
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4.4.2	Obstruction	of	Justice:	Pundit	Interpretations	in	Folha	and	Estado	
In	order	to	understand	the	development	between	the	newscasts	of	March	4	(above)	and	March	16	
(below),	I	will	here	draw	upon	three	political	commentary	pieces,	one	by	Dora	Kramer	in	Estado,	
two	by	Mônica	Bergamo	in	Folha,	and	furthermore	cite	a	Folha	news	report.	All	four	news	items	
deal	with	the	potential	nomination	of	Lula	as	minister,	and	all	four	present	the	same	interpretation:	
Nominating	Lula	would	be	tantamount	to	obstruction	of	justice.			
	
Dora	Kramer	characterizes	an	eventual	nomination	as	an	obvious	maneuver	to	escape	from	Moro.	
Although	Kramer	initially	states	that	she	will	refrain	from	qualifying	such	a	move	as	“stupid,”	she	
then	affirms	that	it	will	be	perceived	as	Lula’s	outright	admission	of	guilt.	
	
A	 fim	 de	 não	 incorrer	 em	 imperdoável	 grosseria,	 evitemos	 qualificar	 como	 “de	 jerico”	 a	 ideia	 de	 levar	 a	
presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	a	nomear	Luiz	Inácio	da	Silva	para	um	ministério	a	fim	de	dar	a	ele	o	foro	especial	
de	 Justiça	 reservado	a	autoridades	de	primeiro	escalão	dos	Poderes	Executivos	e	detentores	de	mandatos	
eletivos.	Melhor	dizer	que	mais	parece	ideia	de	inimigo.		
Lula	demonstra	tirocínio	ao	resistir	à	sugestão	e	a	presidente	da	República	demonstraria	bom	senso	ao	recusar	
esse	tipo	de	colaboração.	Ruim	para	os	dois	em	todos	os	aspectos.	Para	ele,	seria	o	equivalente	a	assinar	um	
recibo	de	culpabilidade	e	uma	confirmação	de	que	tenta	mesmo	fugir	da	alçada	do	juiz	Sérgio	Moro.	Manobra	
óbvia.	(E10/3	2016)	
	
In	a	remarkably	similar	analysis,	Folha’s	columnist	Mônica	Bergamo	explains	the	same	dilemma.	Like	
Kramer,	Bergamo	also	reports	Lula’s	expressed	hesitance,	and	like	Kramer	she	characterizes	it	like	
a	“confession	of	guilt.”	To	Bergamo,	accepting	a	cabinet	position	 is	a	 risky,	 rather	 than	a	 stupid	
move,	because	the	nomination	would	be	perceived	as	abuse	of	office	and	would	quickly	be	subject	
to	legal	challenges:	
	
Setores	do	PT	e	do	governo	seguem	insistindo	na	ideia	de	que	o	ex-presidente	Lula	seja	nomeado	ministro	para	
ganhar	 foro	 privilegiado,	 o	 que	 impediria	 que	 ele	 seguisse	 sendo	 investigado	 na	 Operação	 Lava	 Jato	 em	
Curitiba...	Há	conselheiros	muito	próximos	do	ex-presidente,	no	entanto,	que	combatem	veementemente	a	
possibilidade	de	nomeação.	Eles	têm	dito	a	Lula	que	isso	pareceria	uma	confissão	de	culpa.	O	próprio	petista	
sempre	usou	esse	argumento	para	não	 ir	para	o	governo.	[...]	A	possibilidade	[de	nominação]	é	vista	como	
extremamente	arriscada.	A	presidente	já	foi	inclusive	alertada	para	a	chance	de	a	iniciativa	ser	questionada	no	
STF	(Supremo	Tribunal	Federal)	numa	ação	acusando	a	petista	de	desvio	de	poder.	(F10/3	2016)	
	
Four	days	later,	Bergamo	reported	in	another	column	(F14/3	2016)	that	Lula	was	about	to	accept	
nomination	for	minister	of	the	Casa	Civil.	Unnamed	PT	leaders	are	quoted	indirectly	with	a	rebuttal	
against	the	accusation	that	the	move	was	a	way	of	“fleeing	from	Justice”	(with	a	capital	J).	However,	
Bêrgamo	observes	that	the	“ex-president	was	more	willing	to	accept	the	nomination	after	the	judge	
Maria	 Priscilla	 Veiga	 Oliveira,	 of	 the	 4ª	 Vara	 Criminal	 da	 Capital,	 declined	 to	 authorize	 his	
imprisonment	and	decided	to	send	the	petition	to	be	analyzed	in	Curitiba…”	
		
The	 following	morning,	 Folha	 reporters	 could	 report	 that	 opposition	 leaders	 would	 plan	 to	 do	
exactly	what	Bergamo	foresaw,	again	seeing	the	acceptance	of	a	cabinet	position	as	implying	guilt:	
	
"Isso	é	um	escárnio,	um	tapa	na	cara	da	população.	O	povo	foi	às	ruas	e	se	manifestou,	já	disse	que	não	quer	
Lula	e	não	quer	o	governo	do	PT",	afirmou	o	líder	do	DEM	na	Câmara,	Pauderney	Avelino	(AM).	DEM,	PPS,	
PSDB	e	SD	vão	protocolar,	de	forma	conjunta,	ação	popular	em	27	estados	contra	a	possível	nomeação	de	Lula.		
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Para	 o	 líder	 do	 PPS,	 Rubens	 Bueno,	 dar	 um	 posto	 estratégico	 no	 governo	 a	 Lula	 objetiva	 "atrapalhar	 o	
andamento	da	 investigação"	contra	o	petista	no	caso	da	Lava	Jato.	"É	uma	clara	tentativa	de	obstrução	da	
Justiça,	além	da	nomeação	caracterizar	desvio	de	finalidade,	 já	que	seu	único	objetivo	é	garantir	ao	petista	
foro	privilegiado".	O	coordenador	jurídico	do	MBL	(Movimento	Brasil	Livre),	Rubens	Nunes,	entrará	também	
com	um	pedido	de	liminar	caso	Lula	seja	nomeado.	
	
Hoje	Lula	é	investigado	pela	13ª	Vara	Federal,	em	Curitiba,	sob	o	comando	do	juiz	Sergio	Moro.	Ao	tomar	posse	
como	ministro,	o	caso	sobe	para	o	STF	(Supremo	Tribunal	Federal),	uma	vez	que	Lula	ganha	foro	privilegiado.	
	
Bueno	avalia	ainda	a	nomeação	do	histórico	quadro	do	PT	como	ministro	como	uma	confissão	de	culpa.	"Vai	
transparecer	que,	ao	contrário	do	que	ele	galhofa	em	seus	discursos	e	depoimentos,	não	tem	como	se	explicar	
e	está	com	medo	de	ser	preso	por	determinação	do	juiz	Sergio	Moro".	(F15/3	2016)	
	
Again,	 the	 possible	 escape	 from	 Sérgio	Moro’s	 jurisdiction	 is	 interpreted	 as	 an	 “obstruction	 of	
Justice,”	 and	 public	 indignation	 is	 invoked	 in	 Avelino’s	 characterization	 of	 the	 nomination	 as	 a	
“mockery,	a	slap	in	the	population’s	face.”	
	
In	all	 interpretations	and	analyses,	 the	move	 is	considered	primarily	as	a	 judicial	maneuver,	and	
sometimes	as	a	way	of	regaining	traction	with	a	rebellious	Congress.	Only	once	(F14/3	2016)	is	it	
explained	that	escaping	the	jurisdiction	of	Sérgio	Moro	does	not	really	mean	immunity,	but	a	move	
of	jurisdiction	to	the	Supreme	Court.	In	the	other	instances,	it	is	tacitly	implied	that	the	Supreme	
Court	provides	virtual	immunity	(due	to	the	tardiness	of	trials	there).	As	it	turned	out,	the	pundits	
accurately	predicted	the	nomination,	and	I	will	now	turn	to	the	newscast	representation	of	Lula’s	
nomination	for	minister.		
	
	
4.4.3	Analysis	of	Jornal	Nacional,	March	16,	2016	
The	newscast	 that	aired	on	March	16	had	a	 rather	different	 structure	and	quality	 than	 the	one	
analyzed	above,	although	this	newscast	also	let	the	legal-political	issues	suppress	all	other	news.	I	
will	 present	 a	 somewhat	 shorter	 analysis	 here,	 highlighting	 some	of	 the	 same	 themes	as	 in	 the	
analysis	above.	The	analysis	is	divided	into	the	following	themes:	
	
• Urgency	(and	motivation	for	Urgency)	
• Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression	I:	Influencing	authorities	
• Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression	II:	Obstructing	justice	
• Actants:	Antagonists,	Protagonists,	Protesters	
• Indirect	representation	of	discourse		
	
The	overall	event	structure	of	the	day	looked	like	this,	according	to	the	newscast	(albeit	organized	
in	a	different	order	here):	
	
A	nomeação	de	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	como	novo	ministro-chefe	da	Casa	Civil,	seis	dias	depois	de	promotores	
estaduais	 de	 São	 Paulo	 terem	 pedido	 a	 prisão	 dele,	 foi	 anunciada	 no	 início	 da	 tarde.	Mas	 começou	 a	 se	
concretizar	na	noite	de	terça-feira	numa	reunião	no	Palácio	da	Alvorada.	(2:02)	
	
Dilma	nem	pedalou,	como	de	costume,	retomou	a	conversa	com	Lula	no	café	da	manhã	com	ministros.	Ainda	
precisaram	de	quase	três	horas	de	conversa	para	chegar	finalmente	a	um	termo.	Mal	acabou	a	reunião	e	líderes	
do	PT	no	congresso	já	anunciavam	a	decisão	pela	internet.	(3:00)	
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Antes	que	o	Diário	Oficial	efetivasse	a	nomeação	de	Lula	como	ministro,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	retirou	o	sigilo	de	
toda	 a	 investigação	 sobre	 o	 ex-presidente	 e	 com	 isso	 tornaram-se	 públicas	 no	 fim	 da	 tarde	 conversas	
telefônicas	de	Lula.	(1:33)	
	
The	publication	of	 phone	 taps	 involving	 ex-President	 Lula,	 President	Rousseff,	 and	 a	number	of	
other	political	actors	close	to	Lula,	was	the	focus	of	the	newscast.	The	taps	on	Lula’s	phone	had	
been	legally	ordered	by	judge	Sérgio	Moro,	executed	by	the	federal	police,	and	the	recordings	had	
been	made	public	officially	as	much	other	evidence	in	the	Lava-Jato	case.	What	seemed	to	be	a	leak	
thus	 first	 appeared	 as	 legal,	 although	 recording	 a	 president	 should	 be	 within	 the	 exclusive	
jurisdiction	of	 the	Supreme	Court,	and	 then	only	 if	he	or	 she	were	officially	 investigated.	So,	by	
publicizing	 the	 phone	 tap	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 criminal	 case	without	 authorization	 of	 the	 STF,	Moro	
overstepped	his	jurisdiction,	and	this	particular	conversation,	moreover,	had	actually	occurred	after	
the	authorized	period	of	tapping	Lula’s	phone	had	ended	(in	contrast	to	the	rest	of	the	recordings).	
Thus,	as	evidence	in	a	trial,	it	would	not	even	be	legal	on	formal	grounds	–	but	this	only	entered	the	
public	debate	the	following	days,	as	did	Moro’s	possible	political	motives	for	publicizing	the	phone	
taps	immediately	after	recording	them.	
	
I	will	show	in	this	analysis	that	the	newscasts	continued	and	expanded	the	pundit	interpretations	
seen	above,	by	interpreting	the	judicial	maneuver	as	a	moral	transgression	underscoring	Rousseff’s	
culpability,	and	by	interpreting	the	publication	of	the	recordings	as	the	climax	in	a	series	of	crises,	
which	justified	Moro’s	celerity.		
	
Urgency	(and	motivation	for	Urgency)	
The	escalada	begins	with	the	claim	that	the	political	crisis	 is	peaking:	“A	crise	no	governo	Dilma	
Rousseff	atinge	o	ponto	mais	alto”	(a	claim	that	is	repeated	three	more	times	–	at	1:28,	11:19,	and	
at	 18.46	mins).	 At	 first,	 the	 claim	 is	 related	 to	 the	 nomination	 of	 Lula	 for	 the	 cabinet,	without	
mentioning	 initially	 why	 a	 nomination	 in	 itself	 can	 constitute	 a	 crisis.	 It	 is,	 however,	 implicitly	
justified	by	the	third	sentence	of	the	escalada,	which	states	that	the	nomination	lets	Lula	escape	
the	reach	of	Sergio	Moro	(at	0:16)	and	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	–	an	interpretation	consonant	
with	political	 commentary	discussed	above.	 Immediately	 afterwards,	 the	escalada	 then	 turns	 to	
presenting	the	phone	taps	of	the	ex-president’s	phone,	and	at	0:35	goes	right	into	a	play-back	of	
the	recording	in	which	Rousseff	explains	to	Lula	that	she	will	send	the	official	document	appointing	
him	as	minister	to	Lula	in	São	Paulo	“in	case	of	necessity.”	The	transcript	of	the	first	minute,	minus	
the	phone	conversation,	consist	of	the	following:	
	
A	crise	do	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	atinge	o	ponto	mais	alto.	
Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	é	nomeado	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil;	ele	sai	do	alcance	de	juiz	Sérgio	Moro,	o	juiz	
federal	do	Paraná	responsável	pela	Lava	Jato,	e	passa	a	ter	o	chamado	foro	privilegiado	no	Supremo	Tribunal	
Federal.	 O	 juiz	 Moro	 suspende	 o	 sigilo	 e	 a	 Justiça	 Federal	 torna	 públicos	 os	 grampos	 telefônicos	 do	 ex-
presidente,	um	deles	de	hoje	a	tarde.	Lula	recebeu	ligação	da	presidente	Dilma.	(0:05)		
	
Concluding	 the	 playback,	 the	 anchors	 explicitly	 deliver	 the	motivation	 for	 both	 claims	 of	 crisis,	
urgency,	and	supposedly	for	the	nomination	itself:	
	
Os	grampos	têm	indícios	fortes	de	que	o	objetivo	da	ida	de	Lula	para	ministério	foi	mesmo	tirá-lo	do	alcance	
do	juiz	Moro	e	indicam	que	o	ex-presidente	tentou	influenciar	várias	autoridades	para	se	proteger.	(1:00)	
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In	this	interpretation,	the	nomination	was,	exactly	as	anticipated	by	the	pundits	the	previous	days,	
a	move	to	protect	Lula	from	Moro.	Crucially,	the	phone	tap	appears	to	attest	to	this	interpretation	
because	“the	case	of	necessity”	is	supposed	to	be	an	arrest	warrant	for	Lula,	that	could	be	dodged	
with	an	official	document	in	hand:	“The	members	of	the	Lava-Jato	[task	force]	affirm	that	there	are	
indications	of	attempts	to	obstruct	the	investigations”	(at	1:47).	Thus,	the	crisis	presented	in	the	
opening	sentence	 is	predicated	on	the	nomination	having	 this	subversive	 intention,	dodging	 the	
expected	 arrest	 warrant.	 The	 transcript	 of	 this	 recording	 (and	 the	 same	 interpretation)	 also	
dominated	 every	 front-page	 of	 the	 national	 newspapers	 the	 following	 morning,	 and	 O	 Globo	
featured	the	whole	phone	conversation	(filling	more	than	half	the	front	page)	under	the	headline	
“Dialogue	threatens	Dilma”	(see	appendix	A,	figures	A.8	and	A.9).		
	
Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression	I:	Influencing	authorities	
Two	actions	are	considered	 transgressions:	The	nomination	 (with	 its	 subversive	motivation)	and	
Lula’s	attempts	at	illegally	influencing	authorities.	The	second	transgression	is	covered	late	in	the	
newscast,	but	I	will	start	here.	As	 it	turned	out,	Lula	 in	fact	complains	that	Eugenio	Aragão,	sub-
prosecutor	 of	 the	 PGR	 and	 soon-to-be-appointed	 PT	minister	 of	 Justice,	 should	 help	 him	 as	 “a	
friend,”	but	has	proved	unwilling:	
	
Lula	teria	inclusive	buscado	influenciar	ou	conseguir	ajuda	de	autoridades	do	Ministério	Público	Federal	e	até	
de	ministros	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal...	de	acordo	com	a	Polícia	Federal,	há	indícios	de	que	no	diálogo,	
Lula	esteja	se	referindo	ao	ministro	indicado	da	Justiça	Eugenio	Aragão	que	também	é	subprocurador-Geral	da	
República	 [graphic	 representation	of	oil	 refinery	pipes,	connotating	Lava-Jato].	Lula	disse:	“O	problema	é	o	
seguinte,	Paulinho,	nós	temos	que	comprar	essa	briga,	eu	sei	que	é	difícil,	sabe?!	Eu	as	vezes	fico	pensando	até	
que	o	Aragão	deveria	cumprir	um	papel	de	homem,	porque	o	Aragão	parece	nosso	amigo,	parece,	parece,	mas	
tá	sempre	dizendo	‘olha...’”	(22:51)	
	
This	 indirect	quote	of	Lula	 is	 repeated	ad	verbatim	by	the	anchor	 in	the	studio	a	bit	 later	 in	the	
newscast,	so	that	the	quote	appears	at	23:10	and	again	at	25:26,	after	a	commercial	break.		
	
If	the	yet-to-be-minister	of	Justice	was	unwilling	to	help	out	a	friend	before	he	even	took	office,	it	
seems	that	Lula	was	even	less	lucky	with	influencing	the	Supreme	Court	judge	Rosa	Weber.	Weber	
had	 been	 assigned	 to	 judge	 a	 petition	 from	 Lula’s	 lawyers	 that	 argued	 for	 cancelling	 the	
investigations	due	to	illegal	methods,	and	Weber	was	also	mentioned	in	one	phone	conversation.	
This	phone	conversation,	like	the	above,	is	read	out	by	the	reporter,	instead	of	a	direct	playback	of	
the	published	audio	file.	The	quote	is	read	out	in	voice-over	with	a	background	graphic	of	refinery	
tubes,	from	which	money	bundles	flow.	A	logo	of	the	gas	station	(and	Petrobras	subsidiary	BR)	is	
visible,	 and	 this	 graphic,	 like	 the	 following	 background	 footage	 of	 the	 Curitiba	 federal	 police	
building,	thus	renders	the	conversation	as	belonging	to	the	Lava-Jato	case	(see	newscast	above	and	
appendix	A,	figure	A.7).			
	
Lula	falou:	Eu	acho	que	eles	quiseram	antecipar	o	pedido	nosso	que	tá	na	Suprema	Corte,	que	tá	na	mão	da	
Rosa	Weber...	Lula	falou:	Mas	viu,	querido,	ela	tá	falando	dessa	reunião,	ô	Wagner,	que	queria	que	você	visse				
agora,	falar	com	ela,	já	que	ela	tá	aí,	falar	o	negócio	da	Rosa	Weber,	que	tá	na	mão	dela	pra	decidir.	Se	homem	
não	tem	saco,	quem	sabe	uma	mulher	corajosa	possa	fazer	o	que	os	homens	não	fizeram.	(23:52)	
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Lula	wants	 both	Aragão	 and	Rosa	Weber,	 in	 the	 respective	 cases,	 to	 “act	 like	 a	man,”	 and	 this	
expression	 is	 interpreted	as	an	attempt	 to	 stop	 the	 investigations.	However,	despite	 the	 tap	on	
Lula’s	phone	(and	taps	on	his	aides’	phones),	in	neither	case	did	Lula	and	these	“figures	of	authority”	
actually	talk	over	the	phone.	No	face-to-face	meetings	have	been	documented,	either.	The	claim	in	
the	escalada	that	Lula	had	attempted	to	“influence	authorities	to	gain	protection”	is	thus	a	stretch,	
since	the	taps	only	provide	evidence	of	Lula’s	wishful	thinking.	The	news	report	even	specifies	that	
Weber	then	denied	Lula’s	petition	for	annulling	the	investigation	on	formal	grounds.	We	can	surmise	
that	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	did	not	find	more	proof	than	the	above	of	backstage	deals,	but	it	
remains	unknown	whether	Weber	or	Aragão	at	this	moment	heard	Lula’s	pleas	via	other	channels,	
even	if	they	did	not	attend	to	them.		
	
Labelling	and	Demonstrating	Transgression	II:	Obstructing	Justice	
While	Lula	did	not	seem	to	actually	obtain	help	from	the	relevant	authorities	in	extra-legal	ways,	
the	perfectly	legal	move	of	nominating	him	for	a	cabinet	position	was	at	heart	of	the	postulated	
crisis.	In	the	second	news	report	of	the	newscast,	the	on-site	reporter,	standing	in	the	anteroom	of	
the	Congress,	concludes	that	no	matter	the	argument,	the	fact	remains	that	Lula	now	escapes	Sérgio	
Moro:	“No	matter	the	argument,	fact	is	that	[the	nomination]	implies	foro	privilegiado,	that	is,	he	
escapes	from	the	hands	of	judge	Sérgio	Moro”	(at	3:53).	A	bit	later	(at	4:58),	the	anchor	Vasconcellos	
points	out	that	it	was	unusual	to	have	an	official	publication	of	the	appointment	in	the	Diário	Oficial	
(the	state	publication	that	heralds	new	laws	and	appointments)	before	the	swearing-in	ceremony,	
casting	doubt	on	the	legality	of	the	appointment	by	pointing	out	the	unusually	hasty	and	round-
about	sequence	of	legal	procedures.	
	
The	mere	nomination	of	Lula	is	then	interpreted	as	morally	tainted,	even	if	legally	valid,	in	footage	
of	 two	 on-the-fly	 interviews	 with	 prominent	 members	 of	 the	 opposition.	 The	 Congressman	
Pauderny	Avelino	(DEM)	explains	that	president	Rousseff	is	using	a	legal	act	to	do	an	illegal	one	(at	
6:30),	namely,	the	nomination	of	an	indicted	person	for	cabinet	(although	an	indictment	is	neither	
a	charge	nor	a	sentence),	and	that	the	nomination	was	solely	enacted	to	shield	Lula	from	“federal	
Justice,”	in	which	STF	apparently	does	not	partake.	Senator	Aécio	Neves	is	quoted	(at	6:50),	calling	
the	act	“absolutely	condemnable”	(indirectly	quoted)	and	(then	directly	quoted)	enacted	“with	one	
primary	aim,	that	is	to	impede	the	successful	process	of	the	investigation,	those	of	operation	Lava-
Jato,	as	well	as	those	of	Ministerio	Publico	de	São	Paulo”	(7:00).	
	
Neither	 of	 the	 Congressmen	 refer	 to	 phone	 taps	 or	 the	 suspicion	 that	 sending	 the	 official	
appointment	in	“case	of	necessity”	was	a	way	of	shielding	Lula	from	arrest	ordered	by	Sérgio	Moro.	
Apparently,	 the	 footage	was	 taped	 in	 the	 early	 afternoon	 (which	 is	 corroborated	 by	 the	 broad	
daylight	seen	in	the	footage),	before	the	moment	of	publication	of	the	audio	files.	In	other	words,	
Jornal	Nacional	is	adeptly	bending	temporality:	The	quotes	of	Neves	and	Avelino	apparently	support	
the	interpretation	that	Rousseff’s	legal	maneuvers	with	nominations	and	official	documents	has	the	
ultimate	 aim	 of	 shielding	 Lula	 from	 impending	 arrest,	 which	 would	 constitute	 an	 ethical	
transgression.	 However,	 Neves	 and	 Avelino	 are	 in	 fact	 simply	 repeating	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	
opposition	parties	to	legally	challenge	the	appointment	of	Lula;	a	strategy	that	was	already	prepared	
and	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 the	 intricacies	 of	 paperwork	 and	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 hours	 between	
nomination	and	the	swearing-in.	Towards	the	end	of	the	newscast	(37:00),	an	on-site	news	report	
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account	for	the	 later	reactions	of	the	opposition,	who	at	that	point	demanded	Lula’s	 immediate	
arrest	and	Rousseff’s	resignation.		
	
Like	 in	 the	 newscast	 of	March	 4,	 a	 counterpoint	 is	 only	 presented	 very	 late	 (at	 31:00),	 totally	
separated	 from	 the	 denunciations	 of	 transgression.	 This	 counter-argument,	 presented	 by	 the	
anchor	as	an	indirect	quote	from	the	State	Attorney	José	Eduardo	Cardozo,	simply	states	that	the	
document	containing	the	official	appointment	should	be	sent	to	Lula	because	he	would	maybe	not	
appear	in	the	swearing-in	ceremony	the	following	day.		
	
Actants:	Antagonists,	Protagonists,	Protesters	
By	establishing	Lula	and	Rousseff	as	complicit	in	evading	Justice,	the	central	narrative	opposition	is	
also	established:	Justice	is	here	incarnated	in	the	figure	of	Moro	and	Moro	only	-	which,	as	the	PT	
Senator	Humberto	Costa	noted	(6:12),	“disrespectfully”	implied	that	the	STF	would	not	take	good	
care	of	 investigations	or	 indictments.	Moro	 is	not	 interviewed,	and	no	 footage	of	him	 is	 shown,	
however,	but	his	interpretation	of	the	evasion	of	justice	(warranting	disclosure	of	the	phone	taps)	
is	quoted	at	34:55.	In	the	first	reports,	the	evasion	of	justice	is	mostly	attributed	to	Rousseff,	which	
shifts	her	towards	the	position	of	antagonist	(although	the	anchor	Bonner	in	the	end	of	the	escalada	
describes	this	in	a	nominalization:	“the	Lava-Jato	members	affirm	that	this	indicates	an	action	to	
obstruct	the	investigations”	(at	1:50).	However,	the	interpretation	of	opposition	members	above	
personalizes	this,	pointing	to	Rousseff’s	illegal	intention.	In	the	fifth	news	report	(at	15.34-16:30),	
Rousseff	 repeats	 the	 objection	 that	 obtaining	 foro	 privilegiado	 does	 not	 mean	 obstructing	
investigations,	that	the	belief	that	a	federal	judge	should	make	better	judgments	than	STF	judges	
would	be	“an	inversion	of	the	hierarchy”;	and,	finally,	that	the	obstruction-of-justice	hypothesis	is	
an	attempt	to	cloud	the	fact	that	her	government	would	be	strengthened	with	Lula’s	nomination.	
That	news	report	 is	 followed	directly	by	a	report	 from	the	STF,	summarizing	the	decision	not	 to	
interfere	 in	 the	 impeachment	process.	 Lula	does	not	 comment	 the	 situation	at	any	point	 in	 the	
newscast.	 In	 sum,	 the	 newscast’s	 first	 part	 focalizes	 Rousseff	 and	 her	 intentions,	 although	 the	
outrage	of	the	protests	is	seemingly	much	more	directed	towards	Lula.	This	is	foregrounded	in	the	
third	protest	covered,	where	“protesters	demand	Lula’s	imprisonment”	(32:18)	and	are	shown	with	
inflatable	dolls	depicting	a	cartoon-like	Lula	in	the	black-and-white	stripe	clothes	of	a	prison	inmate.	
	
The	 first	 on-site	 news	 report	 quickly	 characterized	 the	 growing	 street	 protest	 as	 “not	 violent,”	
neither	from	the	side	of	police	nor	the	5000	protesters;	however,	in	the	background,	there	are	loud	
booms	and	shouting,	and	the	palpable	street-level	tension	in	Brasília	is	ignored	by	the	reporter.6	In	
two	instances,	reporters	emphasize	that	the	protests	started	already	in	the	afternoon,	before	the	
publication	of	the	recordings,	but	“began	to	grow	(ganhar	mais	corpo)	now,	in	the	evening,	after	
the	phone	taps	were	published.”	The	protesters	“would	not	accept	the	nomination	of	Lula,”	(9:24)	
and	 began	 to	 assemble	 already	 before	 news	 reached	 the	 public	 about	 Rousseff’s	 possible	
involvement	 in	 the	 obstruction	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	
“peaceful”	protests	against	Lula	are	not	discredited	here,	but	are	represented	as	legitimate,	unlike	
the	“violent”	pro-Lula	protest	two	weeks	earlier.	
	
Indirect	representation	of	discourse	
The	urgency	of	the	newscast	is	premised	on	the	disclosed	phone	taps.	Strangely,	it	is	only	the	very	
first	recording	that	is	actually	played.	Several	other	recordings	are	instead	read	aloud	alternatingly	
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by	 the	 two	 anchors	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 newscast.	 The	 indirect	 representation	 of	 Lula’s	
discourse	is	curious	because	it	is	so	rare	in	contemporary	newscasts;	it	calls	attention	to	itself	as	
format	by	its	unusualness.	Typically,	shorter	quotes	are	interspersed	in	other	reporting	or	at	the	
very	end	of	a	news	report.	Here,	it	becomes	the	only	substance	for	more	than	four	minutes	(25.30-
30.00)	The	unusual	indirect	representation	perhaps	hides	the	fact	that	not	much	of	the	content	is	
exactly	newsworthy.	First,	Lula’s	conversation	concerning	the	minister	of	Justice	(that	had	already	
been	the	quoted	in	the	sixth	news	report)	is	read	aloud	again,	followed	by	a	conversation	in	which	
Lula	laments	that	PGR	Janot	denied	four	cases	against	Aécio	Neves	but	accepted	an	investigation	of	
Lula.	The	next	recorded	phone	conversation	read	out	became	famous	on	social	media,	although	it	
was	devoid	of	any	politically	sensitive	content.	In	a	taped	conversation	between	the	ex-president	
and	Eduardo	Paes,	then	mayor	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	the	two	talk	derogatively	about	the	town	Maricá.	
The	selection	of	this	material	(heavily	live-edited	by	anchor	Bonner	so	as	to	avoid	Lula’s	and	Paes’	
cursing)	mostly	appears	to	exacerbate	the	already	undermined	position	of	Lula,	perhaps	filling	out	
for	the	lack	of	comments	from	him	or	his	press	officers.	In	a	final	conversation,	read	aloud	by	anchor	
Vasconcellos,	Lula	tells	Nelson	Barbosa,	then	minister	of	Finances,	that	his	phone	is	tapped.		
	
Summing	up,	these	two	days	in	March	2016	were	narrated	by	the	Jornal	Nacional	as	the	two	critical	
moments	of	an	evolving	political	crisis.	The	newscast	discredited	PT	in	general	and	emplotted	Lula	
specifically	 as	 the	 central	 antagonist	 in	 the	 plot	 unravelled	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	
investigations.	 For	 the	 Rousseff	 administration,	 this	 spelt	 trouble:	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Lula’s	
cabinet	nomination	was	botched	because	numerous	federal	judges	revoked	it	in	the	following	days,	
and	 because	 the	 STF	 judge	Gilmar	Mendes	 ultimately	 cancelled	 the	 act	 (Damgaard	 2018b:135),	
parties	of	the	coalition	still	used	the	nomination	and	the	crisis	as	an	excuse	to	jump	ship.	With	PT	
increasingly	isolated,	nothing	could	stop	the	impeachment	process	that	was	then	reaching	its	first	
crucial	vote	in	Congress.	The	lead-up	to	this	vote	is	discussed	in	the	following.		
	
	
4.5	Impeachment	
The	 impeachment	 petition,	 submitted	 in	 October	 2015,	 that	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	 ousting	 of	
President	Rousseff	 in	August	2016,	was	based	on	 several	 charges,	many	of	 them	 related	 to	 the	
corruption	of	Petrobras	(Bicudo,	Reale	Júnior,	and	Paschoal	2015:3-9).	However,	according	to	the	
law	defining	 impeachment	proceedings	 (law	1079	of	1950),	acts	anterior	 to	 the	mandate	of	 the	
incumbent	 cannot	 legally	 ground	 an	 impeachment	 process.	 That	 clause	 meant	 that	 even	 if	
conclusive	 evidence	 of	 Rousseff’s	 active	 or	 passive	 acceptance	 of	 corruption	 in	 Petrobras	 had	
surfaced,	as	long	as	the	crime	had	happened	before	her	presidential	period	starting	in	2015,	she	
would	have	been	shielded	from	such	charges	(although	the	allegations	or	evidence	could	still	be	
used	 in	 TSE	 trial).	 Despite	 this	 restriction	 of	 the	 impeachment	 law’s	 scope,	 the	 arguments	
concerning	Dilma’s	role	in	the	graft	of	Petrobras	contracts	were	still	present	in	most	of	the	stages	
of	the	process:	In	the	initial	petition	(ibid.),	in	the	public	and	Congressional	debates,	in	the	reports	
of	the	special	commissions	of	the	Câmara	and	Senate,	as	well	as	in	the	final	accusation,	the	libelo	
acusatório	 (Wink	 2017).	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 firmer	 ground	 for	 initiating	 the	 process	 of	
impeachment,	the	opposition	could	not	rely	only	on	the	allegations	concerning	Rousseff’s	culpability	
in	 the	 Petrobras	 case,	 but	 had	 to	 frame	 the	 impeachment	 petition	 around	 Rousseff’s	 personal	
responsibility	for	certain	fiscal	delays	and	state	budget	manoeuvres.	These	were	dubbed	pedaladas	
fiscais,	and	a	description	of	the	impeachment	demands	a	brief	exposition	of	the	history	of	those	
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delays.	The	following	section	cannot	do	the	complexity	of	the	constitutional	and	fiscal	intricacies	
justice,	but	may	give	the	reader	some	sense	of	what	the	delays	came	to	signify	in	public	discourse.			
	
During	 2014,	 the	 Finance	Ministry	 had	 expanded	 an	 existing	 and	 common	 practice	 of	 delaying	
transfers	of	funds	between	the	State	Treasury	and	public	banks.	Three	public	financial	institutions	
(the	 Caixa	 Federal,	 the	 Banco	 do	 Brasil,	 and	 the	 FGTS)	 transferred	money	 to	 citizens	 in	 several	
conditional	 cash	 transfer	 programs,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 companies	 through	 several	 lines	 of	 credit	 for	
industrial	companies	and	agribusinesses,	but	the	State	Treasury	would	then	“pedal”	for	a	while,	only	
dispensing	funds	some	days	later.	Shifting	temporarily	the	financial	burden	of	the	programs	onto	
other	public	institutions,	the	delays	somewhat	masked	the	fact	that	the	state	accounts	were	in	bad	
shape	after	years	of	plummeting	oil	prices	and	the	great	slow-down	of	the	Chinese	economy,	the	
most	important	export	market	of	Brazil.	The	expansion	of	this	practice,	reaching	at	one	point	3,5	
billion	R$	in	delayed	funds	from	day	to	day,	was	revealed	by	journalists	from	the	financial	beat	of	
Estado	in	April	2014.	While	the	secretary-general	of	the	State	Treasury,	Arno	Augustin,	denied	that	
this	constituted	an	illegal	budget	manoeuvre,	the	government	still	stopped	that	practice	in	2014.	
The	 Lava-Jato	 scandals	 and	 the	 elections	 pushed	 the	 case	 of	 the	pedaladas	 from	 the	 headlines	
(Villaverde	2016).	In	2015,	after	extensive	discussion	of	the	possibility	of	impeaching	Dilma	Rousseff,	
the	pedaladas	were	uncovered	as	a	viable	means	to	that	end.		
	
From	February	to	April	2015,	the	following	six	quotes	from	interviewees,	editors	and	journalists	of	
Veja	may	 serve	 as	 an	 illustration	 of	 how	 quickly	 the	 idea	 of	 impeachment	 became	 a	 topic	 and	
discussed	as	a	plausible	possibility	–	yet	without	the	argument	that	could	bring	down	the	Rousseff	
presidency.	 In	 defending	 the	 admissibility	 of	 an	 impeachment	 process,	 the	 juridical	 issues	 and	
requirements	 of	 an	 impeachment	 process	 were	 discussed,	 and	 Rousseff’s	 connection	 to	 the	
Petrobras	scandal	was	debated.		
	
No	documento	—	de	64	páginas	e	datado	de	23	de	janeiro	—,	o	jurista	afirma	que	"o	assalto	aos	recursos	da	
Petrobras,	perpetrado	durante	oito	anos,	de	bilhões	de	reais,	sem	que	a	Presidente	do	Conselho	(Dilma	presidiu	
o	conselho	de	administração	da	Petrobras)	e	depois	Presidente	da	República	o	detectasse,	constitui	omissão,	
negligência	 e	 imperícia,	 conformando	 a	 figura	 da	 improbidade	 administrativa,	 e	 enseja	 a	 abertura	 de	 um	
processo	de	impeachment".	A	VEJA,	Gandra	Martins	negou	que	tenha	produzido	o	parecer	por	encomenda	de	
empreiteiras	e	[...]	disse	ainda	que	a	análise	da	viabilidade	do	processo	contra	Dilma	"é	estritamente	jurídica,	
sem	conotação	política".	(V#2411)	
	
The	 following	week,	Eduardo	Cunha,	 then	newly-elected	president	of	 the	Câmara,	was	asked	 to	
comment.	He	pointed	out	that	impeachment	would	only	be	admissible	if	the	alleged	transgressions	
of	the	president	were	acts	within	the	current	mandate,	thus	ruling	out	the	Petrobras	corruption:			
	
Um	dos	juristas	mais	renomados	do	país,	Ives	Gandra	Martins	diz	que	já	há	base	jurídica	para	um	pedido	de	
impeachment	da	presidente	da	República.	O	senhor	concorda	com	essa	tese?	
”Não	conheço	os	argumentos	dele	e,	por	isso,	não	posso	comentá-los.	Mas	acho	que	não	é	cabível	um	pedido	
de	 impeachment	em	razão	do	petrolão.	Os	atos	que	estão	sob	 investigação	e	que	porventura	resultem	em	
algum	tipo	de	culpabilidade	aconteceram	no	mandato	anterior,	e	você	não	pode	punir	alguém	por	exercício	de	
mandato	anterior.”	(V#2412)		
	
The	editorial	of	Veja	two	weeks	later	stated	that	it	would	not	be	wise	to	seek	the	rupture	of	the	
presidential	mandate,	ignoring	Cunha’s	temporal	delimitation	of	the	admissible	acts	for	starting	an	
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impeachment.	 Veja’s	 editor,	 Mailson	 Nobrega,	 emphasized	 the	 constitutional	 legitimacy	 of	
impeachment,	and	claimed	that	such	a	process	requires	less	evidence	than	a	standard	trial	in	court:	
	
Conversas	e	especulações	sobre	um	eventual	impeachment	de	Dilma	aumentaram	com	a	forte	queda	de	sua	
popularidade,	que	se	explica	pelos	desastres	derivados	de	má	gestão.	Sobressaem	o	escândalo	na	Petrobras,	
o	risco	de	racionamento	de	energia	e	os	maus	resultados	na	economia.	Apesar	disso,	a	menos	que	novos	fatos	
venham	a	justificá-la,	não	parece	boa	a	ideia	de	buscar	a	interrupção	de	seu	mandato.	[…]	O	impeachment	é	
um	 recurso	 legítimo	 e	 constitucionalmente	 válido	 para	 descontinuar	 más	 administrações.	 É	 um	 processo	
político.	Não	requer	prova	inequívoca,	típica	dos	casos	que	envolvem	crime.	Indicações	de	que	o	dinheiro	da	
corrupção	na	Petrobras	serviu	para	financiar	a	campanha	eleitoral	de	Dilma	bastariam.	Ocorre	que	buscar	o	
impeachment	poderia	não	ser	a	estratégia	mais	conveniente.	Mesmo	que	protestos	de	rua	acontecessem	em	
escala	crescente,	o	governo	ainda	reuniria	condições	para	manter	a	maioria	no	Congresso.	(V#2414)	
	
The	 editorial	 conditions	 the	 government’s	 survival	 on	 Congress,	 “even	 if	 protests	 of	 the	 streets	
should	grow,”	and	this	conditionality	calls	 the	popular	support	 for	 the	president	 into	question	–	
despite	Rousseff’s	re-election,	or,	rather	because	of	the	close	presidential	race	five	months	before.	
If	the	Congress	might	protect	Rousseff,	other	unnamed	“strategies”	for	removing	the	president	may	
be	“more	convenient,”	and	this	sentence	probably	references	the	petitions	for	annulling	the	2014	
elections	that	had	been	filed	by	PSDB	in	the	supreme	electoral	court.		
	
The	following	month,	a	thematic	article	in	Veja	related	the	“six	steps	of	impeachment,”	that	is,	the	
juridical	and	political	sequence	of	institutional	acts.	The	lead	of	the	article	affirmed	that	government	
was	a	disaster,	and	that	the	idea	of	impeachment	is	no	longer	taboo	but	very	much	“on	the	agenda”:		
	
O	segundo	mandato	de	Dilma	Rousseff	começou	de	forma	tão	desastrosa	que,	antes	de	completar	cem	dias,	
o	tema	do	impeachment	deixou	de	ser	tabu	e	passou	a	fazer	parte	da	pauta	política	-	mesmo	que	ainda	de	
forma	incipiente.	(V#2417)	
		
In	 the	 same	 issue	 as	 this	 juridical-political	walk-through,	 a	 report	 in	Veja	 concerning	 the	 recent	
protests	against	the	government	stated	that	the	vice-President	Temer	considered	an	impeachment	
process	to	be	unthinkable	–	on	the	record.	However,	the	Twittersphere	is	reported	to	be	aglow	with	
the	notion	of	impeachment:	
	
….	Desde	fevereiro,	os	usuários	do	Twitter	publicam	em	média	4000	tuítes	por	dia	mencionando	o	afastamento	
da	petista,	segundo	levantamento	da	consultoria	Bites.	Sobre	essa	questão,	PT,	PMDB	e	PSDB	compartilham	a	
mesma	 posição:	 são	 todos	 contra.	 O	 vice-presidente	Michel	 Temer,	 o	 primeiro	 na	 hierarquia	 na	 eventual	
vacância	do	cargo	de	presidente	da	República,	declarou	na	sexta-feira:	"Sobre	essa	história	de	impeachment,	
eu	nem	falo	nisso,	porque	é	absolutamente	inviável,	impensável,	é	uma	quebra	da	institucionalidade	que	não	
é	útil	para	o	país.	Se	o	país	passa	uma	dificuldade,	você	supera	essa	dificuldade,	mas	não	pensa	nessa	hipótese".	
(V#2417)	
	
Even	 if	 the	vice-president	denied	 it,	PSDB	senators	had	argued	strongly	 for	 impeachment	 in	 the	
Congress,	and	Veja	reported	on	April	22	that	the	theme	was	heating	up,	going	from	“cold	to	boiling	
in	one	month”	
	
o	discurso	sobre	o	tema	passou	de	frio	a	borbulhante	em	um	mês	[…]	Cássio	Cunha	Lima	[foi]	um	dos	primeiros	
no	partido	a	levantar	a	bandeira	do	impeachment	("a	presidente	terceirizou	a	gestão	da	economia	e	a	gestão	
da	política,	mas	não	pode	terceirizar	o	crime	de	responsabilidade	que	praticou",	declarou	o	senador.	(V#2422)	
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The	PSDB	senator	Cassio	Cunha	Lima	had	debated	impeachment	in	the	Senate	floor	as	early	as	the	
9th	of	February.	Given	the	interest	in	political	circles,	on	Twitter,	and	in	Veja	(as	well	as	in	other	news	
outlets),	vice-President	Temer’s	denial	seemed	disingenuous.	More	importantly,	both	his	denial	and	
the	 debate	 of	 early	 2015	 in	 general	 lacked	 the	 legally	 valid	 argument.	 Bad	 governance	 of	 the	
economy	was	gradually	brought	up	as	a	sufficient	cause	for	impeachment	(instead	of	the	Petrobras	
investigations,	which,	as	Cunha	had	declared	 in	the	February	 interview,	could	not	 legally	 lead	to	
impeachment).		
	
A	solution	to	 the	 lack	of	a	 transgression	on	which	an	 impeachment	process	could	be	based	was	
eventually	 constructed:	 the	 infringement	 of	 the	 fiscal	 compliance	 law	 (Lei	 de	 Responsabilidade	
Fiscal),	 the	 so-called	pedaladas,	 came	 to	be	considered	“the	silver	bullet”:	After	Eduardo	Cunha	
broke	with	government,	Estado	reported	that	Cunha's	allies	in	the	opposition	were	expecting	the	
2014	accounts	of	the	union	to	be	rejected	by	the	TCU	(the	Tribunal	for	the	Accounts	of	the	Union),	
and	that	this	would	bring	impeachment.	In	an	interview,	titled	“Parecer	‘será	nossa	bala	de	prata’	
diz	lider	do	PSDB	na	Câmara”	published	on	August	3,	the	opposition	leader	Carlos	Sampaio	(PSDB)	
was	asked:	
	
[Estado	interviewer]	O	tema	do	impeachment	voltará	para	a	agenda	da	Câmara	na	volta	do	recesso?		
[Sampaio:]	Volta	totalmente.	E,	se	comprovado	o	crime	de	responsabilidade,	ou	seja,	que	ela	de	fato	falseou	
as	contas	nas	pedaladas	fiscais,	esse	terá	um	formato	muito	mais	técnico	(E3/8	2015)	
	
In	so	many	words,	the	PSDB	leader	affirmed	that	technical	arguments,	such	as	the	pedaladas,	would	
be	the	preferred	way	of	gunning	down	the	president	in	the	months	to	come.	The	journalist	was	of	
course	not	surprised	by	the	answer,	since	the	topic	had	been	on	the	agenda	for	months.	The	choice	
of	pedaladas	as	the	“silver	bullet”	in	the	impeachment	(or,	rather,	the	expectation	of	a	budget	audit	
asserting	that	fiscal	delays	should	be	considered	a	transgression	of	the	law	of	fiscal	responsibility)	
had	already	been	suggested	 in	April,	when	anti-government	protesters	of	 the	Movimento	Brasil	
Livre	(see	section	3.7)	had	handed	in	their	impeachment	petition	to	Cunha.	Furthermore,	the	image	
of	a	“silver	bullet”	in	the	headline	signalled	the	righteous	slaying	of	transgressive	and	unholy	forces.		
	
The	pedaladas	were	not	only	 the	solution	 to	 the	 juridical	 impasse,	but	also	 to	 the	problem	of	a	
lacking	plot	device:	If	only	acts	within	the	current	mandate	could	count	as	transgressions,	then	the	
Petrobras	scandal	could	not	provide	grounds	for	impeachment.	The	electoral	court	had	already	in	
February	denied	one	of	the	PSDB	petitions	for	annulling	the	2014	presidential	election.	So,	to	build	
a	case	against	Rousseff,	as	well	as	a	narrative,	a	new	transgression	had	to	be	assigned	to	her.	This	
emplotment	 worked	 metonymically,	 that	 is,	 by	 chaining	 the	 responsibility	 of	 fiscal	 transfers	
between	public	credit	institutions	and	the	State	Treasury	to	not	just	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	
nor	the	Minister	of	Finances,	but	all	the	way	to	the	presidency.	A	similar	chain-of-command	story	
logic	had	been	used	in	the	Mensalão	case,	both	in	media	(see	section	3.6)	and	in	the	legal	argument	
leading	to	the	conviction	of	PT	leaders	(Greco	and	Leite	2014).	In	the	impeachment	process,	this	
chain	 appeared	 with	 several	 weak	 links,	 however,	 and	 perhaps	 for	 that	 reason,	 the	 chain	 of	
responsibility	sometimes	disappeared	completely	in	the	news	reports	describing	the	impeachment	
petition:	
	
Nesta	terça,	a	oposição	deve	apresentar	novo	pedido	de	impeachment	assinado	pelo	promotor	aposentado	
Hélio	Bicudo,	pelo	ex-ministro	da	Justiça	Miguel	Reale	Júnior	e	pela	advogada	Janaína	Paschoal.	O	texto	incluirá	
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tanto	as	chamadas	pedaladas	fiscais	praticadas	em	2014	–	e	já	condenadas	pelo	Tribunal	de	Contas	da	União	
(TCU)	 –	 quanto	 os	 atrasos	 nos	 repasses	 de	 recursos	 pelo	 Tesouro	Nacional	 para	 bancos	 públicos,	 como	 o	
BNDES,	 feitos	 neste	 ano.	 A	 repetição	 das	 manobras	 contábeis	 em	 2015	 foi	 apontada	 em	 relatório	 do	
procurador	do	Ministério	Público	junto	ao	TCU,	Júlio	Marcelo	de	Oliveira.	(E19/10	2015)	
	
In	 the	 above	 quote,	 the	 hand	 of	 Rousseff	 in	 cooking	 the	 books	 via	pedaladas	 is	 backgrounded	
completely.		At	other	times,	it	is	the	presidential	decrees	that	appear	to	link	Rousseff	to	financial	
transgression,	more	than	the	pedaladas;	while	the	Petrobras	corruption	is	ascribed	more	to	Cunha	
than	to	Rousseff:	
	
Suspeito	 de	 esconder	 contas	 bancárias	 na	 Suíça	 e	 acusado	de	 envolvimento	no	 esquema	de	 corrupção	da	
Petrobras,	o	presidente	da	Câmara,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	recebeu	na	manhã	desta	quarta-feira	(21)	o	
novo	 pedido	 de	 impeachment	 contra	 Dilma	 Rousseff.	 Assinada	 pelo	 ex-petista	 Hélio	 Bicudo	 e	 pelo	 jurista	
Miguel	Reale	 Jr.,	 a	peça	é	 chancelada	pela	oposição	e	 tem	entre	os	argumentos	 justamente	os	desvios	na	
estatal.	Como	informou	o	Painel,	o	novo	pedido	de	impeachment	contempla	também	decretos	assinados	pelo	
governo	 em	 2015	 que	 aumentaram	 em	 R$	 800	 milhões	 as	 despesas	 do	 Executivo	 sem	 autorização	 do	
Congresso.	Os	novos	argumentos	são	uma	forma	de	tentar	provar	que	Dilma	continuou	a	cometer	neste	ano	
irregularidades	 fiscais	 que	 levaram	 o	 TCU	 (Tribunal	 de	 Contas	 da	União)	 a	 reprovar	 as	 contas	 de	 2014	 da	
presidente	(F21/10	2015)	
	
As	shown	in	the	section	above	on	Cunha,	the	initiation	of	impeachment	proceedings,	on	December	
2,	was	emplotted	as	an	act	of	retaliation	or	vengeance	by	various	voices	in	the	newspapers.	This	
created	a	contested	space,	with	all	the	main	arguments	of	the	impeachment	petition	as	well	as	the	
formal	 act	 itself	 under	 close	 scrutiny.	 I	will	 not	 here	 detail	 the	 formal	 and	 legal	 critique	 of	 the	
impeachment	petition,	the	reports	of	the	special	commissions	of	the	Câmara	and	Senate,	nor	of	the	
final	libelo	acusatorio	(see	instead	Bahia,	Bacha	e	Silva,	and	de	Oliveira	2016,	Damgaard	2018b,	ch.	
6,	Wink	2017).		
	
No	matter	the	arguments,	the	process	of	impeaching	Rousseff	came	down	to	simple	math	in	the	
end:	Technically,	the	way	to	stop	impeachment	proceedings	for	Rousseff	was	to	ensure	at	least	one-
third	of	Câmara	voting	against	the	petition.	The	vote	in	the	Câmara	was	eventually	scheduled	for	
April	17.	Failing	to	get	a	third	of	the	votes	there,	a	third	of	the	Senatorial	votes	in	two	subsequent	
votes	could	stop	the	process.	The	crucial	parties	in	this	calculus	were	ideologically	located	to	the	
right	of	PT.	PT	by	itself	occupied	only	70	seats	in	the	Câmara,	and	even	with	the	aid	of	the	left-wing	
parties,	one-third	of	the	513	seats	was	a	long	way	off	for	Rousseff	and	PT.	Getting	aid	from	the	larger	
left-center	parties	PDT	and	PSB	was	far	from	secure,	as	these	parties	preferred	not	to	be	associated	
with	 the	 corruption	 attributed	 to	 PT	 and	 eventually	 be	 able	 to	 launch	 their	 own	 presidential	
candidates,	hopefully	capturing	the	left-wing	voters	then.	So,	PT	was	at	the	mercy	of	PMDB,	in	a	
reversal	of	Cunha’s	 situation	 in	 the	disciplinary	committee.	Similar	 to	Cunha’s	 case,	 the	political	
space	of	negotiations	and	struggle	prior	to	the	impeachment	vote	in	the	Câmara	was	affected	by	
the	events	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations,	and	this	reciprocal	relation	between	the	two	processes	
is	covered	in	the	next	section.		
	
4.5.1	Juxtaposing	Impeachment	and	the	Lava-Jato	Investigations		
As	mentioned,	the	impeachment	petition	of	Bicudo,	Reale	and	Paschoal	included	many	arguments	
for	removing	Rousseff	that	had	to	do	with	the	corruption	of	Petrobras,	despite	the	legal	constraints	
of	 the	 impeachment	 law.	 This	 was	 not	 the	 only	 way	 that	 the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	
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intruded	in	the	impeachment	process.		The	examples	above	from	Jornal	Nacional	also	demonstrated	
how	Lula’s	corruption	cases	contaminated	Rousseff’s	attempt	to	reinvigorate	her	government	by	
nominating	him	as	minister.	But	before	March	16,	when	the	phone	taps	were	published,	and	before	
the	large-scale	street	protests	of	March	13,	the	specter	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	already	hung	above	
the	 impeachment	 in	 the	media	 representations	 of	 the	 process.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 provide	 some	
examples	of	the	narrative	transfer	occurring	between	the	two	sets	of	events.	
	
In	February	2016,	 the	23rd	phase	of	 the	Lava-Jato	 investigations	 revealed	a	connection	between	
Odebrecht,	the	doleiro	Zwi	Skornicki,	and	PT’s	marketing	expert	João	Santana.	Santana	and	his	wife	
were	arrested	on	February	23.	With	this	excuse,	PMDB	sources	filled	the	political	commentary	and	
news	report	with	the	quotes	that	spelled	the	end	of	the	Rousseff	administration:	
	
A	 prisão	 do	 marqueteiro	 João	 Santana	 reacendeu,	 dentro	 do	 PMDB,	 discussões	 sobre	 a	 viabilidade	 do	
impeachment	da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	 (PT).	A	avaliação	é	que,	com	o	avanço	das	 investigações	sobre	
pagamentos	feitos	ao	marqueteiro	por	pessoas	vinculadas	ao	petrolão,	"a	Lava	Jato	subiu	a	rampa	do	Planalto"	
e	o	governo	perdeu	o	controle	do	processo.	(F26/2	2016)	
	
With	the	pressure	of	the	Santana	revelations	as	rhetoric	backup,	the	opposition,	including	parts	of	
PMDB,	renewed	the	efforts	to	press	 impeachment	through	the	STF.	 In	the	above	text,	 the	slow-
down	of	that	process	is	implicit,	but	the	reason	for	the	lost	momentum,	also	according	to	Folha,	was	
judicial	appeals	and	complications:	
	
Deflagrado	no	início	de	dezembro	do	ano	passado,	o	impeachment	perdeu	força	após	ter	seu	rito	suspenso	
pelo	STF,	que	agora	analisa	recursos	apresentados	pelo	presidente	da	Câmara,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	os	
chamados	embargos.	Com	a	prisão	de	João	Santana	–marqueteiro	das	três	últimas	campanhas	presidenciais	
do	PT–,	a	oposição	tem	a	esperança	de	que	o	impeachment	de	Dilma	ganhe	um	novo	fôlego	na	Câmara.	(F23/2	
2016)	
	
In	other	words,	even	though	it	was	not	of	processual	relevance	to	the	impeachment	process,	the	
disclosure	 of	 corruption	 close	 to	 President	 Rousseff	 stoked	 the	 fire	 in	 that	 process	 (and,	more	
appropriately,	the	parallel	trial	into	the	presidential	campaign	of	2014	in	TSE,	the	Supreme	Electoral	
Court).	The	contagion	or	spill-over	effect	was	more	pronounced	than	earlier	in	2016,	when	Jacques	
Wagner	(then	chief	of	staff	 in	the	Rousseff	administration)	had	been	implicated	by	a	leak	of	text	
messages	 from	OAS	president	 Leo	Pinheiro,	and	 rumors	had	 it	 that	 the	 incarcerated	PT	 senator	
Delcídio	do	Amaral	was	about	to	negotiate	a	plea	bargain.	The	two	situations	had	forced	Wagner	
away	from	public	spotlight,	though	he	occupied	the	ministerial	position	usually	assigned	to	the	first	
line	of	defense.	The	arrest	of	 senator	Amaral	and	his	plea	bargain	were	projected	 (by	 the	same	
journalist	of	Folha,	and	probably	the	same	sources	within	PMDB)	to	become	the	new	centerpieces	
of	the	impeachment	process:		
	
A	ala	do	PMDB	que	defende	o	afastamento	da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	acredita	que,	se	homologada	pelo	
STF	(Supremo	Tribunal	Federal),	a	delação	do	senador	Delcídio	do	Amaral	(PT-MS)	resultará	"na	mais	robusta	
peça	de	impeachment"	já	formulada	contra	a	petista,	o	que	empurrará	o	restante	da	sigla	para	a	oposição.	
Após	a	revista	"IstoÉ"	publicar	detalhes	do	conteúdo	do	acordo	de	delação	proposto	pelo	senador,	a	bancada	
do	PMDB	no	Congresso	oscilou	entre	a	perplexidade	e	a	expectativa	sobre	os	desdobramentos	do	mais	novo	
capítulo	da	crise	que	dragou	a	administração	petista.	(F4/3	2016)	
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Already	in	the	23rd	phase	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations,	Folha	editor	Fabio	Zanini	saw	the	disastrous	
potential	of	the	arrest	of	the	marketing	expert	Santana:		
	
Para	 Dilma	 Rousseff,	 a	 investida	 sobre	 João	 Santana	 é	 potencialmente	 mais	 desastrosa	 […]	 Seja	 via	
impeachment,	até	aqui	visto	como	improvável,	seja	pela	cassação	pelo	Tribunal	Superior	Eleitoral,	alternativa	
que	começa	a	ganhar	força.	(F22/2	2016)		
	
It	is	noteworthy	that	the	TSE	trial	is	seen	as	the	most	likely	solution	to	crisis	at	this	moment;	to	the	
editor,	 it	 might	 have	 been	 a	 more	 pleasant	 way	 of	 ousting	 Rousseff,	 since	 the	 TSE	 case	 had	
substantial	and	not	merely	tangential	relation	to	the	corruption	scandals.		In	any	case,	the	leaks	and	
arrests	of	Lava-Jato	become	potent	strawmen	arguments,	standing	in	for	the	actual	substance	of	
the	impeachment	petition.	Put	another	way,	the	arguments	of	the	petition	were	perhaps	not	strong	
enough	to	tear	down	the	governing	coalition,	but	the	double	position	of	Rousseff	as	both	embroiled	
in	the	Lava-Jato	scandals	and	the	impeachment	made	her	political	allies	–	at	least	those	left	in	PMDB	
–	overlay	one	schemata	on	the	other.	Without	a	doubt,	the	comparison	of	the	double	trajectory	of	
expectations	in	the	TSE	trial	and	the	impeachment	proceedings	is	the	backbone	of	the	last	quote.		
	
That	comparison	is	only	the	less	salient	comparison	in	that	analysis,	however.	 In	 its	entirety,	the	
Folha	editor	also	compares	Rousseff’s	situation	to	that	of	Lula,	at	the	onset	of	the	Mensalão	scandal:		
	
Uma	década	depois,	um	publicitário	estrela	volta	a	ameaçar	um	governo	petista.	Em	2005,	Duda	Mendonça	
assombrou	o	país	ao	confessar	à	CPI	dos	Correios	que	recebeu	no	exterior	pela	campanha	de	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	
da	 Silva	 de	 2002,	 sem	 que	 os	 recursos	 fossem	 contabilizados.	 Lula	 balançou,	mas	 ainda	 com	 reservas	 de	
popularidade	e	num	momento	de	economia	em	 início	de	 recuperação,	 segurou-se	no	 cargo.	Duda	acabou	
absolvido	pelo	STF.	Para	Dilma	Rousseff,	a	investida	sobre	João	Santana	é	potencialmente	mais	desastrosa.	O	
contexto	econômico	é	ruinoso,	e	ela	tem	apenas	fiapos	de	aceitação	popular.	O	eventual	comprometimento	
de	 seu	 marqueteiro	 e	 de	 sua	 campanha	 de	 2014	 com	 pagamentos	 ilegais,	 possivelmente	 por	 meio	 da	
Odebrecht,	principal	empresa	envolvida	no	petrolão,	seria	o	fim	da	linha.	(F22/2	2016)	
	
I	will	conclude	this	section	with	the	observation	that	each	of	the	above	four	quotes	is	built	upon	the	
same	narrative	structure:	Santana’s	arrest	(and	Amaral’s	testimony)	draws	Rousseff	directly	into	the	
general	plot	of	the	Petrobras	corruption.	Implicitly,	more	tenuous	relations	to	the	scandal	–	via	the	
imprisoned	PT	leaders	Vaccari	and	Dirceu,	for	example	–	are	thus	overwritten	or	eclipsed,	and	the	
allegations	become	more	robust.	The	new	revelations	are	seen	as	the	crucial	and	“robust”	evidence	
that	was	hitherto	missing.	The	disclosure	“brings	the	Lava-Jato	up	the	ramp	and	into	the	presidential	
palace”	(in	an	allusion	to	the	actual	architecture	of	the	Planalto	palace).	The	leak	and	the	arrest	will	
“push	the	rest	of	PDMB	to	jump	ship,”	“breathing	new	life”	in	the	process	in	the	Câmara,	and	will	
prove	to	be	the	“end	of	the	line”	for	Rousseff.	
	
	
4.5.2	From	Mensalão	to	Petrolão	
The	above	quote	compared	the	Mensalão	scandal	to	the	Lava-Jato	case,	which	in	some	instances	is	
also	 named	 “Petrolão,”	 underscoring	 the	 similarities	 of	 the	 scandals	 (see	 section	 2.2).	 Such	
comparisons	between	the	two	scandals	and	news	reports	identifying	causal	links	between	the	two	
constitute	 another	 important	 set	 of	 transferred	 narrative	 structures,	 to	 which	 I	 now	 turn.	 The	
naming	itself	foregrounds	the	comparison	between	the	scandals	and	implicitly	aligns	or	connects	
them	as	instances	in	a	series.	The	characters	are	also	carried	over	from	one	scandal	to	the	other	
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(see	for	example	the	reference	to	José	Dirceu,	section	4.4.1).	In	examples	such	as	the	following,	it	
appears	to	be	the	mere	mention	of	certain	actors	(rather	than	the	actions	and	actual	events)	that	
connects	the	two	scandals:	
	
Agora,	 emerge	 um	 novo	 nome	 que	 liga	 mensalão	 e	 petrolão.	 É	 Bumlai,	 o	 amigo	 de	 Lula	 –	 contra	 o	 ex-
presidente,	é	bom	repetir	Moro,	“não	há	nenhuma	prova”.	Bumlai,	afirma	Moro	no	seu	despacho,	foi	acusado	
em	2012	por	ninguém	menos	que	Marcos	Valério,	o	operador	do	mensalão,	de	transferir	parte	do	dinheiro	do	
empréstimo	fraudulento	do	Banco	Schain	[sic]	para	o	PT	pagar	uma	chantagem	do	empresário	de	Santo	André	
Ronam	[sic]	Maria	Pinto,	que	ameaçava	denunciar	o	envolvimento	de	petistas	graduados	no	assassinato	do	
prefeito	de	Santo	André,	Celso	Daniel,	em	2002.	Em	troca,	disse	Valério,	a	Construtora	Schain	[sic]	conquistou	
um	contrato	para	construir	uma	sonda	da	Petrobras.	(G1-25/11	2015)	
		
This	commentary	was	published	on	the	day	of	the	arrest	of	the	cattle	king	José	Carlos	Bumlai	(on	
November	 25,	 2015,	 in	 a	 phase	 of	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 called	 “Passe	 Livre”).	 At	 that	 point,	
neither	 Valério	 and	 Ronan	 Maria	 Pinto	 were	 targets	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigation,	 but	 the	
intertextual	reference	turns	the	arrest	of	Bumlai	into	a	piece	of	a	larger	puzzle.	The	authoring	pundit,	
Hélio	Gurovitz	of	G1	and	Época,	reminds	the	reader	that	Bumlai	had	already	been	accused	by	one	
of	the	main	culprits	in	the	Mensalão	case,	Marcos	Valério,	during	that	trial	three	years	earlier.	This	
accusation	dealt	with	events	that	went	all	the	way	back	to	the	murder	of	the	PT	mayor	of	Santo	
André	in	2002.	This	murder	allegedly	involved	top-level	PT	members	who	had	Bumlai	transfer	hush	
money	to	the	businessman	Ronan	Maria	Pinto;	money	that	Bumlai	got	from	the	Schahin	banking	
clan,	whose	construction	company	then	won	the	bid	for	a	drill-ship	contract	with	Petrobras.	Thus,	
the	arrest	of	Lula’s	friend	Bumlai	is	an	outer	layer	that	may	be	peeled	off,	revealing	older	and	more	
sinister	motives	and	transgressions.		
	
On	April	1,	2016,	two	weeks	before	the	scheduled	vote	on	impeachment	in	the	Câmara,	the	Lava-
Jato	investigations	actually	arrested	Ronan	Maria	Pinto	and	the	ex-treasurers	of	PT	Sílvio	Pereira	
and	Delúbio	Soares,	thereby	rejuvenating	elements	from	precisely	those	earlier	scandals	involving	
PT	alluded	to	by	the	pundit	in	the	above	quote:	The	Celso	Daniel	case	and	the	Mensalão	scandal.	
That	Lava-Jato	phase	was	symbolically	named	“Carbono-14,”	implying	the	forensic	or	archaeological	
uncovering	and	reconstruction	of	former	scandals	–	and	hinting	at	the	narrative	desire	of	linking	the	
current	 criminal	 case	 to	 the	 former.	 The	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 thus	 provides	 a	 resolution	 to	
several	loose	ends	in	the	Mensalão	case,	as	well	as	the	“solution”	to	the	never-solved	case	of	Celso	
Daniel’s	murder.	
	
Gurovitz	continued	to	produce	comparisons	of	Mensalão	and	the	Lava-Jato	case,	emphasizing	the	
symmetry	and	 literary	qualities	of	 the	 two	scandals	and	 the	adept	story-telling	strategies	of	 the	
Lava-Jato	task	force	(akin	to	the	“narrative	talent”	displayed	by	the	star	of	the	Mensalão	case,	ex-
STF	judge	Joaquim	Barbosa):	
	
A	simetria	entre	mensalão	e	petrolão	vai	além	dos	personagens	comuns	e	da	sequência	comprovada,	em	que	
um	substitui	o	outro	no	financiamento	do	projeto	petista	de	poder.	O	mensalão	também	inspirou	a	força-tarefa	
da	Lava	Jato	num	dos	requisitos	essenciais	para	a	caça	e	a	perseguição	a	corruptos	e	corruptores	–	a	construção	
de	uma	narrativa	sedutora,	uma	história	capaz	de	convencer	e	engajar	o	público.	
	
Relator	do	processo	do	mensalão,	o	ex-presidente	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	(STF)	Joaquim	Barbosa	–	cuja	
origem	também	está	no	Ministério	Público	–	desenvolveu	uma	forma	clara,	didática	e	persuasiva	de	narrar	os	
crimes,	de	modo	a	levar	os	réus	à	condenação.	Dividiu	os	acusados	em	núcleos	–	operacional,	empresarial	e	
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político	–	e	demonstrou,	com	base	em	provas	robustas,	o	caminho	do	dinheiro	dos	contratos	de	publicidade	
fraudados	até	o	bolso	de	deputados	e	políticos.	
	
De	tão	boa,	a	história	contada	por	Barbosa	parecia	uma	novela	de	Walcyr	Carrasco.	Sem	ela,	a	quadrilha	do	
mensalão	–	defendida	se	não	pelos	melhores,	com	certeza	pelos	mais	bem	remunerados	advogados	do	Brasil	
–	poderia	ter	ficado	impune.	O	talento	narrativo	dele	inspirou	a	força-tarefa	de	procuradores	da	Lava	Jato	a	
também	construir	 uma	narrativa	 sedutora	para	explicar	o	petrolão.	Mas	 a	novela	 contada	por	 eles	 é	mais	
intrincada,	tem	mais	personagens	acessórios	e	vários	pontos	obscuros...	(G1-8/2	2016)	
	
Gurovitz	almost	works	like	a	literary	critic	here,	comparing	the	plots	and	the	narration	of	Petrolão	
and	Mensalão.	At	the	same	time,	his	commentary	makes	explicit	the	causal	links	of	the	connecting	
plot:	The	corruption	scheme	of	the	Mensalão	was	a	way	to	finance	“the	PT	project	of	remaining	in	
power”	and,	once	disclosed,	the	money	flow	from	that	system	was	substituted	by	the	Petrobras	
graft.	The	transposition	of	the	structure	here	is	contrasted,	in	the	following	section,	by	an	operation	
that	changes	the	narrative	structures	through	inversion.	
	
	
4.5.3	The	Coup	and	Original	Sin:	Counternarratives	
In	November	2015,	PT	had	pointed	out	that	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	seemed	to	benefit	PSDB,	
but	mostly	targeted	PT	politicians	although	evidence	implicated	many	other	parties:	
	
No	 documento	 distribuído	 a	 seus	 militantes	 para	 contra-atacar	 a	 Operação	 Lava	 Jato,	 o	 Partido	 dos	
Trabalhadores	(PT)	descreve	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	como	um	aliado	dos	tucanos	e	diz	que	ele	e	“sua	‘equipe’	de	
delegados	da	PF	e	procuradores	do	MPF	do	Paraná	fazem	de	tudo	(até	mesmo	anistiar	criminosos	confessos)	
para	atingir	o	PT”.	“Eles	não	querem	detectar	os	criminosos	e	acabar	com	a	corrupção”,	diz	o	texto.	“O	objetivo	
é	prejudicar	a	imagem	do	PT	e	de	seu	governo.”	(G1-25/11	2015)	
	
After	Cunha	initiated	impeachment	proceedings,	this	“counter-attack”	on	the	Lava-Jato	operation	
morphed	and	acquired	a	new	 focus,	 because	 the	possibility	of	 an	ousting	of	 President	Rousseff	
afforded	a	new	angle	for	comparisons	to	Brazil’s	history	of	democratic	breakdowns,	 likening	the	
impeachment	 to	a	coup	d’état.	President	Rousseff’s	argument	was,	primarily,	 the	 lack	of	a	 legal	
ground	for	impeaching	her:		
	
A	 presidente	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 reafirmou	 […]	 que	 não	 irá	 renunciar.	 […]	 “Se	 eu	 renunciar,	 esconde-se	 para	
debaixo	do	tapete	esse	impeachment	sem	base	legal	e,	portanto,	esse	golpe.	É	confortável	para	os	golpistas	
que	a	vítima	desapareça”,	disse.	(E3/5	2016)	
	
A	secondary	argument	for	the	illegality	of	the	impeachment	had	to	do	with	Cunha.	PT	and	the	party’s	
supporters	pointed	out	that	when	Cunha	initiated	impeachment,	he	did	so	with	personal	interests	
at	heart	(see	section	on	Cunha	above).	The	abuse	of	power,	according	to	former	minister	of	Justice	
and	 (then)	 Attorney-General	 of	 the	 Rousseff	 administration,	 José	 Eduardo	 Cardozo,	 robbed	 the	
whole	process	of	legitimacy:	
	
"É	uma	prova	muito	importante	no	sentido	de	que	ele	(Cunha)	usava	o	cargo	para	finalidades	estranhas	ao	
interesse	público,	como	aconteceu	no	caso	do	impeachment.	No	caso	do	impeachment	foi	exatamente	isso	
que	 estamos	 alegando:	 ele	 usou	 com	 desvio	 de	 poder,	 usou	 o	 impeachment	 injustamente	 em	 benefício	
próprio,	quando	ameaçou	a	presidente	da	República	de	que	ele	abriria	o	processo	se	o	PT	não	desse	os	votos	
(no	Conselho	de	Ética)",	disse	Cardozo	(F5/5	2016)		
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The	role	of	Cunha	as	instigator	of	the	process	was	considered,	in	some	accounts	and	in	statements	
by	Rousseff,	as	“the	original	sin,”	an	act	that	contaminated	the	process	in	its	entirety	and	provided	
opposition	members	“that	couldn’t	win	the	election	with	a	shortcut	to	the	power”	(F27/4a	2016).			
	
Crucially,	the	initial	role	of	Cunha	and	the	motives	for	impeaching	Rousseff	tended	to	gradually	be	
backgrounded	in	the	coverage	of	the	final	stages	of	the	impeachment	process.	Relegating	Cunha	to	
a	backstage	role,	the	use	of	the	coup	d’état	references	and	the	“original	sin”	trope	were	both	barred	
from	the	front-pages	of	the	main	newspapers.	In	the	following,	I	will	recount	and	expand	on	several	
observations,	 originally	 put	 forth	 by	 Miranda	 (2016),	 concerning	 the	 newspapers’	 coverage	 of	
impeachment	as	the	day	of	the	decisive	vote	in	the	Câmara	approached.			
	
	
4.5.4	The	Vote	for	Impeachment	
Weeks	ahead	of	the	decisive	vote	for	impeaching	Rousseff,	both	major	newspapers	of	São	Paulo	
started	 counting	 the	 expected	 votes	 of	 Congressmen	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 the	 readers	 with	 a	
prediction	of	the	virtual	endpoint	of	the	political	struggle	of	the	impeachment.	This	was	constantly	
graphically	present	at	the	top	of	the	newspaper	web	edition,	easily	readable	as	in	a	sports	match	of	
(see	appendix	A,	figures	A.10,	A.11,	and	A.12).	The	same	“sports	score	board”	design	and	horse	race	
framings	(Cappella	and	Jamieson	1997,	Aalberg,	Strömbäck	and	de	Vreese	2011)	were	present	in	
the	final	week	before	the	vote	in	the	Câmara.	The	score	board	was	expanded	in	more	graphically	
creative	forms	on	the	printed	newspapers	on	the	day	of	the	vote	(F17/4,	E17/4).	
	
In	the	days	between	the	vote	in	the	Câmara	and	the	Senate,	the	ousting	of	Rousseff	was	viewed	as	
a	virtual	fact:	Folha‘s	headline	“Dilma	admits	to	allies	that	ousting	is	inevitable”	(F27/4b)	implied	a	
private	admittance	of	defeat,	while	a	Folha	pundit	inversely	lamented	that	Rousseff	would	not	admit	
defeat	and	resign	voluntarily,	as	this	left	the	corrupt	Congressmen	to	judge	her:	
	
Renúncia	 é	 desistência	 e	 isso	 não	 bate	 com	o	 ideário	 esquerdista.	 Renunciar	 como	 estratégia	 política	 não	
funciona	muito,	 a	 história	 deste	 país	 prova,	 e	 até	 nossos	 congressistas	 já	 aprenderam	 que	 é	mais	 seguro	
apanhar	no	cargo.	Dilma	vai	preferir	a	morte	lenta	do	impedimento.	Confia	que	deixar	o	Planalto	com	o	braço	
esquerdo	erguido	bradando	que	a	 luta	continua,	como	José	Dirceu	fez	ao	ser	preso,	será	seu	ritual	final	de	
purificação.	Mas	está	enganada.	Dilma	entrará	para	história	como	uma	presidente	incompetente,	na	política	e	
na	 economia,	 capaz	 até	 de,	 em	 meio	 ao	 maior	 dos	 escândalos	 de	 corrupção,	 cair	 sem,	 de	 fato,	 ter	 se	
locupletado.	Pior,	 julgada	por	um	Congresso	com	contas	na	Suíça	e	campanhas	pagas	com	dinheiro	público	
propinado	por	empreiteiras.	(F14/4	2016)	
	
The	virtual	rout	of	Rousseff	was	underscored	graphically	in	the	week	leading	up	to	the	vote	in	the	
Câmara,	when	the	newspapers’	front	pages	demonstrated	a	visibly	isolated	(F11/4,	E13/4,	G14/4,	
G15/4),	angry	 (F13/4,	E13/4)	and	even	symbolically	decapitated	president	 (E14/4).	Examples	are	
provided	 in	 Appendix	 A.	 Just	 prior	 to	 the	 vote	 in	 the	 Senate,	 Rousseff	 was	 even	 (figuratively	
speaking)	burnt	in-implicit-effigy	on	the	front-page	of	Estado	(E4/5),	as	an	unintended	visual	side-
effect	of	a	pre-Olympic	ceremony.	The	anticipation	of	both	a	“victory	speech”	leaked	by	Temer,	as	
well	as	his	plan	of	government,	combined	with	these	symbolic	images	and	texts	on	the	front-pages	
to	present	the	 impeachment	as	a	 fait	accompli	 (Miranda	2016).	Both	Estado	and	Folha	 featured	
festive	front-page	designs	on	April	18	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.17	and	A.18),	arguably	marking	the	
celebrations	of	 the	opposition-cum-governing	parties	 as	 the	newspapers’	 own	editorial	 stances.	
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Curiously	but	not	incidentally,	the	celebrations	in	Congress	were	clothed	in	national	flags,	banners,	
and	metaphors,	and	I	return	to	this	in	Chapter	6.		
	
The	news	value	of	the	impending	impeachment	underpinned	the	publication	of	a	very	wide	range	
of	stories	in	the	period,	and	few	of	these	will	probably	be	remembered.	The	main	varieties	of	news	
items	printed	in	Estado	and	Folha	that	tangentially	or	substantially	connected	to	the	impeachment	
of	Rousseff	included	reports	on	a)	new	impeachment	petitions	(most	prominently	the	one	handed	
in	by	the	Brazilian	Bar	Association	OAB)	and	revisions	of	the	existing	pending	petitions	(based	on	
Delcídio	 do	 Amaral’s	 testimony),	 b)	 various	 commentary	 and	 op-ed	 pieces	 on	 the	 legality	 of	
petitions,	pedaladas	 and	 the	 rejection	of	 the	state	accounts	by	 the	TCU,	and	c)	 comparisons	 (in	
background	articles)	to	the	impeachment	of	Collor	in	1992.	These	three	themes	related	to	legal	or	
quasi-legal	matters,	 while	 a	 range	 of	 items	 treated	 d)	 the	 crumbling	 government	 coalition	 and	
especially	 e)	 the	 struggle	 for	 control	 of	 the	 PMDB	 group	 in	 the	 Câmara	 (again	 with	 Cunha	 as	
antagonist)	and	the	expulsion	of	PMDB	dissident	ministers	Katia	Abreu	and	Celso	Pansera,	plus	the	
f)	 last-minute	 efforts	 to	 secure	 PP	 and	 PR	 support	 for	 the	 Dilma	 government	 and	 g)	 derived	
discussions	of	the	legality	of	such	negotiations.	In	a	few	instances,	reports	were	published	on	h)	the	
negotiations	about	the	politicians	who	were	expected	to	eventually	form	a	new	cabinet.	Another	
spin-off	 was	 i)	 the	 impeachment	 petitions	 that	 targeted	 Temer	 for	 breaking	 the	 same	 law	 as	
Rousseff	when	signing	decrees	with	budgetary	effects	without	Congress	assent,	and	j)	the	petition	
to	impeach	STF	judge	Marco	Aurelio	de	Mello	who	had	ratified	these	petitions	against	Temer	and	
who	had	forced	Cunha	to	install	a	special	commission	on	the	matter.	Many	news	reports	dealt	with	
k)	street	protests	and	the	events	in	public	spaces	on	the	day	of	the	vote	in	the	Câmara	on	April	17.	
A	subset	of	 these	reports	dealt	with	 l)	 the	reactions	of	parliamentarians	and	civic	society	 to	 Jair	
Bolsonaro’s	laudation	during	his	vote	in	favor	of	impeachment.	Bolsonaro	dedicated	his	vote	to	the	
colonel	 Ustra,	 who	 commanded	 interrogations	 and	 torture	 of	 left-wing	 activists	 during	 the	
dictatorship,	including	that	of	Rousseff.	Some	coverage	dealt	with	m)	a	range	of	equally	extreme	
and	unexpected	expressions	of	discontent	 related	 to	 the	 impeachment,	 including	death	 threats.	
Finally,	a	number	of	news	reports	accounted	for	n)	Rousseff’s	activities	as	her	mandate	hung	by	a	
thread	embroiled	in	the	impeachment,	including	a	trip	to	the	UN	assembly	in	New	York,	a	cancelled	
trip	 to	 Greece,	 and	 the	 always-newsworthy	 reports	 on	 presidential	 bicycling	 around	 Brasília’s	
Planalto	area.	
	
The	 total	number	of	 texts	published	 in	Estado	 and	Folha	 that	 in	one	way	or	 the	other	 tied	 into	
impeachment,	often	through	one	(or	several)	of	the	themes	mentioned	below,	reached	more	than	
3,000	 between	 November	 2015	 until	 the	 day	 (May	 12	 2016)	 when	 Rousseff	 was	 removed	
temporarily	and	Temer	took	office	(Damgaard	2018a).	I	have	argued	elsewhere	(Damgaard	2018b)	
that	the	sheer	volume	of	news	on	the	impeachment	process	had	a	political	effect,	as	it	effectively	
eclipsed	relevant	information	on	other	political	actors	under	scrutiny	for	corruption	–	just	as	the	
front-pages	 of	 April	 and	May	 tended	 to	 ignore	 crucial	 questions	 concerning	 the	 political	 actors	
coming	into	power	when	(rather	than	if)	Rousseff	would	be	ousted.	A	parallel	argument	to	this	is	
developed	in	the	next	chapter.	Rousseff	was	temporarily	removed,	at	first,	on	May	12,	after	the	
Senate	 ratified	 the	 vote	of	 the	Câmara.	 In	 the	 following	months,	 the	 special	 commission	of	 the	
Senate	and	the	plenary	repeated	the	decision	of	the	Câmara,	and	like	the	lower	house	of	Congress,	
interpreted	 fiscal	 delays	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 president’s	 fiscal	 responsibility.	 Rousseff	 was	
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permanently	 removed	 on	 August	 31,	 while	 the	 interim	 President	 Michel	 Temer	 was	 installed	
permanently	as	the	nations’	37th	President.		
	
	
4.6	The	End-of-the-World	Testimony			
Temer’s	cabinet	was	quickly	embroiled	in	scandals,	as	was	his	party	PMDB.	Strands	of	the	Lava-Jato	
investigation	 unraveled	 the	 role	 of	 PMDB	 (and	 several	 other	 parties	 coming	 into	 power)	 in	
corruption	schemes	tied	to	the	cartel	of	construction	companies,	most	prominently	the	Odebrecht	
group.	The	 front	page	of	Veja,	November	2,	2016,	 featured	 the	 following	headline	 (in	 gradually	
darker	hues	of	grey	on	a	completely	black	background):		
	
A	Delação	do	Fim	do	Mundo	–	As	revelações	da	Odebrecht	sobre	corrupção	já	somam	300	anexos	e	deixam	os	
políticos	em	estado	de	pânico.	Sergio	Moro:	‘Espero	que	o	Brasil	sobreviva’	(V#2502)	
	
This	headline	drew	upon	a	moniker	of	a	plea	bargain	that	the	executives	of	the	Odebrecht	group	
had	sought	to	negotiate	for	six	months.	As	the	first	November	issue	of	Veja	hit	the	newsstands,	the	
77	top	leaders	of	the	company	had	been	involved	in	lengthy	negotiations	to	specify	what	kinds	of	
information	and	evidence	about	whom	they	could	deliver	to	the	MPF.	Estado	journalists,	like	Veja’s,	
wrote	of	the	“sense	of	terror”	instilled	in	the	hearts	of	politicians	as	these	negotiations	progressed	
(E8/10	2016).	Since	August	2016,	Veja	and	Folha	had	been	handed	out	morsels	of	information	from	
the	investigations	the	proposed	plea	bargains	and	the	revelations	they	contained.	In	this	way,	the	
so-called	End-of-the-World-Testimony	was	kept	current	in	the	political	landscape	(e.g.	V#2490,	F6/8	
2016,	F7/8	2016,	F28/10	2016),	even	as	the	polarity	of	the	political	spectrum	switched	definitively	
after	the	final	vote	for	impeachment	in	the	Senate	on	August	31.	With	a	new	Executive	and	a	new	
cabinet,	Veja	and	Folha	increasingly	shifted	attention	away	from	PT,	while	Estado	maintained	the	
party	as	focus	of	the	reporting	on	corruption.	On	October	25,	the	plea	bargain	was	settled,	but	had	
at	that	point	been	a	virtual	political	fact	for	eight	months.	
	
In	March	2016	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	made	a	new	set	of	crucial	discoveries	concerning	the	
construction	 company.	 The	 23rd	 phase	was	 triggered	 on	 February	 22,	with	 several	doleiros	 and	
middlemen	arrested	or	taken	into	custody,	along	with	the	Odebrecht	employees	Benedicto	Barbosa	
and	the	secretary	Maria	Lúcia	Tavares.	The	operation	was	dubbed	”Acarajé”	after	the	Odebrecht-
internal	practice	of	referring	to	kickbacks	by	the	name	of	the	Bahian	deep-fried	seafood	sandwich.	
Tavares	 quickly	 decided	 to	 negotiate	 a	 plea	 bargain,	 which	 allegedly	 stirred	 frantic	 meetings	
between	 the	 top	 echelon	 of	Odebrecht	 and	 their	 chief	 lawyers	 (F8/3	 2016).	 The	 “prince	 of	 the	
contractors”	(V#2469),	heir	to	the	dynasty	Marcelo	Odebrecht,	had	been	imprisoned	preventively	
for	nine	months	at	that	point.	
	
With	information	from	Tavares,	the	police	learned	not	only	the	company’s	culinary	code-names	for	
bribes	and	kickbacks,	but	eventually	a	whole	system	of	bribe	distribution.	One	month	later	(March	
22,	2016),	the	26th	phase	(dubbed	”Xepa”)	continued	the	scrutiny	of	the	Odebrecht	organization,	
this	 time	 targeting	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 company.	 The	 phase	 name	was	 a	 reverse-wordplay	
implying	that	the	investigations	reached	the	apex	of	the	organization.	The	”Xepa”	phase	revealed	
the	extent	of	a	secret	department	within	the	Odebrecht	company	solely	tasked	with	moving	bribes	
and	 laundering	 money.	 Tavares	 was	 a	 low-level	 employee	 in	 what	 became	 known	 as	 the	
“department	of	bribes.”	The	task	force	in	Curitiba,	on	the	day	of	the	26th	phase,	publicized	many	of	
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the	documents	seized	during	the	23rd	phase	concerning	the	unravelling	of	the	department	of	bribes.	
In	 particular,	 plans	 detailing	 the	 bribes	 to	 more	 than	 300	 individuals	 of	 24	 parties	 had	 been	
publicized	(F22/3b	2016).	Next	to	each	code-named	politician	or	local	party	office,	values	of	tens	or	
hundreds	of	thousands	reais,	supposedly	bribes,	were	listed.		
	
However,	judge	Moro,	realizing	that	the	Curitiba	court	did	not	have	the	jurisdiction	of	the	hundreds	
of	federal	Congressmen,	soon	decreed	the	secrecy	of	those	documents,	but	journalists	of	UOL	had	
already	downloaded	and	publicized	them	(Rodrigues	2016),	and	the	plans	were	disseminated	and	
discussed	 in	 all	 the	 daily	 papers	 the	 following	 day.	 However,	 arguing	 that	 one	 could	 not	 know	
whether	 it	 was	 really	 a	 plan	 of	 legitimate	 donations	 or	 criminal	 kickbacks,	 the	 Jornal	 Nacional	
cautiously	opted	to	only	mention	the	names	of	the	parties	in	a	short	section	of	the	newscast	that	
night	(JN22/3	2016).	Instead,	the	newscast	spent	the	time	on	the	upcoming	impeachment	vote.	The	
Globo	commentator	Merval	Pereira	argued	exactly	the	same	in	an	op-ed	piece	in	O	Globo	three	days	
later	 (G25/3	 2016).	 The	 cautiousness	 of	 the	 Globo	 editors	 starkly	 contrasted	 the	 rapid	
dissemination,	one	week	earlier,	of	secret	recordings	of	Lula	and	Rousseff.	
	
On	 the	 day	 of	 the	 Xepa	 phase,	 Folha	 revealed	 that	 the	 top	 executives	 of	 Odebrecht	 including	
Marcelo	Odebrecht	was	now	looking	to	negotiate	a	plea	bargain.	Marcelo’s	testimony	was	expected	
to	be	“explosive,”	and	the	(F22/3a	2016),	and	the	bribe	department	secretary	Tavares	was	called	
the	“secretary-bomb”)	(F22/3b	2016).		
	
The	 following	 day,	 the	 Folha	 columnist	 Clovis	 Rossi	 pointed	 out,	 in	 an	 op-ed	 piece	 entitled	 “A	
delação	do	 fim	do	mundo”	 that	 if	 the	plans	 could	be	 substantiated,	 “not	 a	 stone	would	be	 left	
unturned”	in	the	political	elite.	A	“strict”	or	even	“ultimate	confession”	(confissão	terminante)	of	
Odebrecht	leaders	would	effectively	mean	a	scenario	“like	the	end	of	the	[political]	world”:		
	
Como	todos	os	grandes	partidos	políticos	são	parte	do	sistema,	é	inevitável	que	não	sobre	pedra	sobre	pedra	
do	conjunto	todo.	O	efeito	será	certamente	devastador	para	o	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	[…]	O	problema	é	que	
os	 parlamentares	 incumbidos	 de	 julgar	 o	 governo,	 no	 processo	 de	 impeachment,	 também	 tendem	 a	 ser	
atingidos	–o	que	de	fato	configura	um	cenário	de	fim	de	mundo.	(F23/3	2016)	
	
This	op-ed	piece	gave	the	media	a	moniker	for	the	plea	bargain,	which	at	time	was	neither	official	
nor	 initialized,	but	which	materialized	 later	 in	2016.	The	moniker	became	the	established	short-
hand	term	for	the	plea	bargain,	as	seen	on	the	Veja	front-page	in	November.	The	End-of-the-World	
Testimony	worked,	like	all	harbingers	of	apocalypse,	as	herald	of	the	end	times;	in	other	words,	a	
narrative	future	 is	projected.	The	temporal	horizon	for	Clovis	Rossi	 is	 first	the	destruction	of	the	
Rousseff	administration,	but	because	the	“whole	gamut”	of	parliament	is	next	in	line,	the	second	
temporal	horizon	is	open,	indefinite,	and	existentially	threatening.	The	Veja	front-page	quotes	judge	
Sérgio	Moro’s	perception	of	a	threat	to	the	nation:	“I	hope	that	Brazil	survives.”			
	
The	agents	of	 this	narrative	are	positioned	 like	dominos,	one	triggering	 the	 fall	of	 the	next:	The	
Odebrecht	 secretary’s	 bomb	 is	 what	 triggers	 the	 ultimate	 confession	 from	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	
business	group,	and	this	generates	the	subsequent	explosion	of	the	political	world.	An	editorial	in	
Folha	expected	this	 to	create	a	backlash	against	 the	Lava-Jato	operation,	hoping	for	a	rebirth	of	
Brazilian	democracy	after	the	“explosive	list”	(F25/3	2016).	This	implies	a	cathartic	motive,	with	the	
Lava-Jato	task-force	in	the	position	of	the	punisher.	A	rebirth	motive	is	also	implied	in	the	quote	of	
		 125	
judge	Moro	on	the	Veja	front-page	(V#2502).	Odebrecht	was	eventually	forced	to	repent	in	public:	
On	December	2,	2016,	after	striking	plea	bargain,	the	company	bought	advertisement	space	in	the	
national	newspapers	and	declared	mea	culpa.	
	
	
4.6.1	Political	cataclysm:	The	hour	of	the	final	judgment	
IstoÉ	spelled	out	the	significance	of	the	political	moment	in	just	five	words	on	the	front	page,	mid-
March	2017.	The	result	of	a	huge	collective	plea	bargain	had	now	materialized,	and	it	would	shake	
the	foundations	of	the	Republic.	The	lead	of	the	feature	article	stated:	
	
A	hora	do	Juízo	Final.	
No	aguardo	dos	pedidos	de	inquéritos	do	procurador-geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	Brasília	estremece.	O	
STF	já	prepara	HDs	para	armazenar	as	delações	dos	77	executivos	da	Odebrecht.	A	Lava	Jato	chega,	enfim,	à	
classe	política.	Começa	o	fim	do	mundo.	Detentor	dos	mais	recônditos	segredos	capazes	de	abalar	a	República,	
o	Procurador-Geral	Rodrigo	Janot	carrega	um	semblante	que,	de	tão	sereno	e	tranquilo,	contrasta	com	o	da	
esmagadora	maioria	dos	políticos.	[...]	revelarão	indícios	veementes	de	pagamentos	de	propina	para	mais	de	
uma	centena	de	políticos,	incluindo	a	cúpula	do	governo,	petistas	de	altíssimo	calibre,	como	os	ex-presidentes	
Lula	e	Dilma	Rousseff,	e	lideranças	de	PMDB	e	PSDB.	(I#2465)	
	
The	notion	of	a	final	 judgment	(which	was	already	used	as	a	code-name	for	the	7th	phase	of	the	
Lava-Jato	investigations)	is	of	course	apocalyptic	and	biblical.	The	artwork	or	collage	on	the	front	
page	also	paraphrases	satirically	the	Michelangelo	fresco	of	the	same	name	(displayed	in	the	Sistine	
Chapel),	showing	all	major	(non-PSDB)	politicians	of	the	recent	years	are	depicted	in	Renaissance	
nude	or	with	cloth	draped	around	their	angelically	muscular	bodies.	Eduardo	Cunha’s	face	has	the	
prominent	position	closest	to	the	spectator,	strung	up	on	the	cross.	Above	them	all,	PMDB	and	PT	
leaders	alike,	hovers	the	face	of	Marcelo	Odebrecht.7	In	text	and	in	art	work,	the	political	elite	(equal	
to	“Brasília”	by	synecdoche)	is	thus	awaiting	–	but	not	waiting	much	longer	–	for	a	final	verdict	in	
consequence	 of	 the	 plea	 bargain	 negotiated	 with	 the	 executives	 of	 the	 Odebrecht	 group.	 The	
verdict,	if	the	notion	of	“the	end	of	the	world”	is	to	make	sense,	must	thus	be	a	verdict	with	dire	
consequences	for	the	political	elite.		
	
Also	in	March	2017,	Veja	(V#2520)	ran	a	front-page	with	a	burning	electoral	ticket	and	the	faces	of	
Dilma	Rousseff	 and	Michel	 Temer	half-consumed	by	 the	 fire	 (see	 appendix	A,	 figure	A.24).	 This	
parallel	expression	of	an	impending	negative	verdict	made	sense	in	the	context	of	the	court	trial	
against	both	in	the	TSE.	Whether	in	the	STF	or	TSE,	“the	political	class”	was	thus	facing	“its	crucial	
moment”	 (quoting	 here	 the	 IstoÉ	 front-page	 I#2465,	 see	 figure	 A.19).	 The	 result	 of	 this	 “final	
judgment”	is	symbolically	provided	by	both	Veja	and	IstoÉ:	The	end	of	the	world	in	terms	of	well-
known	party	leaders	from	PT,	PMDB	and	PSDB,	and	the	cancellation	and	conflagration	of	the	2014	
presidential	elections.	
	
I	will	return	to	the	notion	of	“the	end	of	the	world”	shortly.	Before	doing	so,	I	must	mention	the	
consequent	horizon	of	the	political	as	it	was	articulated	then,	what	some	commentators	termed	the	
“day	after.”	With	political	cataclysm	impending	in	one	or	the	other	courtroom,	the	prospects	of	the	
2018	 general	 elections	 were	 wide	 open	 and	 “more	 unpredictable	 than	 any	 other	 presidential	
election	since	 the	 transition	 to	democracy”	 (F6/4	2018).8	Notice	how	the	unpredictability	of	 the	
2018	elections	yields	an	open-ended	narrative	structure:	Unlike	the	impeachment	stories	discussed	
below,	 it	was	difficult	 to	 formulate	any	 coherent	 stories	about	 the	political	world	after	October	
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2018,	as	 the	horizon	of	possibilities	was	 too	wide	and	 therefore	 too	distant.	Unlike	 the	crisis	of	
impeachment,	which	presented	a	storyable	solution	in	its	very	theme,	the	cataclysm	catalyzed	by	
the	Lava-Jato	case	did	not	appear	to	have	a	clear	end	to	be	projected	and	narrated	ahead	of	the	
fact:	A	crisis	may	have	solutions,	while	cataclysms,	as	a	rule,	don’t.	A	threatened	political	elite	did	
not	constitute	a	crisis	on	the	same	scale	as	the	impeachment,	as	the	problem	here	is	not	instability,	
but	unpredictability;	an	epistemic	threat	to	the	whole	system,	rather	than	a	periodic	malfunction	
that	may	be	solved	through	constitutional	means.		
		
While	the	closure	to	this	narrative	remains	to	be	discovered,	the	protagonists	are	ready	at	hand:	
Personified	 in	 the	 “serene	 and	 tranquil”	 PGR	 Janot,	 “guardian	 of	 the	 most	 recondite	 secrets	
capacious	of	shaking	the	Republic”	in	tandem	with	the	institutional,	de-personified	protagonist	of	
the	 STF.	 In	 conjunction	with	 the	 biblical	 visual	 connotations,	 Janot	 is	 represented	 as	 an	 angelic	
guardian	next	to	the	ultimate	seat	of	judgment,	which	again	brings	biblical	symbolism	to	mind.	If	
the	politicians	depicted	are	close	to	their	judgment,	then	Janot	is	a	sentinel,	symbolically	placed	in	
a	Purgatory-like	interim	space.	
	
To	understand	this	complex	metaphor	of	apocalyptic	proportions,	we	must	however	read	more	than	
the	Bible.	The	reader’s	assumed	previous	knowledge	includes	a	sense	of	the	overall	Lava-Jato	case	
(at	this	point	targeting	most	of	the	major	politicians	in	Congress),	but	also	some	technical	knowledge	
about	the	judicial	process.	 It	 is,	 for	 instance,	assumed	that	the	reader	knows	how	politicians	are	
indicted	by	the	PGR	and	that	the	STF	can	then	choose	to	judge	or	not.	Moreover,	the	debate	of	the	
veracity	of	plea	bargains	is	denied	relevance	in	the	quote,	as	the	“secrets”	and	vehement	indicia”	
are	implied	to	have	the	potential	of	“shaking	the	Republic,”	which	supposedly	would	require	the	
evidence	 to	 be	 found	 truthful.	 Indeed,	we	 are	 given	 to	 understand	 that	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Odebrecht	plea	bargain	is	due	to	its	truthfulness.	This,	finally,	brings	with	it	the	assumption	that	the	
reader	knows	that	the	“final	judgment”	would	be	possible	only	because	of	the	scope	and	level	of	
detail	 of	 the	 testimonies	 given	 by	 the	 bosses	 of	 the	 Odebrecht	 group,	 the	 largest	 of	 Brazil’s	
construction	companies.		
	
	
4.6.2	The	Fall	of	the	Republic	
The	 notion	 of	 future	 grave	 ramifications	 of	 Odebrecht’s	 inside	 knowledge	 was	 already	
foreshadowed	 when	 Marcelo	 Odebrecht	 was	 imprisoned,	 and	 the	 motive	 of	 a	 “threat	 to	 the	
Republic”	was	foregrounded	on	Época’s	front	page	on	June	22,	2015	(E#889):	“Ele	ameaça	derrubar	
a	República.”	
	
Emilio	Odebrecht	acredita,	sem	evidências,	que	o	governo	do	PT	está	por	trás	das	investigações	lideradas	pelo	
procurador-geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot.	“Se	prenderem	o	Marcelo	(Odebrecht,	filho	de	Emilio	e	atual	
presidente	da	empresa),	terão	de	arrumar	mais	três	celas”,	costuma	repetir	o	patriarca,	de	acordo	com	esses	
relatos.	“Uma	para	mim,	outra	para	o	Lula	e	outra	ainda	para	a	Dilma.”…	Os	comentários	de	Emilio	Odebrecht	
eram	apenas	bravata,	um	desabafo	de	pai	preocupado,	fazendo	de	tudo	para	proteger	o	filho	e	o	patrimônio	
de	uma	família?	Ou	eram	uma	ameaça	real	a	Dilma	e	a	Lula?	Os	interlocutores	não	sabem	dizer.	(E#889)	
		
Here,	the	threat	works	metonymically:	a	threat	to	Dilma	and	Lula	equals	a	threat	to	the	Republic.	
The	vision	of	members	of	the	business	elite	overthrowing	the	Republic	would	grow	to	involve	more	
than	just	the	PT	leaders	in	2016	in	consequence	of	the	Odebrecht	plea	bargain.	That	development	
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also	entailed	another	kind	of	emplotment:	Logically,	whereas	a	narrative	of	a	final	judgment	implies	
an	 institutional	arena	 in	which	corrupt	politicians	could	be	tried,	a	 threat	 to	 the	Republic	would	
require	more	earth-shattering	revelations	-	a	rupture	of	the	entire	institutional	order.	When	such	
ruptures	appeared	on	the	horizon,	and	the	very	ground	shook	under	Brasília,	the	narrative	of	the	
national	threat	also	reappeared.	After	all,	if	the	Supreme	Court	turned	out	to	be	corrupt,	how	could	
any	(secular)	final	judgment	be	trusted?		
	
The	fear	that	political	actors	even	pulled	the	strings	of	the	Supreme	Court	judges	was	a	part	of	the	
Lula	leaks	(see	above,	section	4.4.3),	although	Lula’s	supposed	attempts	did	not	succeed.	Another	
leak	 revealed	 similar	 plans	being	hatched	by	PMDB	 shortly	 thereafter:	Folha,	 on	May	23,	 2016,	
published	 recordings	 (taped	 before	 the	 impeachment	 became	 a	 reality)	 which	 featured	 a	 key	
witness	 in	 the	 Petrobras	 case.	 Sergio	Machado	 -	witness,	 former	 senator,	 and	 president	 of	 the	
Petrobras	subsidiary	Transpetro	-	discussed	the	removal	of	Rousseff	with	major	political	actors	of	
PMDB,	such	as	the	President	of	the	Senate,	Renan	Calheiros,	and	ex-President	José	Sarney.	In	the	
conversations,	the	politicians	agreed	that	it	was	necessary	to	end	the	corruption	probes	into	the	
political	establishment,	which	threatened	to	“put	an	end	to	the	political	class.”	On	the	recordings,	
another	key	actor,	PMDB	Senator	Romero	Jucá,	stated	that	someone	needs	to	“stop	the	bleeding”	
caused	by	the	Lava-Jato	investigations.	This	could	be	done	by	changing	government	and	ending	the	
Prosecutor	General's	project	of	cleaning	politics:	
	
Tem	que	resolver	essa	porra...	Tem	que	mudar	o	governo	pra	poder	estancar	essa	sangria.	Acabar	com	a	classe	
política	para	ressurgir,	construir	uma	nova	casta,	pura,	que	não	tem	a	ver	com	[corrupção]	[...]	Caiu.	Todos	
eles.	Aloysio,	Serra,	Aécio.	...	tudo	mundo	na	bandeja	para	ser	comida.	(cited	in	Valente,	2016	-	F23/5)).	
	
Machado	was	called	the	“human	bomb”	as	the	media	quickly	picked	up	on	the	explosive	potential	
of	his	eventual	testimony	in	a	plea	bargain,	that	would	make	the	leaked	“testimony	of	Delcídio	do	
Amaral	look	like	a	Disney	tale”	(F26/5	2016).	Veja	claimed	that	the	Lava-Jato	task	force	for	more	
than	a	 year	had	viewed	Machado	as	 “the	perfect	way	 to	get	 to	 the	big	 sharks	of	 the	Petrobras	
corruption	scheme,	especially	the	PMDB	leadership,”	which	would	explode	as	a	result	of	the	taps:	
	
As	 gravações	de	 conversas	entre	 Sérgio	Machado	e	 seus	aliados	do	PMDB	 já	provocaram	a	queda	de	dois	
ministros,	Romero	Jucá,	do	Planejamento,	e,	na	semana	passada,	Fabiano	Silveira,	da	Transparência.	Foi	apenas	
uma	amostra	do	que	a	delação	de	Sérgio	Machado	pode	produzir.	As	revelações	mais	graves	e	explosivas	ainda	
estão	por	vir,	e	vão	implodir	a	cúpula	do	PMDB,	o	partido	que	dividiu	com	o	PT	os	lucros	do	petrolão.	(V#2481)	
	
Jucá,	on	the	same	recording,	also	implied	that	a	backstage	deal	between	the	STF	and	the	military	
forces	was	under	construction	to	enact	his	project	of	“stopping	the	bleeding.”	He	sketched	out	a	
“national	 pact,	with	 the	 Supreme	 court,	with	 everybody”	 in	 the	 leaked	 recording	 (F23/5	 2016),	
which	could	limit	the	reach	of	the	investigations.	Jucá	stepped	down	after	the	leak,	as	did	another	
recorded	 cabinet	 member,	 but	 the	 sense	 that	 “deep	 state”	 actors	 of	 the	 old	 elite	 were	 doing	
everything	in	their	power	to	stop	the	Lava-Jato	trials	lingered.		
	
A	 year	 later,	 in	May	2017,	 the	wording	of	 this	 vision	 changed	with	 a	new	 leak	 involving	Michel	
Temer:	The	threat	to	the	Republic	was	now	the	impending	“the	Fall	of	the	Republic.”	The	fall	would	
be	precipitated	by	a	new	plea	bargain,	negotiated	by	Joesley	and	Wesley	Batista,	two	meat	tycoons	
and	brothers.	The	Batistas,	leaders	of	the	large	JBS	group,	had	apparently	helped	Temer	pay	hush	
money	to	the	imprisoned	Eduardo	Cunha.	Cunha	himself	declared	the	end	of	the	Republic	in	the	
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event	of	a	plea	bargain:	“’Se	a	 JBS	delatar,	 será	o	 fim	da	República’,	diz	Eduardo	Cunha”	 (E17/5	
2017),	read	one	Estado	headline.	However,	Temer	weathered	the	storm,	explaining	away	the	arrest	
of	his	aide	who	carried	R$	500,000	 in	cash,	and	also	 ignoring	the	 leaks	of	 the	conversation	with	
Joesley	Batista	in	which	he	consented	to	maintain	payments	to	pay	for	Cunha’s	silence.	Counting	on	
the	immobility	of	the	institutional	checks	and	balances	and	the	legislative	shield	of	Congress	(Pérez-
Liñán	 2014)	 to	 stop	 corruption	 probes	 against	 him,	 Temer	 simply	 absorbed	 the	 scandal	 and	
continued	to	govern.	A	majority	 in	the	Câmara	voted	not	to	 let	a	trial	against	Temer	commence	
(with	251	votes	against	233).	Moreover,	other	 leaks	 from	 the	Batista	 case	hinted	 that	 Supreme	
judges	could	be	bought,	and	the	office	of	the	PGR	was	later	scandalized	as	it	turned	out	that	one	of	
the	 public	 prosecutors	 working	 directly	 under	 Rodrigo	 Janot	 had	 assisted	 the	 meat	 tycoons	 in	
obtaining	very	favorable	terms	in	their	plea	bargain.9		
	
	
4.7	Forecasting	Elections	and	the	Fear	of	Chaos	
Rounding	off	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	briefly	 review	 the	 solutions	 to	political	problems	offered	across	
these	texts.	Overall,	the	Lava-Jato	processes	promised	to	solve	the	central	democratic	contradiction	
–	persistent	suspicions	of	corrupt	political	leaders,	who	anyway	get	elected	-	by	bringing	members	
of	the	political	elite	and	the	business	leaders	to	trial,	more	swiftly	and	more	decisively	than	ever	
before.	 In	 particular,	 the	 lingering	 suspicions	 about	 Lula	 and	 PT	 leaders	 left	 from	 the	 previous	
scandals	 (the	Mensalão	 and	 the	Celso	Daniel	 case)	were	pursued	by	 the	 Lava-Jato	probe	and	 it	
seemed	to	unwind	the	plot	that	had	successfully	kept	PT	in	power	and	grafted	millions	and	millions	
from	the	coffers	of	Petrobras	and	other	state	companies.	However,	other	plots	were	also	unmasked,	
giving	 rise	 to	 new	 contradictions,	most	 importantly	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 impeachment	 process,	
which	could	either	be	interpreted	as	a	parliamentary	coup	d’état	which	would	shield	investigated	
politicians,	or	as	a	shortcut	to	re-establishing	economically	sound	governance	model	of	the	public	
sector.	 The	 texts	 thereby	 also	 establish	 or	 undermine	 legitimacy	 of	 Rousseff’s	 and	 Temer’s	
governments	and	of	Brazil’s	representative	democracy	–	and	this	issue	of	legitimacy	was	brought	
forth	by	the	erratic	disclosure	of	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.		
	
Undeniably,	the	texts	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	also	opened	discussions	of	the	legitimacy	and	equity	of	
the	 Judiciary.	Did	 the	 trials	 and	 investigations	 represent	 the	effective	 rule	of	 law,	or	 did	 vested	
interests	drive	these	processes?	The	roles	played	by	Moro,	by	Janot,	and	by	the	STF	in	various	cases	
came	under	intense	scrutiny,	especially	in	the	cases	with	weak	or	entirely	missing	causal	links:	How	
could	Lula	be	charged	with	corruption	in	lieu	of	a	specific	corrupted	action	performed	as	president	
–	and	was	it	plausible	that	the	bribes	and	kickbacks	of	his	hypothetical	corruption	only	materialized	
years	after	his	presidency?	The	Lava-Jato	task	force	insisted	that	“no	specific	act	of	government”	
was	needed	(section	4.4.1).	A	similar	logic	was	employed	in	the	arguments	for	impeaching	Rousseff,	
where	a	tangible	Presidential	order	for	the	fiscal	delays	 in	the	State	Treasury	could	not	quite	be	
found,	and	evidence	from	the	Lava-Jato	case	was	legally	barred	from	spilling	over.	Ultimately,	of	
course,	the	President	could	be	considered	responsible	for	every	act	of	state,	even	if	no	specific	deed	
was	documented.		
	
The	 legal	 contradictions	 were	 resolved	 to	 the	 disadvantage	 of	 the	 PT	 leaders,	 with	 Rousseff	
impeached	and	Lula	going	to	jail	on	April	7,	2018,	sentenced	to	12	years	of	prison	in	the	first	of	eight	
corruption	cases.	The	proportions	of	these	legal	outcomes	seemed	excessive	to	many,	especially	as	
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the	PGR	and	 the	STF	did	not	 come	off	 as	particularly	efficient	 in	pressing	 charges	against	other	
investigated	 Senators	 and	 Congressmen.	 As	 Temer’s	 inner	 circle	 became	 exposed	 for	 hatching	
backstage	plans	to	stop	the	Lava-Jato	investigation,	the	injustice	appeared	even	more	appalling	and	
the	contradiction	of	substituting	one	president	suspected	of	corruption	for	another	was	evident.	
	
Because	of	Temer’s	deft	hand	in	avoiding	prosecution	and	annulment	of	his	mandate	(Damgaard	
2018b:105),	this	contradiction	not	really	be	solved,	but	the	desire	for	a	solution	was	clearly	present	
in	the	texts;	only	the	total	destruction	of	the	whole	political	elite,	the	“Fim-do-Mundo,”	would	fulfil	
the	desire.	But	who	or	what	would	rise	in	the	ensuing	power	vacuum,	after	the	Fall	of	the	Republic?	
While	the	Lava-Jato	probe	and	trials	in	various	emplotments	did	offer	solutions	to	various	problems,	
new	challenges	to	Brazilian	democracy	arose	on	the	horizon	as	the	presidential	elections	of	October	
2018	drew	closer:	In	May	2018,	the	Brazilian	economy	was	stopped	in	its	tracks	due	to	a	paralyzing	
truck	driver	strike,	leaving	gas	stations	empty	and	even	the	military	with	precious	little	fuel.	Folha	
pundit	 Celso	 Rocha	 de	 Barros	 interpreted	 the	 situation	 as	 “chaos,”	 and	 this	 chaos	 would	 be	 a	
decisive	factor	that	could	lead	the	right-wing	candidate	Jair	Bolsonaro	to	the	presidency:	
	
Bolsonaro	apoia	a	greve	dos	caminhoneiros	porque	o	desabastecimento	vai	deixar	a	população	com	fome,	e	
Bolsonaro	quer	a	população	com	fome.	Bolsonaro	quer	isso	tudo	porque	sabe	que	quanto	mais	você	estiver	
com	raiva,	medo	e	fome,	quanto	mais	estiver	desesperado	e	sem	saber	o	que	fazer,	menor	será	sua	capacidade	
de	pensar	direito.	E	ninguém	jamais	votará	em	Bolsonaro	se	estiver	pensando	direito.	Bolsonaro	apoia	a	greve	
para	produzir	desordem	agora	e	vender	ordem	em	outubro.	Cai	nessa	quem	for	otário...		É	incapaz	de	criticar	
as	milícias	que	aterrorizam	o	Rio	de	Janeiro.	E	agora	torce	pelo	caos.	(F28/5	2018)	
	
The	pundit	here	ascribes	an	electoral	motivation	to	Bolsonaro	(whose	candidature	was	based	on	
military	nostalgia	and	authoritarian	law-and-order	policies),	asserting	that	Bolsonaro	would	benefit	
from	 chaos,	 because	 such	 chaos	 would	 push	 the	 increasingly	 desperate	 population	 to	 take	
desperate	measures	in	the	voting	booth.	Many	other	editorials	and	pundits	expressed	similar	fears	
of	the	imprudent	gut-level	reactions	of	voters	to	the	years	of	scandals,	but	few	connect	the	figure	
of	national	chaos	to	the	candidate	Bolsonaro	so	directly.	
	
Observing	the	waves	of	corruption	allegations,	scandals,	and	crises	retrospectively,	it	becomes	clear	
that	the	extent	and	ramifications	of	the	disclosure	of	corruption	grew	gradually	as	new	narrative	
structures	emerged	and	coalesced	on	top	of	earlier	ones.	To	recapitulate,	all	the	way	back	in	April	
2014,	the	scandal	of	Petrobras	was	merely	“a	bad	deal”	(F4/4	2014)	involving	PT.	Four	years	later,	
successive	 revelations,	 exposés	 and	 leaks	 had	 spread	 like	 rings	 in	 the	 water,	 bringing	 Brazilian	
democracy	 to	 the	 brink	 of	 the	 abyss.	 The	 story	 of	 the	 Car	Wash	was	 expanded	 to	 a	 crisis	 and	
eventually	to	a	tale	of	political	cataclysm,	but	this	escalating	sequence	of	course	only	appeared	as	
such	in	the	rear-view	mirror.	At	each	moment,	the	crisis	seemed	to	be	the	ultimate	one,	and	in	the	
next	chapter,	I	turn	to	this	distinctly	temporal	limitedness	of	the	scandal,	or	moment-to-moment	
effect	of	the	media	narration.	
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Chapter	5	
Time	and	Narrative	Desire	in	Scandal	News	
	
The	 previous	 chapter	 deliberately	 delayed	 a	 concluding	 summary	 of	 contrasting	 or	 consonant	
emplotments	of	the	disclosure,	leaks	and	scandals	in	Brazil’s	political	sphere	2014-2018	–	and	yet,	
a	reader	with	a	knack	for	narrative	may	have	gleaned	the	contours	of	several	plots	already.	The	goal	
of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 establish	 the	 possible	 plots	 informing	 the	 texts	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter.	Using	the	terminology	presented	in	Chapter	2,	I	name	such	analytical	constructions	fabulas	
in	the	following.		
	
This	is	not	the	first	task	undertaken	in	this	chapter,	however.	The	a	posteriori	analytical	construction	
of	such	fabulas	may	gloss	over	the	contingency	of	the	moment,	the	risk	of	an	unfolding	event	series	
with	no	guarantee	of	resolution.	Unlike	intertextual	fabulas	that	may	be	analytically	re-constructed	
as	meaningful	wholes	after	the	fact,	media	texts	rarely	account	for	events	only	in	the	retrospective;	
rather,	the	texts	point	both	backwards	and	forwards	in	time.	Situated	in	media	res,		
	
Journalism	 constitutes	 a	 series	 of	 interrelated	 practices	 for	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 time.	 It	 arrests	 the	
ordinary	 and	 the	 unusual	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 texts	 that	 create	 feelings	 of	 simultaneity,	 help	 to	 define	 the	
contemporary,	 outline	 possible	 futures,	 and	 shape	 our	 understanding	 and	memories	 of	 the	 past.	 (Bødker	
2016:55,	emphases	mine)	
	
Before	 I	 present	 the	 fabulas	 that	 I	 have	 constructed	 from	 the	news	 texts,	 I	must	 therefore	 first	
explore	the	significance	of	the	texts’	temporality	in	the	middle	of	the	plot,	so	to	speak.	The	textual	
practice	linking	reported	events	to	previous	and	upcoming	events	is	an	important	feature	of	these	
narrative	structures,	and	only	after	we	grasp	this	can	we	begin	to	consider	how	the	 incremental	
development	of	the	scandals	had	an	impact	on	the	political	field.		
	
	
5.1	Timing	the	Tale:	Seriality	and	Coverage	In	Media	Res	
In	 a	 constantly	 updated	 landscape	 of	 news,	 we	 must	 now	 more	 than	 ever	 consider	 “news	 as	
something	constantly	unfolding”	(Bødker	2016:60),	accumulating	content	and	weaving	journalistic	
material	together.		
	
Stories	that	matter	are	stories	that	persist	and	take	different	turns	over	days	or	weeks	or	longer.	[…]	as	time	
passes,	 the	 story	 grows	 the	 ripples	 spread	out	 into	past	 and	 future,	 the	 time	 span	enlarges	backward	and	
forward,	the	reverberations	to	past	and	future	become	the	news	context	for	the	story.	(Schudson	1987:89)	
		
The	characteristic	“linking”	and	continuous	replacement	of	news	stories	is	enhanced	by	hypertext	
(Bolter	and	Grusin	1999:43-4,	Bødker	2016:59),	but	such	linking	is	not	a	property	exclusive	to	digital	
news;	 in	 fact,	 serialization	 is	as	old	as	 the	penny	press.	Serialization	of	 real	events	was	 found	 in	
famous	 historical	 scandals	 such	 as	 the	 Dreyfus	 affair,	 while	 fictional	 serials	 were	 popular	 and	
common	content	in	newspapers,	with	Conan	Doyle’s	“penny	dreadfuls”	as	one	of	many	examples.	
Mussell	has	argued	that	it	was	a	defining	genre	characteristic	of	the	developing	news	press:	“It	was	
through	 formal	 properties	 –	 from	 their	 materiality	 to	 their	 seriality	 –	 that	 newspapers	 and	
periodicals	constituted	a	distinct	print	genre.	 […]	The	two	most	 important	 formal	properties	are	
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miscellaneity	and	seriality”	(Mussell	2012:50).	In	this	continuation	of	texts,	any	specific	newspaper	
is	the	same	while	the	news	content	gradually	changes;	so	it	is	the	recurrent	formal	features	that	
stabilize	 the	 slowly	 mutating	 format	 across	 editions	 (ibid.:42-54).	 “Repetition	 is	 a	 vital	 and	
overlooked	 component	of	periodical	 form”	 (ibid.:50),	 and	 repetition	especially	 took	 the	 form	of	
seriality	in	the	19th	century	papers	and	periodicals.	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	the	overarching	headline	“Escândalo	em	série,”	printed	in	O	Globo,	was	
mentioned.	It	appeared	already	in	late	2014,	overtly	signalling	seriality.	For	more	than	three	years,	
this	overarching	headline	underscored	the	feuilleton-like	character	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	
and	the	snow-balling	series	of	not	just	police	actions	against	major	companies	and	political	players,	
but	also	the	cascade	of	plea	bargains,	one	leading	to	another.	This	patterning	of	the	scandal	as	an	
affaire,	an	ongoing	narrative	 that	unfolds	and	 is	publicly	contested,	 is	 supposed	 to	keep	up	and	
direct	the	audience's	interest	by	maintaining	the	elements	of	the	overarching	story	arc	(Boltanski	
1999:59).	The	seriality	established	on	the	O	Globo	front	page	is	an	editorial	choice	echoed	in	all	of	
the	newspapers,	print	as	well	as	online:	Every	outlet	tagged	online	content	“Lava	Jato”	or	“Lava-
Jato”	and	created	subsections	of	their	websites	gathering	the	scandal-specific	productions	under	
this	moniker,	 thus	 playing	 on	 an	 already	 existing	 everyday-language	 shorthand.	 The	 volume	 of	
content	on	the	scandal	gathered	in	these	subsections	frequently	surpassed	the	“regular”	political	
news	 in	2015	and	2016.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 semantic	evolution	of	 the	word	 Lava-Jato	 turned	 from	
reference	to	a	police	operation	to	a	symbolic	signifier	of	the	whole	gamut	of	political	unravelling	
and	the	earthquake	slowly	eroding	Brazil’s	political	institutions.		
	
Each	instance	of	serialized	media	texts	is	thus	poised	at	a	point	on	a	story	arc	that	stretches	ahead	
in	 media	 res	 (Motta	 2013:97).	 Because	 of	 this,	 news	 on	 political	 scandals	 often	 narrate	 both	
(contested)	pasts	and	(possible)	futures.	I	will	briefly	consider	six	examples	of	this	temporality.	The	
first	example	deals	with	the	PGR’s	request	for	investigations	into	49	current	or	former	public-office	
holders,	a	request	that	was	authorized	by	the	STF	judge	Teori	Zavascki	in	March	2015.	
	
Janot	 e	 sua	 equipe	 prepararam	a	 lista	 com	uma	estratégia	 cautelosa.	 Para	 evitar	 ataques	 de	 advogados	 e	
desarmar	alguns	dos	ministros	mais	conservadores,	os	procuradores	optaram	por	não	usar	nenhuma	prova	
colhida	no	decorrer	de	um	ano	de	 investigação	da	Lava	Jato.	Centraram-se	somente	nas	delações	de	Paulo	
Roberto	 Costa	 e	 Alberto	 Youssef,	 já	 homologadas	 por	 Teori.	 Caso	 fizessem	uso	 das	 provas,	 boa	 parte	 das	
acusações	ficaria	mais	robusta.	Permitiram	até	a	denúncia,	etapa	seguinte	ao	pedido	de	abertura	de	inquérito.	
Na	avaliação	de	Janot	e	sua	equipe,	porém,	o	risco	jurídico	era	demasiado.	"Abriríamos	flancos	perigosos",	diz	
um	dos	procuradores	da	equipe.	"Pode-se	argumentar	que	cada	político,	por	ter	foro	no	Supremo,	requer	um	
processo	que	comece	do	zero,	apenas	pela	delação	homologada."	A	esperança	dos	procuradores	é	que	Teori	
e	os	demais	ministros	da	Segunda	Turma	do	Supremo,	responsáveis	pelo	caso,	permitam	a	produção	de	provas.	
Precisam	autorizar	quebra	de	sigilos	bancários,	fiscais,	telefônicos,	além	de	outras	medidas	sigilosas.	(E#874)	
	
In	 this	 example,	 the	 text	 presents	 the	 situation	 as	 a	 legal	 trench-style	warfare	with	 “dangerous	
flanks”	that	poses	“legal	risks”	to	the	whole	investigation.	The	strategy	and	hopes	of	the	prosecutors	
for	the	upcoming	stages	of	the	pre-trial	phase	are	described,	and	the	choice	of	strategy	is	based	on	
specific	 assessments	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 previously	 accumulated	 evidence.	 The	 uncertain	 future	
projects	a	narrative	risk	(Silverstone	1981:136),	a	disappointing	ultimate	outcome	of	the	trials.		
	
In	narratological	terms,	the	text	above	is	structured	in	a	complex	way;	primarily	as	a	past-tense	(but	
contemporary)	 account	 focalizing	 the	 team	 of	 national-level	 prosecutors	 headed	 by	 PGR	 Janot.	
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What	complicates	matters	here	is	multiple	futures,	an	extended	backstory,	and	the	short	interview	
quote	which	is	cited	in	the	present	tense	(“diz”	rather	than	“disse”),	underscoring	the	here-and-now	
tempus.	The	likelihood	of	future	legal	attacks	by	defense	lawyers	are	pre-empted	by	their	strategy	
of	 only	 basing	 the	 petition	 for	 investigation	 in	material	 from	 plea	 bargains,	 and	 an	 alternative	
strategy	is	presented	as	too	dangerous;	thus,	two	immediate	futures	are	spelled	out	here,	plus	a	
more	long-term	future	with	a	possible	extended	phase	of	gathering	more	evidence,	depending	on	
the	 goodwill	 of	 the	 STF.	 The	 past	 tense	 reaches	 back	 one	 year,	 to	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	
operation,	but	implicitly	goes	even	further,	since	the	plea	bargains	detail	events	going	back	decades.	
Elsewhere	in	the	text,	several	events	of	political	transgression	are	mentioned,	going	all	the	way	back	
to	the	PSDB	government	of	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	(1995-2002).	Emblematically,	the	headline	
of	the	article	is	“The	list	was	only	the	start,”	encapsulating	the	future	projection	or	narrative	desire	
for	more	investigations	and	revelations.	The	question	prompted	by	the	headline	–	the	start	of	what,	
exactly?	–	is	answered	shortly	after	the	above	quote:		
	
Mas	o	Supremo,	mais	uma	vez,	ocupa	o	centro	das	atenções.	Pouco	tempo	depois	do	mensalão,	um	julgamento	
que	rompeu,	na	cúpula	do	judiciário,	a	cultura	da	impunidade	dos	poderosos,	os	ministros	terão	de	se	voltar	a	
um	caso	que	paralisa	Brasília	e	eletriza	o	Brasil.	Os	quatro	ministros	responsáveis	pela	Lava	Jato	-	Teori,	Cármen	
Lúcia,	Celso	de	Mello	e	Gilmar	Mendes	-	terão	anos	difíceis	pela	frente.	(E#874)	
	
The	Lava	Jato	is	here	presented	as	a	case	of	high-level	corruption	that	is	doomed	to	either	confirm	
the	milestone	of	the	Mensalão	case,	or	else	disappoint	the	“electrified”	nation.			
	
The	future	is	not	the	only	thing	that	may	be	presented	as	full	of	doubts	and	risks.	The	next	example	
demonstrates	the	contested	nature	of	pasts.	Here,	a	news	item	presents	several	contested	pasts	
discussed	in	the	immediate	past,	leading	to	a	future	process	in	the	Ethics	Commission	of	the	Câmara.	
	
O	presidente	da	Câmara	dos	Deputados,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	disse	nesta	terça-feira	(3)	que	irá	provar	
no	Conselho	de	Ética	que	não	faltou	com	a	verdade.	A	declaração	foi	dada	horas	após	o	conselho	instaurar	
processo	para	 investigar	 se	Cunha	cometeu	quebra	de	decoro	parlamentar	por	não	 ter	declarado	à	 Justiça	
Eleitoral	ter	contas	bancárias	na	Suíça	atribuídas	a	ele	e	a	parentes.	Segundo	a	Procuradoria	Geral	da	República,	
documentos	enviados	pelo	Ministério	Público	suíço	confirmam	a	existência	dessas	contas.	Em	depoimento	à	
CPI	da	Petrobras,	em	março,	Cunha	negou	ter	qualquer	conta	no	exterior.	(G1	3/11	2015)	
	
Above	this	text,	a	short	bit	of	Jornal	Nacional	coverage	is	embedded	as	video.	A	part	of	the	fourth	
phrase	(“o	conselho	instaurar	processo”)	is	a	hyperlink	to	the	earlier	news	piece	on	the	start	of	the	
Ethics	Committee	process	the	same	day,	and	just	below	the	quoted	section,	five	other	hyperlinks	to	
news	from	October	and	November	2015	are	provided	as	background	material	for	the	case,	covering	
the	main	news	on	Cunha’s	involvement	in	the	Lava-Jato	case.	Each	of	these,	in	turn,	contains	more	
hyperlinks,	through	which	one	can	eventually	trace	the	story	back	to	the	CPI	session	of	March	2015	
mentioned	in	the	quote.	Systematically,	the	sentences	of	the	news	item	can	be	broken	down	into	
the	following	elements:	
	
I. Immediate	past	(the	speech	act	–	Cunha’s	statement)		
i. 	presidente	da	Câmara	dos	Deputados,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	disse	nesta	terça-feira	(3)	
II. Future	(the	object	of	the	statement)		
					ii.	 que	irá	provar	no	Conselho	de	Ética		
III. Factual	but	contested	past	(Cunha	spoke	in	CPI	session)	
				iii.							que	não	faltou	com	a	verdade.	
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IV. Pre-immediate	past	(the	background	event	of	Cunha’s	statement)		
				iv.							A	declaração	foi	dada	horas	após	o	conselho	instaurar	processo		
V. Possible	past	#1	(the	object	of	the	coming	ethics	committee	investigation	–	determining	if	it	
was	a	breach	of	decorum)		
v.						para	investigar	se	Cunha	cometeu	quebra	de	decoro	parlamentar	por	não	ter	declarado	à	Justiça	Eleitoral	
ter	contas	bancárias	na	Suíça	atribuídas	a	ele	e	a	parentes.		
VI. Factual	Past	(evidence	of	the	accounts)		
vi.	 	 	 	 Segundo	 a	 Procuradoria	 Geral	 da	 República,	 documentos	 enviados	 pelo	 Ministério	 Público	 suíço	
confirmam	a	existência	dessas	contas.		
VII. Factual	Past	(Cunha	spoke	in	CPI	session)	
				vii.					Em	depoimento	à	CPI	da	Petrobras,	em	março,	Cunha	negou	
VIII. Possible	past	#2	(Cunha’s	denial	of	the	factual	past	#2)		
				viii.			ter	qualquer	conta	no	exterior.	
	
This	 text,	 like	 the	previous	one,	exists	 in	a	 serial	 relationship	 to	other	 texts:	 The	 latter	example	
relates	 to	 the	ongoing	coverage	of	Cunha’s	alleged	 lies	and	accounts,	while	 the	 former	example	
serializes	political	scandals	intertextually,	linking	Petrolão	to	Mensalão	and	even	further	back.	Both	
examples	demonstrate	the	back-and-forth	zig-zag	movements	of	tempus	(common	to	many	kinds	
of	news,	see	Bell	1991:150),	where	the	context	of	the	past	motivates	coverage	of	immediate-past	
events;	the	inclusion	of	future	events,	meanwhile,	foreshadows	resolution	to	conflicts	presented	or	
implied	in	the	recent	event.	Such	emplotment	of	resolution	is	not	only	intertextual,	but	may	also	
crop	up	in	the	text	itself.	In	the	latter	example,	the	relationship	between	Cunha’s	trial	in	the	Ethics	
Committee	and	the	trials	in	the	STF	is	mentioned	later,	with	one	potential	resolution	mentioned:	“o	
processo	no	Supremo	já	tem	como	consequência,	no	caso	de	condenação,	a	perda	de	mandato,	o	
que	dispensaria	 a	necessidade	do	Conselho	de	Ética.”	 (G1	3/11	2015).	 In	 fact,	 the	 consequence	
turned	out	to	be	not	only	a	revoked	mandate,	but	a	unanimous	prison	sentence	in	the	STF.		
	
Another	example	of	serial	coverage	shows	that,	even	caught	in	media	res,	a	news	item	may	still	have	
an	endpoint	which	terminates	the	arc	of	the	fabula.	This	news	item,	with	the	headline	“Favorável	
ao	 impeachment,	 líder	 do	 PR	 na	 Câmara	 entrega	 cargo,”	 deals	with	 the	 gradual	 rupture	 of	 the	
government	coalition,	specifically	the	break-off	of	the	coalition	support	party	PR,	and	the	text	clearly	
projects	the	future	outcome	of	that	event,	namely,	the	impeachment	of	Dilma	Rousseff:	
	
Favorável	ao	impeachment	de	Dilma	Rousseff	(PT),	o	deputado	Maurício	Quintela	[sic]	Lessa	(PR-AL)	entregou	
no	fim	da	tarde	desta	segunda-feira	(11)	a	liderança	do	partido	na	Câmara,	cargo	que	ocupava	desde	o	início	
do	segundo	mandato	da	petista.	A	Executiva	Nacional	do	PR	é	contrária	à	saída	de	Dilma,	mas	a	maioria	dos	40	
deputados	do	partido	na	Câmara,	a	quinta	maior	bancada	da	Casa,	é	favorável	ao	impeachment.	
	
[...]	Os	deputados	da	sigla	estão	liberados	para	votar	como	quiserem,	mas	Maurício	Quintela	calcula	que,	dos	
40,	 entre	 25	 e	 30	 votos	 devem	 ser	 pelo	 impeachment	 no	 próximo	 domingo,	 dia	 17	 de	 abril,	 quando	 está	
prevista	a	votação	no	plenário.	"Não	só	tenho	absoluta	certeza	de	que	houve	o	crime	de	responsabilidade,	
como,	do	ponto	de	vista	político,	achamos	que	o	governo	da	presidente	Dilma	não	tem	a	menor	condição	de	
tirar	 o	 país	 da	 crise	 que	 se	 encontra	 hoje.	 Achamos	 que	 com	 o	 governo	 novo,	 o	 país	 terá	 pelo	menos	 a	
esperança	de	dias	melhores,	credibilidade,	oportunidades	de	voltar	a	crescer",	 justificou	Lessa	sua	posição.	
(F11/4	2016)	
	
In	this	example,	the	temporal	aspects	are	seemingly	much	more	straight-forward	than	in	the	first	
two	 examples.	 With	 only	 the	 party	 boss’	 voice	 present,	 Rousseff’s	 crime	 is	 represented	 “with	
absolute	certainty,”	motivating	the	expected	ousting,	and	Quintella’s	direct	quote	even	spells	out	a	
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hope	for	a	better	future	for	the	country	when	the	impeachment	of	Rousseff	succeeds	–	with	his	aid	
and	the	aid	of	his	partisans.		
	
The	 temporal	 concepts	 of	 anticipation	 and	 expectation,	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.4,	 may	 help	
understand	 how	 news	 constructs	 horizons	 of	 political	 agency.	 The	 above	 example	 of	 temporal	
prolepsis	demonstrates	how	the	fall	of	the	Rousseff	government	is	clearly	anticipated	in	the	media	
texts;	in	fact,	it	is	precisely	the	increasing	possibility	of	impeachment	that	makes	news	such	as	the	
statements	of	the	PR	party	boss	newsworthy.	Every	bit	of	information	that	mattered	in	the	struggle	
for	votes	against	or	in	favour	of	impeaching	Rousseff	was	turned	into	a	news	piece	online	by	the	
daily	newspapers,	so	that	the	total	volume	of	news	on	impeachment	sky-rocketed	in	March,	April	
and	May	2016	(see	appendix	C).	While	by	themselves	insignificant,	the	accumulation	of	news	items	
became	a	torrent	of	signals	that	indicated	the	likelihood	of	Rousseff	losing	the	vote	and	eventually	
being	removed	from	office	–	just	as	in	the	example	above.		
	
The	gradual	realization,	provoked	by	the	evidence	leaking	from	the	Lava-Jato	investigations,	that	
the	 Petrobras	 subcontractors	 paid	 off	 not	 just	 government	 leaders,	 but	 scores	 of	 Congressmen	
across	the	board,	only	rarely	challenged	the	expected	outcome.	The	example	below	is	one	of	few	
reports	which	mention	the	possibility	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	producing	results	that	could	
change	the	course	of	the	impeachment:	
	
Marcelo	Odebrecht	decide	fazer	delação	premiada	na	Lava	Jato	
Maior	 empreiteira	 do	 País,	 no	 dia	 em	 que	 foi	 alvo	 de	 mais	 uma	 fase	 das	 investigações	 de	 corrupção	 na	
Petrobrás	 admitiu	 em	 nota	 oficial	 acordo	 de	 'colaboração	 definitiva'	 de	 seus	 executivos	 com	 o	Ministério	
Público	Federal…	Mais	influente	empreiteira	do	País,	a	Odebrecht	mantém	sólidos	contatos	com	o	universo	da	
política	brasileira.	Por	isso,	o	anúncio	agitou	os	gabinetes	de	Brasília	no	início	da	noite	de	ontem.	A	expectativa	
é	 de	 que	Marcelo	 Odebrecht	 e	 os	 demais	 executivos	 possam	 revelar	 detalhes	 capazes	 de	 impactar	 até	 o	
processo	de	impeachment	da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff.	(E22/3	2016)	
	
Overall,	as	described	in	section	4.5.4,	impeachment	appeared	to	be	a	fait	accompli	in	March	and	
April	of	2016;	the	endpoint	of	that	story	would	be	realized	as	a	matter	of	when,	rather	than	if.	In	
the	same	vein,	the	previous	chapter	contained	several	other	examples	of	teleology	in	news	reports,	
projecting,	 for	 instance,	 “the	 end	 of	 the	 Republic”	 or	 the	 fall	 of	 Cunha	 through	 various	 legal	
processes,	just	after	his	“meteoric	ascension”	to	power.	It	might	not	seem	surprising	that	legal	trials	
such	as	Cunha’s	are	presented	with	textual	reference	to	the	resolution	or	expected	outcome	of	a	
sentence.	However,	because	of	the	usual	impunity	in	Brazilian	corruption	cases,	such	an	outcome	
carried	strong	symbolic	aspects.	Since	actual	cases	of	court	sentencing	of	politicians	were	few	and	
far	between,	that	most	iconic	moment	thinkable	–	the	ex-president	Lula	being	taken	away	by	police	
agents	 in	handcuffs	–	was	 considered	 to	be	even	more	 symbolic.	 That	moment	did	not	actually	
manifest	itself	 in	2016,	but	the	expectation	of	it	was	no	doubt	present.	A	number	of	news	items	
discussed	 the	 legality	 and	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 Lula’s	 coercive	 testimony	 (reported	 in	 the	 Jornal	
Nacional	on	March	4),	and	some	pundits	claimed	that	Lula	had	expected	hand-cuffs	as	part	of	the	
police	operation.	One	pundit,	using	ascription	(see	section	1.5),	even	had	Lula	insist	on	being	taken	
away	in	handcuffs,	with	the	aim	of	underscoring	his	narrative	of	political	persecution:	
	
[Segundo	relatos,	Lula]	teria	dito	que	só	iria	algemado.	E	depois	usou	de	todo	o	seu	carisma	e	verve	para	falar	
aos	 seus	 seguidores.	 Se	 Lula	 condena	 Moro	 por	 um	 “espetáculo”,	 pretendeu	 combater	 espetáculo	 com	
espetáculo,	numa	estratégia	de	vitimização.	(E9/3	2016)	
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In	an	op-ed	two	days	later,	also	in	Estado,	the	expectation	of	handcuffs	is	repeated,	as	element	in	a	
predictive	interpretation	wherein	Lula	wants	to	appear	as	victim.	However,	in	this	interpretation,	
Lula	 came	 off	 much	 too	 angry	 to	 pull	 off	 convincingly	 the	 stance	 of	 the	 unjustly	 arrested	 and	
oppressed	citizen:	
	
As	crises	assumem	ritmos	mais	rápidos	no	seu	final.	A	reação	de	Lula	na	entrevista	coletiva,	ao	sair	da	PF,	não	
me	pareceu	a	de	um	candidato.	Em	2002	foi	difícil	vencer	com	o	“Lulinha	paz	e	amor”.	Em	2018	será	impossível	
vencer	como	jararaca.	Um	candidato	não	se	identifica	com	uma	cobra	peçonhenta.	Nem	se	considera	a	alma	
mais	honesta	do	Brasil.	Verdade	que	seu	marqueteiro	está	na	cadeia.	Mas	onde	está	a	intuição	política	que	
sempre	lhe	atribuem?	Ele	perdeu	a	cabeça	e,	com	ela,	a	chance	de	representar	a	serenidade	do	inocente.	Seu	
marqueteiro	representou.	Não	evitou	a	cadeia,	mas,	pelo	menos,	era	um	script	mais	elaborado.	Lula	queria	ser	
algemado.	(E11/3	2016,	see	also	appendix	A,	figure	A.24)	
	
Through	this	temporal	prolepsis	-	a	hypothetical	but	non-realized	situation	with	Lula	in	handcuffs	-	
the	 event	 is	 located	 as	 part	 of	 a	 pattern,	 as	 one	 in	 a	 rhythmic	 series	 of	 “crisis	moments.”	One	
paragraph	later,	the	same	pundit	considers	the	coming	end	of	the	Rousseff	government	and	the	
likely	 fall	of	Cunha	(who	had	at	 that	point	been	charged	before	the	Supreme	Court)	as	 the	next	
critical	moments	that	could	lead	to	some	optimism	on	the	market	with	a	recovery	of	the	national	
economy.	The	moments	are	then	tied	into	the	street	protests	planned	for	the	following	Sunday:	
	
Apesar	de	seu	ritmo,	os	últimos	dias	têm	trazido	uma	ponta	de	otimismo,	mesmo	nos	mercados,	que	são	tão	
voláteis.	Esse	otimismo	está	baseado	na	queda	de	Dilma,	mas	deve	ser	estendido	também	a	Eduardo	Cunha.	
Os	dois	são	rejeitados	pela	maioria.	Não	se	trata	apenas	de	festejar	uma	queda,	desfazer-se	de	uma	pedra	no	
caminho.	É	criar	uma	chance	de,	superando	o	impasse	político,	recuperar	a	economia.	
	
O	que	move	as	pessoas	no	domingo	não	é	só	a	unânime	luta	contra	a	corrupção,	mas	também	a	clareza	sobre	
as	dificuldades	cotidianas.	Elas	podem	não	ter	uma	noção	clara	do	que	deva	ser	feito.	Mas	sabem	que	algo	
precisa	ser	feito.	E	urgente.	(E11/3	2016)	
	
That	the	pundit	identifies	a	rhythm	is	interesting	because	that	interpretation	of	events	summons	
forth	 the	pattern	before	 the	events	have	even	manifested	 themselves.	The	events	 linked	 in	 the	
example	 are	 also	 the	most	 important	mediated	 events	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal,	
judging	by	the	political	consequences.	Hundreds	of	legal	trials	have	been	initiated,	but	the	removal	
of	Cunha	and	Rousseff,	the	incarceration	of	Lula	and	the	protests	during	March	2016	were	certainly	
the	most	highly-profiled	moments.	The	author	could	not	know	their	political	significance,	but	clearly	
had	a	well-developed	sense	of	where	things	would	go.	The	example	is,	for	exactly	that	reason,	good	
for	summarizing	the	findings	of	this	section.	It	shows	how	news	items	and	political	commentary	is	
always	located	in	media	res	but	with	a	sense	of	an	end-point	and	point	of	departure,	or	temporal	
compass	markings	that	may	be	revealed	by	analyzing	temporal	modes.		
		
By	ascription	and	prediction,	 interpretations	are	stabilized	and	chains	of	events	established	that	
point	towards	an	endpoint	and	a	resolution.	The	resolution	works	to	conclude	an	emplotted	seriality	
between	certain	events,	contingently	selected	(Somers	1994),	and	the	relevance	of	any	information	
presented	in	the	news	items	is	linked	to	this	seriality.	In	other	words,	the	narrative	emplotment	is	
an	 important	 resource	 for	 claiming	 newsworthiness.	 When	 intertextually	 stretching	 towards	
resolutions	or	end-goal	(say,	impeachment,	a	court	sentence,	or	Lula	being	taken	to	jail),	such	news	
generates	what	I	will	characterize,	in	the	following,	as	narrative	desire.		
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5.2	Narrative	Desire	in	Emplotment	of	Real	Events	
In	the	above	examples	(and	in	various	examples	of	the	previous	chapter,	e.g.	V#2435,	E17/7	2015,	
and	the	quotes	of	the	prosecutor	Santos	Lima	in	section	4.4.1),	several	different	narrative	desires	
are	articulated.	 I	 introduced	the	concept	of	narrative	desire	 in	Chapter	2	with	 these	words:	The	
desire	 for	narrative	closure	 is	 the	point	where	 temporality	connects	with	 the	cast	of	characters,	
invested	with	values.	As	discussed	above,	most	story	arcs	that	deal	with	corruption	are	directed	
towards	an	endpoint	-	usually	an	ending	with	either	the	fall	of	the	accused	(through	impeachment,	
removal	from	office,	or	sentence	and	prison	time),	or,	inversely,	the	accused	politician’s	success	in	
overcoming	the	legal	processes	and	political	problems.	I	have	here	analyzed	the	temporal	features	
of	 several	 media	 texts	 that	 may	 serve	 as	 illustrations	 of	 modes	 of	 temporality	 that	 generate	
narrative	desire	 through	anticipation;	 specifically,	 the	desire	 for	ousting	Rousseff,	 the	desire	 for	
Cunha’s	fall	and	for	corruption	trials	against	other	corrupted	Congressmen,	and	the	desire	to	see	
Lula	in	handcuffs	at	Sérgio	Moro’s	bidding.	In	this	section,	I	will	develop	the	argument	that	these	
desires	 are	defining	 features	of	 fabulas	 (see	 section	2.3),	 using	 the	 just	mentioned	examples	of	
narrative	desires.		
	
First,	I	will	clear	up	one	potential	misunderstanding:	I	am	not	implicitly	blaming	Brazilian	journalists	
for	being	biased	against	PT	and	Cunha,	unconsciously	or	not.	While	 that	claim	 is	often	explicitly	
made	by	various	Brazilian	 scholars	of	media	and	politics	 (e.g.	 van	Dijk	2017,	Albuquerque	2017,	
Chaia	2016:52,	Souza	2016),	my	claim	is	more	limited.	With	the	examples	above,	I	simply	hope	to	
show	that	events	in	scandals	are	covered	because	they	are	deemed	newsworthy	on	the	grounds	of	
their	 likely	 consequences.	 Those	 consequences	are	defined	 institutionally,	 and	 the	projection	of	
futures	found	in	the	news	are	basically	accounts	of	likely	scenarios	within	the	relevant	institutional	
frameworks.	 As	 such,	 the	 journalists	 merely	 reproduce	 the	 “webs	 of	 facticity”	 and	 the	
commonplace,	 institutionally	 sanctioned	 interpretations	 of	 events.	 What	 emerges	 both	 in	 and	
especially	 between	 singular	 instances	 of	 news	 reporting	 on	 real	 life	 events,	 however,	 is	 the	
narrativization	of	these	scenarios,	as	hypothesized	in	Chapter	2.	Some	journalists	would	argue	that	
the	telling	has	nothing	to	do	with	narratives;	the	notion	of	narrative	structures	and	desires	impinging	
upon	factual,	objective	reporting	seems	embarrassing.	Hayden	White	offered	an	explanation	as	to	
why	narratives	are	embarrassments	in	the	accounts	of	real	events:		
	
It	 is	because	 real	events	do	not	offer	 themselves	as	stories	 that	 their	narrativization	 is	 so	difficult.	What	 is	
involved	then,	in	that	finding	the	“true	story”,	that	discovery	of	the	“real	story”	within	or	behind	the	events	
that	come	to	us	in	the	chaotic	form	of	“historical	records”?	What	wish	is	enacted,	what	desire	is	gratified,	by	
the	fantasy	that	real	events	are	properly	represented	when	they	can	be	shown	to	display	the	formal	coherency	
of	a	story?	In	the	enigma	of	this	wish,	this	desire,	we	catch	a	glimpse	of	the	cultural	function	of	narrativizing	
discourse…	(White	1981:4)	
	
Coherency	 does	 not	 simply	 present	 itself	 to	 the	 journalist:	 It	 is	 always	 constructed,	 and	 co-
constructed	with	the	reader’s	 interpretations.	So,	 in	the	op-ed	piece	from	Estado	directly	above,	
coherency	is	almost	forced	upon	the	material,	although	it	may	seem	textually	fragile	to	the	outsider:	
What	is	the	pattern	or	rhythm	that	links	protests,	the	fall	of	Rousseff	and	of	Cunha,	and	the	not-
manifested	handcuffing	of	Lula	together?	How	does	coherency	emerge	here?		
	
The	last	few	paragraphs	of	the	op-ed	piece	above	postulate	the	optimism	of	the	market,	linking	this	
to	economic	recovery.	What	provokes	optimism	is	the	anticipation	of	Cunha’s	and	Rousseff’s	fall	
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(which	 in	 turn	 is	 linked	 to	 Lula,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter).	 The	protesters,	 or	 rather	
“people”	 in	 general	 (“as	 pessoas”),	 know	 that	 “something	 must	 be	 done,”	 urgently,	 in	 the	
“unanimous”	 fight	 against	 corruption,	 even	 “without	 a	 clear	 notion”	 of	 what	 that	 “something”	
should	be.	Their	protests	will	however	demonstrate	the	political	support	 for	 impeachment,	 thus	
precipitating	Rousseff’s	 fall	 and	strengthening	 the	virtuous	cycle	beginning	 in	 the	“volatile	 stock	
markets.”	This	projection	of	the	future	connects	the	text	to	one	emergent	fabula	–	a	fabula	of	the	
cleaning	 of	 Brazilian	 politics,	 starting	 with	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 The	 desired	 narrative	
resolution	 (popular	 protests)	 to	 the	 supposed	 or	 perceived	main	 problem	 (political	 leaders	 like	
Rousseff	 or	 Cunha)	 gives	 a	 strong	 clue	 about	 the	 kind	of	 fabula	 that	 this	 text	 draws	upon.	 This	
narrative	desire	directs	attention	and	demands	confirmation:	If	the	protests	turn	out	to	be	a	success,	
then	the	success	of	the	impeachment	proceedings	is	accordingly	more	likely.	Similarly,	every	time	a	
coalition	party	breaks	from	government	(like	the	PR	party),	it	brings	the	impeachment	a	little	closer,	
and	is	narrated	as	doing	so.	Causality	works	forwards	in	this	emplotment,	because	the	news	item	
stands	in	media	res	(Motta	2013:97).		
	
The	temporal	horizon	of	this	desired	forward-movement	limits	the	temporal	extent	of	fabulas.	That	
is,	the	limits	of	a	given	fabula’s	scope	is	based	on	the	narrative	desire:	The	interrogation	or	coercive	
testimony	 of	 Lula	 generates	 the	 expectation	 of	 a	 trial,	 and	 the	 eventual	 trial	 will	 generate	 the	
expectation	of	a	sentence	(rendering	Lula	ineligible	in	the	2018	elections),	and	this	should	ultimately	
be	 followed	by	 incarceration.	The	smaller	events	of	day-to-day	politics	and	 trials	are	 thus	made	
meaningful	 and	 gain	 importance	 (that	 is,	 made	 newsworthy)	 because	 they	 actualize	 and	 even	
“speed	up”	the	present-now	towards	a	narrative	climax	or	solution.	The	desire	for	resolution	is	built	
into	the	ongoing	sense-making	activity	of	constructing	a	coherent	emplotment	of	complex	political	
events	and	horizons	of	action.		
	
The	construction	of	coherency	usually	involves	reducing	complexity	and	ignoring	large	swathes	of	
political	 reality.	 In	 other	 words,	 to	 produce	 meaningful	 but	 readable	 journalistic	 material,	
newsworkers	and	political	pundits	expound	on	the	basis	of	the	available	pool	of	fabulas,	which	may	
serve	to	cut	short	extended	background	explanations,	handle	doubt	and	“hedges,”	and	abbreviate	
the	forecasts	of	future	events.	Therefore,	the	presence	of	narrative	desire	(e.g.	to	see	PT	leaders	in	
jail)	in	news	texts	is	not	necessarily	a	clear-cut	case	of	ideological	bias	on	the	part	of	the	journalist	
–	but	a	property	of	the	developing,	intertextually	emergent	fabulas.	That	is	not	to	say	that	counter-
narratives	do	not	exist,	and	that	journalists	and	commentators	are	totally	restrained	in	their	choice	
of	fabulas	from	which	they	may	draw	emplotments	of	events.	I	merely	point	out	that	the	genre	of	
news	 and	 the	 institutional	 circumstances	 of	 scandals	 together	 engender	 this	 specific	 temporal	
orientation	and	narrative	desire	 for	resolution	 in	the	texts.	 If	 the	texts	 failed	to	explain	the	root	
causes	 or	 ultimate	 consequences,	 they	 could	 hardly	 be	 recognized	 as	 newsworthy,	 nor	 as	 truly	
reporting	on	the	series	to	which	they	belong,	and	so	they	would	likely	be	discarded	by	editors.		
	
Journalists	are	 sometimes	prompted	by	 their	 sources	 to	 look	 for	 symbolic	 significance	 that	may	
emerge	as	emplotment	in	the	text.	In	the	previous	chapter,	we	saw	how	Cunha	and	Lula	defined	the	
investigations	as	political	persecution;	such	definitions	may	carry	over	into	the	media	texts	(and	into	
intertextually	 emerging	 fabula).	 Politicians	 are	not	 the	only	one	 to	play	 at	 that	 game,	however.	
Arantes	noted	that	the	Brazilian	press	since	the	early	00s	“has	been	filled	with	cleverly	named	police	
operations,”	and	the	catchy	names	engage	public	and	media	attention,	giving	“a	sense	of	the	result	
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and	the	likely	responsibility	of	those	being	implicated”	(Arantes	2011:201).	The	symbolic	naming	of	
operations	provides,	simultaneously,	an	informational	shortcut,	a	hashtag-like	function	for	digital	
and	cognitive	retrieval,	and	a	discursive	node	in	public	debate.	The	moniker	“Lava-Jato”	itself	was	
certainly	less	laden	with	symbolism	than	later	investigative	phases,	but	has	by	2018	gathered	up	all	
of	 the	 political	 history,	 and	 can	 now	 signify	 everything	 from	 the	 specific	 police	 agents	 and	
prosecutors	to	the	historical	moment	and	the	combat	against	corruption	in	general.	
	
With	the	power	to	name	operations	 in	clever	ways,	the	agents	and	prosecutors	of	the	Lava-Jato	
task-force	have	also	invoked	story	arcs	and	specific	narrative	desires.	Notable	examples	include	the	
police	 operations	 christened	 “Final	 Judgement”,	 “Xepa”,	 “Aletheia”,	 to	 name	 the	 most	 salient.	
Almost	every	operative	phase,	that	is,	every	sequence	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	that	involved	
arrests,	 coercive	 interrogations,	 and	 search	warrants,	was	 named	by	 the	 task-force	 (three	 early	
phases	and	the	46th	phase	were	never	named).	Some	names	were	clearly	chosen	for	their	symbolic	
relation	to	the	task-force’s	interpretation	of	events:	“Aletheia,”	the	revelation	of	truth,	is	referring	
both	to	Heideggerian	and	ancient	Greek	concepts	of	the	unveiling	truth	moment	(for	Lula),	while	
the	 operation	 “Resta	 Um”	 targeted	 the	 Petrobras	 sub-contractor	 that	 had	 avoided	 being	
investigated	until	that	day.	The	name	of	the	“Xepa”	phase	(the	word	“apex”	backwards)	signified	
that	the	task-force	reached	the	top	of	the	corruption	scheme	–	the	Odebrecht	group.	In	appendix	
B,	 I	have	compiled	a	 list	of	phase	names	 (and	 their	 timeline	and	 targets).	 The	mythological	 and	
graphological	 implications	 of	 such	 naming	 suggest	 certain	 endpoints	 and	 outcomes	 of	 the	
investigations.	Several	other	phase	names	are	wordplays	on	the	investigated	targets,	and	some	are	
named	after	classical	Greek	and	Roman	figures.	A	number	of	phases	are	named	for	Italian	concepts	
and	films	as	a	kind	of	tribute	to	the	Mani	Pulite	operation	that	was	carried	out	in	Italy	in	the	1990s	
against	a	vast	corruption	network	in	national	politics.	Because	it	broke	the	rule	of	silence	in	mafia-
politics	(the	rule	called	the	“Omertá,”	which	became	another	phase	name),	this	operation	served	as	
inspiration	to	judge	Moro	(Moro	2004),	although	it	brought	with	it	the	ascension	of	Silvio	Berlusconi.	
By	maintaining	the	overall	Lava-Jato	moniker	for	the	task-force,	and	continuing	to	refer	to	this	ur-
disclosure	of	corruption	in	Petrobras	even	when	investigating	cases	completely	outside	of	the	state	
company,	the	police	force	is	also	utilizing	the	effect	of	seriality.	
	
In	 the	section	above,	we	saw	pseudo-seriality	at	work	 linking	the	Lava-Jato	 investigations	to	the	
revelations	 and,	 crucially,	 to	 the	 outcome	of	 the	Mensalão	 scandal.	 This	 outcome	was	 deemed	
successful	at	first	because	it	broke	the	de	facto	rule	of	impunity	for	Brazilian	politicians,	and	that	is	
then	the	standard	by	which	the	Lava-Jato	trials	are	measured.	The	Mensalão	outcome	provides	not	
only	a	pattern	for	the	Lava-Jato	case	(or	Petrolão,	as	it	was	called	from	time	to	time),	but	also	the	
demand	to	reveal	certain	gaps	left	by	the	Mensalão.	In	that	scandal,	the	suspicion	lingered	that	Lula	
was	aware	and	even	responsible	for	the	kickback	schemes	distributed	to	Congress	members	(see	
Chapter	 3	 and	 Damgaard	 2015a).	 Although	 Petrobras	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	 slush	 funds	
revealed	in	the	Mensalão	case,	the	narrative	desire	for	a	sentencing	of	Lula	could	thus	perhaps	be	
remedied	through	the	revelations	of	the	Lava-Jato	case.	Thus,	this	is	pseudo-seriality,	or	a	transfer	
of	the	elements	of	the	same	narrative	structure	and	desire.	
	
Another	case	of	narrative	transfer	was	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	where	we	saw	four	
examples	(see	section	4.5.1)	of	the	overlaps	of	Lava-Jato	exposés	to	the	gradual	crumbling	of	the	
governing	coalition	in	early	2016;	here,	the	outcome	expected	is	a	new	government	taking	the	reins	
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from	 Rousseff,	 and	 the	 means	 to	 that	 end	 is	 the	 undermining	 of	 Rousseff	 through	 corruption	
allegations,	however	unrelated	to	the	fiscal	manoeuvres	of	the	pedaladas	(see	section	4.5).		
	
Two	other	specific	outcomes	are	worth	unpacking	further,	because	they	link	fabulas	in	non-serial	
ways.	Instead,	these	two	outcomes	appear	to	provide	narrative	resolutions	to	the	respective	desires	
in	more	complex	ways	than	mere	seriality.	
	
First,	although	the	notion	of	Eduardo	Cunha’s	retaliation	was	developed	already	in	November	2015,	
the	contours	of	the	fabula	of	Golpe,	a	coup	d’état,	only	solidified	as	actors	besides	Cunha	(leaders	
from	both	PMDB	and	PSDB)	were	 revealed	 to	work	 from	 less-than-Republican	motives.	Various	
leaks	and	hints	gradually	allowed	for	a	retrospective	re-writing	of	the	impeachment	and	trials	of	PT	
members	as	a	backstage	deal	 in	Congress	orchestrated	to	stop	the	Lava-Jato	 investigations	from	
reaching	them.	With	the	Supreme	Court’s	removal	of	Cunha	as	President	of	the	Câmara	 in	May,	
elements	of	this	fabula	of	Golpe	was	even	officially	sanctioned,	but	not	in	time	to	save	Rousseff’s	
mandate.	 The	 temporality	 here	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 internal	 analepsis	 (Genette	 1980:49),	 a	
second-order	narrative	interfering	with	the	structure	and	causal	links	of	the	surface	story.		
	
A	 second	example	of	 such	a	complex	 temporality	 is	 the	combination	of	 Lula’s	 interrogation	and	
Rousseff’s	 increasingly	 close	 relation	 to	 Lula	 in	March	2016.	 Since	 Lula	had	been	an	outsider	 to	
Rousseff’s	government	for	several	years,	and	frequently	critical	(in	2015)	of	the	perceived	orthodox	
economic	team	led	by	Joaquim	Levy,	the	increasing	narrative	intertwinement	of	their	fates	was	in	a	
way	 surprising.	 With	 the	 interrogation	 of	 Lula,	 the	 suspicions	 that	 clung	 to	 him	 apparently	
undermined	 the	 idea	 of	 reinforcing	 the	 Rousseff	 cabinet.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 close	 connection	
between	Lula	and	Rousseff	as	the	twin	masterminds	of	the	Petrobras	corruption	(which	Veja	had	
denounced	on	the	eve	of	the	2014	second	round	of	elections;	see	appendix	A,	figure	A.4)	was	not	
present	in	the	coverage	of	Lula’s	corruption	seen,	for	instance,	in	the	Jornal	Nacional	(detailed	in	
the	previous	chapter).	The	testimony	of	Delcídio	do	Amaral	had	helped	resuscitate	the	fabula	of	a	
Rousseff-Lula	scheme	somewhat;	and	with	the	published	recordings	of	March	2016,	a	new	focal	
point	 of	 the	 scandal	 emerged	 in	 which	 both	 are	 “caught	 in	 plotting.”	 Since	 the	 particular	 and	
personal	responsibility	of	Rousseff	in	fiscal	delays	and	state	budget	expenditure	overshoots	was	still	
a	bit	unclear,	the	phone	taps	provided	a	convenient	cause	for	 indignation	that	could	ground	the	
coalition	parties	jump-ship	strategy	(Balán	2011).	The	temporal	structure	of	the	story	level	here	is	
complex,	 as	 it	 combines	and	 subsumes	 two	 independent	 storylines	of	 the	past	 (of	pedaladas	 in	
Rousseff’s	period	and	of	the	Petrobras	graft	in	Lula’s	period)	and	only	ties	them	together	with	the	
botched	nomination	of	Lula	 for	minister.	This	heterodiegetic	analepsis	 (Genette	1980:50)	of	two	
stories	can	only	come	together	in	combination	with	a	third	story,	that	of	the	Lava-Jato	task-force	
and	 judge	Moro’s	 successful	operations,	which	provokes	 the	disclosure	of	 Lula’s	 corruption	and	
requires	Rousseff	to	shield	Lula	with	the	foro	privilegiado	of	a	cabinet	position.		
	
The	complex	organization	of	time	in	news	is	nothing	new,	but	still,	studies	that	look	to	temporal	
organization	 of	 news	 discourse	 have	 not	 linked	 such	 organizing	 structures	 to	 political	 action	 –	
precisely	because	analyses	of	news	items	tend	to	balk	at	going	on	to	the	analysis	of	intertextually	
emergent	 temporal	 structures	 of	 discourse.	 This	 is	 the	 topic	 of	 the	 following	 sections,	 treated	
through	a	presentation	of	 six	 fabulas	 that	 I	 have	abstracted	 from	 the	material	presented	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	how	the	fabulas	cropped	up	as	the	purported	grounds	
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and	 discursive	 backdrop	 of	 a	 range	 of	 political	 events	 and	 judicial	 interventions	 (all	 the	 while	
acknowledging	 that	 completely	 different	motives	 also	 played	 a	 role).	 The	 narrative	 desires	 and	
structures	are	reflected	in	the	actions	and	utterances	of	political	actors	(such	as	the	moment	where	
Lula,	in	the	quoted	speech	in	the	Jornal	Nacional	on	March	4,	calls	out	the	desire	to	persecute	him,	
or	in	Rousseff’s	various	denunciations	of	the	imminent	golpe).	The	actors’	adherence	to	narrative	
structures	 is	 not	merely	 rhetorical,	 however.	 Below,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 fabulas	 constrain	 and	 co-
constitute	the	field	of	political	action,	and	in	the	following	chapter,	I	will	discuss	how	the	fabulas	
presented	here	have	limits	beyond	which	action	cannot	be	thought	nor	articulated.		
	
	
5.3	Six	Fabulas	of	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	and	the	Impeachment	Process	
The	previous	chapter	and	the	above	sections	have	shown,	in	glimpses,	several	different	desires	for	
narrative	solutions	to	the	scandals.	On	one	hand,	many	texts	can	be	grouped	by	the	extension	of	
the	 desire	 for	 punishment	 and	political	 change.	 In	 particular,	many	 texts	 focus	 on	 the	 eventual	
ousting	of	Rousseff,	while	fewer	texts	have	a	scope	of	desire	that	encompasses	all	of	Congress	and	
consider	the	political	elite	en	bloc	to	be	the	problem	that	needs	to	be	treated.	Some	texts	present	
the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 and	 earlier	 scandals	 as	 peas	 in	 a	 pod,	 but	 represent	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 as	 a	
decisive	break	or	rupture	that	may	solve	the	historic	inability	to	hold	politics	accountable.	On	the	
other	hand,	many	texts	articulate	the	inversed	notion	that	impeachment	of	Rousseff	and	the	trials	
of	Lula	were	staged	pseudo-legal	processes	to	gain	political	power.	By	casting	the	events	as	stages	
of	a	coup	d’état,	these	texts	resolve	different	problems	or	contradictions,	first	and	foremost	the	
contradiction	of	an	elected	government	and	President	with	little	popular	support.	
	
I	here	divide	up	the	six	fabulas	that	I	have	constructed	on	the	basis	of	the	textual	analysis	of	the	
previous	chapter	 into	 three	groups.	The	 first	 two	 fabulas	 tell	 the	 stories	of	a	 successful	 crusade	
against	 corruption	 and	 Impeachment	 of	 a	 President,	 while	 the	 next	 two	 stories	 invert	 the	
interpretation,	seeing	the	same	events	as	political	persecution	and	a	coup	d’état.	Finally,	two	more	
mirrored	stories	expand	the	cast	of	characters	 to	encompass	not	 just	 the	PT	 leaders,	seeing	the	
imminent	downfall	of	the	political	elite	as	either	perfectly	positive	or	democratically	dangerous.		
	
The	method	of	analytically	constructing	these	fabulas	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	The	main	points	
of	 this	 can	 be	 boiled	 down	 as	 follows:	 Fabulas	 are	 constructed	 analytically	 from	 intertextual	
convergences	between	groups	of	texts	that	exhibit	 identical	emplotment	of	events	and	 identical	
temporal	structures,	actors,	and	arcs.	They	are	models,	much	like	Max	Weber’s	ideal-types	(Weber	
1922,	1.I.6),	that	are	intentionally	purified	of	the	empirical	clutter,	but	the	elements	making	up	each	
fabula	are	abstracted	from	actual	texts.	Certain	keywords	cling	to	some	text	groups,	and	I	use	these	
monikers	 for	naming	the	fabulas.	 In	each	summary	of	the	fabulas,	 I	will	mostly	 ignore	the	many	
possible	narrated	versions	(which	 in	the	narratological	terminology	would	be	termed	stories),	by	
reducing	the	temporal	sequence	to	straightforward	chronology	starting	from	a	transgression	event	
and	ending	with	a	resolution.	As	mentioned	at	the	start	of	Chapter	4,	the	constructed	fabulas	are	
the	contingent	results	of	a	hermeneutic	procedure,	developed	in	order	to	improve	understanding	
of	the	possible	meanings	distributed	across	the	analyzed	textual	system.	
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Fabula	1	–	Crusade	against	Corruption	
[Transgression	event]		
The	 graft	 in	 Petrobras	 via	 overpriced	 construction	 contracts	 was	 installed	 by	 PT	 governments,	
maintained	 while	 the	 Mensalão	 scandal	 unfolded,	 and	 it	 kept	 PT	 in	 power	 throughout	 three	
presidential	periods.		
[Resolution]		
However,	the	adroitly	executed	investigations,	commanded	with	surprising	celerity	by	the	Curitiba	
Lava-Jato	task	force	under	the	auspices	of	Sérgio	Moro,	exposed	the	plot	that	for	a	decade	had	cost	
the	Brazilian	nation	billions,	bringing	the	main	culprits	to	trial:	Dirceu,	Vaccari	Neto,	and	first	of	all	
Lula.	In	the	trials,	justice	was	served	when	their	guilt	was	demonstrated	and	sanctioned	by	several	
independent	instances	of	the	judicial	system.	The	PT	masterminds,	like	the	corrupt	subcontractors,	
received	severe	sentences.	The	revelation	of	the	corruption	and	the	punishment	of	PT	leaders	thus	
ended	the	13	years	of	socialist	governments	in	Brazil.	
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]		
The	Petrolão	scandal	and	trials	concluded	the	earlier	trial	of	the	Mensalão	scandal:	This	trial	did	not	
find	proof	of	Lula’s	guilt,	and	even	the	PT	leaders	that	were	convicted	in	2012	were	let	off	the	hook	
too	easily	by	presidential	pardons.	With	the	exposure	of	Lula’s	role	as	instigator	of	the	abuse	of	state	
resources	for	political	and	private	purposes,	and	with	his	sentence	in	2017	and	prison	term	in	2018,	
the	failures	of	the	earlier	trial	found	a	resolution.		
	
Fabula	1a	-	Impeaching	the	incompetent	and	corrupt	President	
[Transgression	event]	
By	masking	budget	deficits,	Dilma	Rousseff	tried	to	hide	the	fact	from	Congress	and	the	Brazilians	
that	the	state	budget	was	in	bad	shape,	and	she	let	the	public	banks	take	the	brunt	of	the	fiscal	
problems	in	2014.	This	was	an	intentional	act,	ordered	from	the	Planalto,	in	violation	of	the	fiscal	
responsibility	 law	(LRF).	Rousseff	 in	effect	financed	the	unjust	distribution	of	wealth	through	the	
programs	 “Minha	Casa,	Minha	Vida”	 and	 the	Bolsa	 Familia	 program	by	denying	 the	banks	 their	
interest	rates,	working	around	the	norms	of	transparent	financial	governance	of	the	state	budget,	
and	by	painting	an	optimistic	picture	of	the	national	economy.	Even	if	the	interest	rates	were	paid	
back	to	the	banks	in	2015,	other	sanctioned	limits	to	the	budget	deficit	were	still	violated	by	the	
Rousseff	administration.		
[Resolution]			
The	trio	of	lawyers	Bicudo,	Reale	and	Paschoal	formulated	a	coherent	criticism	of	the	violations,	and	
Cunha	accepted	their	petition	for	impeaching	Rousseff,	which	was	ratified	in	four	instances,	by	both	
special	commissions	of	the	Câmara	and	the	Senate,	and	by	the	plenaries	of	Congress,	overseen	by	
the	 Supreme	Court	 President	 Lewandowski.	 Thus,	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 proceedings	was	 observed	
throughout,	 and	 Rousseff	 was	 forced	 to	 step	 down	 in	 August	 2016	 in	 consequence	 of	 her	
transgressions.		
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]		
The	voluminous	documentation	of	pedaladas	and	other	violations	of	the	LRF	effectively	provides	
the	grounds	for	removing	Rousseff	and	installing	new	fiscal	management	of	the	state,	including	the	
eventual	budget	 limit	 law	(PEC	de	Teto	dos	Gastos),	which	was	widely	unpopular,	but	necessary	
because	 of	 the	 mismanagement	 of	 the	 state	 coffers	 under	 Rousseff.	 The	 impeachment	 was	 a	
necessary	adjustment	to	irresponsible	fiscal	policies	and	a	just	response	to	the	deceit	of	voters	who	
believed	the	lie	that	Rousseff	had	things	under	control.				
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Fabula	2	–	Coup	d’état	
[Transgression	event]	
The	original	sin	of	this	fabula	is	the	manoeuvres	of	Eduardo	Cunha:	Using	impeachment	as	a	threat	
in	order	to	protect	his	own	interests	in	the	Ethics	Council,	Cunha	initiated	the	impeachment	process	
in	order	to	divert	attention	from	his	own	case	and	to	lift	his	colleague	Temer	to	the	presidency.		The	
media	played	along	with	this,	and	the	over-exposure	of	corruption	in	PT	was	symptomatic	of	the	
anti-socialist	bias	in	the	Brazilian	media.	While	most	of	the	political	parties	ought	to	be	implicated	
in	the	scandal,	the	Lava-Jato	task-force	mostly	fed	the	media	with	bits	of	information	that	implicated	
PT	actors.	Several	leaks	were	obviously	designed	to	create	a	political	climate	hostile	to	President	
Rousseff	(for	example,	the	leak	of	Alberto	Youssef’s	testimony	prior	to	the	second	round	of	elections	
in	2014,	and	the	leak	before	Lula	took	office	in	March	2016).	With	the	constant	media	attacks	on	PT	
and	Rousseff,	the	rest	of	the	political	parties	that	had	gained	from	the	graft	in	Petrobras	negotiated	
a	backstage	deal	to	oust	Rousseff	and	then	put	Vice-President	Temer	in	power	with	the	ultimate	
aim	 of	 stopping	 the	 investigations	 once	 PT	 had	 been	 removed.	 By	 impeaching	 Rousseff,	 the	
sovereign	decision	of	the	electorate	was	revoked,	and	the	impeachment	was	thus	a	coup	d’état.	
[Resolution]			
Ex-senator	and	Transpetro	director	Sergio	Machado	had	recorded	PMDB	actors	discussing	how	to	
go	about	the	ousting,	revealing	their	vested	anti-democratic	intentions.	With	these	recordings	and	
later	phone	taps	of	Temer	and	Aécio	Neves,	it	became	apparent	that	for	the	government	parties	
that	jumped	ship	in	March	2016,	as	well	as	for	the	former	opposition,	the	point	of	ousting	Rousseff	
was	to	save	their	own	hides	by	intervening	in	the	police	investigations,	and	to	implement	several	
unpopular	reforms.	The	reforms	to	the	pension	system,	budget	limits,	and	labor	market	legislation	
would	then	leave	the	next	president	in	a	better	political	position,	freed	from	the	costly	negotiations	
needed	to	secure	reforms	without	electoral	support.	
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]		
This	 fabula	 explains	 two	problems	 for	 Rousseff:	 the	 corruption	 allegations	 and	 the	 low	 support	
during	 her	 second	 term.	 The	 Rousseff	 administration	 was	 never	 a	 corrupt	 government,	 and	
removing	 her	 only	 succeeded	 through	 a	 thoroughly	 anti-democratic	 and	 legally	 fraught	
impeachment	 proceeding,	 executed	 against	 the	will	 of	 the	 people	 by	 a	 small	 group	within	 the	
political	elite.	The	low	approval	ratings	of	the	Rousseff	government	were	an	artifact	of	the	media	
barrage,	and	the	unpopularity	of	Rousseff	was	eventually	exceeded	by	Temer.	The	fabula	explains	
both	 the	 political	 crisis	 and	 impeachment	 process	 as	 stages	 in	 the	 old	 elites’	 subversive	 self-
preservation	strategy,	aided	by	media	conglomerates.		
	
Fabula	2a	–	Political	Persecution	by	the	República	da	Curitiba	
[Transgression	event]	
Casting	any	and	all	of	Lula’s	projects	in	his	post-presidential	period	as	corrupt,	the	Lava-Jato	task-
force	 (called	 the	 “República	 da	 Curitiba,”	 see	 Castro	 2016	 and	 footnote	 9)	 executed	 a	 media	
campaign	to	tarnish	Lula’s	image	and	keep	him	from	being	a	viable	presidential	candidate	in	2018.	
Swan	 boats,	 public	 talks,	 and	 diplomatic	 missions	 to	 secure	 overseas	 contracts	 for	 Brazilian	
companies;	any	item	or	activity	could	be	linked	to	Lula’s	alleged	friends	in	the	business	world	and	
could	be	construed	as	a	kickback	paying	for	political	influence	in	Petrobras,	BNDES,	and	Congress.	
The	 quality	 of	 the	 evidence	 however	 vanishes	 into	 thin	 air,	 especially	 in	 the	 real	 estate	 cases,	
because	Lula	either	never	benefitted	(Guarujá	and	Instituto	Lula	cases)	or	never	knew	that	Petrobras	
subcontractors	had	been	involved	in	renovating	the	real	estate	(Atibaia	case).	
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[Resolution]			
The	 fabula	 ends	 in	 tragedy,	 with	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 deciding	 not	 to	 interfere	 in	 the	 political	
persecution	directed	from	Curitiba.	Even	as	Lula	continued	to	appear	in	the	polls	as	the	eventual	
winner	of	the	presidential	elections	 in	2018,	the	trials,	 imprisonment,	and	TSE	verdict	 (yet	to	be	
announced)	demolished	Lula’s	chance	to	even	present	his	candidature.		
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]	
This	fabula	inverts	the	first	fabula	by	presenting	the	Lava-Jato	project	as	a	fundamentally	political	
project	that	sought	to	interfere	judicially	by	waging	“lawfare.”	Thus,	it	provides	a	solution	to	the	
cognitive	mismatch	of	a	very	popular	ex-president	being	dragged	through	nine	trials,	by	postulating	
the	denunciations	as	exaggeration	or	fiction	(Damgaard	2018b:118-36).		
	
Fabula	3	–	Cleaning	Congress	
[Transgression	event]	
The	 corruption	 of	 Brazilian	 politics	 runs	 far	 and	 deep,	 through	 the	 current	 political	 elite	 to	 the	
coroneis	of	yorn.	Fortunately,	the	Lava-Jato	task-force,	the	federal	police,	the	Prosecutor-General(s),	
and	several	valiant	and	indomitable	judges	managed	to	change	the	tide	by	taking	the	old	elite	to	
trial;	 Lula,	 Cunha,	 Aécio	Neves,	 and	 the	 PMDB	 leaders	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 first	 and	 foremost.	 By	
cleaning	up	politics,	the	way	is	paved	for	a	new	generation	of	politicians.	The	parties	in	power	tried	
to	buy	time	and	avoid	the	current	that	would	sweep	them	out,	and	the	old	elite	tried	to	protect	
itself	by	appointing	new	leaders	of	the	PF,	CGU,	and	PGR.	They	mutilated	anti-corruption	bills	and	
proposed	laws	to	punish	 judges	who	would	 interfere,	but	the	tide	could	not	be	turned	once	the	
principal	leaders	of	the	old	elite	had	been	weakened	by	incarceration,	by	the	many	exposés,	and	
the	multitudes	manifesting	popular	will	through	street	protests.	
[Resolution]			
Paving	 the	 way	 for	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 politicians	 and	 supported	 by	 a	 new	 wave	 of	 social	
movements,	the	Lava-Jato	became	an	impulse	or	catalyst	that	not	only	helped	the	people	shed	the	
heavy	yoke	of	a	bloated	and	bureaucratic	socialist	state,	but	also	moving	Brazil	towards	a	freer	and	
less	protectionist	state	of	society.	It	required	the	heavy	hand	of	justice,	principally	directed	by	Sérgio	
Moro,	to	break	the	spell	of	impunity	that	the	old	elite	clung	to.	The	cleaning	up	of	politics	set	the	
stage	for	a	new	and	morally	better	State	and	Congress,	and	it	forced	even	the	recalcitrant	Supreme	
Court	 Judges	 to	 concede	 their	 monopoly	 on	 judging	 the	 federal	 representatives,	 senators	 and	
ministers.	
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]	
In	this	fabula,	the	so-called	“excesses”	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	were	necessary	measures	to	
combat	the	extreme	capillarity	and	embeddedness	of	corruption	in	the	institutions	of	power,	where	
everyone	is	protecting	someone	else	and	thus	producing	a	spiral	of	silence.	If	the	judiciary	attack	on	
the	old	elite	seems	one-sided	and	partial,	it	is	a	misinterpretation	of	the	situation:	The	necessary	
but	legitimate	use	of	force	and	rule	of	law	to	uncover	the	evidence	(and	to	avoid	the	destruction	of	
evidence)	 was	 wielded	 in	 prudent	 measure.	 Most	 plea	 bargains	 were	 negotiated	 while	 the	
defendant	was	still	free,	and	the	extended	preventive	arrests	were	only	used	in	cases	where	more	
corruption	schemes	were	likely	to	be	unearthed.		
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Fabula	3a	–	Fall	of	the	Republic	
[Transgression	event]	
After	 various	 political	 backstage	 deals	 and	 the	 excessive	 judicial	 interventions	 into	 politics,	 the	
Brazilian	democracy	and	its	institutional	structures	are	precariously	close	to	collapsing.	With	two	
Constitutional	crises	between	the	Legislative	and	the	Judiciary	Branches,	with	street	protests	that	
threatened	 to	 turn	 violent,	with	 a	General	 of	 the	Armed	 Forces	 hinting	 at	military	 intervention	
through	Twitter,	and	an	increasingly	polarized	political	discourse	in	the	social	networks,	the	country	
have	seen	all	the	symptoms	of	a	hitherto-unseen	institutional	stress	as	well	as	several	harbingers	of	
the	imminent	implosion	of	the	system.	Bribes	and	kickbacks	-	the	currency	of	exchange	for	making	
coalitional	presidentialism	work	in	practice	-	devaluated	too	quickly	for	any	insider	to	take	the	reins	
and	restructure	the	system.	At	the	outset,	the	rapid	deterioration	of	traditional	political	consensus	
mechanisms	and	the	undermining	of	checks	and	balances	not	only	gave	the	judiciary	new	powers,	
but	 it	 also	made	 the	 2018	 elections	 the	most	 unpredictable	 and	 potentially	 groundbreaking	 in	
decades.	The	PSDB-PT	axis	of	political	orientation	was	shattered,	along	with	the	veto-player	model	
of	 peemedebismo	 (Nobre	 2013b),	 and	 together	 with	 these	 two	 cornerstones	 of	 congressional	
politics	 it	 is	 predicted	 that	 the	 virtual	 prerogative	of	 Congress	 to	benefit	 in	whatever	way	 from	
directing	the	federal	machine	and	the	billion-dollar	budget	amendments	will	also	erode.	
[Resolution]			
The	expectation	of	a	new-comer	bodes	no	well	for	Brazil,	unfortunately,	as	the	high-volatility	states	
of	the	political,	judiciary	and	military	systems	in	conjunction	amount	to	a	bomb	waiting	to	explode	
–	a	Trump-presidency	situation	in	the	making	with	added	class	tensions	and	an	economy	not	ready	
to	step	out	of	the	recession.	Thus,	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	blindly	pulled	the	thin	threads	that	
kept	 the	democracy,	with	all	 the	 flaws	and	errors,	 from	 running	 seriously	afoul	 in	 the	historical	
backwaters	of	populist	and	military	rule.		
[Narrative	Solution	to	Contradiction]	
The	fabula	of	the	fall	of	the	Republic	is	an	apocalyptic	narrative,	hopelessly	defending	the	return	to	
the	uneasy	alliance	of	traditional	political	elites	with	socialist-welfare	state	redistribution	politics	
and	gradual	social	inclusion	–	even	at	the	cost	of	the	probably	Utopian	moral	purity	in	politics.	While	
not	exactly	an	excuse	for	corruption,	the	fear	of	the	violent	Christian	right-wing	discourse	embodied	
in	Jair	Bolsonaro	condones	the	Lava-Jato	movement	for	pushing	a	fragile	democracy	close	the	edge	
of	authoritarian	populism.	
	
The	six	fabulas	can	be	reencountered	as	the	underlying	narratives	of	both	journalistic	and	scientific	
works	about	the	Lava-Jato	case	and	the	political	upheaval.	Fabula	1	provided	the	motif	for	books	by	
Paduan	(2016)	and	the	TV	Globo	journalist	Netto	(2016),	while	fabula	1a	underpins	the	book-length	
resumé	of	the	pedaladas	(Villaverde	2016)	and	the	anthology	put	together	by	pro-impeachment	law	
scholars	 (Martins	 et	 al.	 2016).	 Scientific	 works	 using	 fabula	 2’s	 leitmotif	 of	 golpe	 abound	 (e.g.	
Albuquerque	2017,	Souza	2016:106-116,	Proner	et	al.	2016,	Gentili	2016),	and	many	scholars	have	
also	contributed	to	works	on	the	political	persecution	of	Lula	along	the	lines	of	fabula	2a	(Avritzer	
2016b,	Bahia,	Bacha	e	Silva,	and	de	Oliveira	2016,	Guimarães	et	al.	2016,	and	Zanin	Martins	et	al.	
2017).	 My	 own	 work	 tends	 towards	 the	 pessimistic	 fabula	 3a	 (Damgaard	 2018b),	 but	 there	 is	
currently	a	remarkable	dearth	of	academic	work	along	the	more	optimistic	lines	of	fabula	3.	
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5.4	Time	of	the	Crisis:	Temporal	Scope	
On	the	basis	of	the	abstracted	fabulas	presented	above,	I	will	now	turn	to	the	practical	implications	
of	these,	starting	with	the	temporal	scopes	of	the	fabulas.	At	first	glance,	all	of	the	fabulas	draw	
upon	 the	 Brazilian	 history	 of	 corruption	 scandals,	 but	 for	 the	 most	 part	 the	 emplotted	 events	
coincide	with	the	2014-2018	electoral	cycle;	there	is	rarely	much	longue	durée	to	be	found	here,	for	
all	its	fire	and	brimstone,	crisis	and	apocalypse.	The	temporal	scope	of	the	Brazilian	news	during	the	
Lava-Jato	scandal	is	somehow	quite	limited,	even	when	looking	to	the	future.	The	compressed	scope	
of	the	future	horizons	at	the	maximum	stretch	until	the	2018	general	elections,	while	in	the	case	of	
news	 and	 fabulas	 about	 the	 impeachment,	 the	 scope	 of	 foresight	 is	 cut	 short	 at	 the	 expected	
moment	of	the	ousting.	Thus,	compared	to	the	torrent	of	news	pieces	about	special	commissions	
and	 vote	 counts,	 not	 that	 many	 news	 pieces	 of	 March	 and	 April	 2016	 began	 to	 consider	 the	
government	that	was	about	to	take	over.	This	begs	the	question:	Why	is	the	temporal	aspect	of	
these	fabulas	so	constrained?	
	
In	the	past	decade,	breaking	news,	real-time	news,	live	feeds,	Twitter	and	web-based	broadcasting	
formats	have	become	ubiquitous,	and	studies	of	the	temporal	horizon	of	news	have	discussed	the	
idea	 that	 time	 is	 accelerated	and	 compressed	by	news	 (Hassan	2012,	Bødker	2016,	Bødker	 and	
Brügger	 2018,	 Verón	 2014).	 Such	 observations	 of	 acceleration	 are	 linked	 to	 epochal	
characterizations	of	sociology,	such	as	Giddens’	thoughts	on	high	modernity	(1991)	and	Harvey’s	
discussion	of	time-space	compression	(1989).	Already	in	the	1980s,	as	the	cable	networks	began	
developing	the	24-7	news	format,	did	Schudson	notice	the	well-developed	journalistic	fetish	for	the	
present	(while	warning	that	timeliness	“in	news	is	defined	in	practice	not	only	be	the	recency	of	a	
reported	event	but	by	its	coincidence	with	the	searchlight	of	the	journalistic	institution,”	Schudson	
1987:82).		
	
A	special	kind	of	compressed	time	is	the	crisis	–	a	discursive	phenomenon	that	has	much	to	do	with	
media	and	narration	(e.g.	Boydstun	and	Russell	2017,	Deacon	2012).	In	this	section,	I	will	analyze	
the	temporal	structures	of	the	fabulas	(rather	than	the	temporal	modes	of	particular	news	texts),	
and	 argue	 that	 a	 particular	 time	 scope	 of	 the	 crisis	 (or	 crises)	 was	 established	 through	 the	
storytelling	 found	 in	 the	 news	 on	 corruption	 and	 scandals.	 Because	 of	 this	 particular	 temporal	
scope,	 and	 because	 the	 electoral	 cycle	 and	 the	 Constitution	 remained	 the	 framework	 of	 these	
fabulas,	the	legitimacy	of	the	entire	system	of	democracy	in	Brazil	was	virtually	beyond	critique.	Put	
simply,	 the	 struggle	 to	 preserve	 the	 Constitution	 and	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 impeachment	
process	 were	 two	 major	 concerns	 (van	 Dijk	 2017);	 no	 solutions	 to	 either	 crisis	 or	 impending	
democratic	catastrophe	coming	from	outside	of	the	Constitution	or	the	ballot-boxes	could	ever	be	
thought	nor	 told.	Even	 the	coverage	of	 the	 large-scale	protests	 concealed	 the	contradictions	by	
simply	interpreting	the	protests	as	“social	movements”	with	the	goal	of	replacing	of	one	President	
with	another	–	although	both	president	and	vice-president	were	then	under	scrutiny	and	suspicion.	
	
The	crisis	moments	attracted	special	attention	 in	 the	mainstream	strata	of	 the	mediascape,	and	
various	textual	measures	were	introduced	to	cut	up	time	in	even	smaller	slices	when	moments	of	
crisis	were	 identified.	This	compression	took	various	 forms,	depending	on	the	media	outlet:	The	
newspapers	produced	real-time	updated	reports	online,	while	the	broadcast	outlets	modified	the	
standard	flow	of	programming	through	“breaking	news”	interruptions.	In	the	previous	chapter,	the	
latter	was	seen	 in	the	extended	editions	of	Jornal	Nacional	 in	March,	which	 ignored	other	news	
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completely	(and	in	parallel	provided	a	full	day	of	coverage	of	Lula’s	interrogation	on	the	GloboNews	
24-7	news	channel).	The	first	temporal	rupture	of	normal	media	time	in	the	course	of	the	Lava-Jato	
scandal	–	but	certainly	not	the	last	-		was	the	moment	just	prior	to	the	2014	election’s	second	round,	
when	the	weekly	magazine	Veja	went	outside	of	the	normal	publication	schedule	and	published	a	
denunciation	of	Rousseff	and	Lula,	presumably	to	maximise	the	electoral	impact	of	the	exposé.	As	
the	scandal	went	from	the	stage	of	rumours	to	actual	trials,	focus	in	the	news	outlets	increasingly	
shifted	 towards	 the	 courts,	 especially	 the	 Supreme	 Court.	 For	 instance,	 the	 STF	 sessions	 on	
December	16	and	17,	2015,	were	covered	through	real-time	text	streams	by	both	Folha	and	Estado,	
because	these	sessions	re-configured	the	rules	of	the	impeachment	process	laid	down	by	Cunha,	
and	were	seen	as	the	first	legal	battle	for	the	constitutionality	and	legitimacy	of	the	impeachment	
process.	Online,	the	two	outlets	even	kept	updating	score	boards	(as	in	a	football	match)	to	orient	
the	reader	as	 to	which	way	the	 judges	seemed	to	 incline	–	 in	 favour	of	Rousseff	or	 in	 favour	of	
Cunha’s	interpretation	of	the	process	guidelines.		
	
In	the	Jornal	Nacional	(in	the	headline	sequence	described	in	section	4.4.3	above),	the	arc	of	crisis	
moments	was	narrated	as	reaching	its	zenith	on	March	16.	The	street	protests	on	March	13	had	also	
called	for	special	all-day	coverage	in	the	online	media	outlets	and	the	24-7	news	channels,	and	the	
spontaneous	protests	of	March	16	likewise	drew	attention	outside	of	the	ordinary	programming.	
The	first	vote	for	impeachment,	on	April	17,	was	set	up	and	formatted,	again,	as	a	sports	match,	
with	large	screens	and	sections	of	Brasília’s	central	esplanade	divided	between	the	two	“teams”	of	
“supporters,”	and	the	roll-call	vote	was	broadcast	live	by	Globo,	Record,	and	Rede	Bandeirantes.	
The	decisive	debates	and	stages	of	the	vote	carried	out	in	the	Senate	in	the	following	months	were	
also	 covered	 intensely	 by	 newspapers	 through	 constantly	 updated	 feeds	 that	 interpreted	 the	
political	events.	On	top	of	the	media	conglomerates’	scrutiny,	the	official	broadcasting	service	of	
Congress	also	covered	 the	events	 from	start	 to	end,	as	did	 the	TV	 Justiça	 in	 the	Supreme	Court	
plenary	sessions.	The	coverage	at	this	stage	of	scandal	and	crisis	was	never	hesitant	nor	ambiguous,	
since	the	trials	in	court	and	Congress,	like	the	protests,	were	pre-endowed	with	meaning	–	and	the	
meaningfulness	of	the	events	was	derived	precisely	from	the	fabulas	discussed	above.	That	is,	the	
sampled	media	outlets’	coverage	of	the	sequences	of	the	impeachment	process	was	produced	to	
fit	into	the	story	arc	1a	with	a	climactic	media	spectacle	(Pozobon	and	Prates	2017,	Kellner	2002).	
			
Even	 the	happenings	 that	 seemingly	appeared	out	of	 the	blue	had	been	 foreseen	by	 the	media	
organizations,	and	planned	ahead	to	some	extent.	Two	examples	speak	volumes:	The	Lava-Jato	task-
force	was	looking	into	the	PT	marketing	expert’s	company	Polis,	and	this	was	the	topic	of	news	items	
a	month	before	judge	Moro	authorized	the	arrest	warrant	for	João	Santana	and	his	wife,	both	of	
whom	were	 away	 in	 Panama.	 Teams	 of	 TV	 reporters	 were	 ready	 to	 cover	 their	 arrest	 as	 they	
returned	to	Brazilian	soil.	Similarly,	the	interrogation	of	Lula	was	expected	(by	both	Lula	and	the	
media),	and	TV	Globo	had	sent	a	helicopter	to	circle	the	ex-president’s	house	in	order	to	get	footage	
of	the	early-morning	police	operation	on	March	4.			
	
In	 general,	 extraordinary	 events	 such	 as	 these	may	 gain	 a	 second-life	 outside	of	 the	newsroom	
frenzy,	 further	 adding	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 compressed	 time	 of	 crisis,	with	 updates	 appearing	 every	
minute.	 The	 unfolding	 stages	 of	 these	 events	 are	 “breaking	 on	 Twitter,	 discussed	 on	 blogs	 and	
Facebook,	 and	 followed	 and	 developed	 by	 legacy	 news	 institutions”	 (Bødker	 2016:60).	 In	 other	
words,	the	elements	of	scandal-related	events	get	processed	and	published	through	fast	“breaking	
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news”	cycles,	and	they	are	interpreted	instantaneously	by	pundits	and	news	commentators,	hours	
before	quality	newspapers	and	evening	news	broadcasts	are	edited.	Furthermore,	because	“news	
are	 [sic]	 almost	 seamlessly	 immersed	 in	 everyday	 practices	 through	 apps	 on	 mobile	 devices”	
(Bødker	and	Brügger	2018:58),	breaking	news	is	delivered	rapidly,	and	this	means	that	it	is	mostly	
packaged	and	framed	in	accordance	with	the	intertextual	resources	ready	at	hand.	Interpretations	
based	on	the	fabulas	and	gut-level	reactions	of	indignation	provide	the	most	immediate	repertoire	
for	understanding	suddenly	disclosed	information,	leaked	phone	recordings,	or	footage	of	coercive	
testimonies.	 In	 a	 fast-paced	 media	 environment,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 certain	 patterns	 and	
interpretations	are	reproduced	over	and	over.	
	
The	compression	and	acceleration	of	time	may	derive	from	the	event	itself,	so	that	the	presence	of	
crisis	reverberates	instantaneously	with	the	audience	(or	so	that	a	critical	event	is	represented	as	
reverberating	throughout	the	nation).	But	acceleration	might	also	be	experienced	and	analyzed	in	
a	serial	manner,	which	I	touched	upon	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter.	The	rhythm	of	exposés	and	
revelations	may	speed	up	and	slow	down,	contributing	to	the	experience	of	a	crescendo	of	crisis.	
Along	this	line,	it	was	obvious	that	just	prior	to	the	impeachment	vote	in	April	2016,	the	breaking	
news	on	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	came	at	a	much	faster	pace	than	the	two	years	up	to	that	moment.	
The	afore-mentioned	political	commentary	about	Lula	in	handcuffs	corroborates	this	perception	of	
rhythmical	intensification.	In	February,	the	arrest	of	the	PT	marketing	expert	Santana,	followed	by	
the	incarcerated	PT	senator	Delcídio	do	Amaral	leaked	plea	bargain	on	March	3	(a	scoop	published	
online	by	 IstoÉ),	and	Lula’s	coercive	testimony	on	March	4.	 	Thus,	the	impetus	of	the	protests	in	
mid-March	was	boosted	by	the	news	“storm”	(Boydstun,	Hardy	and	Walgrave	2014).		
	
The	groups	Movimento	Brasil	Livre	and	VemPraRua	–	who	had	also	rallied	protests	in	2015	-	had	
convened	street	protests	on	March	13,	2016,	and	these	turned	out	to	muster	massive	support.	Both	
Folha	and	Estado	dedicated	their	front	pages	to	illustrating	the	crowds	massing	in	São	Paulo	(see	
appendix	A,	figures	A.20-23),	reporting	that	the	protests	were	the	largest	seen	in	Brazilian	history,	
with	estimates	of	 the	police	 reaching	1.4	million	and	 the	Datafolha	counting	500,000	protesters	
downtown	(Datafolha	2016).	The	Rio	de	Janeiro	police	force	did	not	estimate	the	turn-out,	but	the	
organizers	claimed	that	one	million	protesters	marched	in	the	streets.	In	the	protests,	the	recent	
spate	of	news	was	recycled	in	various	forms	in	the	speeches	and	pamphlets,	Moro’s	face	was	turned	
into	an	 iconic	mask,	and	small	 inflatable	dolls	of	Lula	 in	the	clothes	of	an	 inmate	were	sold.	The	
protesters	did	not	exclusively	take	to	the	streets	to	call	for	impeachment,	though	that	certainly	was	
an	important	issue;	that	afternoon,	top	politicians	of	PSDB	had	to	escape	from	the	Avenida	Paulista	
(the	central	São	Paulo	street)	after	protesters	extended	their	complaints	verbally	and	physically	to	
all	members	of	the	political	elite.	Protests	occurred	in	over	200	cities,	and	various	critiques	naturally	
emerged	 in	 this	 multitude	 of	 political	 discontent.	 Nonetheless,	 a	 major	 outcome	 of	 the	 large	
protests	 was	 the	 mainstream	 media’s	 portrayal	 of	 wide-spread	 popular	 support	 for	 the	
impeachment	process.		
	
Based	on	head	counts,	 the	protests	were	represented	as	historical	by	 the	media	outlets	studied	
here,	 and	 the	massive	 turnout	 was	 interpreted	 as	 reactions	 to	 Rousseff’s	 government	 and	 the	
scandals	proliferating	around	 it.	Perhaps	counterintuitively,	 the	dynamic	spill-over	effects	of	 the	
protests	 in	Congress	 resulted	 in	 four	major	 coalition	parties	 leaving	 the	government	only	 to	 re-
constitute	themselves	as	coalition	parties	two	months	later.	Thus,	 if	anybody	had	a	vain	hope	of	
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cleaning	 up	 politics	 through	 such	 protests,	 that	 hope	 could	 only	 be	 sustained	 by	 ignoring	 the	
continuity	of	centre-right	parties	in	government.	In	short	order,	PMDB	and	the	centre-right	parties	
in	the	governing	coalition	PTB,	PRB,	PR	and	PP	declared	full	or	partial	support	for	impeachment	in	
the	 following	 two	 weeks,	 while	 the	 special	 commission	 of	 the	 Câmara	 settled	 on	 a	 report	
recommending	impeachment:		
	
On	March	16,	the	PRB	announced	that	it	would	leave	the	government.	“This	crisis	cannot	be	endured,	or	be	
allowed	to	continue.	The	Brazilians	are	suffering,”	said	the	PRB	president	Marcos	Pereira,	referencing	the	wave	
of	protests	(on	March	13)	and	the	negative	news	about	the	PT	(especially	the	leak	of	the	imprisoned	Senator	
Delcídio	do	Amaral	 the	week	before).	 The	party	also	announced	 that	 its	minister	of	 Sports,	George	Hilton,	
would	 leave	 the	 position.	 In	 response,	 Hilton	 left	 PRB,	 announced	 his	 affiliation	 with	 Pros,	 and	 remained	
minister	of	Sports	until	 the	 impeachment	of	Rousseff.	The	 then-president	of	PTB,	Cristiane	Brasil,	 likewise,	
announced	 that	 she	would	 vote	 for	 the	 impeachment	 of	 Rousseff,	 on	March	 18,	 although	 the	 party	 only	
officially	recommended	impeachment	on	April	13.		
	
PMDB	had	been	deliberating	 internally	when	 to	 leave	 ever	 since	Cunha	urged	 the	party	 to	 leave	 the	 year	
before.	During	 the	parliamentary	 recess	and	 the	 internal	elections	 for	party	president,	 the	discussions	had	
demonstrated	increasing	hostility	toward	Rousseff,	and	a	party	convention	was	called	shortly	after	the	2016	
carnival.	The	agenda	was	simple:	A	vote	whether	or	not	to	leave	the	government.	Henrique	Eduardo	Alves	left	
his	minister	 position	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 convention,	 on	March	 28.	 The	 following	 day,	 PMDB	pulled	 off	 the	
shortest	party	convention	ever	seen	in	Brazil,	as	the	sole	point	on	the	agenda	was	resolved	in	three	minutes.	
After	a	symbolic	vote,	the	senator	Romero	Jucá,	who	would	become	minister	for	a	fortnight	before	resigning	
after	a	new	leak,	announced	that	the	motion	for	withdrawing	from	government	was	approved.	Next	to	Jucá	
stood	 Eduardo	 Cunha,	 and	 the	 event	 ended	 with	 the	 100	 delegates	 shouting	 “Brasil	 pra	 Frente,	 Temer	
Presidente”	(“Go	Brazil,	Temer	for	President”).	Nonetheless,	the	ministers	Celso	Pansera,	Marcelo	Castro,	and	
Katia	Abreu	remained	ministers	in	the	Rousseff	administration	until	she	was	ousted.	
	
Sensing	that	a	new	majority	was	about	to	form,	the	strategy	of	jumping	ship	suddenly	became	attractive	to	the	
rest	of	 the	coalition	parties,	and	 the	exit	of	PMDB	 therefore	 started	a	wave	of	defections:	On	April	12,	PP	
announced	 their	 decision	 to	 abandon	 government,	 support	 impeachment,	 and	 Occhi	 left	 the	 Ministry	 of	
National	Integration	the	following	day.	The	same	day,	April	13,	the	PSD	group	leader	in	the	Congress,	Rogerio	
Rosso,	declared	that	there	was	a	broad	consensus	about	supporting	impeachment,	and	that	the	minister	of	the	
party,	 Kassab,	was	 known	 to	 respect	 the	will	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 group.	 Kassab	 resigned	 two	 days	 later,	
despite	stating	that	he	“was	convinced	of	the	President’s	personal	integrity.”	The	parliamentarians	of	PR	never	
decided	upon	an	official	party	line	and	ended	up	mostly	voting	for	impeachment	(with	the	votes	26	for	and	10	
against),	but	the	PR	minister	Rodrigues	continued	in	the	cabinet	until	the	final	removal	of	Rousseff.	(Damgaard	
2018b:71-2)	
	
This	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 decisive	 vote	 in	 the	 highly	 mediatized	 format	 on	 April	 17,	 as	 the	
culmination	 of	 two	 months	 of	 straight	 negative	 news	 on	 PT,	 Lula	 and	 Rousseff	 (Damgaard	
2018a:124,	2018b:163,	and	appendix	C).	In	the	following,	I	will	uncover	the	coverage	that	was	buried	
in	the	avalanche	of	news	on	impeachment,	and	call	attention	to	the	questions	that	were	delayed	
while	the	proceedings	unfolded.	
	
	
5.5	Timing	Suspicions	and	Burying	Allegations	
If	the	rapid	succession	of	exposés	underscored	the	suspicions	of	corruption	in	the	PT	government,	
it	underplayed	 similar	 suspicions	 in	 the	 coalition	party	PMDB.	Cunha’s	 corruption	case	was	well	
underway	in	both	the	Ethics	Committee	of	the	Câmara	and	in	the	Supreme	Court,	but	the	rest	of	
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the	party	elite	was	absent	from	the	news.	The	most	telling	example	is	the	coverage	of	suspicions	
pertaining	to	the	president-to-be,	Michel	Temer.	
	
Temer’s	alleged	corruption	cases	made	the	front-pages	of	Estado	de	S.	Paulo,	Globo,	and	Folha	de	
S.	Paulo	at	several	moments	(see	appendix	C,	table	C.2).	Even	so,	the	media	interest	quickly	died	
out.	 When	 the	 testimony	 of	 Sergio	 Machado,	 director	 of	 the	 state	 company	 Transpetro,	 was	
published	 by	 the	 press	 on	 June	 16,	 2016,	 including	 elements	 indicating	 Temer’s	 involvement	 in	
grafting	the	state	company,	Estado	even	noted	on	their	front	page	coverage	of	this	plea	bargain	that	
this	was	“the	first	time	in	the	Lava-Jato	case	that	Temer	was	linked	to	illicit	funding.”	In	fact,	Estado	
had	reported	a	similar	claim	made	by	Delcídio	do	Amaral	two	months	before,	on	March	15	(and	
printed	it	on	the	front	page	the	following	day),	and	in	the	claim	to	novelty	boldly	ignored	the	exposé	
printed	in	Folha	in	December	2015	about	Temer	receiving	kickbacks	from	OAS	(like	Lula),	as	well	as	
the	case	of	bribes	in	the	Porto	de	Santos	(admittedly	unrelated	to	Lava-Jato).	However,	even	when	
they	made	the	front	pages	(see	the	appendix	C	for	data	on	front	page	headlines	mentioning	Temer	
in	corruption	investigations),	these	exposés	were	never	included	in	the	reporting	on	his	taking	over	
of	the	presidency;	nor	were	the	cases	reported	as	an	ethical	problem	for	the	parties	supporting	his	
coming	into	power.	
	
Like	the	front-page	coverage	of	the	period	prior	to	the	impeachment,	the	news	items	found	in	the	
subsections	 of	 Folha	 and	 Estado	 on	 politics	 neither	 maintained	 attention	 nor	 unearthed	 new	
material	in	the	cases	of	corruption	where	Temer	was	mentioned.	However,	a	lot	of	attention	was	
paid	to	the	fact	that	Temer	had	acted	as	Head	of	State	when	signing	decrees	for	extra	expenses,	
hypothetically	 putting	 him	 in	 the	 same	 predicament	 vis-à-vis	 the	 law	 of	 fiscal	 responsibility	 as	
Rousseff.	This	theme,	spurred	by	the	general	interest	in	impeachment,	got	much	more	traction	in	
early	April	than	all	the	previously	mentioned	cases	combined	(see	the	appendix	C,	figure	C.2).	 In	
sum,	 suspicions	 that	 Temer	was	 involved	 in	 corruption	 only	 spurred	 brief	 interest,	 and	without	
follow-up	coverage,	those	cases	were	simply	buried	–	at	least	until	Temer	took	office	as	President.		
	
The	 testimony	 of	 Sergio	 Machado	 exposed	 not	 just	 Temer,	 but	 two	 newly	 appointed	 PMDB-
affiliated	ministers	in	the	new	cabinet	at	the	end	of	May	2016,	ten	days	after	the	ousting	of	Rousseff.	
On	May	22,	Folha	published	recorded	conversations	between	a	number	of	PMDB	bosses	and	Sérgio	
Machado.	Machado	knew	that	he	was	a	potential	 target	of	 the	Lava-Jato	probe,	and	had	 taped	
backstage	discussions	to	be	used	as	bargaining	chip	should	he	be	arrested	and	eventually	needed	
to	negotiate	a	plea	bargain.	The	newly	appointed	Minister	of	Planning	and	Budgets,	Romero	Jucá,	
affirmed	on	the	tapes	that	it	was	necessary	to	“stop	the	bleeding”	of	the	political	class	by	changing	
government	 and	 ending	 the	 PGR’s	 and	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task-force’s	 project	 of	 cleaning	 Brazilian	
politics.	 A	 number	 of	 PMDB	 bosses,	 including	 ex-President	 José	 Sarney,	 argued	 likewise	 in	 the	
conversations	 that	were	 recorded.	 Jucá	 and	 the	Minister	 of	 Transparency,	 Fabiano	 Silveira,	 left	
office,	while	Jucá,	upon	stepping	down,	returned	to	his	seat	in	the	Senate,	and	participated	in	the	
Senate’s	 final	 impeachment	 verdict	 against	 Rousseff	 on	 August	 31,	 when	 Michel	 Temer	 was	
permanently	proclaimed	President.	In	the	following	fourteen	months,	two	other	PMDB	ministers	
from	Temer’s	cabinet	(Geddel	Viera	Lima	and	Henrique	Alves)	were	forced	to	leave	office	on	Lava-
Jato-related	corruption	suspicions	and	both	were	subsequently	incarcerated.	
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The	 insight	that	can	be	gleaned	from	this	specific	example	may	contribute	to	studies	of	political	
scandals	with	the	insight	that	the	timing	of	scandals	matters	a	great	deal	to	the	way	that	political	
events	play	out.	In	the	present	example,	the	fact	that	the	temporal	scope	found	in	the	news	on	the	
scandals	was	governed	and	constrained	by	certain	fabulas	is	of	enormous	interest,	because	it	was	
not	 merely	 fortuitous	 timing	 (for	 Temer,	 that	 is).	 Although	 suspicions	 flourished	 concerning	
corruption	involving	various	politicians,	possible	ramifications	were	only	projected	for	some	of	these	
actors.	Case	in	point:	Michel	Temer,	even	when	mentioned	by	some	of	the	very	same	testimonies	
that	implicated	Rousseff,	rarely	appeared	as	subject	of	follow-up	news	items	in	these	cases	–	and	
those	cases	were	rarely	presented	as	a	future	problem	for	his	government	by	the	media	outlets	
studied	here.	The	temporal	scope	was	restricted	so	that	no	“imminent	earthquake”	appeared	to	be	
in	store	for	his	cabinet-to-be,	unlike	the	Rousseff	administration.			
	
Even	more	thought-provoking	is	the	probability	of	Folha	having	had	access	to	the	Machado	tapes	
even	before	Temer	took	the	mantle	from	Rousseff	in	May.	The	leak	was	published	within	a	fortnight	
of	his	taking	over,	but	the	recordings	were	made	during	March.	It	is	uncertain	when,	exactly,	the	
journalist	Rubens	Valente	obtained	these	from	either	the	federal	prosecutors,	or	from	Machado	or	
his	lawyers	–	but	the	value	of	the	scoop	undoubtedly	increased	once	Jucá	and	Fabiano	Silveira	had	
taken	office	as	ministers.	Such	a	scandalous	disclosure	of	information	is	a	commodity	in	the	media	
market	with	a	fluctuating	price	tag,	depending	on	the	timing	of	the	disclosure.	It	is	also	possible	that	
the	delay	of	the	publication	was	a	strategy	on	the	part	of	the	PGR,	who	might	want	to	disrupt	the	
new	government	as	soon	as	possible,	but	not	jeopardize	the	impeachment	of	Rousseff.	By	waiting	
to	leak,	the	scandal	involving	PMDB	actors	received	maximum	attention,	which	it	perhaps	would	
not	have	if	Rousseff	had	managed	to	cling	to	her	mandate.	Had	the	PGR	chosen	another	(earlier)	
time	and	place	of	the	leak,	and	if	this	had	turned	out	to	be	of	consequence	to	the	impeachment	
vote	in	the	Senate,	the	prosecuting	institution	as	such	might	have	been	prone	to	the	accusation	of	
defending	PT	by	selectively	leaking	to	the	press.		
	
Ultimately,	what	 is	more	 disconcerting	 than	 the	 hypothetical	 delay	 of	 the	 leak	 by	 either	 of	 the	
gatekeepers	of	 that	disclosure,	 is	 the	 limited	 scope	of	 the	 impeachment	 in	 general.	Why	would	
media	organizations	that	had	reported	on	Temer’s	involvement	in	the	Lava-Jato	case	tacitly	stand	
by	while	he	replaced	Rousseff?	Society’s	supposed	watchdog	seemed	to	have	been	pacified	(Porto	
2011a);	and	even	if	the	impeachment	petition	against	Temer	raised	some	eyebrows	and	became	
the	topic	of	some	thirty	news	items	in	Estado	and	Folha,	the	day-to-day	coverage	did	not	question	
the	legitimacy	of	the	take-over.	Folha	produced	the	editorial	“Nem	Dilma,	Nem	Temer”	(“Neither	
Dilma	Nor	Temer”),	but	the	authoring	editor	only	pointed	out	that	Temer	lacked	sufficient	popular	
support	and	that	the	Supreme	Electoral	Court	trial	against	Rousseff	could	result	in	Temer’s	downfall	
as	well	(F2/4	2016)	(see	also	de	Almeida	2016:201,	Marques,	Mont’Alverne	and	Mitozo	2017).		
	
Similarly,	 the	media	 texts	 in	 April	 and	May	 2016	 at	 no	 point	mentioned	 the	 possibility	 of	 two	
presidents	 removed	 from	 power	 in	 a	 row,	 even	 as	 the	 leaks	 of	 the	 backstage	 considerations	
materialized	and	the	first	couple	of	ministers	was	forced	to	resign.	The	idea	that	Temer	might	be	
forced	to	step	down	before	the	2018	elections	only	emerged	as	the	trial	of	the	Supreme	Electoral	
Court	moved	decisively	forward	in	late	2016	and	early	2017;	and	with	the	JBS	leak	of	May	2017,	the	
rumours	 became	 much	 more	 persistent.	 During	 the	 impeachment	 proceedings,	 however,	 the	
horizon	of	future	political	outcomes	did	not	include	this	as	a	problem	of	legitimacy,	and	the	risk	of	
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the	Supreme	Electoral	Court	trial	removing	Temer	was	mostly	disregarded	as	a	remote	possibility,	
given	the	tardiness	of	the	Court.	Even	twice	 indicted	by	the	PGR	in	the	second	half	of	2017,	the	
journalists	of	the	political	beat	reported	on	the	low	probability	of	Temer’s	corruption	cases	being	
sent	to	the	Supreme	Court	for	a	criminal	trial.		
	
The	lenient	coverage	of	Temer	was	perhaps	the	result	of	the	source-journalist	relationship;	negative	
reports	on	the	new	president	could	sour	the	source	relationships	that	journalists	need	to	produce	
material.	In	the	first	half	of	Temer’s	presidency,	his	support	in	Congress	for	passing	bills	was	one	of	
the	highest	witnessed	by	any	Brazilian	president	since	the	return	to	democracy	(Pereira	2018).	The	
Congress	support	was	perhaps	reflected	in	the	timid	treatments	in	media	coverage,	even	if	popular	
support	 fell	 away	 quickly.	 Folha’s	 editors	 even	 deliberately	misread	 a	 survey	 conducted	 by	 the	
associated	poll	service	DataFolha	in	order	to	present	a	coherent	positive	picture	of	the	economy	
and	 the	 president	 (Damgaard	 2018b:58).	 In	 sum,	 the	 representation	 of	 crisis	 gave	 way	 to	
normalization	for	a	few	months,	at	least	as	far	the	presidency	was	concerned,	consistent	with	the	
exclusion	of	exposés	concerning	Temer	in	the	lead-up	to	the	ousting	of	Rousseff.	Business-as-usual	
resumed,	and	transgressions	that	seemed	scandalous	in	March	2016	(such	as	nominating	Lula	for	
minister)	were	reduced	to	background	information	in	comparable	cases	(with	Temer	changing	the	
ministerial	status	of	Moreira	Franco’s	secretariat	to	the	same	effect)	(ibid.:135).		
	
	
5.6	Crisis	as	Argument	in	Judicial	and	Legislative	Solutions	to	Corruption	Scandals	
The	Supreme	Court	did	not	enjoy	post-impeachment	peace,	and	a	climate	of	business-as-usual	did	
not	emerge	in	the	august	court	of	the	nation.	Rather,	several	judicial	interventions	led	to	small-scale	
institutional	 crises	 (ibid.:115-8),	 and	 the	 tendency	 of	 judicialization	 (Tate	 and	 Vallinder	 1995,	
Werneck	Vianna	et	al.	1999,	Werneck	Vianna,	Burgos	and	Salles	2007)	continued	with	increasing	
intensity,	based	on	the	string	of	crises.	With	the	disclosure	of	the	corruption	in	the	Lava-Jato	cases,	
many	 judicial	 review	 processes	 that	 had	 been	 dormant	 in	 the	 drawers	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
surfaced	and,	under	intense	public	and	media	scrutiny,	small	majorities	of	Supreme	Court	judges	
have	changed	important	pieces	of	legislation.	In	this	section,	I	will	briefly	discuss	how	crisis	triggered	
judicial	and	legislative	proposals	and	solutions	to	the	impasses	of	Brazilian	democracy	during	the	
Lava-Jato	scandal	(Avritzer	2016a).			
	
The	STF	judges,	to	different	degrees,	have	argued	for	the	need	to	change	existing	legislation	on	the	
basis	 of	 the	 public	 demand	 and	 outrage	 provoked	 since	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 became	
“national	 legacy.”	The	first	area	was	the	 judicial	 review	of	campaign	donations	 from	companies,	
which	was	banned	in	2015	by	the	STF.	The	next	important	change	was	the	decision,	on	February	17,	
2016,	to	reduce	the	number	of	appeal	options	that	can	prevent	incarceration	to	two,	that	is,	from	
the	moment	a	culprit	is	found	guilty	in	two	instances,	a	prison	term	may	be	realized.	The	third	and	
massively	debated	review	is	the	restriction	of	the	prerogative	of	being	judged	before	the	STF.	The	
parliamentary	 prerogative	 called	 foro	 privilegiado,	 on	 May	 3,	 2018,	 was	 restricted	 to	 trials	 of	
criminal	actions	committed	as	acts	of	office.	A	fourth	change	of	jurisprudence,	effected	by	the	STF	
on	June	14,	2018,	deemed	coercive	testimonies	unconstitutional	(such	as	Lula’s	testimony	described	
in	 the	 previous	 chapter).	 Each	 of	 the	 judicial	 reviews	 was	 debated	 intensely	 in	 the	 climate	 of	
increasing	political	crisis	of	legitimacy	which	gradually	also	became	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	the	STF.	
On	 top	 of	 the	 STF’s	 internal	 problem	 of	 case	 overload	 (Falcão,	 Arguelhes	 and	 Recondo	 2016),	
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exacerbated	 by	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations,	 idiosyncratic	 decisions	 made	 by	 Supreme	 judges	
(especially	 Gilmar	Mendes	 and	Dias	 Toffoli)	 sparked	 public	 controversy.	 For	 reasons	 of	 space,	 I	
cannot	show	the	trajectory	of	the	court	decisions	nor	the	public	debates	on	these	issues,	but	the	
bottom-line	 of	 the	many,	 highly	mediatized	 discussions,	 however,	 was	 the	 demand	 for	 judicial	
action	to	solve	problems	remaining	after	disclosure	of	corruption,	including	problems	of	procedural	
delays,	the	sense	of	impunity,	and	the	perpetual	problems	of	lobby	activities	(ibid.,	Guimarães	et	al.	
2016,	Napolitano,	Vicente	and	Soares	2017,	Proner	et	al.	2016).	
	
The	interventions	of	the	STF	and	other	courts	into	cabinet	nominations	were	also	closely	tied	to	the	
media’s	disclosure	of	corruption.	Lula’s	cancelled	nomination	for	minister	was	discussed	in	section	
4.4.3,	 and	 three	 other	 ministerial	 nominations	 were	 also	 legally	 contested,	 namely	 those	 of	
Wellington	Cesar	Lima	and	Eugenio	Aragão	(both	in	2016	for	the	Ministry	of	Justice),	and,	in	2018,	
Cristiane	Brasil	(of	PTB).	Brasil	was	hindered	in	taking	office	as	Minister	of	Labour,	and	her	substitute	
later	had	his	office	 searched	by	 the	police.	 In	November	2015,	 the	STF	authorized	 the	arrest	of	
Senator	Delcídio	do	Amaral	during	his	term,	a	measure	hitherto	unseen.	The	STF	also	intervened	to	
revoke	both	the	Câmara’s	and	the	Senate’s	choice	of	Presidents,	but	with	very	different	results:	
Eduardo	Cunha	was	effectively	removed	and	later	incarcerated,	while	Renan	Calheiros	ignored	the	
Court	decision	and	remains	Senator.	 In	 the	case	of	Lula,	Cunha	and	Calheiros,	 the	extraordinary	
situations	pertaining	to	high-level	corruption	were	invoked	in	the	warrants	of	the	public	prosecutors	
and	repeated	by	the	courts.	Both	executive	and	legislative	branches	have	argued	strongly	that	the	
interventions	of	the	judiciary	are	unconstitutional.	Most	of	these	cases	of	interventions	and	judicial	
review	were	sparked	directly	by	the	political	struggle	arising	from	the	dispute	for	executive	power	
in	the	wake	of	corruption	disclosure.	Frequently,	the	active	and	interventionist	stance	of	the	STF	
has	been	based	on	arguments	about	the	“state	of	exception.”	
	
The	representation	of	a	crisis	and	state	of	exception	petered	out	in	the	transition	of	power	in	August	
2016;	after	that,	the	STF	lost	the	force	to	enforce	decisions	upon	the	Senate	(in	the	case	of	Renan	
Calheiros),	and	did	not	revoke	the	nomination	of	PMDB	leader	Moreira	Franco,	despite	the	similarity	
to	the	case	of	Lula	(Damgaard	2018b:135).	Tension	soared	again	with	Lula’s	appeal	cases	in	April	
2018,	as	one	of	the	Armed	Force’s	Generals	tweeted	that	the	STF	should	take	the	“right	decision.”	
Thus,	the	STF	has	been	at	the	brink	of	constitutional	rupture	at	several	points	(ibid.:115-6),	adding	
to	the	fabula	of	exceptional	times	(or	apocalyptic	end-times).	This	was	both	the	challenge	and	the	
condition	for	the	strategy	of	judicial	reviews	in	the	court:	To	appear	both	legitimate	and	decisive	-	
and	to	act	decisively	-	in	time	of	extraordinary	need,	visibility,	and	public	scrutiny.	
	
The	legislative	branch,	meanwhile,	also	responded	to	the	disclosure	of	corruption	and	the	state	of	
crisis	with	a	range	of	bills,	none	of	which	passed	in	the	end:	First,	the	so-called	crisis	of	governability	
in	 the	 Rousseff	 administration	 was	 answered	 by	 bills	 laying	 out	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 from	
presidential	system	to	a	(semi-)parliamentarian	system	(on	top	of	scattered	calls	for	the	restoration	
of	monarchy).	Second,	the	MPF	proposed	ten	bills	that	would	improve	the	efforts	towards	reducing	
impunity	and	increasing	efficiency	in	corruption	investigations;	most	proposals	were	altered	heavily	
in	 the	 Congressional	 committee	 preparing	 the	 process	 prior	 to	 the	 bills	 going	 to	 the	 floor	 of	
Congress,	however.	Third,	several	bills	aimed	at	increased	punishment	for	judges	overstepping	the	
constitutional	 bounds	 when	 interfering	 with	 politics.	 Fourth,	 various	 bills	 dealt	 with	 issues	 of	
oversea	bank	accounts,	aiming	at	reduced	taxation	or	removing	fines	for	declaring	funds	that	had	
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been	hidden.	Fifth,	new	rules	for	district	gerrymandering	also	entered	the	floor	of	Congress.	Finally,	
as	the	only	passed	bill,	electoral	financing	to	parties	from	a	public	fund	was	increased.		
	
At	the	time	of	writing,	few	permanent	changes	seem	to	have	resulted	in	the	legal	realm	after	the	
crises.	No	electoral	reform	has	been	enacted,	and	the	oscillating	majorities	of	the	STF	have	recently	
put	into	question	the	changes	enacted	through	judicial	reviews.	This	means	that	both	the	use	of	
coercive	testimonies	and	the	reduction	of	appeal	 instances	before	incarceration	appears	as	 legal	
instruments	 that	may	 be	 changed	 at	whim.	 The	 reduction	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 protection	 (see	
above	and	section	4.2)	seems	to	hold,	for	now.	The	publicity	of	investigation	into	political	corruption	
is	still	a	local	decision	–	although	the	arguments	fielded	by	Sérgio	Moro	for	the	utmost	degree	of	
publicity	 in	 high-level	 corruption	 cases	 were	 accepted	 and	 extended	 by	 Supreme	 judges	 Teori	
Zavascki	and	Edson	Fachin,	it	is	not	a	principle	automatically	transferred	to	all	corruption	probes	on	
Brazilian	soil.	However,	the	Lava-Jato	case	did	prove	to	be	a	watershed	case	of	transparency,	but,	
as	discussed	above,	that	did	not	translate	into	perfectly	equilibrated	agenda-setting,	as	cascades	of	
news	reports	skewed	attention	to	a	few	of	the	many	corruption	cases,	especially	those	involving	
Lula.	 In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 I	 will	 expand	 on	 what	 could	 be	 termed	 a	 narrative	 outcome	 of	 the	
judicialization,	namely	the	extensive	focalization	of	judges	and	prosecutors	as	protagonists	of	the	
political	fantasy.	
	
Arguably,	the	most	profound	legal-political	outcome	of	the	strings	of	crises	was	the	incarceration	of	
the	ex-president	Lula	and	the	impeachment	of	President	Dilma	Rousseff.	As	the	final	part	of	this	
chapter,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 consider	 how	 the	 fabulas	 were	 reflected	 in	 the	 moment	 of	 Rousseff’s	
impeachment.	
	
	
5.7	History,	Temporal	Scope,	and	Epochalization		
As	argued	initially,	the	most	basic	chronological	function	of	news	is	to	establish	seriality	and	relation	
between	texts,	but	as	seriality	develops,	it	 inevitably	begs	the	question	of	conclusion,	of	closure.	
Especially	 in	the	case	of	a	series	of	episodes	with	a	crime	novel-like	plot,	a	demand	for	revealed	
truth	or	full	transparency	is	engendered:	Disclosure	demands	closure.	One	such	moment	of	ultimate	
closure,	 a	 final	 turn	of	 the	page,	was	 in	evidence	on	August	29,	2016,	when	Rousseff	defended	
herself	in	the	Senate	prior	to	the	vote	that	would	ultimately	remove	her	from	the	presidency.	In	her	
speech,	she	articulated	a	variation	of	fabula	2,	where	the	temporal	scope	was	radically	expanded	to	
encompass	national	history,	and	she	insisted	that	history	would	acquit	her,	as	she	stood	on	“the	
right	side	of	history”:		
	
Se	 alguns	 rasgam	 o	 seu	 passado	 e	 negociam	 as	 benesses	 do	 presente,	 que	 respondam	 perante	 a	 sua	
consciência	e	perante	a	história	pelos	atos	que	praticam.	A	mim	cabe	lamentar	pelo	que	foram	e	pelo	que	se	
tornaram.	E	resistir.	Resistir	sempre.	Resistir	para	acordar	as	consciências	ainda	adormecidas	para	que,	juntos,	
finquemos	o	pé	no	terreno	que	está	do	lado	certo	da	história,	mesmo	que	o	chão	trema	e	ameace	de	novo	nos	
engolir.	Não	luto	pelo	meu	mandato	por	vaidade	ou	por	apego	ao	poder,	como	é	próprio	dos	que	não	tem	
caráter,	princípios	ou	utopias	a	conquistar.	Luto	pela	democracia,	pela	verdade	e	pela	justiça.	Luto	pelo	povo	
do	meu	País,	pelo	seu	bem-estar.	[...]	Hoje	o	Brasil,	o	mundo	e	a	história	nos	observam	e	aguardam	o	desfecho	
deste	processo	de	impeachment.	No	passado	da	América	Latina	e	do	Brasil,	sempre	que	interesses	de	setores	
da	elite	econômica	e	política	foram	feridos	pelas	urnas,	e	não	existiam	razões	jurídicas	para	uma	destituição	
legítima,	conspirações	eram	tramadas	resultando	em	golpes	de	estado.	(Rousseff	2016,	emphasis	mine)	
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Using	this	turn	of	phrase,	Rousseff	reflected	and	implicitly	criticized	the	editorials	and	commentary	
of	 the	media	 in	 those	 days,	 in	 which	many	 observed	 her	 ousting	 as	 the	 end	 of	 an	 epoch.	 The	
epochalization	in	these	news	texts	discussed	the	end	of	the	PT	“cycle,”	13	years	of	government	with	
a	model	that	could	neither	sustain	economic	growth	nor	the	popular	and	elite	support.	In	the	weeks	
of	2016	when	the	media	crisis	and	scandal	coverage	grew	most	intense,	a	profound	lack	of	foresight	
was	evident,	as	detailed	in	the	sections	above.	The	crisis	had	a	definite	short-term	scope.	As	the	
impeachment	proceedings	reached	their	endpoint,	the	scope	had	widened	to	that	of	historical	time,	
and	the	fabula	spanned	not	just	Brazil,	but	was	widened	to	include	both	Latin	America	(comparing	
Rousseff	to	Cristina	Kirchner	and	Brazil	to	Venezuela,	for	instance)	and	the	entire	globe.	The	crisis	
moments	of	March	compressed	and	closed	off	the	temporal	scope	of	the	fabulas	presented	in	news,	
but	in	August	2016,	in	contrast,	the	already	defeated	President	Rousseff	shifted	the	perspective,	as	
did	many	pundits,	towards	geopolitical	history	(as	well	as	back	to	the	prior	presidential	breakdowns	
of	 Brazil).	 Similar	 epochal	 interpretation	 of	 political	 events	 and	 similar	 conceptions	 of	 historical	
significance	 surfaced	 when	 Lula	 was	 incarcerated	 in	 April	 2018	 (Feres	 Júnior	 2018).	 These	 two	
moments	were	presented	as	momentous	or	laden	with	symbolic	significance	of	another	temporal	
order	 than	 the	 rapid,	 live-on-air	 struggles	 of	 leaks,	 judicial	 interventions,	 and	 backstage	
manoeuvres.	
	
Epochal	characterizations	are	more	obviously	the	stuff	of	op-eds	and	political	speeches	than	of	run-
of-the-mill	news	reports.	The	temporal	scope	of	the	mediascape’s	narrative	strips	probably	always	
varies	 according	 to	 the	 strata	 or	 type	 of	 news;	 but	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 the	moments	 of	 crisis	
compress	 the	 temporal	horizons,	drawing	 in	 close	on	 the	minute	details,	while	 the	moments	of	
“solutions”	expand	the	vista.	This	mechanism	of	grand-scale	storytelling	is	apparent	in	Rousseff’s	
speech	above,	with	the	nation	appearing	as	the	subject	of	history	and	as	victim	of	conspiracies.		
	
In	 some	 media	 texts	 presented	 in	 this	 and	 previous	 chapters,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 and	 the	
impeachment	 became	 treatments	 for	 an	 ailing	 Nation	 beleaguered	 by	 crises:	 The	 first	 Lula	
administration	had	a	crisis	of	governability,	leading	to	a	moral	crisis	(and	a	corruption,	via	Dirceu	if	
not	 Lula,	 of	 the	model	 of	 creating	 Congressional	majorities).	 The	 Rousseff	 administration	 then,	
taking	over	the	reins	of	government,	also	inherited	a	party	and	its	electoral	base	in	crisis	because	of	
the	moral	crisis	(or	rather,	because	of	the	Mensalão	scandal).	With	less	PT	representatives,	Rousseff	
had	to	manage	a	more	 ideologically	distant	 (and	more	rebellious)	support	base	 in	Congress	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 electoral	 and	 moral	 crisis,	 and	 her	 government	 then	 faced	 an	 even	 more	 severe	
governability	crisis,	with	PMDB	leaders	forcing	fiscal	strain	upon	the	state	budget	through	legislative	
measures	unchecked	by	the	executive	branch,	thus	deepening	the	economic	crisis	that	began	to	
form	at	the	end	of	her	first	period.	 In	parallel,	 the	scandals	grew	to	ever	 larger	dimensions	(The	
Postal	Service	scandal	led	to	the	disclosure	of	the	much	bigger	Mensalão	scandal,	which	was	then	
surpassed	by	the	Lava-Jato	scandal),	and	the	protests	of	June	2013	were	outsized	by	those	in	2016.	
So,	the	impeachment	and	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	in	combination	were	narrated	as	the	culmination	
or	climax	of	a	series	of	nation-spanning	crises,	one	crisis	overtaking	the	next	in	size	and	impact.	I	will	
return	to	the	theme	of	the	Nation	in	the	following	chapter.	
	
To	conclude	this	chapter,	I	will	highlight	that	temporal	orientation	and	even	a	sense	of	history	are	
embedded	 in	 news	 texts	 and	 political	 utterances	 in	 scandals.	 But,	 because	 certain	 fabulas	 exist	
ready	 to	 hand,	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 closure	 (as	 well	 as	 narrative	 risk),	 a	 limited	 range	 of	 potential	
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consequences	is	drawn	upon	by	journalists	and	pundits.	In	the	case	of	the	Lava-Jato	scandals	and	
impeachment,	 this	 also	 created	 a	 situation	 where	 several	 fabulas	 reciprocally	 permeated	 each	
other,	 as	 the	 emplotment	 of	 events	 in	 one	 fabula	 could	 introduce	 risk	 and	 change	 the	 odds	 of	
particular	outcomes	in	the	others.	Within	this	constructionist	view	of	news	and	political	history,	I	
have	attempted	to	account	for	the	ways	in	which	the	moments	of	crisis	in	news	produced	certain	
presentations	 of	 past	 and	 future	 time,	 as	well	 as	 how	 crises	 come	 to	 be	 interwoven.	 The	most	
important	overlaps	and	ruptures	of	temporality	included	the	overlaps	(discussed	in	the	last	chapter)	
between	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	and	the	issue	of	fiscal	delays,	juxtaposed	to	the	declining	approval	
of	the	Rousseff	government	and	grafted	onto	the	fabula	of	corruption	in	Petrobras.	Then,	in	early	
2016,	the	conjunction	of	rapidly	emerging	arrests	and	allegations	embroiling	PT	combined	with	the	
street	protests	 led	by	VemPraRua	and	MBL	 to	provide	centre-right	parties	of	 the	Congress	with	
legitimate	grounds	for	jumping	ship	and,	eventually,	be	re-installed	in	a	new	cabinet	with	Temer	at	
the	helm.	Temer	himself	benefitted	from	a	blind	spot	of	the	mainstream	media	in	March	and	April,	
but	his	honeymoon	days	as	president	were	also	cut	short.	In	the	following	two	years,	cycles	of	crises	
triggered	the	apocalyptic	premonitions	of	fabula	3a	and	gave	birth	to	the	fear	of	the	chaos	ensuing	
if	PT	and	the	old	elite	would	be	swept	from	Congress	and	presidency	in	October	2018.		
	
The	theoretical	argument	of	this	chapter,	then,	asserts	that	the	conjunctions	and	disjunctions	of	
temporality,	 structured	 through	 premonitions	 and	 narrative	 desire	 for	 certain	 outcomes,	 are	
exceedingly	 important	 phenomena	 in	 scandals	 because	 they	 delimit	 the	 scope	 of	 news,	 and	
moreover	form	the	base	of	textual	strategies	of	containment	and	contagion	in	time,	that	is,	of	which	
elements	of	a	fabula	that	may	interact	with	one	another.	The	identification	of	particular	narrative	
desires	for	resolutions	to	the	emplotment	was	used	for	establishing	the	endpoints	of	the	fabulas;	in	
the	next	chapter,	I	will	go	on	to	look	at	the	ways	in	which	narrative	desire	organizes	actants,	the	
acting	units	of	the	fabulas,	around	axes	of	values.	The	next	chapter	will	also	rephrase	the	question	
of	what	lies	outside	of	these	fabulas,	replacing	the	temporal	scope	with	a	focus	on	the	actors	within	
the	limits	of	the	narrative	structure	of	the	fabula.	
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Chapter	6	
The	Political	Unconscious	of	the	Lava-Jato	Case	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	will	move	from	questions	of	temporal	structures	and	the	endpoints	of	story	arcs	to	
synchronic	 issues	concerning	value	systems.	Narrative	desire	does	not	only	provide	 impetus	and	
movement;	it	desires	certain	solutions	set	within	ideological	structures.	A	solution	emerging	in	the	
intertextually	emergent	fabulas	of	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	is	not	necessarily	ideologically	closed	off,	
given	the	distributed	and	non-authored	nature	of	the	fabulas,	that	may	contain	several	rudimentary	
or	 unarticulated	 fragments	 of	 value	 systems	 in	 tension	 and	 contradiction	 with	 one	 another.	
Therefore,	 scandals	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 composition	 (Pietilä	 1992)	 performance	 (Motta	
2013:99),	or	contested	assertion	of	norms	(Thompson	2000:16),	rather	than	a	simple	reproduction	
of	public	morality	(Prior	2015:103).		
	
Like	Elizabeth	S.	Bird,	 I	think	that	“media	scandals	[…]	should	be	explored	[…]	for	the	values	and	
boundaries	they	are	expressing”	(Bird	1997:107),	underscoring	the	plural	here.	I	will	therefore	not	
start	this	chapter	by	defining	a	finite	set	of	hegemonic	moral	claims	or	norms	supposedly	prevalent	
in	Brazilian	society	and	then	connect	this	set	to	the	fabulas	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter.	Rather,	
I	will	return	to	these	fabulas	and	analyze	the	values	that	seem	to	be	at	stake,	and	how	the	solutions	
presented	 express	 conflicting	 value	 systems.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 will	 return	 to	 the	 theoretical	 line	 of	
Chapter	2,	considering	how	Greimasian	actant-subjects	desire	and	transfer	values	as	the	fabulas	of	
the	Lava-Jato	progress.	On	the	basis	of	this	analysis,	it	will	then	be	possible	to	characterize	the	inner	
limits	 of	 the	 value	 systems	 and	 consider	 what	 lies	 outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Political	
Unconscious	in	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.		
	
Preliminarily,	 I	will	 assign	 the	notion	of	 “value”	 to	 dichotomous	 concept-pairs	 such	 as	 the	ones	
discussed	 by	 Lévi-Strauss	 and	 Greimas	 (Greimas	 1987:84),	 and	 let	 “ideology”	 designate	 more	
complex	sets	of	political	preferences	and	worldviews.	The	two	concepts	may	gradually	shade	into	
each	 other,	 however.	 Highlighting	 one	 relevant	 example,	 the	 “value”	 of	 morality	 is	 especially	
problematic.	The	morally	right	may	be	contrasted	to	the	morally	corrupt	in	a	seemingly	obvious	way	
in	everyday	talk,	 in	news	texts	and	even	in	academic	 literature,	but	this	binary	opposition	black-
boxes	the	ideologically	laden	concept	of	“moral.”	Scholars	analyzing	Brazil’s	scandals	often	identify	
scandals	as	ritual	acts	with	moral	implications,	for	example	stating	that:	
	
The	scandals	that	put	into	question	the	norms	and	values	of	societal	or	political	order	are	often	moments	of	
reflection	and	debate,	moments	when	society	faces	its	weaknesses	and	in	which	particularly	the	media	claim	
for	 strengthening	 norms	 and	 conventions	 meanwhile	 broken.	 Transgressions	 are	 revealed,	 offenders	 are	
identified	and,	in	some	cases,	punished,	in	some	kind	of	ritual	that	ultimately	contribute	to	the	purification	of	
the	political	institutions	and	for	the	recovery	of	public	morality.	(Prior	2015:103-4)	
	
However,	even	where	the	concept	of	struggle	is	foregrounded,	a	view	of	public	order	and	public	
morality	in	the	singular	may	be	overly	simplistic.	Gans	noted	that	morality	is	merely	an	assumption:	
	
…news	also	assumes	a	consensus	about	values	that	may	not	exist,	for	it	reminds	the	audience	of	values	that	
are	being	violated	and	assumes	that	the	audience	shares	these	values.	When	a	story	reports	that	a	politician	
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has	been	charged	with	corruption,	it	suggests,	sotto	voce,	that	corruption	is	bad	and	that	politicians	should	
be	honest.	(Gans	1980:40)	
	
Such	claims	to	norms	may	however	not	have	much	resonance	in	every	part	of	society.	In	the	context	
of	African	corruption	discourse,	Koechlin	argues,	with	Laclau,	that	
	
“corruption”	is	not	so	much	a	practice	or	structural	feature,	but	rather	a	nodal	point	which	enables	different	
claims,	interests	and	identities	to	link	up	and	structure	the	political	in	new	ways.	Corruption	is,	in	the	terms	of	
political	discourse	theory,	an	‘empty	signifier’,	a	catalyst	of	social	and	political	organisation.	Key	here	is	not	so	
much	what	corruption	‘is’,	key	here	is	the	ways	in	which	different	actors	relate	to	what	‘corruption’	signifies	
and	the	ways	the	seek	to	differentiate	or	link	up	in	relation	to	this	signifier.	My	key	hypothesis	is	that	the	very	
discourse	of	corruption	provides	the	terrain	in	which	these	struggles	take	place.	The	overarching	interest	and	
the	main	objective	of	the	following	chapters	is,	consequently,	the	exploration	of	the	political	and	social	spaces	
that	 ‘corruption’	opens	up	 (or	closes	down),	 i.e.	 the	manifold	political	and	social	articulations	 that	 feed	off	
corruption	as	a	reference.	My	premise	is	that	although	the	discourse	of	corruption	may	take	on	a	hegemonic	
(in	the	sense	of	dominating)	shape,	it	actually	provides	the	terrain	for	the	articulation	of	particular	struggles	–	
and	potentially	may	lead	to	the	creation	of	a	plurality	of	political	spaces	and	public	spheres.	(Koechlin	2013:93)	
	
I	have	elsewhere	argued	along	the	same	lines	(Damgaard	2015b),	and	I	still	think	that	the	“broken	
norms	and	conventions”	and	the	“public	moral”	referred	to	by	Prior	are	not	a	priori	defined,	but	
rather	contested	and	created	in	the	very	discursive	acts	relating	to	corruption.	In	order	to	see	such	
struggles,	it	is	necessary	to	answer	how	both	values	and	ideologies	come	to	be	articulated	in	the	
texts,	stories,	and	fabulas	I	have	analyzed.	This	leads	me	back	to	the	semiotics	of	Greimas	introduced	
in	Chapter	2.		
	
	
6.1	A	Greimasian	Reading	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	
In	Greimas	(1987:71-81),	the	subject-actants	of	narratives,	as	they	perform	and	embody	narrative	
functions,	become	vested	with	values,	or	rather	engage	in	the	transfer	of	values.	Greimas’	way	of	
mapping	out	thematic	values	of	narratives	is	particularly	useful,	according	to	Jameson,	because	“it	
maps	 the	 limits	of	 a	 specific	 ideological	 consciousness	and	marks	 the	 conceptual	points	beyond	
which	that	consciousness	cannot	go,	and	between	which	 it	 is	condemned	to	oscillate”	 (Jameson	
1981:32).	In	Jameson’s	conceptualization	of	Greimas,		
	
Such	a	vision	is	not	to	be	taken	as	the	logical	articulation	of	all	the	political	positions	or	ideological	possibilities	
objectively	present	 […],	but	 rather	as	 the	 structure	of	a	particular	political	 fantasy,	as	 the	mapping	of	 that	
particular	"libidinal	apparatus"	in	which	[…]	political	thinking	becomes	invested—it	being	understood	that	we	
are	not	here	distinguishing	between	fantasy	and	some	objective	reality	onto	which	it	would	be	"projected,"	
but	rather,	with	Deleuze	or	with	J.-F.	Lyotard,	asserting	such	fantasy	or	protonarrative	structure	as	the	vehicle	
for	 our	 experience	 of	 the	 real.	 When	 Greimas'	 system	 is	 used	 in	 this	 fashion…	 it	 furnishes	 the	 graphic	
embodiment	of	 ideological	closure	as	such,	and	allows	us	to	map	out	the	 inner	 limits	of	a	given	 ideological	
formation	and	to	construct	the	basic	terms	of	this	particular	libidinal	apparatus	or	"desiring	machine"	(ibid.:48)	
	
Following	 this,	 I	 take	 it	 that	 fabulas	 articulate	 various	 values	 that	 can	 be	 expressed	 in	 a	 logical	
structure,	and	the	desires	for	certain	values	expressed	by	the	subject-actants	form	a	good	starting	
point	 for	 exploring	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 value	 system.	 One	 obvious	 desire	 articulated	 in	 the	
disclosure	of	corruption	is	the	desire	for	truth,	as	Lull	and	Hinerman	note	in	their	introduction	to	
the	seminal	volume	Media	Scandals:	“Truth	is	always	at	issue”	(1997:1).	In	the	fabulas	presented	in	
the	previous	 chapter,	 as	well	 as	 in	 text	examples	 from	 the	various	media	outlets,	 this	 is	 readily	
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apparent.	In	the	fabulas,	various	protagonists	reveal	the	truth	of	corruption,	of	hidden	backstage	
deals,	or	of	political	manipulation	in	the	legal	system.	Seen	from	this	angle,	at	least	a	part	of	the	
fabula	will	read	like	a	quest,	where	actants	seek	the	truth	and	expose	the	lack	of	truth	on	the	part	
of	the	antagonists.	Truth	is	projected	as	beyond	morals,	a	background	condition	for	understanding	
the	very	 reality	of	 the	scandalous	disclosure.	Truth	 is	 furthermore	 tempered	by	uncertainty	and	
delays.	 The	 latter	 was	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 but	 the	 former	 merits	 further	
consideration.	Uncertainty	and	doubt	are	obstacles	to	be	overcome	during	the	pursuit	of	truth,	and	
the	operation	that	transfer	value	is	thus	all	about	shifting	actants	from	liminal	and	uncertain	spaces	
to	 positions	 of	 certain,	 evident	 truth:	 A	 revelation	 must	 be	 followed	 by	 the	 legal	 stages	 of	
investigation,	indictment,	charge	and	ultimately	a	verdict,	so	that	the	truth	is	legally	established	and	
no	longer	subject	to	the	risk	of	being	challenged.	This	is	the	trajectory	of	the	fabulas	1,	1a,	and	3,	
which	can	be	expressed	schematically	through	this	semiotic	square:		
	
Semiotic	schema	of	truth	and	doubt	
Truth	 	 	 	 Falsehood				 	 (axis	of	knowledge)	
	 	 	 X	
Not	proven	false		 	 Not	proven	true	 (axis	of	the	contradictories	(Greimas	1987:51))	
	
In	fabula	1	and	1a,	the	PT	ex-presidents	and	the	party	try	to	deny	or	hide	their	responsibility	for	the	
broken	economy	of	Petrobras	and	Brazil	 in	general.	 The	protagonists	of	 this	 fabula	 set	 strive	 to	
reveal	 the	 truth,	 dispel	 the	doubt,	 and	 to	 repair	 the	 lack	of	 knowledge	 through	disclosure.	 This	
operation	will	move	the	respective	antagonists	to	the	position	of	proven	falsehood	in	the	schema.	
The	 contradiction	 that	 is	 solved	 in	 either	 set	 of	 fabulas	 is	 precisely	 the	 problem	 of	 doubt	 and	
contradiction	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	scandals:	History	needs	revision,	the	web	of	facticity	is	torn,	
and	trust	 in	public	office	 is	challenged.	Overcoming	these	obstacles	by	unmasking	the	truth,	 the	
syntactic	operations	or	narrative	utterances	(ibid.:71)	perform	a	transfer	of	value,	attributing	the	
value	of	truth	to	one	actant	while	depriving	it	of	other	actants.	
	
The	fabulas	2	and	2a	play	out	an	inversion	of	the	revelation	of	truth	presented	in	fabulas	1	and	1a,	
by	positing	(political/ethical)	transgressions	in	the	very	accountability	institutions	and	procedures	
of	Congress	that	are	supposed	to	hold	politicians	accountable.	Thus,	fabulas	2	and	2a	inverse	the	
allocation	of	truth	to	the	judicial	actors	(and	also	deny	moral	qualities	to	the	prosecutors	and	to	
Moro).	Note,	however,	that	even	if	the	truth	claim	is	inversed	in	2	and	2a,	the	aim	is	still	unmasking	
truths	–	only	 this	 time	about	 the	miscarriages	of	 justice	and	 the	hidden	motives	of	 the	puppet-
masters	orchestrating	the	coup	d’état	and	the	political	persecution.	The	desire	is	fundamentally	the	
same	as	regards	to	truth.	So,	in	fabula	2	and	2a,	on	the	axis	of	knowledge,	actants	of	the	judicial	
system	know	that	PT	is	persecuted,	but	falsely	continue	to	assert	the	impartiality	of	justice.		
	
Once	a	public	denunciation	of	political	 transgression	creates	public	awareness	and	suspicions	of	
corruption,	actant-subjects	of	the	fabulas	may	then	be	positioned	in	another	grid	of	values,	dealing	
not	with	 truth	claims	and	 the	unmasking	of	 falsehood	but	with	 the	status	of	guilt	and	sanction,	
defined	 in	 the	 legal	 arenas.	 This	 semiotic	 schema	mapping	 out	 the	 logical	 positions	 in	 judicial	
processes	was	developed	in	Chapter	2,	and	importantly,	it	defines	whether	actants	can	continue	as	
active	agents	in	the	political	sphere:		
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Individual	object	positions	in	judicial	processes	
	
No	sanction	 	 Impunity	
Innocent	 	 Guilty	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 X	
Not	guilty	 	 Not	innocent	
Punished	 	 Punished	 	
	
The	above	semiotic	schema	of	value	lays	two	sets	of	axes	on	top	of	each	other,	that	of	sanction	and	
that	of	 guilt.	 This	 generates	 two	positions	 that	 are	problematic	or	 contradictory	 and	 in	need	of	
resolution:	 The	 position	 of	 impunity	 and	 the	 position	 of	 a	miscarriage	 of	 justice	 containing	 the	
innocent-but-punished.	 By	 understanding	 texts	 and	 fabulas	 about	 investigations	 and	 trials	 as	
narrative	 utterances,	 Brazil’s	 historical	 tendency	 of	 impunity	 for	 political	 corruption	 is	 thus	
rediscovered	as	one	logical	possibility	of	contradictories	in	a	Greimasian	framework.		
	
The	subject-actants	are	moved	around	and	allocated	values	in	different	ways	in	each	set	of	fabulas:	
While	most	politicians	claim	innocence	(the	important	historical	exceptions	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	
being	Delcídio	do	Amaral,	Antônio	Palocci,	and	Pedro	Vargas),	a	great	many	could	potentially	be	
seen	as	being	located	in	the	top-right	corner.	In	fabula	1	and	1a,	we	find	a	number	of	PT	politicians,	
but,	as	the	trials	progressed	in	Curitiba,	Lula,	José	Dirceu,	Delúbio	Soares,	Silvio	Pereira,	and	João	
Vaccari	Neto	moved	to	the	“punished”	category,	all	of	them	however	countering	this	(in	the	fabula	
2a)	by	self-identifying	as	not-guilty	but	punished,	the	lower	left	corner.	In	the	fabulas	of	coup	d’état	
and	political	persecution	or	witch-hunt	(fabula	2	and	2a),	the	guilty	(located	top-right)	remain	free,	
and	impunity	reigns	in	Brasília	with	the	golpistas	running	the	government	and	attempting	to	stop	
further	investigations.	Fabulas	1/1a	and	2/2a	thus	have	inversed	value	schemas:	The	sentenced	PT	
actants	switch	place	horizontally	between	the	two	sets,	as	does	the	political	actors	who	succeeded	
in	removing	Rousseff.	Cunha	appears	as	actant	only	in	the	second	set:	
	
	
Fabula	1/1a	 	 	 	 	 	 Fabula	2/2a	
	 	 	 Impunity	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Impunity	
Judiciary	 	 (empty)	 	 	 (empty)	 	 	 PSDB,	Temer	 	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X	
(empty)	 	 Lula	/PT	 	 	 Lula/Rousseff/PT	 	 (Cunha)	
Punished	 	 	 Innocent/punished	 	 Punished	
	
	
In	the	third	set	of	fabulas,	“Cleaning	Congress”	and	“Fall	of	the	Republic,”	the	old	political	elite	en	
bloc	(be	it	PT,	PMDB	or	PSDB)	who	are	traditionally	found	in	the	upper-right	corner,	governing	in	a	
corrupt	way	but	enjoying	impunity,	are	falling	like	a	line	of	dominos,	one	for	one	caught,	trialled,	
and	transferred	to	the	lower-right	corner.	The	public	prosecutors,	judges	and	police	agents	are	here	
located	in	the	position	of	Helpers,	in	the	Proppian	terminology,	who	contribute	to	bringing	about	
the	change,	rather	than	protagonists	in	their	own	right.	
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Fabula	3/3a	
	 	 	 Impunity	
A	new	leader	 	 (a	few	remaining)	 	 	
	 	 X	
(empty)	 	 Old	elite:	PT,	PMDB,	PSDB	
Punished	 	
	
Whereas	the	advent	of	new	faces	replacing	the	old	elite	is	positively	assessed	in	fabula	3,	in	fabula	
3a	this	change	has	the	unfortunate	effect	of	pushing	an	untainted	but	unfit	person	in	position	to	
claim	 the	 presidency	 through	 illegitimate	 and	 excessive	 judicial	 interventions.	 In	 fabula	 3,	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 attaining	 power	 lies	 precisely	 in	 the	 top-left	 position;	 even	 the	 association	 with	
politicians	from	the	right-hand	side	contaminates	a	candidacy.	In	fabula	3a,	legitimate	rule	cannot	
be	 founded	 solely	 upon	 popular	 will	 electing	 a	 “clean”	 candidate,	 as	 this	 will	 only	 prolong	 the	
shadow	influence	of	economic	elites	upon	the	political	field.		
	
In	this	third	fabula	set,	the	issue	of	legitimate	use	of	force	is	also	at	stake,	and	the	discussions	of	
prolonged	preventive	arrests	and	plea	bargains	contrasts	the	necessary	use	with	the	excessive	use	
of	 judicial	 measures.	 The	 suspicion	 that	 the	 political	 elite	 wants	 to	 be	 rid	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	
investigation	 escalates	 the	 conflict,	 and	 by	 investing	 such	 sinister	 motives	 in	 all	 of	 actants	 of	
Congress	and	government,	normal	measures	are	deemed	insufficient.	The	extraordinary	measures	
match	 the	 extraordinary	 need	 for	 swift	 and	 effective	 judicial	 intervention,	 and	 this	 provides	 a	
narrative	solution	to	the	contradiction	of	a	judicial	system	that	flirts	with	extra-judicial	instruments	
and	unequal	treatment	before	the	law.		
	
Value	schema	characterizing	judicial	interventions	
Normal	 	 	 Abnormal	
legitimate	 	 	 illegitimate	
	 	 	 X	
Exceptional	 	 	 Exceptional	
but	excessive	 	 	 but	necessary,	thus	also	legitimate	
	
The	legitimacy	of	judiciary	and	judicial	decisions	was	of	course	also	a	theme	in	the	other	fabulas.	As	
described	above,	 the	value	 schema	of	 truth	may	be	 flipped	 (throwing	doubt	upon	 that	which	 is	
perceived	and	therefore	“known”	as	truth),	and	this	generates	the	contrasting	1/1a	and	2/2a	value	
schemes,	concerning	the	righteous	or	unfair	judicial	status	of	diverse	political	actants.		
	
This	 contest	 for	 true	 interpretations	 and	 true	 identifications	 of	 transgressions	 (whether	 in	 the	
judiciary,	legislative,	or	executive	branch)	then	generates	second-order	conflicts	of	values,	where	
the	issue	at	stake	is	the	legitimacy	of	power	and	resistance:	The	legitimate	use	of	presidential	power,	
the	legitimacy	of	judicial	interventions,	and	the	legitimacy	of	civic	society	resistance	against	either	
of	the	former.	The	themes	of	legitimacy	and	resistance	are	differently	distributed	in	the	fabulas,	as	
are	the	temporal	horizons	(discussed	in	the	previous	chapter):	
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Theme	 Fabula:	 1,	1a,	3	 2,	2a,	3a	
Legitimation	of	power	(Rousseff)	 	 Illegitimate	presidency	 Legitimate	presidency	
Legitimation	of	power	(Temer)	 	 Legitimate	presidency*	 Illegitimate	presidency	
Legitimation	of	public	opinion	 	 Legitimate	protests	 Overwhelming	media	bias	
Resistance		 	 PT	Capture	of	State	Power	 Excess	of	Judiciary	and	Moro	
Power	balance	 	 Functioning	institutions	 State	of	Exception	
Temporality	 	 	 	
Time	of	crisis	 	 A	crisis	overcome	 The	cataclysm	
Time	of	the	Nation	 	 Crusade	against	
corruption	
Fim-do-mundo	
	
Note	that	the	Temer	presidency	at	most	moments	appeared	as	less	than	fully	 legitimate,	even	if	
judged	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 enacting	 necessary	 policy	 changes.	 However,	 because	 the	 Temer	
administration	 seemed	 to	 deliver	 some	 of	 the	 desired	 political	 reforms,	 the	 illegitimacy	 of	 the	
presidency	 itself	was	downplayed	 in	editorials	of	 the	mainstream	outlets.	Perhaps	 for	 the	 same	
reasons,	 the	 crises	 relating	 to	 the	 Temer	 presidency	were	 never	 presented	 as	 symbolically	 and	
historically	important	as	the	crisis	pertaining	to	Lula	and	Rousseff.		
	
The	necessity	and	 legitimacy	 in	resisting	state	authority	were	also	determined	by	the	 location	 in	
either	set	of	fabulas:	In	the	fabulas	with	PT	acting	as	antagonists,	it	was	necessary	and	legitimate	to	
resist	the	corrupt	state	through	public	protests,	panelaços,	online	mobilization,	and	so	forth.	In	the	
fabulas	where	Moro	and	the	Congress	deliberately	executed	pseudo-trials	with	no	respect	for	the	
rule	of	law,	resistance	to	the	judicial	authorities	was	likewise	cast	as	legitimate	and	necessary.		
	
Because	of	 the	contested	space	of	 truth,	 “public	morality”	becomes	ambiguous	 in	 the	Lava-Jato	
scandal,	and	the	sets	of	values	discussed	above	inherit	this	ambiguity,	so	that	judicial	intervention,	
accountability	processes,	court	sentences,	and	even	political	change	at	large	can	be	either	good	or	
bad.	Even	more	fundamentally,	the	foundation	and	edifices	of	democracy	were	called	into	question	
as	the	legitimacy	of	institutional	processes	came	under	serious	scrutiny	in	news	texts	invoking	the	
various	fabulas.	Because	these	are	themes	not	normally	called	into	question,	the	instability	of	norms	
provoked	by	 the	 recycling	of	 contesting	 fabulas	merits	 the	 term	 “crisis.”	 In	 consequence	of	 the	
instability	and	diverging	structures	of	values,	the	fabulas	needed	different	solutions	which	yielded	
the	diverging	endpoints	of	each	fabula.		
	
	
6.2	Ideology	and	the	Limits	of	Political	Imagination	
So	far,	I	have	reviewed	how	value	sets	such	as	true-false,	guilty-innocent,	or	legitimate-illegitimate	
could	 be	 arranged	 in	 logical	 structures	 that	 allowed	 for	 synchronic	 comparison	 of	 the	 fabulas	
abstracted	from	the	diachronic	operations	of	the	previous	chapter.	However,	these	basic	value	pairs	
and	structures	have	little	to	do	with	political	preferences	and	worldviews,	or	in	a	word,	ideology.	
Indeed,	in	some	assessments	of	corruption	scandals,	the	discourse	of	news	has	been	characterized	
as	individualizing,	emptying	the	political	field	of	ideology,	filling	this	field	instead	with	vague	moral	
admonishments	concerning	individual	public	decency	(e.g.	Allern	and	Pollack	2012:183,	Delli	Carpini	
and	Williams	2001:178,	Gronbeck	1997:135-7,	Thompson	2000:111-6).	When	scandals	take	center	
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stage,	personality	and	individual	credibility	become	the	issue,	turning	public	attention	away	from	
substantive	issues,	according	to	this	argument.		
	
The	argument	that	scandals	eclipse	ideology	has	resonance	in	the	context	of	Brazilian	media.	First	
off,	the	political	arena	as	displayed	in	Brazilian	media	is	generally	a	space	of	personal	ethics	and	
personal	biography,	rather	than	party-based	ideology.	While	the	parties	of	the	Congress	generally	
consistent	 act	 in	 a	 consistent	 manner	 (Power	 and	 Zucco	 Júnior	 2011),	 there	 is	 increasing	
fragmentation	 of	 Congress	 (with	 28	 parties	 represented	 in	 the	 2015-2018	 period),	 confusingly	
similar	abbreviations,	and	the	trajectories	of	many	important	politicians	easily	span	three	or	four	
ideologically	 heterogeneous	 parties	within	 two	 decades	 of	 public	 life	 (Pereira,	 Power	 and	 Raile	
2011:36).	The	media	system	responds	to	this	with	a	presidential	focus	(Albuquerque	2011:91)	and	
limited	 interest	 to	 party-internal	 issues	 (apart	 from	 the	 PT).	Most	main	 parties	 are	 themselves	
internally	ideologically	heterogeneous,	either	because	they	are	catch-all	centrist	parties,	because	of	
regional	considerations	and	traditions,	or	due	to	the	erratic	trajectories	of	individual	politicians	who	
will	likely	be	incorporated	by	diverse	parties	(Borges	and	Sanches	Filho	2016:9)	mostly	for	the	sake	
of	visibility	and	votes.	Thus,	the	problem	of	ill-defined	ideological	orientation	could	be	seen	as	one	
symptom	of	an	“empty”	or	non-ideological	political	field.	In	such	a	field,	scandals	provide	tests	of	
credibility	(Thompson	2000:115)	that	are	more	symbolically	significant	in	public	than	the	party	card.	
	
According	to	this	view,	because	scandals	emphasize	personalization	or	individualization	of	politics	
(Allern	and	Pollack	2012:183,	van	Aelst,	Shaefer	and	Stanyer	2011)	and	focalize	the	person	over	the	
(party)	ideology	(Albuquerque	2011:91),	power	–	that	is,	the	legitimate	exercise	of	political	power	
–	is	grounded	more	in	the	moral	qualities	of	the	incumbent	or	the	candidate	rather	than	the	political	
project.	The	“empty”	political	character	of	scandal	does	not	hold	up	to	closer	scrutiny,	however:	In	
the	 Lava-Jato	 case,	 certain	 features	 made	 the	 scandal	 intensely	 aligned	 with	 party	 lines	 and	
ideological	 preferences;	 and	 in	 theory,	 the	 absence	 of	 political	 preferences	 and	 ideologically	
motivated	 actions	 relating	 to	 political	 transgressions	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 a	 scandal.	
Furthermore,	 comparative	 research	 has	 yielded	 interesting	 insights	 into	 the	 backstage	 level	 of	
scandals,	where	relative	party	strength	may	be	the	parameter	most	accurately	predicts	occurrence	
of	scandals.	In	other	Latin	American	cases,	there	is	a	clear	pattern	of	scandals	having	much	to	do	
with	 the	 relative	 levels	of	power	and	 influence	 in	 inter-	 and	 intragovernmental	 struggles	 (Balán	
2011,	see	also	studies	of	US	politics	in	the	same	vein	by	Nyhan	2017	and	Rottinghaus	2014).	In	this	
interpretation,	scandals	are	a	front,	barely	disguising	the	brutal	melee	between	political	actors	of	
different	factions,	usually	divided	along	ideological	lines	and	only	unstably	united	by	the	will	to	rule.		
	
The	question	of	a	party-specific	bias	in	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	was	raised	early	on,	due	to	the	
aggregate	trajectory	of	the	trials,	conflicts	of	jurisdictional	competency,	and	appeal	cases.	In	early	
2015,	the	arrest	of	the	PT	treasurer	Vaccari	Neto	cast	suspicion	on	the	party	apparatus	as	a	whole,	
while	other	arrested	in	the	case	were	not	tied	directly	to	parties	in	news	media	texts.	For	example,	
although	it	was	well	known	that	the	Petrobras	director	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	was	appointed	by	the	
party	PP,	and	that	the	doleiro	Youssef	distributed	kickbacks	to	this	party,	this	was	rarely	seen	as	a	
problem	for	the	party;	nor	did	it	mean	that	PP	was	expelled	from	Rousseff’s	cabinet	(and	indeed	the	
party	 later	 became	 a	 vital	 support	 for	 the	 Temer	 government,	 despite	 being	 the	 target	 of	 an	
enormous	civil	lawsuit	moved	by	public	prosecutors,	see	Damgaard	2018b:129).		
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The	unevenly	distributed	focus	on	parties	and	party	allegiance	(see	appendix	C)	reached	a	whole	
other	level	with	the	incarceration	of	Lula	on	April	7,	2018.	Denunciations	of	anti-PT	bias	in	the	media,	
present	 in	 fabula	 2	 and	 2a,	 had	 been	 common	 in	 left-wing	 politics	 since	 the	 Mensalão	 case	
(Damgaard	2015a,	Biroli	and	Mantovani	2014:209).	This	theme	was	 increasingly	present	 in	news	
meta-reports	in	CartaCapital	and	JornalGGN,	for	instance,	in	the	build-up	to	the	impeachment	of	
Rousseff,	 boiling	up	again	as	 Lula	was	 interrogated	by	 Sérgio	Moro	and	 later	 sentenced	 (in	 July	
2017),	but	it	reached	its	climax	as	the	ex-president	faced	incarceration	in	2018	(Feres	Júnior	2018).	
Since	Lula	was	the	ultimate	political	icon	of	socially	inclusive	politics	and	redistribution	of	wealth,	
class	discourse	with	explicit	ideological	content	could	hardly	avoid	being	invoked	in	the	course	of	
the	scandals	and	judicial	processes.		
	
Given	that	Lula	and	PT	is	associated	with	certain	governance	models	and	a	leftist	ideology,	it	comes	
as	no	surprise	that	the	second	set	of	fabulas	could	be	interpreted	not	just	as	miscarriages	of	justice	
and	backstage	politics	 at	 its	worst,	 but	 as	 an	 ideological	 struggle	barely	masked	 as	 scandal	 and	
economic	 crisis.	 This	 ideological	 interpretation,	 commonly	 found	 in	 in	 left-wing	 entrepreneurial	
online	media	such	as	JornalGGN	or	Mídia	NINJA	or	print/web	outlets	such	as	CartaCapital,	expands	
the	 semiotic	 squares	 of	 basic	 values	 constructed	 in	 the	 above	 section,	 so	 that	 I	 may	 add	 new	
connotations	to	the	value	schemas	already	established:		
	
Fabula	2/2a	-	ideological	aspects	
	
	 	 	 	 (guilty	but	counting	on	impunity	in	the	courts)	
	 Metropolitan	elite	 	
(empty)	 	 	 Conservatives		
Oppressors	
	 	 	 PSDB,	Temer	 	
	 	 	 Mainstream	media	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	
Grassroots	and	PT	
Lula/Rousseff	 	 	
Oppressed	 	 	 (empty)	
Workers	
Common	people		
(unjustly	punished	by	courts)	
	
	
The	actual	 scandal	at	hand,	 in	 this	 fabula,	 thus	becomes	a	 tragic	allegory	expressing	 the	eternal	
conflict	of	master-slave	relations	in	Brazilian	history,	transposed	unto	the	social	terrain	of	the	21st	
century.	In	this	second	horizon	of	a	Jamesonian	analysis	(1981:66,	79),	the	contradiction	of	a	popular	
(and	poll-leading)	but	convicted	and	incarcerated	ex-president	is	solved	by	denying	the	truth	value	
of	the	mainstream	fabula	(fabula	1	and	1a)	and,	by	inverting	the	truth	value,	constructing	a	prism	
for	understanding	all	prior	and	subsequent	acts	of	the	scandal.	
	
Because	 of	 the	 (frequently	 articulated)	 claim	 that	 the	 prosecutors	 acted	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	
conservative	 elite,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task-force	 and	 PGR	 Janot	 often	 denied	 partisan	 leanings,	 for	
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example	in	the	statement	of	the	federal	prosecutor	Carlos	dos	Santos	Lima,	section	4.4.1:	“This	is	a	
Republican	moment”	in	which	“no-one	should	be	exempt	from	investigations.”	Religion	sometimes	
substituted	for	ideology,	furthermore,	and	the	evangelical	inclination	of	Lima’s	colleague	in	the	task-
force,	public	prosecutor	Deltan	Dallagnol,	was	sometimes	remarked	upon	by	left-wing	actors.		
	
A	right-wing	version	of	the	above	value	scheme	is	likewise	easily	found,	sometimes	echoing	religious	
positions	(evangelical	denominations	have	long	opposed	PT	policies	on	abortion	and	gay	politics,	
e.g.	Biroli	and	Miguel	2011:81).	This	value	scheme	appears	occasionally	 in	political	commentary,	
and	pervasively	 in	the	social	media	discourse	of	VemPraRua,	Revoltados	Online,	and	Movimento	
Brasil	Livre,	the	organizations	behind	the	street	protests	of	2015	and	2016.	To	them,	the	PT	actors	
received	their	just	punishment	for	attempting	to	“perpetuate	their	power	project”	(a	quote	found	
in	such	strata	of	the	media	but	also	in	the	samples	above,	e.g.	G1-8/2	2016).	The	PT	power	project,	
in	this	view,	was	a	clandestine	co-optation	of	the	Brazilian	state	aiming	to	destroy	the	nuclear	family,	
endorse	gay	politics,	help	out	communist	powers	in	Latin	America	such	as	Cuba	and	Venezuela,	and	
of	course	to	get	rich	all	the	while.		
	
Fabula	1/1a	-	ideological	aspects	 	 	
Innocent	 	 	 	 Guilty	 	
(Judiciary	actors)	 	 	
Liberal	political	actors	
Evangelical		 	 	 	 (empty)	
Nuclear	family	values	
	 	 	 	 X	
	 	 	 	 	 PT	
(empty)	 	 	 	 Communist	
	 	 	 	 	 Secular	
	 	 	 	 	 Gay		
	 	 	 	 	 Punished	
	
This	 set	of	 ideological	values	opposed	 in	 this	version	 is	not	dissimilar	 to	 the	 liberal/conservative	
values	and	metaphor	categories	discussed	by	Lakoff	(2002),	as	the	right-wing	schema	projects	an	
image	of	PT	according	to	a	“demonology”	(ibid.:171),	in	caricature	of	left-wing	discourse	informed	
by	 the	worst	 possible	 violations	 of	 a	 conservative	moral	 order.	 In	 sum,	 ideology	may	 very	well	
become	vested	in	the	subject-actants	of	fabulas	on	corruption.	In	this	specific	case,	the	operation	
works	through	binary	oppositions	articulated	as	contrasts	between	the	PT	(with	its	specific	historical	
allegiances	and	public	image)	and	the	forces	opposing	PT.		
	
Importantly,	 when	 either	 set	 of	 fabulas	 is	 extended	 to	 include	 ideology	 (or	 demonology,	 the	
caricature	 of	 ideology),	 the	 capture	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 appears	 as	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 the	
antagonists,	to	the	detriment	of	the	citizens	and	democracy.	In	fabulas	1	and	1a,	PT	seized	power	
and	made	the	state	a	part	of	the	party	machinery.	Inversely,	in	fabulas	2	and	2a,	the	judiciary	actors	
(with	vested	 interests)	and	the	corrupt	 legislative	branch	conspired	successfully	to	take	over	the	
state	 that	 was	 previously	 ruled	 democratically.	 Although	 the	 timing	 is	 different,	 the	 narrative	
operations	 in	both	sets	of	 fabulas	are	 isomorph:	The	State	was/is	corrupt,	corrupted	by	political	
actors,	and	needs	to	be	saved	for	the	sake	of	the	citizens.		
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The	association	of	PT	with	the	Brazilian	state	in	the	underlying	narrative	structure	of	the	fabulas	1	
and	1a,	and	the	association	of	conservative	elites	recapturing	the	state	in	fabulas	2	and	2a,	yield	
another	way	of	 looking	at	 ideology.	 Thinking	about	 ideology	 in	 this	way,	 as	 a	 contrast	between	
corrupt	elite	politics	and	the	citizenry,	provides	a	third	option	for	interpreting	the	ideological	value	
of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case,	 which	 is	 even	 consonant	 with	 the	 fabulas	 3	 and	 3a.	 I	 consider	 this	
interpretation	to	be	a	populist	 reading	of	 the	whole	scandal	and	political	crisis.	 In	 this	view,	the	
“cleaning	of	Congress”	is	essentially	anti-elitist,	and	the	movement	will	pave	the	way	for	populist-
style	 presidential	 candidates,	 Jair	 Bolsonaro	most	 (in)famously,	 but	 with	 various	 other	 possible	
candidates	appearing	and	disappearing	from	time	to	time	(Luciano	Huck	and	Joaquim	Barbosa	as	
the	most	salient	candidates	highlighted	as	“newcomers”).	Even	if	such	candidates	were	aligned	with	
political	 parties,	 their	 main	 claim	 as	 candidates	 was	 their	 status	 as	 outsiders,	 fresh	 faces	 not	
associated	with	 the	 old-elite,	willing	 to	 take	 bold	 steps	 to	 ensure	 a	 new	beginning	 for	 Brazilian	
politics	(see	footnote	8).		
	
This	interpretation	also	highlights	the	tension	between	the	judiciary	branch	of	government	and	the	
political	 branches	 (legislative	 and	 executive).	 If	 the	 judiciary	 actors,	 Moro	 in	 particular,	 are	
considered	as	the	just	and	morally	incorruptible	subject-actants,	they	are	positioned	diametrically	
across	from	the	corrupt	State	actors	that	have	been	sentenced	by	Moro	in	the	period	2015-2018	–	
the	list	 includes	Petrobras	directors,	PT	politicians,	businessmen	prospering	from	the	corruption,	
and	Lula	as	the	mastermind.	In	other	words,	the	State	is	“guilty”	and	“punished”	in	this	schema,	
which	I	will	unfold	in	two	steps:	
	
	
State	contra	Judiciary	
	
Innocence	
Judiciary		
Rule	of	law	
	 	 X	
	 	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	
	 	 	 State	(legislative	and	executive	branch)		
	 	 	 Punished	
	
Now,	 if	 we	 remember	 that	 the	 basic	 axes	 of	 this	 scheme	 is	 guilty/punished	 and	 innocent/not	
punished,	the	so-far	empty	slot	in	the	top-right	suggestively	demands	to	be	filled	in.	In	this	corner,	
we	may	 locate	Politics	 in	 general	 –	 	 yet	 to	be	punished	 (in	 fabulas	2,	 2a,	 3,	 and	3a)	due	 to	 the	
pervasive	impunity,	but	certainly	guilty.		
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State-Judiciary-Politics	
	
Innocence	 	 Impunity	(not	innocent,	not-punished)	
Judiciary		 	 Politics	
Rule	of	law	 	 Private	interests	(corrupted)	
X	
	 	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	
	 	 	 State		
	 	 	 Punished	
	
This	opposes	Politics	to	the	State,	i.e.	private	interests	actively	corrupting	the	passive	State	actors.	
Subject-actants	in	Politics	do	not	attempt	to	represent	specific	constituencies	and	their	collective	
political	interests,	but	rather	to	live	like	kings	through	their	corruption	of	the	State.	Who	then	suffers	
from	a	corrupted	State	and	from	the	corrupted	Politics?	The	obvious	candidate	 for	 the	slot	of	a	
punished	and	suffering	(but	essentially	innocent)	subject,	opposed	to	politics	and	subjugated	to	the	
State,	would	be	the	citizens.	The	citizens,	“o	Povo,”	are	deceived	by	the	actants	of	the	right	axis,	but	
potentially	 liberated	 by	 the	 Judiciary.	 This	 attempt	 at	 constructing	 a	more	 complete	 schema	 of	
State-Judiciary-Politics-Citizen	relations	then	looks	like	this:		
	
State-Judiciary-Politics-Citizen	
	
Innocence	 	 	 Impunity	(not	innocent,	not-punished)	
Judiciary		 	 	 Politics	
Rule	of	law	 	 	 Private	interests	(corrupted)	
	 	 	 X	
Suffering	subject	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	
Citizens	 	 	 State		
Punished,	but	innocent	 Punished	
	
In	this	schema	of	positions,	all	the	abstract	 institutional	and	collective	entities	of	the	democratic	
system	acting	in	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	are	allocated	guilt,	innocence,	and	moral	value	relative	to	the	
public	good.	If	this	graphic	embodiment	adequately	illustrates	ideological	closure	of	the	fabulas,	not	
just	1	and	1a,	but	really	all	six	fabulas,	then	it	becomes	apparent	that	they	all	spring	from	the	same	
narrative	 engine	 producing	 desire,	 an	 underlying	 political	 fantasy	 (Jameson	 1981,	 paraphrasing	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	1977[1972]).	
	
In	this	fantasy,	the	ideal	of	the	Judiciary	is	to	establish	and	secure	the	rule	of	law.	The	ideal	may	be	
realized	 (in	 fabulas	 1	 and	 1a),	 or	 be	manipulated	 for	 political	 (fabula	 2	 and	 2a)	 or	 indeed	 anti-
democratic	 purposes	 (3a).	 The	 Judiciary	 is	 facing	 off	 against	 potent	 and	 anti-democratic	 forces,	
however,	threatening	to	undo	each	conquest	of	justice.	
	
Politics	is	the	perennial	space	of	corruption;	even	as	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	moved	on	to	new	
targets	and	while	evidence	mounted	against	PSDB,	the	disappointment	that	the	2018	elections	still	
only	provided	“old”	candidates	was	tangible,	because	these	candidates	(such	as	Geraldo	Alckmin)	
were	part	of	the	established	system,	ever	under	suspicion.	
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The	State,	whether	in	the	hands	of	Temer	or	of	Rousseff,	was	corrupted	by	power.	In	fabulas	1,	1a,	
3,	and	3a,	this	is	intrinsic.	Even	in	fabulas	2	and	2a,	the	system	of	governance	is	full	of	problems	and	
vices	and	ever	in	need	of	political	and	electoral	reform.	Sacrifices	had	to	be	made,	compromises	and	
deals	must	be	struck	through	pork-barrel	politics,	nominations	and	negotiations	to	win	the	vote	of	
every	veto-player.	
	
Thus,	the	democratic	pillars	of	legislative,	executive	and	judiciary	branches	of	government	stand	in	
eternal	tension,	and	the	Citizens	(or	“o	povo”	-	the	people)	are	perpetually	suffering	from	the	abuse	
of	the	state	apparatus.	The	next	corruption	scandal	always	lurks,	and	replacing	one	president	with	
the	 next	 is	 no	 guarantee	 for	 a	 radical	 renewal	 of	 politics.	 The	 population	 at	 large	 also	 remains	
passive	 and	 disqualified	 from	 politics	 (in	 an	 echo	 of	 the	 “povo	 bestializado”	 discourse,	 Wink	
2008:270),	awaiting	the	salvation	delivered	by	the	judiciary.		
	
Each	fabula	has	distinct	syntagmatic	relations	between	the	terms:	
	
1/1a:	Judiciary	 >	(punishes)	Politics		 >	(for	corrupting)	the	State		 >	(thus	saving)	the	Citizens	 	
2/2a:	Politics	 >	(corrupts)	Judiciary	 >	(that	punishes)	the	State		 >	(which	manipulates)	the	Citizens	
3/3a:	Judiciary	 >	(interferes)	Politics	 >	(destroying)	the	State		 >	(setting	loose)	the	Citizens	 	
	
It	could	be	argued	that	the	Judiciary	should	not	be	interpreted	as	protagonist	in	the	fabulas	2/2a,	
but	rather	as	antagonist.	However,	the	self-proclaimed	victims	of	golpe	and	persecution	repeatedly	
appeal	to	a	sense	of	justice.	Even	as	she	was	being	ousted,	Rousseff	insisted	on	that	politics	should	
not	 interfere	 in	 the	 judiciary,	 hoping	 against	 hope	 that	 the	 judiciary	 would	 let	 justice	 prevail.	
Ultimately,	 she	 invoked	 the	 metaphor	 that	 history	 would	 judge	 the	 current	 political	 situation.	
Likewise,	Lula	appealed,	literally,	to	the	supposedly	greater	and	less	corrupted	judicial	instance	of	
the	UN.	Thus,	 a	 vestige	of	 the	desire	 for	 an	 independent	and	morally	uncorrupted	 legal	 system	
remained	in	the	fabulas	2/2a,	even	if	the	particular	trials	turned	out	as	miscarriages	of	justice.	
	
	
6.3	National	Struggles	and	Unity	in	Media	Discourse	
The	battleground	in	these	fabulas	is	only	obliquely	mentioned:	In	the	previous	chapters’	hundred	
examples	of	media	texts,	the	word	“nation”	is	never	mentioned,	and	“country”	and	“Brazil”	are	rare	
occurrences	 (almost	 exclusively	 used	 by	 politicians).	 The	 concept	 of	 the	 “Republic”	 is	 textually	
manifest	only	at	the	apices	of	the	crises.	Nonetheless,	the	fabulas	do	present	a	nation	torn	from	
within,	split	between	warring	institutions	and	the	citizens	awaiting	a	gallant	rescue.	Citizens,	in	all	
three	fabula	sets,	are	opposed	to	state	actors:	To	Congressmen	who	does	not	truly	represent	the	
people	and	corrupt	the	state	companies;	or	to	unjust	and	politicized	Judiciary	crusaders,	judges	and	
magistrates	or	to	corrupt	federal	governments	-	led	by	Temer,	Lula,	or	Rousseff,	it	matters	not;	the	
citizens	find	the	enemy	within	(the	state).	This	emplotment	parallels	the	position	of	the	State	as	
external	 to	 the	Nation	 in	 various	historical	Brazilian	discourse	 formations,	 either	 as	 a	 colonizing	
apparatus	or	as	an	entity	appropriated	by	patrimonialist	interests	(Chaui	2000:42,	Sorj	2000).	
	
The	Nation,	then,	is	the	contested	space	of	these	fabulas,	and	the	primordial	and	eventual	unity	of	
the	national	community	 is	quintessentially	a	discursive	effect	 (to	return	to	Anderson’s	argument	
(1983)).	But	how	can	unity	be	achieved	discursively,	if	the	concept	of	nationhood	only	infrequently	
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appears	 in	 the	 news	 on	 corruption?	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 (incomplete)	 suppression	 of	 national	
categories	is	actually	significant	in	relation	to	the	ideological	split	discussed	in	the	previous	section.	
Simply	put,	the	struggles	between	Brazilian	classes	is	not	narrated	as	such	in	these	fabulas.	Instead	
of	a	contested	ideological	space,	the	conflict	of	the	fabulas	are	instead	located	inside	the	nation-
state.	At	the	same	time,	this	projects	a	desire	for	unity	among	the	Brazilian	citizens	while	erecting	
an	abyss	between	citizens	and	the	seat	of	power	in	Brasília.	
	
Although	discussions	that	imply	conflict	within	Brazilian	society	is	more	common	in	the	coverage	
found	 in	 left	 wing	 blogs	 and	 commentary	 of	 right-wing	 social	 media	 (especially	 with	 MBL,	
Movimento	Brasil	Livre),	the	mainstream	media	also	to	some	extent	acknowledged	the	ideological	
conflict,	especially	in	the	coverage	of	protests.	Protesters	were	stereotyped	(with	gastronomical-
pejorative	terms)	as	either	coxinhas	(anti-PT)	or	mortadelas	(pro-PT).	More	significantly,	elements	
of	the	anti-PT	protests	underscored	the	association	of	the	national	with	anti-corruption	and	anti-
socialist	discourse:	The	national	football	shirt	(see	section	4.4.1),	the	slogan	“Our	banner	shall	never	
be	red”	used	in	the	protests	(“A	nossa	bandeira	jamais	será	vermelha”),	and	the	constant	presence	
of	the	national	flag	during	the	impeachment	vote	in	the	Câmara	(see	appendix	A.11	and	A.18)	were	
three	obvious	 examples	 of	 the	use	of	 national	 symbols.	 These	 symbols,	 beyond	 contrasting	 the	
symbolic	 red	 color	 of	 traditional	 socialist	 banners	 to	 the	 national	 flag’s	 green	 and	 yellow,	 also	
opposed	the	Brazilian	nation	(inhabited	by	citizens)	to	the	Brazilian	state	(colonized	by	politics).	In	
other	words,	precisely	 in	 the	moment	when	 the	unity	of	 the	nation	 is	 invoked	 through	national	
symbols,	 it	 is	 used	 to	mark	 out	 a	 difference	within	 the	 nation.	 Bhabha	 observed	 that	 claims	 of	
national	community	are	“poised	on	the	fissures	of	the	present	becoming	the	rhetorical	figures	of	
the	past”	(Bhabha	1994:142),	and	this	goes	for	the	present	example	as	well:	The	nation	appears	in	
narration	of	already-superseded	ambiguities	and	conflicts,	even	as	that	conflict	rages.	
	
The	twin	themes	uncovered	in	the	Greimasian	reading	above	–	the	enemy	within	the	State,	always	
leeching	parasitically	on	the	Citizens,	and	the	double	assignment	of	political	corruption	to	specific	
ideological	 positions	 –	 are	 related,	 moreover,	 to	 the	 nation	 through	 the	 mediatized	 point	 of	
enunciation.	The	fabulas	emerge	intertextually	in	Brazil’s	mainstream	media	which	maintain	what	
may	be	termed	an	“omnibus	stance”	 in	their	discourse,	even	if	the	media	organizations	are	well	
aware	of	their	elite	or	conservative	audiences.	Nonetheless,	their	implicit	proposition	is	that	they	
deal	in	news	of	national	import	and	from	a	unified	national	perspective	–	the	weeklies	and	Jornal	
Nacional	most	obviously,	but	also	the	national	editions	of	the	metropolitan	newspapers.	 In	their	
enunciation	to	a	general,	national	public,	we	find	the	discursive	imprint	of	an	imagined	community	
(Anderson	1983)	and	a	singular	public	sphere	(Habermas	1989[1962]),	even	as	the	media	report	on	
the	apparent	rupture	of	the	political	field	and	the	conflict	of	street	protests.	In	the	fabulas	of	the	
mainstream	media,	we	 rarely	encounter	 an	explicit	 rupture	 in	 the	national	 community,	 and	 the	
media	never	present	their	perspective	as	one-sided,	biased	–	that	would	go	completely	against	the	
grain	of	news	as	a	political	institution	delivering	independent	“omnibus”	news	for	all	(Cook	2006,	
Allern	and	Blach-Ørsten	2011).	Instead,	the	conflict	of	the	fabulas	is	transposed	from	the	ideological	
level,	from	the	clash	of	classes	to	the	institutions,	so	that	various	institutional	positions	are	infused	
with	popular	legitimacy	to	curb	corruption:	First	and	foremost	judge	Sérgio	Moro	(fabula	1/1a),	but	
also	the	judges	that	can	safeguard	against	the	golpe	and	persecution	(2/2a),	or	even	the	deus-ex-
machina	solution	of	a	political	newcomer	(fabula	3).	“The	people”	is	always	unified	in	these	fabulas,	
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because	the	political	conflict	is	denied	its	class	dimensions,	and	because	the	narration	departs	from	
the	omnibus	media’s	foundational	claim	to	national	singularity.		
	
By	partly	eclipsing	the	multiplicity	of	perspectives,	the	discursive	strategies	of	cultural	identification	
at	 work	 in	 mainstream	 media	 works	 just	 like	 the	 counter-narratives	 of	 the	 left-wing,	 as	 they	
transpose	or	displace	the	multiple	identities	of	the	citizens	and	instead	propose	a	single	community:		
	
Counter-narratives	 of	 the	 nation	 that	 continually	 evoke	 and	 erase	 its	 totalizing	 boundaries…	disturb	 those	
ideological	 manoeuvres	 through	 which	 ‘imagined	 communities’	 are	 given	 essentialist	 identities.	 For	 the	
political	 unity	 of	 the	 nation	 consists	 in	 a	 continual	 displacement	 of	 the	 anxiety	 of	 its	 irredeemably	 plural	
modern	space…	(Bhabha	1994:149)	
	
The	omnibus	stance	of	the	mainstream	media	bars	the	specific	assignment	of	political	corruption	to	
ideological	positions,	locating	the	conflicts	triggered	by	corruption	in	the	institutional	field	instead.	
This	displaces	the	anxiety	of	the	radical	possibilities	contained	within	the	protests	–	constitutional	
rupture,	 violence,	 revolution.	 Here,	 news	 work	 like	 the	 national	 discourses	 of	 the	 nineteenth	
century	 did,	 constructing	 national	 identity	 “on	 an	 imaginary	 plane	 that	 hid	 and/or	 eliminated	
differences”	(Hardt	and	Negri	2000:103).	
	
Tellingly,	some	editorials	heralded	the	anti-corruption	efforts	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	as	“a	national	
legacy”	–	the	very	same	words	that	once	described	Petrobras	and	the	wealth	of	oil	resources	which	
could	 have	made	 Brazil	 the	 Land	 of	 the	 Future	 (in	 the	words	 of	 Zweig	 1941).	 However,	 in	 the	
interpretations	consonant	with	fabulas	2/2a,	the	Lava-Jato	case	is	considered	“a	political	project,”	
and	the	probe	is	thus	politicized	in	the	very	moment	it	is	claimed	as	national.	Crucially,	if	one	is	to	
optimistically	argue	for	the	“national”	significance,	then	fabula	1	or	1a	must	be	invoked,	while	in	
pessimistically	denying	it,	one	is	sucked	into	the	fabulas	2/2a.	In	this	way,	a	discourse	of	the	nation	
(i.e.	political	claims	and	references	to	the	national)	seems	to	emerge	in	response	to	the	fabulas	of	
state	corruption	(Gupta	1995),	with	the	markers	of	this	discourse	distributed	exactly	according	to	
the	fabulas.	Like	other	national	representations,	the	need	for	declaring	the	Lava-Jato	case	a	national	
milestone	however	only	arises	the	moment	it	has	been	questioned	and	unmasked	as	subservient	to	
specific	ends	rather	than	to	truly	collective,	national	interests	(Hardt	and	Negri	2000:104).	
	
	
6.4	The	Limits	of	Political	Imagination	in	Scandal	Fabulas	
Even	 articulated	 in	 six	 different	 versions,	 the	 persistent	 features	 of	 the	 scandal	 fabulas	 are	
significant.	These	features	are	constituted	by	the	structural	limitations	imposed	upon	the	political	
imagination	by	the	particular	ideology	of	form	governing	this	cultural	production.	Because	of	these	
limitations,	divergent	value	systems	cannot	perturb	or	penetrate	the	flows	of	the	mediascape,	and	
so	the	positions	of	actants	and	positions	are	only	inversed	and	shuffled	around.	No	other	political	
imaginaries	and	desires	are	conceivable	here,	or	 they	are	dismissed	as	outdated	vestiges	of	 the	
Brazilian	and	Latin	American	history.	In	the	stratum	of	mainstream	news,	revolution	is	not	an	option,	
and	the	only	resolution	to	the	impasse	of	an	exposed	but	still	hegemonic	corrupt	political	system	is	
crusades	led	by	the	judiciary.		
	
The	primacy	of	the	legal	in	this	extended	genre	of	news	on	scandals	(accessed	here	in	the	forms	of	
newscasts,	in	magazines,	tabloids	and	newspapers,	in	blogs	and	commentary,	tweeted	and	recycled	
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across	social	networks)	is	perhaps	the	effect	of	its	determinate	set	of	raw	semantic	materials:	Legal	
processes,	 denunciations,	 indictments,	 evidence	 from	 investigations,	 leaks	 of	 plea	 bargains	 and	
testimonies,	and	secret	phone	taps	–	elements	from	which	to	create	a	state	of	exception	and	crisis.	
Producing	citizens	as	passive	subjects	and	politics	as	a	space	of	barely	disguised	personal	interests	
and	hypocrisy,	the	fabulas	emerging	from	this	material	allocate,	or,	more	properly,	bind	the	actants	
in	value	systems	of	transgression	and	guilt.	The	fabulas	–	even	the	ones	that	inverse	the	allocation	
of	 corruption	 -	are	 trapped	along	 the	 fault	 lines	of	 their	 story	arcs	 flowing	 in	a	 single	 system	of	
ideological	closure.	They	are	temporally	locked	to	certain	endpoints	(as	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter),	and	the	fabulas’	resolutions	are	also	corralled	into	a	legal	territory:	The	corruption	trials	
and	even	the	configuration	of	a	split	nation	can	only	be	solved	in	the	domain	of	the	courts,	where	
the	questions	of	 guilt	 and	 responsibility	 are	 settled,	 and	where	 terabytes	of	 data	 and	 scores	of	
testimonies	can	ultimately	be	evaluated.	Because	the	crises	following	the	corruption	disclosure	are	
imagined	to	be	solvable	only	in	the	judicial	domain,	the	Constitution,	governed	in	the	final	instance	
by	 the	 STF,	 frames	 and	 closes	 off	 the	 fabulas.	 This	 is	 of	 course	 paradoxical,	 because	 the	most	
fundamental	problem	of	Brazilian	political	corruption	is	the	morose	pace	of	higher	courts	in	both	
judicial	 review	and	criminal	 trials,	and	 the	 repeated	 instances	of	non-legitimate	but	 legally	valid	
candidates	assuming	office	within	the	constitutional	bounds.	
	
With	Jameson	(1981:73)	and	Kristeva	(1980),	the	mainstream	media’s	intertextual	system	could	be	
considered	 an	 ideologeme	 –	 an	 intertextual	 function	 materialized	 at	 different	 structural	 levels	
within	 specific	 historical	 and	 social	 coordinates	 (ibid.:36).	 The	 ideologeme	 is	 what	 unites	 the	
mediascape’s	“series	of	elements	(such	as	characters,	plots,	and	textual	forms)	out	of	which	scripts	
can	be	formed”	(Appadurai	1996:35).	As	they	are	recycled	and	recombined	as	strands	of	DNA	in	the	
cultural	pool	of	plots,	 the	same	actants	surface	across	the	many	different	textual	 instances:	Not	
social	classes,	but	a	nation	of	citizens	pitted	against	the	elite;	this	elite	is	not	characterized	so	much	
by	political	projects	and	ideologies	as	by	their	power	to	corrupt,	and	when	ideology	rears	its	head,	
it	is	cast	in	the	visual	symbolic	language	of	a	folk	demonology	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.24-26):	A	
hydra-like	Lula,	Temer	as	the	Devil’s	Advocate,	and	Rousseff	as	a	burning	witch.	The	ideologeme	
draws	solutions	to	the	social	problems	and	contradictions	from	the	ideoscape	while	drawing	genres,	
metaphors	and	expressive	potentiality	from	the	mediascape.	The	ideologeme	is	historically	situated,	
building	 upon	decades	 of	 scandals	 in	 the	news	 as	well	 as	 popular	 presentations	 of	 the	political	
sphere	 in	crime	fiction	and	telenovelas	(Porto	2011b).	 It	becomes	apparent	with	the	Greimasian	
reading	that	modern	ideals	of	rule	of	law	and	objective	news	media	performing	as	the	watchdog	
also	delimit	this	political	fantasy.	Thus,	the	fabulas	are	trapped	in	the	presidential	system	of	Brazil	
but	also	in	the	complex	and	convoluted	federal	union	-	a	many-layered	system	of	opposing	interests,	
in	 which	 the	 state	 is	 ever	 in	 danger	 of	 being	 “taken	 over”	 by	 politics	 through	 the	 transition	
mechanism	 at	 every	 election	 and	 its	 accompanying	 political	 appointment	 system	 in	 state	
companies.	 It	 was	 symbolically	 very	 fitting	 that	 the	 gargantuan	 state	 oil	 company	 Petrobras	
provided	fuel	for	fabulas	of	the	conflagration	of	the	Republic.	But	despite	the	apocalyptic	tenor,	the	
inclination	towards	judicial	solutions	within	the	framework	of	the	1988	Constitution	anchors	this	
ideologeme	 to	 the	 currently	malfunctioning	 institutional	 checks	 and	 balances,	with	 inconsistent	
Supreme	 judges,	 politically	 savvy	 but	 independent	 prosecutors,	 and	 all	 too	 well-protected	
politicians.		
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Chapter	7	
Concluding	Remarks	
	
What	did	the	monumental	re-writing	of	Brazil’s	recent	political	history	accomplish,	in	the	end?	Apart	
from	 dispelling	 the	 optimistic	 predictions	 that	 emerged	 with	 the	 commodities	 boom	 and	 the	
discovery	 of	 Brazil’s	 rich	 deep-sea	 oil	 deposits,	 and	 apart	 from	 shattering	 the	 notion	 of	 an	
increasingly	well-consolidated	and	accountable	democratic	system,	what	was	the	point	and	morale	
of	 this	 particular	 story?	 In	 the	 telling	 of	 the	 fabulas	 about	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 and	 the	
impeachment	of	Rousseff,	a	story	subject	coalesced:	A	nation	at	the	end	of	an	epoch,	caught	in	a	
descending	 spiral	 of	 crises,	 one	 propelling	 the	 next;	 but	 equally,	 a	 moment	 of	 disclosure,	 of	
resistance	to	existing	ways	of	doing	politics,	of	civic	mobilization,	and	of	a	Judiciary	branch	wrestling	
free	from	traditional	patterns,	no	longer	content	shielding	the	elite.	Crises	and	conflicts	of	different	
scales	and	with	different	solutions	were	narrated	and	distributed	across	the	mediascape.	Although	
an	optimistic	belief	in	the	rule	of	law	applying	to	all	Brazilians	may	briefly	have	flourished,	at	the	
time	of	writing,	the	outcome	seems	to	have	been	a	sea	change	in	politics	as	well	as	in	public	opinion,	
thrust	forward	by	disenchantment	in	the	wake	of	corruption	disclosure.	
	
After	the	series	of	scandals	linked	to	the	Lava-Jato	investigation	and	the	impeachment,	the	latest	
polls	reveal	a	depressing	picture:	97	percent	of	the	population	believes	that	the	current	government	
governs	 for	 personal	 gains,	 while	 only	 13	 percent	 of	 citizens	 are	 satisfied	 with	 democracy	
(Latinobarómetro	2017:9-10).	The	disapproval	of	Congress	is	now	at	60	percent,	higher	than	ever	in	
the	 period	 since	 the	 transition	 back	 to	 democracy	 (Datafolha	 2017),	 and	 political	 corruption	 is	
perceived	to	be	rampant,	with	78	percent	of	surveyed	Brazilians	saying	that	corruption	seems	to	be	
increasing	(Pring	2017).	Not	surprisingly,	a	record-high	number	of	voters	are	expected	to	vote	blank	
or	forfeit	their	votes	in	the	2018	general	elections.	
	
The	Lava-Jato	case	at	 first	appeared	as	a	 solution	 to	Brazilian	democracy’s	historical	problem	of	
impunity	 in	political	 corruption	 cases.	 If	 the	disclosure	of	 the	Petrobras	 graft	 could	not	prevent	
Rousseff	 from	being	 re-elected,	 it	did	provide	an	ambience	of	crisis	 capable	of	undermining	her	
support,	and	the	scandal	combined	rather	well	with	the	exposés	of	the	pedaladas	and	Congress’s	
rejection	of	the	state	accounts.	The	series	of	scandals	thus	offered	a	satisfying	end	to	the	Mensalão	
case	as	well	as	a	cause	for	ousting	a	president,	plus	a	convenient	excuse	to	jump	ship	for	coalition	
parties	(Balán	2011).	At	the	end	of	the	fabula	symbolically	solving	the	problem	of	impunity	lay	the	
electoral	destruction	of	PT	and	of	Lula’s	image,	and	ultimately	the	end	to	socialist	rule	in	Brazil.	A	
variant	of	this	fabula	also	endowed	legitimacy	to	the	“correction”	of	the	re-election	of	Rousseff	in	
2014,	although	it	required	turning	a	blind	eye	to	the	problems	of	accountability	on	the	horizon	for	
the	cabinet	and	president	coming	into	power.	To	report	and	narrate	this	required	de-selecting	news	
for	publication	and	delaying	exposés	that	could	call	the	impeachment	process	into	question.		
	
Two	fabulas	emerged	to	counter	 these	by	 inversing	the	actantial	 roles.	The	main	strip	of	events	
narrated	 in	 the	Golpe	 fabula	 cast	 the	 impeachment	 as	 a	 variation	 of	 a	 coup	 d´état,	 while	 the	
counternarrative	emplotting	a	political	persecution	of	Lula	drew	upon	Brazil’s	history	of	suppressing	
left-wing	ideology	(and	left-wing	presidents).	These	variations	of	counternarratives	did	not	escape	
the	boundaries	of	 the	previous	emplotments	of	corruption	 fabulas,	as	 they	simply	displaced	the	
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mark	of	corruption	unto	a	different	part	of	the	political	elite.	They	did,	however,	solve	the	problem	
of	 explaining	 why	 the	 popular	 PT	 leaders	 suddenly	 found	 themselves	 under	 siege	 in	 trials,	 in	
Congress,	 and	 stuck	 in	 a	 lame-duck	 situation	 with	 little	 control	 of	 the	 national	 economy:	 The	
impeachment	and	its	legal	base	constituted	a	way	to	trigger	a	non-democratic	regime	change,	which	
would	eventually	benefit	the	old	and	corrupt	elite	as	they	re-conquered	the	state	apparatus.	
	
Finally,	 two	more	fabulas	sprang	from	the	spiraling	corruption	 investigations,	projecting	either	a	
moral	cleansing	or	a	fall	of	the	Republic.	With	increasing	political	instability	and	never-ending	media	
exposés	 of	 politicians,	 barely	 contained	 by	 the	 Temer	 administration	 through	 diverse	 judicial	
maneuvers,	the	first	fabula	of	this	set	proved	that	excessive	judicial	means	and	various	innovations	
of	jurisprudence	were	necessary	in	order	to	reach	that	extraordinary	Utopian	end	to	impunity.	The	
second	fabula	of	the	third	set	inverted	the	Utopian	forecast	and	projected	an	apocalyptic	result	of	
the	proliferating	police	investigations	and	judicialization	of	politics,	ultimately	playing	presidential	
power	into	the	hands	of	authoritarian	outsiders,	or	even	predicting	a	return	to	military	rule.		
	
The	entwined	 stories	of	 the	 impeachment	and	 the	Lava-Jato	 scandal,	 as	 told	 in	 the	mainstream	
media,	conspicuously	avoided	telling	certain	stories	and	asking	certain	questions,	though.	As	argued	
in	the	last	chapter,	the	solutions	proposed	to	political	crises	were	confined	to	the	frame	of	the	1988	
Constitution	and	four-year	electoral	cycles,	and	the	possibility	of	non-scheduled	direct	elections	was	
rarely	discussed	for	long;	likewise,	the	very	concept	of	a	presidential	line	of	succession	was	not	the	
object	of	critique,	even	as	every	politician	in	that	 line	came	under	suspicion	of	corruption	at	the	
same	moment.	The	role	of	political	parties	in	the	web	of	accountability	was	and	remains	completely	
overlooked,	 making	 it	 inconceivable	 that	 Brazil’s	 many	 parties	 could	 play	 any	 positive	 role	 in	
producing	accountability	to	their	constituencies.	The	net	effect	of	the	fabulas’	deadlock	in	a	value	
system	of	punishment	and	impunity	is,	surprisingly	perhaps,	stasis:	Little	electoral	reform,	no	new	
model	for	coalitional	cohesion,	and	certainly	no	guarantee	of	an	end	to	impunity	in	corruption	cases,	
Lula’s	 and	 Cunha’s	 incarcerations	 notwithstanding.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 limits	 and	
operations	 of	 the	 political	 unconscious,	 which	 splits	 ideology	 down	 a	 stereotyped	 divide	 and	
projects	the	political	stereotypes	unto	a	simplistic	conceptual	semiotic	diagram	reflecting	the	basic	
narrative	 tension	 governing	 the	 production	 of	 fabulas	 about	 corruption.	 In	 this	 value	 schema,	
Politics	is	always	corrupted	and	the	State	is	always	opposed	to	the	Nation.	Moreover,	the	citizens	
of	the	Nation	are	somehow	always	addressed	as	a	unity,	even	when	class	conflict	abounds	and	social	
and	economic	inequality	skyrocket.		
	
The	media	conglomerates’	role	in	setting	up	these	narrative	structures,	patrolling	their	boundaries	
and	consequently	gate-keeping	them	so	as	to	only	allow	information	that	fits	with	these	narratives	
would	 be	 the	 material	 for	 another	 research	 project,	 directed	 at	 newsrooms,	 editorial	 and	
journalistic	principles	and	practices.	However,	I	have	here	theoretically	made	the	case	that	the	news	
should	 not	 be	 considered	 “objective”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 not-invented;	 indeed,	 news	 never	was	 an	
objective	 representation	 of	 encountered	 facts	 and	 events.	 In	 the	 journalistic,	 editorial	 and	
interpretive	 practices	 of	 newsworkers	 in	 the	 political	 beat,	 all	 the	 elements	 -	 headlines,	 leads,	
quotes	from	sources,	ascriptions	and	predictions	–	are	crafted	in	order	to	cohere	and	to	answer	not	
merely	 the	 “what,”	 the	 “where”	 and	 the	 “who,”	 but	 especially	 the	 “why”	 (Carey	 1987).	 With	
linguistic	and	text-centric	approaches	to	news	(such	as	critical	discourse	analysis	in	the	vein	of	van	
Dijk,	or	framing	studies),	it	is	always	hard	to	approach	the	source	of	coherence,	the	origins	of	the	
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macropropositions	that	provide	scaffolding	for	the	diverse	elements	of	news	texts	and,	ultimately,	
the	 textual	 tether	 that	constitutes	 the	“why.”	Therefore,	 I	have	argued	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 in	 the	
specific	case	of	scandals,	researchers	must	pay	heed	to	shared	but	distributed	narrative	structures	
that	 organize	 actants	 and	 events	 along	 story	 arcs.	 Such	narrative	 structures	 provide	 the	 “why,”	
supply	criteria	for	selecting	and	construing	events	as	newsworthy,	and	condition	the	possible	frames	
and	metaphors.	Unfolding	within	a	fluid	mediascape	through	a	set	of	literary	forms	and	conventions	
(Schudson	 2003:178),	 a	 scandal	 ought	 to	 be	 studied	 as	 a	 cultural	 product,	 and	 should	 be	
interrogated	in	its	textual	and	visual	dimensions	with	the	aim	of	uncovering	its	limited	universe	of	
realized	fabulas,	or	what	Jameson	would	term	its	specific	ideology	of	form	(Jameson	1981:62,	84).		
	
The	approach	developed	here	–	a	narratology	of	political	news	-	may	contribute	to	the	toolbox	of	
political	science	as	a	method	for	determining	how	solutions	to	political	crises	may	emerge,	while	
others	remain	inconceivable.	The	empirical	matter	of	the	thesis,	meanwhile,	is	in	itself	a	case	which	
may	pose	new	theoretical	questions.	Despite	–	or	even	because	of	-	its	status	as	a	unique	scandal,	
a	hundred-year	wave	engulfing	Brazil,	 the	Lava-Jato	scandal	 is	especially	 relevant	 to	both	media	
studies	and	political	science	as	an	extreme	case	study	(Flyvbjerg	2004).	Within	political	science,	such	
a	wide-flung	scandal	may	help	researchers	expand	on	findings	of	Balan	(2011),	Maier	(2011)	and	
others	who	measure	political	impact	of	scandals.	Furthermore,	the	case	prompts	new	theoretical	
questions	to	theories	of	coalition	formation,	agenda-setting,	and	accountability:	President	Temer’s	
resilience	to	scandal	and	the	effects	of	corruption	allegations	across	the	entire	political	spectrum	
are	two	decidedly	non-standard	aspects	of	the	Lava-Jato	case	that	merit	more	research	in	the	field	
of	political	science,	as	does	the	issue	of	accountability.	With	a	multitude	of	politicians	investigated	
and	 terabytes	 of	 data	 disclosed	 in	 the	 court	 processes,	 the	 scandal	 prompted	 a	 plethora	 of	
perplexing	questions	and	paradoxes	concerning	the	staying	power	of	the	coalitional	presidentialist	
system	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 Brazil’s	 institutions,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 efficiency	 of	 accountability	
processes	and	the	real	independence	of	accountability	institutions.		
	
Undeniably,	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	challenges	the	perfectly	logical	but	still	flawed	assumption	that	
disclosure	 of	 corruption	 improves	 the	 quality	 of	 democracy.	 It	 is	 therefore	 difficult	 to	 conclude	
whether	the	corruption	probe	was	a	boon	or	a	curse	to	democracy,	although	it	probably	did	not	
help	dispel	the	sense	of	impunity	–	removing	Rousseff	but	leaving	Temer	to	govern	and	to	escape	
two	indictments	and	the	revocation	of	his	mandate	in	the	Supreme	Electoral	Court.	At	the	time	of	
writing,	the	jury	is	still	out,	debating	the	long-term	benefits	of	the	Lava-Jato	trials,	while	the	judges	
are	 fighting	 it	out,	 alternatingly	 annulling	and	 reinstalling	prison	 sentences	 for	 Lula,	Dirceu,	 and	
arrested	 PMDB	 leaders	 such	 as	Henrique	Alves	 and	Geddel	 Vieira	 Lima.	 Future	 research	 should	
explore	 how	 the	 fabulas	 analyzed	 here	 leaves	 an	 imprint	 on	 public	 opinion	 and	 electoral	
preferences,	identifying	the	links	between	the	discourse	of	media	and	policy	initiatives,	social	and	
political	mobilization.	Many	 questions	 remain	 in	 this	 area:	What	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 these	
fabulas	 of	 corruption	 (especially	 the	 limits	 of	 this	 political	 unconscious	 articulated	 across	 the	
emerging	fabulas)	and	civic	society?	If	scandals,	even	more	than	other	political	news,	may	initiate	a	
spiral	of	cynicism	and	distrust	in	government	institutions	(Cappella	and	Jamieson	1997,	Mesquita	
2014),	can	civic	society	then	be	expected	to	provide	the	basis	of	political	 revitalization?	Will	 the	
Lava-Jato	 scandal,	 like	 its	 Italian	 forebear	 operation	Mani	 Pulite	 (Moro	 2004),	 ultimately	 thrust	
populist	and	anti-democratic	forces	to	the	fore?		
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Within	the	field	of	media	studies,	the	narrative	approach	developed	here	could	contribute	not	only	
by	rescuing	the	notion	that	news	may	be	cast	in	a	narrative	form,	but	also	by	explaining	how	the	
storyable	forms	turn	out	as	they	do:	As	imagined	solutions	to	real	social	and	political	problems.	I	
have	taken	the	assertions	of	earlier	authors	such	as	Bell,	Hall,	Tuchman	and	Schudson	at	face	value,	
and	 treated	 the	 intertextual	 assemblages	 of	 linked	 news	 texts	 as	 narrative	 constructs.	 Echoing	
Silverstone	(1981:91),	I	left	the	particular	in	order	to	establish	the	generality	of	the	textual	system,	
abstracting	the	actantial	positions	and	temporal	structures.	I	believe	that	these	structures	–	here	
termed	fabulas	 -	govern	specific	 textual	articulations,	and	that	the	fabulas	offer	solutions	to	the	
contradictions	found	in	surface	manifestations	of	textual	accounts	of	the	real	events.	The	fabulas,	I	
believe,	 will	 become	 not	 just	 the	 backgrounded	 blueprints	 of	 future	 news	 texts	 and	 political	
commentary,	but	also	inform	the	proto-narratives	underlying	scientific	arguments	and,	ultimately,	
underlying	Brazilian	history.	I	have	argued,	with	Jameson,	Koselleck,	MacIntyre,	and	others,	that	this	
is	 because	 History	 can	 only	 be	 imagined	 and	 represented	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 narrative	 forms	 and	
structures.	 These	 sedimentary	 structures	 in	 the	 political	 unconscious	 may	 very	 well	 contain	 a	
number	of	contradictions	and	tensions,	even	as	they	delimit	the	inventory	of	possible	solutions	to	
conflicts	and	the	horizon	of	political	agency.	Therein	-	in	the	continuous	circulation	of	fragments	of	
such	fabulas	-	lies	the	power	of	media	in	times	when	scandal	and	crisis	wash	over	democracies.	
	
Notes	
	
1)	This	notion	of	script	is	thus	conceptually	similar	to	that	of	Erving	Goffman	(1956,	1959)	who	launched	the	influential	
idea	that	individuals	constantly	co-constitute	and	mutually	project	definitions	of	their	interactions,	based	on	socialized	
expectations	of	various	everyday	situations	(how	to	act	as	a	consumer	or	purchaser,	in	educational	settings,	in	colloquial	
and	festive	settings,	etc.).	With	several	metaphors	from	the	world	of	theatre,	Goffman	drew	attention	to	the	ways	in	
which	people	manage	the	reciprocal	impressions	and	expressions	of	these	standardized	but	non-written	interactional	
situational	scripts,	or	routine	“pre-established	patterns	of	action”	(1956:8).	In	the	second	version	(1959)	of	his	seminal	
book	on	the	Representation	of	Self	in	Everyday	Life,	the	word	“script”	was	introduced,	and	the	term	caught	on	so	that	
“cultural	scripts”	are	now	common	parlance	in	cultural	studies.		
	
2)	 Van	 Dijk	 specifically	 argued,	 in	 private	 correspondence	 on	 February	 18,	 2016,	 that	 narrative	 cannot	 be	 used	
conceptually	here:	
	
…	in	the	strict	sense	your	media	data	are	not	narratives	(even	when	journalists	talk	of	stories),	according	to	the	
more	specific	meaning	of	the	terms,	you	would	not	need	a	narrative	analysis….	The	fact	that	the	news	actors	
referred	to	seem	like	personages	of	a	story,	and	the	events	the	complicating	events,	with	a	resolution	(in	terms	
of	the	narrative	theory	of	Labov),	do	not	make	the	media	discourse	type	narrative…For	your	research	this	means	
the	following:	
1.	The	actual	'real'	sociopolitical	events	of	corruption:	kickbacks,	etc.	
2.	 The	ways	 these	 are	 represented	mentally	 (in	 Episodic	Memory,	 part	 of	 Long	 Term	memory	 by	 different	
participants…	The	event	models	of	journalists	(or	readers)	are	not	only	influenced	by	the	"real"	events	(which	
they	usually	know	about	indirectly,	namely	through	other	discourses	(of	other	media,	witnesses,	police	reports,	
the	internet,	etc.)	but	also	by	their	socially	shared,	more	general	attitudes	about	corruption,	and	these	(and	
other	attitudes	may	be	based	on	the	fundamental	professional	(journalistic)	and	sociopolitical	ideologies	(e.g.,	
neoliberal,	socialist,	nationalist,	etc.)	of	the	journalists.	
3.	 The	 various	 discourse	 types	 or	 genres	 expressing	 these	 subjective	 models,	 for	 instance	 in	 everyday	
conversational	stories,	in	news	reports,	editorials,	columns,	background	articles,	opinion	articles,	letters	to	the	
editor,	 reportages,	 and	 other	 media	 genres.	 These	 are	 different	 discourse	 genres,	 and	 only	 some	 are	
narratives…	News	"stories"	do	NOT	have	this	schematic	story	of	a	narrative,	but	their	own	news	schema…	It	is	
theoretically	very	muddy	and	vague	to	call	all	these	genres	"stories".		
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3)	In	the	overlapping	Petrobras/Pasadena	scandals,	one	could	perhaps	glimpse	another	plot	structure	that	elides	the	
scandals,	 instead	focalizing	the	weakened	Rousseff,	pressed	by	external	forces	(economy	and	electoral	surveys),	but	
without	attributing	personal	culpability.	Indeed,	several	researchers	have	observed	news	frames	representing	Rousseff	
as	incompetent	(see	Cioccari	2015,	Guazina,	Prior,	and	Araújo	2017,	Mont’alverne	and	Marques	2013)	from	the	start	of	
her	mandate	 and	 especially	 after	 the	 period	 after	 the	 2013	 protests,	 when	 her	 popularity	 dropped	 in	 the	 surveys	
(Baptista	2017).	However,	it	is	not	feasible	to	disentangle	effects	of	scandals	from	other	negative	coverage	in	the	survey	
studies	and	link	it	causally	to	poll	performance;	in	all	likelihood,	it	was	a	feedback-phenomenon	(Boydstun	2013:157-
8).	At	this	point,	it	suffices	to	say	that	news	texts	and	frames	may	strategically	or	involuntarily	be	situated	in	multiple	
discursive	formations	and	even	give	rise	to	several	different	fabulas,	since	discourse	is	fundamentally	open-ended.		
	
4)	 In	 earlier	 TV	 Globo	 news	 reports,	 there	 is	 no	 documentation	 of	 actual	 wounds	 sustained	 during	 Lula’s	 planned	
interrogation	at	the	Forum	Criminal	da	Barra	Funda	in	São	Paulo;	then,	the	newscast	only	showed	a	brief	clip	of	agitated	
protesters,	while	the	situation	was	reported	to	be	overall	“tranquil”;	see	https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4819420/.	
	
5)	A	comparison	of	the	anchor	Vasconcellos’	body	language	in	her	quotes	of	denials	is	interesting:	Whereas	her	somber	
facial	expressions	of	this	newscast	in	general	seem	to	underscore	accusations,	with	nods	of	the	head	and	similar	bodily	
emphasis	on	words	of	dire	significance,	she	inverts	the	pattern	by	disapprovingly	shaking	her	head	when	quoting	the	
particular	denials	of	PP	and	PMDB,	confirming	their	voices	by	corporally	denying	the	accusation.		
	
6)	I	was	personally	present	as	observer	right	in	front	at	the	protest	that	day	in	Brasília.	The	reporter	of	the	first	news	
report	either	did	not	know	about	or	simply	ignored	the	fact	that	fireworks	had	been	thrown	at	the	police	shortly	before	
nightfall,	and	he	downplays	the	violence	of	the	moment	when	PMDB	Congressman	Carlos	Marun	was	surrounded	by	
shouting	and	hooting	people	as	he	crossed	from	the	Congress	to	the	Palácio	do	Planalto.	This	is	reported	as	a	“group	of	
Congressmen	from	the	opposition	were	expelled”	(at	9:51),	but	not	reported	as	violence,	and	neither	is	the	fireworks	
thrown.	
	
7)	Possibly,	the	satire	takes	on	a	double	meaning,	illustrating	the	comment,	still	fresh	in	the	newspapers	of	early	March,	
uttered	by	senator	Romero	Jucá	who	stated	that	if	the	STF	wanted	to	abolish	the	foro	privilegiado,	it	should	be	general,	
not	just	for	specific	situations;	“everybody	in	the	orgy	[suruba],	not	just	a	hand-picked	orgy.”	With	this	connotation,	the	
catharsis	of	the	final	judgment	on	the	IstoÉ	front	page	gains	a	sexual	undertone,	and	the	faces	of	politicians	appear	as	
writhing	in	painful	glee	in	face	of	their	punishment	before	the	Supreme	Court.		
	
8)	What	especially	complicated	the	picture	of	pollsters	and	commentators	was	the	all-inclusiveness	of	the	Lava-Jato	
investigations	(though	the	same	inclusiveness	did	not	extend	to	the	court	rooms).	With	the	four	previous	second-turn	
contenders	Rousseff,	Lula,	Serra	and	Neves	out,	the	only	candidates	with	experience	from	previous	races	were	Geraldo	
Alckmin	and	Marina	Silva.	In	late	2017	and	early	2018,	a	dozen	parties	prepared	to	launch	their	own	candidates	in	hope	
of	snatching	discontented	voters.	The	roster	then	included	Manuela	d’Avila,	Guilherme	Boulos,	Ciro	Gomes,	Rodrigo	
Maia,	Henrique	Meirelles,	 Joaquim	Barbosa,	 Alvaro	Dias,	 Flávio	 Rocha,	 Paulo	 Rabello	 and	 even	 Fernando	Collor	 de	
Mello.	The	theme	of	“new”	and	“clean”	outsiders,	most	clearly	expressed	in	the	never-realized	candidacy	of	TV	anchor	
Luciano	Huck,	had	as	 its	mirror	the	fear	of	the	right-wing	pre-candidate	Jair	Bolsonaro	with	a	strongly	authoritarian	
discourse	and	symbolically	important	(albeit	empirically	limited)	military	connections.	
	
9)	With	this	 revelation,	Temer	and	PMDB	began	to	denounce	the	PGR	for	vested	political	 interests,	 just	 like	PT	had	
criticized	Sérgio	Moro	and	the	Curitiba	task-force,	building	on	Lula’s	phrase	about	the	“Republic	of	Curitiba.”	This	is	a	
paraphrase	of	an	older	expression,	coined	after	legal	maneuvers	in	1954	put	pressure	on	then-President	Getúlio	Vargas,	
who	eventually	committed	suicide.	The	maneuvers	relocated	an	investigation	of	manslaughter	from	the	police	to	the	
Federal	Air	Force,	 situated	at	Galeão	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro.	The	 investigation	 rapidly	advanced	 towards	 the	presidential	
palace	 by	 blaming	 the	 president’s	 brother	 for	 ordering	 the	 manslaughter.	 The	 independence	 of	 the	 Air	 Force	
investigation	 made	 Galeão	 seem	 a	 Republic	 apart	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 Brazil,	 earning	 the	 air	 force	 commanders	 the	
nickname	 República	 do	 Galeão.	 In	 this	 vein,	 the	 counter-narrative	 of	 Lula	 intertextually	 rephrased	 the	 historical	
existence	of	interstate	conflict.	The	phrase	was	even	inversed,	in	a	contrastingly	laudatory	sense,	by	Lula	and	Rousseff’s	
opponents	during	the	vote	on	impeachment	in	the	Câmara	(Castro	2016).	
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References	–	news	texts	(in	chronological	order)	
	
News	texts	from	2014	
	
Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
4/4	2014	 F4/4	2014	 Folha	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/159669-tudo-embolado.shtml	
13/4	2014	 F13/4	2014	 Folha	 Petrobras	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/elianecantanhede/2014/04/1439915-oposicao-mostra-a-cara.shtml	
10/06	2014	 F10/6	2014	 Folha		 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Mateus	Leitão	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/06/1467860-petrobras-nao-era-balcao-de-negocios-diz-ex-diretor-que-esteve-preso.shtml	
21/5	2014	 F21/5	2014		 Folha		 Petrobras		 Jurisdictional	competence	 Editorial	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/166889-competencia-e-pressa.shtml	
10/8	2014	 F10/8	2014	 Folha		 Alberto	Youssef	 Plea	bargain	 Mario	Cesar	Carvalho	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1498307-preso-desde-marco-doleiro-alberto-youssef-quer-colaborar-com-a-justica.shtml	
5/9	2014	 V#2390		 Veja	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/exclusivo-paulo-roberto-costa-comeca-a-revelar-nomes-dos-beneficiarios-do-esquema-de-corrupcao-da-petrobras/	
10/10	2014	 I#2342	 IstoÉ	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Josie	Jerônimo	
https://istoe.com.br/387126_DELATOR+DA+PETROBRAS+DIZ+QUE+A+CAMPANHA+DE+DILMA+EM+2010+FOI+BENEFICIADA+POR+DINHEIRO+DESV
IADO/	
14/11	2014	 E#859	 Época	 Petrobras		 Cartel	 Murilo	Ramos,	Marcelo	Rocha,	et	al.	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2014/11/bescandalo-da-petrobrasb-partidos-e-empreiteiras-no-juizo-final.html	
15/11	2014	 G15/11	2014	 O	Globo	 Petrobras		 Cartel	 (O	Globo	front	page	editor)	
http://www.estemundopossivel.com.br/upfiles/fckeditor/image/CAPA%20O%20GLOBO%20LAVA-JATO.jpg	
17/11	2014	 V#2400	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Reinaldo	Azevedo	
https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/cunha-candidato-a-presidencia-da-camara-diz-que-reforma-politica-ele-quer-feita-pelo-congresso-com-
financiamento-privado-voto-majoritario-e-sem-reeleicao/	
7/12	2014	 G7/12	2014	 O	Globo	 Lula	 OAS	 Germano	Oliveira	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/cooperativa-entrega-triplex-de-lula-mas-tres-mil-ainda-esperam-imovel-14761809		
29/12	2014	 F29/12	2014	 Folha	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Andréia	Sadi	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/12/1568027-entrevista-da-2-camara-nao-poupara-envolvidos-na-lava-jato-diz-cunha.shtml	
	
	
	
News	texts	and	broadcast	news	from	2015	
	
7/1	2015	 F7/1	2015	 Folha	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Severino	Motta,	Gabriel	Mascarenhas		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/01/1571474-lider-do-pmdb-sera-alvo-da-procuradoria-na-lava-jato.shtml	
12/1	2015	 V#2408	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Ricardo	Pessoa	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
http://www.manancialvox.com/diario/VEJA-14-01-2015.txt	
4/2	2015	 V#2411	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 R.	Rangel,	R.	Bonin,	B.	Megale	
No	link	available	
11/2	2015	 V#2412	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 (no	author	of	interview)	
No	link	available	
25/2	2015	 V#2414	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Mailson	Nobrega	
No	link	available	
28/2	2015	 E28/2	2015	 Estado	 Petrobras		 Rodrigo	Janot	 B.	Bulla,	D.	Carvalho,	T.	Fernandes	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,estresse-domina-congresso-a-espera-dos-pedidos-de-inquerito-do-procurador-geral,1641898	
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Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
12/3	2015	 G12/3	2015	 O	Globo	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Chico	de	Gois,	Eduardo	Bresciani	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/depoimento-de-eduardo-cunha-cpi-da-petrobras-vira-ato-de-desagravo-15574079	
12/3	2015	 E12/3	2015	 Estado	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 D.	Carvalho,	D.	Cardoso,	P.	Venceslau	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-suspeita-cunha-vai-a-cpi-e-e-alvo-de-elogios-dos-colegas,1649829	
12/3	2015	 F12/3	2015	 Folha	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Gabriel	Mascarenhas,	Aguirre	Talento	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/03/1601786-sessao-da-cpi-vira-evento-de-desagravo-a-eduardo-cunha.shtml	
12/3	2015	 JN12/3	2015	
Jornal	
Nacional	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 JN	newsroom	
https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4031161/	
14/3	2015	 V#2417	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Gabriel	Castro	
https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/entenda-como-funciona-um-processo-de-impeachment/	
14/3	2015	 V#2417	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 M.	Barros,	Daniel	Pereira,	Pieter	Zalis	
No	link	available	
21/3	2015	 V#2418	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Adriano	Ceolin	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/o-poderoso-cunha/	
22/4	2015	 V#2422	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	
No	link	available	
29/4	2015	 V#2423	 Veja	 Lula		 Leo	Pinheiro	 Kalleo	Coura,	Hugo	Marques		
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/os-favores-do-empreiteiro/	
18/6	2015	 F18/6	2015	 Folha	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Solange	Almeida	 Rubens	Valente	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1644488-aliada-de-cunha-fez-requerimento-a-pedido-de-corretor-ligado-ao-deputado.shtml	
18/6	2015	 G18/6	2015	 O	Globo	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Solange	Almeida	 Chico	Otavio	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aliada-de-cunha-pressionou-executivos-da-schahin-envolvida-na-lava-jato-16478499	
19/6	2015	 F19/6	2015	 Folha	 Odebrecht		 Arrests	 David	Friedlander,	Raquel	Landim	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1645019-presidente-da-maior-empreiteira-do-pais-nao-tinha-medo-de-ser-preso.shtml	
20/6	2016	 JN20/6	2015	
Jornal	
Nacional	 Odebrecht		 Arrests	 Jornal	Nacional	newsroom	
https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4267836/		
20/6	2016	 F20/6	2015	 Folha	 Odebrecht		 Arrests	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/ilustrada/223240-monica-bergamo.shtml	
22/6	2015	 E#889	 Época	 Petrobras		 Marcelo	Odebrecht	 F.	Coutinho,	T.	Bronzatto,	D.	Escosteguy	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/06/marcelo-odebrecht-ameaca-derrubar-republica.html	
6/7	2015	 E#891	 Época	 Petrobras		 Sérgio	Moro	 T.	Bronzatto,	L.	Loyola,	D.	Escosteguy	
No	link	available	
15/7	2015	 G15/7	2015	 O	Globo	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Renato	Onofre,	Thais	Skodowski	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/delator-da-lava-jato-diz-que-cunha-pediu-propina-de-us-5-milhoes-16790059	
17/7	2015	 E17/7	2015	 Estado	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Daniel	Carvalho,	Victor	Martins	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,cunha-cira-cpi-do-bndes-apos-romper-com-governo,1727327	
19/7	2015	 E19/7	2015	 Estado	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Alberto	Bombig	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,reves-de-cunha-muda-rumo-da-oposicao,1727909	
20/7	2015	 E#893	 Época	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 F.	Tavares,	A.	Ribeiro,	P.	M.	de	Moura	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/07/acoes-da-policia-terao-consequencias-politicas.html	
22/7	2015	 V#2435	 Veja	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Daniel	Pereira	
http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e	
22/7	2015	 V#2435	 Veja	 Lula		 Leo	Pinheiro	 Rodrigo	Rangel,	Robson	Bonin	
http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e	
3/8	2015	 E3/8	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Pedaladas	 Pedro	Venceslau		
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,parecer-sera-nossa-bala-de-prata--diz-lider-do-psdb-na-camara,1736834	
19/10	2015		 E#906	 Época	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Talita	Fernandes	
No	link	available	
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Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
19/10	2015		 E19/10	2015		 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Igor	Gadelha	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lamento-que-seja-com-um-governo-brasileiro-o-maior-escandalo-de-corrupcao-do-mundo--diz-cunha,1782426	
21/10	2015	 F21/10	2015	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Débora	Alvares,	Ranier	Bragon	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/10/1696548-suspeito-de-corrupcao-cunha-recebe-pedido-de-impeachment-de-dilma.shtml	
23/10	2015	 E23/10	2015	 Estado	 Rodrigo	Janot	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Lorenna	Rodrigues	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,janot-manda-indireta-e-diz-que-nao-adianta-esconder-bens-fora-do-brasil,10000000582	
29/10	2015	
G1-29/10	
2015	
G1	
(Globo)	 Lula		 Fiscal	crisis	 Nathalia	Passarinho,	Filipe	Matoso	
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/lula-diz-que-pt-vive-maior-bombardeio-na-historia-do-pais.html	
3/11	2015	
G1-3/11	
2015	
G1	
(Globo)	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ethics	Committee	 Fernanda	Calgaro	
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/11/eduardo-cunha-diz-que-provara-ao-conselho-de-etica-que-falou-verdade.html	
20/11	2015	 E20/11	2015	 Estado	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ethics	Committee	 D.	Carvalho,	D.	Cardoso,	Igor	Gadelha	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,aliados-de-cunha-impedem-leitura-de-relatorio-que-pede-processo-contra-ele,10000002520	
24/11	2015	 F24/11	2015	 Folha	 Sergio	Moro	 anti-corruption	 (front	page	editor)	
24/11	2015	 G24/11	2015	 O	Globo	 Sergio	Moro	 anti-corruption	 (front	page	editor)	
24/11	2015	 E24/11	2015	 Estado	 Sergio	Moro	 anti-corruption	 (front	page	editor)	
	
No	links	
available	
	
25/11	2015	
G1-25/11	
2015	
G1	
(Globo)	
José	Carlos	
Bumlai	 Celso	Daniel	 Hélio	Gurovitz	
http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/o-novo-elo-entre-mensalao-e-petrolao.html	
2/12	2015	 F2/12a	2015	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ranier	Braigon,	Gustavo	Uribe	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713918-bancada-petista-decide-votar-contra-cunha-no-conselho-de-etica-da-camara.shtml	
2/12	2015	 F2/12b	2015	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Gustavo	Uribe,	Ranier	Braigon	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1714133-cunha-deflara-processo-de-impeachment-contra-dlma.shtml	
2/12	2015	 V-2/12	2015	
Veja	
online	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Marcela	Mattos	
http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/o-fator-janot-na-decisao-de-cunha-sobre-o-impeachment	
2/12	2015	
JN	2/12	
2015	
Jornal	
Nacional	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Jornal	Nacional	newsroom	
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/12/dilma-diz-que-recebeu-com-indignacao-abertura-de-impeachment.html	
3/12	2015	 E3/12a	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Beatriz	Bulla	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pt-desiste-de-recurso-no-stf-apos-gilmar-se-tornar-relator,10000003791	
3/12	2015	 E3/12b	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Marco	Aurélio	Nogueira	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/marco-aurelio-nogueira/impeachment-e-um-risco-mas-pode-trazer-ganhos-para-o-debate-democratico/	
3/12	2015	 E3/12c	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 E.	Machado,	D.	Dimoulis,	R.	Dias	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/supremo-em-pauta/impeachment-supremo-tera-papel-decisivo-para-preservar-legalidade/	
5/12	2015	 E5/12	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Economist	editorial	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-roto-e-a-esfarrapada-se-estranham--imp-,1807179	
8/12	2015	 E8/12	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Fernando	Dantas	
http://economia.estadao.com.br/blogs/fernando-dantas/as-razoes-de-temer/	
	
	
News	texts	and	broadcast	news	from	2016	
18/1	2016	 E18/1	2016	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Editorial	
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,a-verdade-do-impeachment,10000007338	
19/1	2016		 E19/1	2016	 Estadão	 Sergio	Moro	 Manifesto	against	LJ	 Fausto	Macedo,	Julia	Affonso	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/promotores-paulistas-repudiam-manifesto-dos-advogados-contra-a-lava-jato/	
22/1	2016	 V#2462	 Veja	 Lula	 OAS	 Veja	newsroom	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ministerio-publico-vai-denunciar-lula-por-ocultacao-de-propriedade/	
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Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
29/1	2016	 F29/1	2016	 Folha			 Lula	 Odebrecht	 Flávio	Ferreira	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/01/1734827-odebrecht-fez-obra-em-sitio-ligado-a-lula-diz-fornecedora.shtml	
3/2	2016	 V#2463	 Veja	 Lula	 OAS	 D.	Pereira,	R.	Rangel,	R.	Bonin	
No	link	available	
8/2	2016		 G1-8/2	2016		
G1	
(Globo)	 Mensalão	 Petrobras	 Hélio	Gurovitz	
http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/quadrilha-do-petrolao-e-uma-so.html	
22/2	2016	 F22/2	2016	 Folha			 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Fabio	Zanini	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1741820-apos-dez-anos-publicitario-estrela-volta-a-ameacar-governo-petista.shtml	
23/2	2016	 F23/2	2016	 Folha			 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Ranier	Bragon	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1742320-oposicao-decide-ir-ao-stf-pedir-que-impeachment-seja-destravado.shtml	
26/2	2016	 F26/2	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Daniele	Lima	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1743480-pmdb-volta-a-considerar-impeachment-apos-prisao-de-santana.shtml	
4/3	2016	 F4/3	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Delcídio	do	Amaral	 Daniele	Lima	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1746176-delacao-de-delcidio-reforca-pressao-por-impeachment-avalia-pmdb.shtml	
4/3	2016	 JN4/3	2016	
Jornal	
Nacional	 Lula	 OAS	 JN	newsroom	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IdpIBPW8Bs	
8/3	2016	 F8/3	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Maria	Lúcia	Tavares	 Graciliano	Rocha,	Bela	Megale	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1747462-responsavel-por-planilha-da-odebrecht-negocia-delacao.shtml	
9/3	2016	 E9/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Sérgio	Moro	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-vara,10000020255	
10/3	2016	 E10/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Dora	Kramer	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nomeacao-so-pode-ser-ideia-de-inimigo,10000020477	
10/3	2016	 F10/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1748472-planalto-teme-acao-no-stf-se-lula-virar-ministro-da-casa-civil.shtml	
11/3	2016	 E11/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Presidential	candidate	 Fernando	Gabeira	
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,de-paz-e-amor-a-jararaca,10000020610	
14/3	2016	 V#2469	 Veja	 Marcelo	Odebrecht	 Petrobras	 Ulisses	Campbell	
No	link	available	
14/3	2016	 F14/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1749879-lula-deve-aceitar-convite-de-dilma-para-ser-ministro.shtml	
15/3	2016	 F15/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 D.	Álvares,	R.	Bragon,	P.	Reverbel		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1750090-oposicao-vai-acionar-justica-se-lula-assumir-ministerio-de-dilma.shtml	
16/3	2016	 V#2469	 Veja	 Lula	 Petrobras	 (Veja	frontpage	designer)	
https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/felipe-moura-brasil/o-desespero-da-jararaca/	
16/3	2016	 JN16/3	2016	
Jornal	
Nacional	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Jornal	Nacional	newsroom	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z_k	
22/3	2016	 E22/3	2016	 Estado	
Marcelo	
Odebrecht	 Impeachment	
P.	Venceslau,	R.	Brandt,	V.	Hupsel	Filho,		
F.	Macedo	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/marcelo-odebrecht-decide-fazer-delacao-premiada-na-lava-jato/	
22/3	2016	 F22/3a	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Plea	bargain	 Mario	Cesar	Carvalho		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752993-executivos-da-odebrecht-decidem-fazer-acordo-de-delacao.shtml	
22/3	2016	 F22/3b	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Graciliano	Rocha		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752707-odebrecht-tinha-departamento-de-propina-no-pais-diz-lava-jato.shtml	
23/3	2016	 F23/3	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Clovis	Rossi	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1753135-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo.shtml	
25/3	2016	 G25/3	2016	 O	Globo	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Merval	Pereira	
https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/merval-pereira/post/tentativa-de-sabotagem.html	
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Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
	
25/3	2016	 F25/3	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Editorial	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2016/03/1753954-lista-explosiva.shtml	
11/4	2016	 F11/4	2016	 Folha	 Partido	da	República	 Government	rupture	 Débora	Álvares	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1759860-favoravel-ao-impeachment-lider-do-pr-na-camara-entrega-cargo.shtml	
14/4	2016	 F14/4	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Jose	Henrique	Mariante	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/josehenriquemariante/2016/04/1760726-revisao-inconsequente.shtml	
27/4	2016	 F27/4a	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Marina	Dias	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765414-dilma-acusa-cunha-de-ser-pecado-original-do-impeachment.shtml	
27/4	2016	 F27/4b	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Marina	Dias,	Gustavo	Uribe,	Valdo	Cruz	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765178-dilma-admite-que-afastamento-da-presidencia-se-tornou-inevitavel.shtml	
3/5	2016	 E3/5	2016	 Estado		 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Victor	Martins,	Carla	Araújo	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,e-confortavel-para-os-golpistas-que-a-vitima-desapareca--diz-dilma-sobre-pressao-para-
renuncia,10000048880		
5/5	2016	 F5/5	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 L.	Colon,	M.	Haubert,	D.	Álvares	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1768027-afastamento-de-cunha-confirma-tese-para-anular-impeachment-diz-cardozo.shtml	
23/5	2016	 F23/5	2016	 Folha	 Sergio	Machado	 Romero	Jucá	 Rubens	Valente	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1774018-em-dialogos-gravados-juca-fala-em-pacto-para-deter-avanco-da-lava-jato.shtml	
26/5	2016	 F26/5	2016	 Folha	 Sergio	Machado	 Romero	Jucá	 Bernardo	Mello	Franco	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/bernardomellofranco/2016/05/1775184-o-novo-homem-bomba.shtml	
8/6	2016	 V#2481	 Veja	 Sergio	Machado	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
No	link	available	
6/8	2016	 F6/8	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Michel	Temer	 Folha	Newsroom	São	Paulo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799749-odebrecht-delatara-pedido-de-apoio-financeiro-de-temer-
afirma-revista.shtml	
7/8	2016	 F7/8	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 José	Serra	 Bela	Megale	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799887-jose-serra-recebeu-r-23-mi-via-caixa-2-afirma-
odebrecht.shtml	
8/8	2016	 V#2490	 Veja	 Odebrecht	 Michel	Temer	 Daniel	Pereira	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/odebrecht-cita-temer-em-negociacao-de-delacao-premiada/	
8/10	2016	 E8/10	2016	 Estado		 Odebrecht	 Plea	bargain	 Beatriz	Bulla	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,hotel-de-brasilia-vira-qg-de-delacao-da-odebrecht,10000081003	
28/10	2016	 F28/10	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 José	Serra	 Bela	Megale	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/10/1827058-odebrecht-diz-que-caixa-2-a-serra-foi-pago-em-conta-
suica.shtml	
2/11	2016		 V#2502	 Veja	 Odebrecht	 Sergio	Moro	 (Veja	frontpage	designer)	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/lava-jato-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo/		
	
	
News	texts	from	2017-18	
17/5	2017	 E17/5	2017	 Estado	 JBS	 Michel	Temer	 Alexandre	Hisayasu,	Fausto	Macedo	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/se-a-jbs-delatar-sera-o-fim-da-republica-diz-eduardo-cunha/	
28/5	2018	 F28/5	2018	 Folha	 Jair	Bolsonaro	 Elections	 Celso	Rocha	de	Barros	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/celso-rocha-de-barros/2018/05/bolsonaro-te-acha-otario.shtml	
6/4	2018	 F6/4	2018	 Folha	 Lula	 Elections	 Mauro	Paulino,	Alessandro	Janoni	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/04/lula-deixa-herdeiros-mas-centro-tem-potencial.shtml	
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Appendix	A	
Visual	Representations	of	the	Lava-Jato	Scandal	and	Impeachment	
	
Front	pages	of	weekly	magazines	and	newspapers,	collages,	and	graphic	details	of	print	and	online	news	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.1,	A.2,	and	A.3:	Businessmen	on	the	front	
pages	of	Veja	and	O	Globo.	See	section	5.1	and	
4.1.1.	Notice	the	super-header	“Escândalos	em	
série”,	“Serial	scandals”,	on	O	Globo	front	page.		
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Figure	A.4:	“They	knew	everything”,	Veja,	revealed	
online	and	on	TV	on	October	23,	2014,	published	on	
October	26	(V#2397).	See	section	4.1.	
	
Figure	A.5:	“He	threatens	to	overthrow	the	Republic”,	
Época,	June	22,	2015	(E#889).	See	section	4.1.2.	
Compare	the	similarities	in	design	and	hue	with	figure	
A.4.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.5:	“Nothing	can	stop	him”,	Época,	
July	6,	2015	(E#891).	See	section	4.2.	
	
	
Figure	A.6:	“Janot,	ur	the	hope	of	Brazil!”	
Photo	recycled	on	social	media,	March	8,	
2015.	See	section	4.2.1.		
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Figure	A.7:	Screen	shot	from	Jornal	Nacional,	March	4,	2016.	See	section	4.4.1.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.8	and	A.9:	The	Lula-Rousseff	phone	recording	(in	its	entirety)	and	protests	on	front-pages	
of	Folha	and	O	Globo,	March	17,	2016.	See	section	4.4.3.		
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Figure	A.10	and	A.11:	Score	board	element	of	newspaper	front	pages	(Folha,	April	16	and	17).	See	
section	4.5.4.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.12:	Folha’s	news	site	graphic	score	board	after	impeachment	vote	in	the	Senate,	May	12,	
2016.	Notice	the	similar	design	of	web	and	print	score	board.	
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Figure	A.13	and	A.14:	Score	board	element	of	newspaper	front	pages	(Estado,	April	17,	and	O	
Globo	April	12,	2016).	See	section	4.5.4.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.15	and	A.16:	Estado	front	page	photos.	Rousseff	burnt	in-implicit-effigy	on	the	front-page	
of	Estado	(E4/5	2016)	(figuratively	speaking)	and	symbolically	decapitated	(E14/4	2016).		
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Figure	A.17	and	A.18:	Festive	front	pages	celebrating	the	Câmara’s	vote	in	favor	of	impeachment.	
O	Globo	and	Estado,	April	18,	2016.		
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Figure	A.19:	“The	Final	Judgement”.	IstoÉ,	March	14,	2017	(I#2465).	See	section	4.6.	
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Figure	A.20,	A.21,	A.22	and	A.23:	Front	pages	with	photos	of	protests	on	March	13	(F14/3,	E14/3	
2016)	and	March	31	(F1/4	and	E1/4	2016,	bottom).	Notice	size	differences	in	layout	of	photos.	See	
section	5.4.	
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Figure	A.24,	A.25	and	A.26:	A	visual	demonology	of	presidents	and	ex-presidents	in	Veja,	March	
11,	2016	(V#2469)	and	March	8,	2017	(V#2520)	plus	Claudio	Lessa’s	montage	“The	Devil’s	
Advocate”.	See	section	6.4.	
	
	
	
	
(Compare	with	A.15,	Estado’s	impeachment	photo	of	
Rousseff	and	the	Olympic	torch,	E4/5	2016)	
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Appendix	B	
Phases	of	the	Lava-Jato	Investigation	
	
This	 appendix	 provides	 a	 timeline	 with	 the	 names,	 dates,	 and	 principal	 targets	 (of	 arrests	 or	
interrogations)	relating	to	each	of	the	investigative	phases.	The	numbering	of	the	phases,	in	2016	
and	2017,	became	erratic,	as	some	phases	spawned	one	or	more	sub-operations.			
	
1. Lava	Jato	(17-3-14)	Alberto	Youssef,	Habib	Chater		
2. Bidone	(20-3-14)	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	
3. Dolce	Vita	(11-4-14)	Ecoglobal	Ltda.,	Nelma	Kodama	
4. Casablanca	(11-6-14)	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	
5. Bidone	II	(1-7-14)	João	Procópio	Junqueira	Pacheco	de	Almeida	Prado	
6. Bidone	III	(22-8-14)	Individuals	linked	to	Paulo	Roberto	Costa	
7. Juízo	Final	(14-11-14)	Nestor	Cerveró	(ex-director	of	Petrobras),	Ricardo	Pessoa	(UTC),	
CEOs,	presidents	of	OAS,	Camargo	Corrêa,	Mendes	Júnior,	amongst	others	(see	section	4.1)	
8. (unnamed	operation)	(14-1-15)	Arrest	of	N.	Cerveró,	as	he	was	trying	to	escape	Brazil		
9. My	Way	(5-2-15)	BR	Distribuidora,	Zwi	Skornicki	
10. Que	País	é	Esse?	(16-3-15)	Named	for	Renato	Duque’s	response	to	his	arrest	warrant	in	
phase	7;	arrests	of	Queiroz	Galvão	executives	
11. A	Origem	(10-4-15)	André	Vargas,	Luiz	Argolo,	Pedro	Corrêa	(PP)	
12. (unnamed	operation)	(15-4-15)	João	Vaccari	Neto	arrested	
13. (unnamed	operation)	(21-5-15)	Milton	Pascowitch	arrested	
14. Erga	Omnes	(19-6-15)	Odebrecht	group,	arrest	of	Marcelo	Odebrecht	and	Otávio	Azevedo,	
president	of	Andrade	Gutierrez.	
15. Conexão	Monaco	(2-6-15)	Jorge	Zelada	
a. Politeia	(14-7-15)	Search	warrants	in	offices	and	houses	of	Fernando	Collor	de	
Mello,	investigating	BR	Distribuidora,	and	PP	politicians	Mario	Negromonte,	Dudu	
da	Fonte,	Ciro	Nogueira	and	Fernando	Bezzera	Coelho	(then	PSB)		
16. Radioatividade	(28-7-15)	Othon	Pinheiro	and	state	nuclear	company	Eletronuclear	
17. Pixuleco	(2-8-15)	José	Dirceu	
18. Pixuleco	II	(13-8-15)	Alexandre	Romano	
19. Nessun	Dorma	(21-9-15)	Engevix	executive	José	Antunes	Sobrinho	
20. Corrosão	(16-11-15)	Roberto	Gonçalves,	former	Petrobras	manager	
21. Passe	Livre	(24-11-15)	Jose	Carlos	Bumlai	
a. Catilinárias	(15-12-15)	PMDB	politicians	Eduardo	Cunha,	Henrique	Alves,	Celso	
Pansera,	Edson	Lobão,	Aníbal	Gomes	
22. Triplo	X	(27-1-16)	Bancoop/OAS	scheme,	involving	the	owners	of	the	triplex	attributed	to	
Lula	as	well	as	the	Panama	law	firm	Mossack	Fonseca	
23. Operação	Acarajé	(22-2-16)	João	Santana,	marketing	expert	working	for	PT	
24. Aletheia	(4-3-16)	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	and	his	family	
25. Polimento	(21-3-16)	Operation	in	Lisboa,	against	Raul	Felippe	Schmidt	
26. Xepa	(22-3-16)	based	in	the	operation	Acarajé,	investigating	the	construction	contracts	of	
the	Corinthians	stadium	in	São	Paulo	
27. Carbono	14	(1-4-16)	PT	ex-secretary	Silvio	Pereira,	linked	to	Celso	Daniel	and	the	Mensalão	
case	
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28. Vitória	de	Pirro	(12-4-16)	Gim	Argello	(PTB)	for	manipulating	CPI	de	Petrobras	in	2014	
29. Repescagem	(23-5-16)	PP	politicians	and	Jose	Claudio	Genu,	ex-treasurer	of	PP	
30. Vício	(24-5-16)	more	investigation	against	Dirceu	
a. Custo	Brasil	(23-6-16)	Ex-minister	Paulo	Bernardo	(PT)	
b. Sepsis	(1-7-16)	Lúcio	Funaro		
31. Abismo	(4-7-16)	PT	ex-treasurer	Paulo	Adalberto	Alves	Ferreira	
32. Caça-Fantasmas	(7-7-16),	revisiting	the	Mossack	Fonseca	organization	and	the	Panama	
bank	FPB	
33. Resta	Um	(2-8-16),	arresting	Quieroz	Galvão	bosses	Colares	og	Zanoides,	and	investigating	
the	deceased	PSDB	national	president	Sergio	Guerra	
a. Operacao	Irmandade	(10-8-2016)	Samir	Assid,	brother	of	Adir	Assad	
34. Arquivo	X	(22-9-16)	Guido	Mantega	
35. Omertà	(26-09-16)	Palocci	and	Brani	Kontic	(Palocci	aide)		
36. Dragão	(10-11-16)	-	Adir	Assad,	Tacla	Duran	–	UTC	and	Mendes	Junior	
37. Calicute	(17-11-16)	Ex-governor	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Sergio	Cabral	(PMDB)		
a. Deflexão	(4-12-16)	TCU	judge	Vital	do	Rego,	Marco	Maia	(PT),	based	on	Delcidio	
plea	bargain	and	OAS?	
b. Eficiência	(26-1-17)	Eike	Batista	apprehended	
c. Levitã	(16-2-2017)	referring	to	Hobbes’	work	and	his	phrase	“homo	homini	lupus”,	
implicit	reference	to	the	target,	Edison	Lobão	Filho,	involved	in	the	Belo	Monte	
graft	
38. Blackout	(23-2-17)	–	A	father/son	couple	apprehended	(both	with	the	name	Luz)	
a. Tolypeutes	(14-3-17)	–	RioTrilhos	(linha	4	de	Metrô	no	RJ)	and	sub-secretaries	of	
the	Sergio	Cabral	administration	
b. Satelites	(21-3-17)	–	Senators	Humberto	Costa	(PT),	Renan	Calheiros	and	Eunício	
Oliveira	(of	PMDB)	(plus	Oliveira’s	security	firm	Confederal,	used	by	the	state)	and	
the	company	Corpvs	
39. Paralelo	(28-3-17)	–	Petrobras	ex-director	(after	Barusco)	Roberto	Gonçalves	again	
a. Quinta	de	Ouro	–	(29-3-17)	TCE	RJ	–	Jorge	Picciani	and	judges	of	TCE-Rio	arrested	or	
interrogated	
b. Satelites	2	(28-4-17)	search	warrants	against	Bruno	Mendes,	Senators	Renan	
Calheiros	and	Romero	Jucá	and	ex-president	José	Sarney	(all	PMDB)	plus	the	
chemical	company	Triunfo	Caio	Gorentzvaig	
40. Asfixia	(4-5-17)		
a. Patmos	(18-5-17)	search	warrants	in	Senator	Aecio	Neves’	(PSDB)	house	and	
offices,	arrest	of	his	sister	Andrea	Neves,	search	warrants	for	individuals	linked	to	
Michel	Temer,	including	colonel	João	B.	Lima	Filho	and	congressman	Rocha	Loures	
(PMDB)	
41. Ratatouille	(1-6-17)	search	warrants	for	Cabral	assessor	Marco	Antonio	de	Luca	
a. Manus	(6-6-17)	Henrique	Alves	(PMDB)	arrested	for	Arena	das	Dunas	graft		
b. Tendão	de	Aquiles	(9-6-17)	Grupo	JBS	for	insider	trading	prior	to	operation	Patmos	
c. Ponto	Final	(3-7-17)	–	public	transportation	contracts	in	Rio,	Rogerio	Onofre	and	
Jacob	Barata	Filho	arrested,	as	well	as	Fetranspor	president	and	board	members	
42. Cobra	(27-7-17)	–	Aldemir	Bendine,	ex-president	of	Petrobras	arrested	
a.	Rio	40	Graus	(3-8-17)	–	Alexander	Pinto	(assessor	of	Rio	ex-mayor	Paes)	arrested	
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b.	Gotham	City	(9-8-17)	–	arrest	warrants	for	two	construction	firm	bosses,	linked	to	
Rogerio	Onofre		
c.	Ponto	Final	II	(15-8-17)	Roberto	Bethlem	(Fetranspor)	arrested	in	Rio		
d.	Étimo	(16-8-17)	Interrogations	expanding	on	the	phase	Xepa	(in	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	and	
Porto	Alegre)	
43.	Sem	Fronteiras	(18-8-17)	Honorary	consul	to	Greece	Konstantinos	Georgios	Kotronakis	
44.	Abate	(18-8-17)	Candido	Vaccarezza	(PT)	arrested,	linked	to	Sargeant	Marine	contracts	with				
Petrobras	
45.	Abate	II	–	Tiago	Cedraz	(son	of	TCU	minister	Aroldo	Cedraz)	forced	to	testify,	implicated	by	
Jorge	Luz	
a.	Tendão	de	Aquiles	II	(13-9-17)	-	Wesley	Batista,	ex-leader	of	Grupo	JBS,	arrested	
46.	(unnamed	operation)	(20-10-17)	Petroquisa	and	the	probe-ship	Vitoria	10.000	
	 a.	Cadeia	Velha	(14-11-17)	Jorge	Picciani	(PMDB),	Felippe	Picciani,	Jacob	Barata	Filho	again	
47.	Sothis	(21-11-17)	Transpetro	director	José	Antonio	de	Jesus	and	possible	financing	of	PT	
48.	Integração	(22-2-18)	public	transport	in	Paraná	
49.	Buono	Fortuna	(9-3-18)	Ex-minister	Delfim	Netto	and	his	nephew,	involved	in	Belo	Monte	graft	
a.	Pão	Nosso	(13-3-18)	investigation	of	the	Rio	prison	food	system,	arrest	of	secretary	in	
the	Cabral	administration	of	Rio,	and	Cesar	Rubens	Monteiro	
50.	Sothis	II	(23-3-18)	Sergio	Machado,	Transpetro	corruption	
a.	Skala	(29-3-18)	Wagner	Rossi,	Coronel	Lima	Filho,	Michel	Temer	aides	arrested	
b.	Tira-Teima	(10-4-18)	Hypermarca	investigated,	related	to	Eunício	Oliveira	(PMDB)	
c.	Rizoma	(12-4-18)	Milton	Lyra,	Marcelo	Sereno		(related	to	non-LJ	operations	called	
Operação	Eficiencia	and	Operação	Unfair	Play)	
d.	Cambio,	Desligo	(3-5-18)	Dario	Messer	and	45	doleiros	
51.	Déjà	vu	(8-5-18)	Odebrecht	again	
52.	Greenwich	(21-6-2018)	Odebrecht	contracts	with	Petrobras	Química	investigated	
	
	
Brief	considerations	about	naming:	
	
• Many	names	simply	refer,	more	or	less	obliquely,	to	the	targets	of	the	operations	(this	is	
the	case	in	phase	16,	22,	38,	47,	and	49,	or	the	operations	Corrosão,	Tolypeutes	and	Levitã,	
for	instance).		
• Some	names	are	direct	quotes	of	the	apprehended	persons	(e.g.	phases	9,	10,	and	17)	
• A	number	of	phases	are	named	for	specific	synonyms	for	“bribes”,	such	as	Pixuleco,	
Acarajé,	and	Custo	Brasil.		
• Several	names	are	tributes	to	other	probes	–	such	as	Nessun	Durma	and	Omertá	
• Some	names	are	given	to	an	operation	because	of	the	sequential	relation	to	other	
operations:	Déjà	vu,	Repescagem,	Paralelo,	and	Satelites	are	examples	of	this.	
• Some	are	pop-cultural	references	–	X-files,	Casablanca,	and	Dolce	Vita,	for	instance.			
• Many	names	refer	to	classical	literature	and	mythology,	including	Patmos,	Vitoria	de	
Pyrrho,	and	Catilinárias.	
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Appendix	C	
Corruption	cases	reported	in	the	newspapers	
	
Figure	C.1.	Count	of	news	items	in	Folha	and	Estado	de	S.	Paulo	(web	and	print)	reporting	on	the	
most-covered	corruption	topics	from	October	2015	till	May	2016.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	C.1.	Summed	frequency	of	front-page	news	items	concerning	corruption	cases	in	Folha,	
Estado,	and	O	Globo,	October	17,	2015	till	April	17,	2016.	
	
327	 61	 33	 261	 206	 160	 48	 43	 22	 15	
Impeachment	 Dilma	 Pedaladas	 Lula		 Petrobras	 Cunha	 Odebrecht	 Delcídio	 Calheiros		 Neves	
Source:	Author’s	database.	
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Remarks	on	sampling	methodology	
“I	sample	all	front	pages	from	Folha,	Estado,	and	O	Globo—the	three	main	national	papers	of	Brazil—and,	
furthermore,	sample	all	printed	and	web-published	articles	in	Folha	and	Estado	dealing	with	news	on	national	
corruption	and	the	impeachment	proceedings	(this	leaves	out	stories	on	corruption	abroad,	e.g.	the	Panama	
Papers,	as	well	as	corruption	in	the	international	soccer	association	FIFA).	The	sample	period	contains	the	six	
months	of	front-page	items	up	until	the	Lower	House	of	Congress	voted	on	the	impeachment	(on	April	17,	
2016),	while	the	article	sample	comprised	the	period	October	2015	to	May	12,	2016,	when	the	Senate	ratified	
the	vote	of	the	Lower	House.	The	total	sample	includes	8,800	news	items,	and	more	than	1,300	front	page	
items,	all	dealing	with	news	on	political	transgression	and	corruption.”	(Damgaard	2018a:119)	
	
“The	headline	samples	provide	an	index	of	the	salience	of	each	corruption	case	on	the	national	media	agenda	
on	a	daily	basis.	If	a	corruption	case	is	mentioned	on	one	or	more	front	page,	there	is	a	chance	that	it	may	
also	reach	the	news	broadcasts.	The	article	sampling,	meanwhile,	took	both	printed	and	web-publicized	news	
items	 and	 opinion	 pieces	 from	 Estado	 and	 Folha,	 leaving	 out	 O	 Globo	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 excess	 data	
redundancy.	This	second	sample	provides	an	index	of	how	attention	to	all	cases	of	corruption	was	distributed	
by	including	the	cases	that	did	not	make	it	to	the	front	pages.	The	front-page	count	is	inherently	weighted,	
since	only	so	many	headlines	can	fit	in	a	front	page,	while	a	sampling	of	all	published	articles	of	print	and	
web	face	fewer	restrictions.	The	print	versions	of	quality	newspapers,	as	pointed	out	above,	normally	have	
many	pages	dedicated	to	the	coverage	of	politics,	while	their	online	versions	face	no	restrictions	inherent	in	
the	format.	Thus,	these	kinds	of	media	give	a	measure	of	the	resources	and	attention	given	to	scandals	and	
investigations	 independent	of	other	news	of	national	or	 international	 importance.	The	 sample	of	articles	
includes	articles	published	on	the	newspapers’	online	editions…	I	opted	to	collect	both	web	and	print	versions	
of	news	items	on	corruption	from	Estado	and	Folha	in	a	single	SQL	database	structure	with	various	metadata	
and	a	coding	of	the	issues	being	reported.”	(Damgaard	2018b:157)	
	
“In	general,	I	included	all	articles	covering	political	corruption	or	corruption	in	state	companies	(since	these	
have	politically	appointed	executive	officers),	as	well	as	all	articles	treating	or	discussing	alleged	improper	
economic	or	political	conduct	of	the	President,	ex-presidents,	ministers	or	ex-ministers,	since	these	articles	
are	partly	overlapping	thematically...	This	means	that	the	articles	concerning	impeachment	petitions	were	
included,	though	they	in	many	cases	do	not	deal	with	corruption	per	se,	but	certainly	deal	with	perceived	
illicit	political	 actions.	 This	 inclusion	was	 fortunate,	because	 it	 allows	 for	 comparisons	between	 the	most	
visible	political	topics	of	the	sampled	period	–	 impeachment	and	the	Lava-Jato	case.	However,	 I	excluded	
articles	about	corruption	in	national	and	international	football	associations,	as	well	as	articles	about	the	train	
cartel	of	São	Paulo,	as	that	case	was	running	out	of	steam	and	went	on	to	disappear	totally	from	the	media	
agenda.	 Articles	 about	 ex-president	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso’s	 mistress	 were	 also	 excluded,	 as	 the	
framing	in	most	of	these	articles	(whatever	the	population	in	general	may	think)	did	not	cast	the	Cardoso	
case	as	corruption,	but	as	extra-marital	activity,	making	it	scandalous	for	sexual-moral	reasons	rather	than	
for	public-office	moral	reasons.	Leaving	aside	those	caveats,	I	have	deployed	the	definition	given	and	kept	
track	of	the	various	corruption	cases	and	their	spin-off	probes,	identifying	news	items	related	to	these	cases	
and	the	politicians	under	scrutiny.”	(Damgaard	2018b:159)	
	
The	database	and	the	tally	of	headlines	and	topics	are	available	online,	at	the	time	of	writing,	at	the	University	
of	Copenhagen’s	Centre	for	Latin	American	Studies	site	(www.clas.hum.ku.dk/research).	
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Corruption	cases	involving	Temer	in	the	newspapers	
	
Table	C.2.	Headlines	implicating	Temer	in	Estado	de	S.	Paulo	(E),	Folha	de	S.	Paulo	(F),	and	O	Globo:	
	
	
Figure	C.2.	Number	of	news	items	in	Folha	and	Estado	concerning	five	cases	involving	Temer:	
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Temer	and	Argeplan	scheme
Temer	impeachment	petition
Temer	in	Ficha	Limpa	violation
Temer	in	Petrobras	graft
Temer	sponsored	by	port	company
Sum	of	Number	of	Records	for	each	Date	of	Web	publish	Week.		Color	shows	details	about	Corruption	topic.	The	data	is	ﬁltered	on	Date	of	Web	publish,
which	ranges	from	17/10/2015	to	12/05/2016	and	keeps	Null	values.	The	view	is	ﬁltered	on	Corruption	topic,	which	keeps	Temer	and	Argeplan	scheme,
Temer	impeachment	petition,	Temer	in	Ficha	Limpa	violation,	Temer	in	Petrobras	graft	and	Temer	sponsored	by	port	company.
E F G
2016-04-06 STF	manda	Câmara	abrir	impeachment	de	Temer;	Cunha	reage Marco	Aurélio	decide	iniciar	impeachment	de	Temer	 Ministro	manda	acolher	processo	contra	Temer
2016-04-03 Nem	Dilma	nem	Temer
2016-04-02 STF	divulga	parecer	contra	Michel	Temer	
2016-04-01 Temer	nega	que	vá	interferir	na	Lava	Jato	 Temer	e	FH	falam	em	blindar	Lava-Jato
2016-03-16 Temer	é	citado	no	caso	Petrobras Senador	implica	também	Temer,	Renan	e	Esteves Janot	vai	pedir	investigação	de	Lula,	Temer,	Mercadante	e	Aécio
2016-03-11 Ex-diretor	preso	foi	indicado	por	Temer,	afirma	Delcídio	
2016-03-01 Emenda	de	Cunha	à	Lei	dos	Portos	ajuda	doador	de	Temer
2016-02-12 Ao	TSE,	Temer	acusa	oposição	de	'demonizar'	doação	eleitoral
2016-01-12 Lava	Jato	faz	Temer	se	unir	a	Dilma	em		defesa	no	TSE
2015-12-19 Em	mensagem,	empreteira	cita	repasse	a	Temer	de	R$5	milhões
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Appendix	D	
Transcript	of	news	broadcasts	
	
Jornal	Nacional,	broadcast	on	TV	Globo,	20:30	on	March	4,	2016	–	see	section	4.4.1	
Retrieved	from	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IdpIBPW8Bs	
	
[WB	=	William	Bonner;	RV	=	Renata	Vasconcellos]	
	
[music,	zoom	in	on	anchors	in	Globo	studio]	
WB:	Boa	noite	
RV:	Boa	noite	
WB:	A	operação	Lava	Jato	chega	ao	ex-presidente		
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Policiais	federais	obrigam		
[footage	from	Lula’s	house,	agents	leading	Lula	out	of	the	garage	and	into	black	car]	
Lula	prestar	depoimento	numa	sala	no	aeroporto	de	Congonhas	
[studio,	head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	ação	policial	atrai	manifestantes	pro	e	contra	ao	ex-presidente	
[footage	of	police	and	protesters	in	half	melee	in	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
e	as	provocações	de	lado	a	lado	terminam	em	violência	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	procuradores	investigam	contas	de	instituto	Lula	e	a	empresa	de	palestras	dele	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
e	afirmam	que	o	instituto	e	a	empresa	receberam	pagamentos	e	doações	das	cinco	empreiteiras	
mais	envolvidas	no	desvio	de	dinheiro	da	Petrobras	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	os	investigadores	querem	saber	porque	empresas	dos	filhos	do	ex-presidente	receberam	
dinheiro	do	instituto	Lula	e	da	empresa	de	palestras	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Agentes	também	fizeram	buscas	na	casa	de	Lula	em	São	Bernardo	do	Campo		
[footage	of	beach	side	apartment	and	ranch]	
e	no	tríplex	em	Guarujá	e	no	sitio	em	Atibaia	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	investiga	se	a	OAS	bancou	armazenamento	de	objetos	de	Lula	
depois	que	ele	deixou	a	Presidência	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	isios	e	reformas	no	sitio	e	no	apartamento	foram	pagamento	de	vantagem	indevida	ao	ex-
presidente	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	este	é	o	momento	de	sermos	republicanos		
Não	há	ninguém	isento	de	investigação	no	pais	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	O	ex-presidente	repudia	as	acusações	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	critica	a	condução	coercitiva		
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[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	diz	que	teria	prestar	do	esclarecimento	se	tivesse	sido	convidado	a	depor	
[footage	of	Lula	at	press	conference]	
Lula:	então	era	só	ter	comunicar	[not	intelligible]	diremos	lá	
Lamentavelmente,	eles	preferiram	a	utilizar	a	prepotência.		
A	arrogância.		
Num	show	e	num	espetáculo	e	pirotécnica		
[studio,	head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	manifesta	
[footage	of	Dilma	at	press	conference]	
WB:	solidariedade	ao	ex-presidente	Lula	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	rebate	afirmações	do	acordo	de	delação	premiada	do	senador	Delcídio	do	Amaral	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	nossos	repórteres	mostram	a	repercussão	da	24o	fase	da	Lava	Jato	no	Congresso	e	no	
mercado	financeiro	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	a	nova	denúncia	de	Procuradoria-Geral	da	República	contra	o	deputado	Eduardo	Cunha	
[full	studio	shot	from	above]	
WB:	o	Jornal	Nacional	está	começando		
[graphic	with	logotype;	music]		
[2:00	-	full	studio	shot,	zooming	in]	
WB:	Policiais	federais	levaram	o	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	para	depor	a	investigadores	
da	operação	Lava	Jato	hoje	da	manha	numa	sala	do	aeroporto	de	Congonhas	em	São	Paulo.	Ele	foi	
o	alvo	central	da	24o	fase	da	operação,	que	recebeu	o	nome	de	“Aletheia”.		
[shot	from	left,	zooming	in	again	on	WB]	
WB:	Em	grego,	essa...	palavra	significa	“a	busca	da	verdade”.	
[footage	from	helicopter,	above	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	and	Lula’s	apartment]	
Reporter	VO	[José	Roberto	Burnier]:	Eram	6	da	manha	quando	policia	federal	bateu	a	porta	do	
apartamento	do	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	em	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	onde	ele	mora	
De	acordo	com	os	procuradores	da	operação	Lava	Jato,	Lula	recebeu	os	policiais	com	
tranquilidade.	Para	não	chamar	atenção,	Lula	saiu	num	carro	sem	o	logotipo	da	PF,	por	volta	da	7	
de	manha.	
Mas	ele	não	foi	para	a	sede	da	policia	federal	na	zona	oeste	de	São	Paulo,	
para	onde	os	intimados	costumam	ser	levados.	
Ele	percorreu	cerca	de	25	quilómetros,	entre	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	e	a	zona	sul	de	São	Paulo	
onde	fica	o	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	
[repórter	on-site,	half-shot]	
Burnier:	Por	questões	de	segurança	o	ex-presidente	Lula	foi	trazido	aqui	para	ala	de	autoridades	
de	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	
É	uma	área	militar;	mais	protegida.	Durante	mais	de	três	horas,	Lula	prestou	depoimento	numa	
sala	que	normalmente	é	usada	pela	Presidência	da	República		
[head-shot	of	police	delegate	Igor	Romário	de	Paula]	
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Romário	de	Paula:	o	acompanhamento	nas	ultimas	semana	detetou	a	movimentação	de	pessoas	
ligadas	de	uma	forma	ao	ex-presidente	e	sua	família,	no	sentido	de	mobilizar	pessoas	para	tentar	
prejudicar	a	diligência	de	hoje.	
Então	a	por	isso	o	local	do	depoimento	dele	foi	mudado,	por	isso	as	equipes	hoje	são	
acompanhados	das	equipes	estáticas	para	isolar	áreas	necessário,	e	feito	no	forma	mais	ágil	
possível,	no,	foi	uma	mudança	de	procedimento	por	ser	o	ex-presidente	da	República			
Foi	uma	questão	só	de	segurança	mesmo	
[footage	from	press	conference,	in	Curitiba	presumably,	with	judge	Sergio	Moro]	
Reporter	VO:	No	total,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	expediu	11	mandados		
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
de	condução	coercitiva,	que	é	quando	o	suspeito	ou	investigado	tem	que	ser	apresentar	a	uma	
autoridade	policial,	ainda	que	fique	calado.	
[footage	of	Congonhas	from	helicopter,	shots	of	police	cars	coming	down	a	street]	
Moro	também	expediu	33	mandados	de	busca	e	apreensão,	cumpridos	nos	estados	de	São	Paulo,	
Rio	e	Bahia.	
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
200	policiais	e	30	auditores	da	Receita	Federal	
[footage	of	Tax	Authority	car	opening	door]	
participaram	na	operação.	
[Animated	graphic	of	“propinoduto”	–	showing	tubes,	supposedly	at	a	Petrobras	refinery,	dripping	
bundles	of	money.	A	document	hovers	in	from	left,	depicting	the	court	order	quoted	below]	
As	buscas	foram	autorizadas	dia	24	de	fevereiro.	A	justificativa	do	Ministério	Público	para	a	
condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	é	que		
[quote,	graphic	highlights	of	that	text	section]	
a	medida	é	necessária	para	evitar	tumultos	políticos,	como	ocorrido	no	Fórum	criminal	da	Barra	
Funda	em	fevereiro,	quando	pessoas	ficaram	feridas.	
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
Assim	que	a	notícia	foi	divulgada,	manifestantes	começaram	a	se	aglomerar	em	frente	ao	
apartamento	de	Lula.	
[footage	shows	2	seconds	of	protesters	singing	“Olé,	olé	oh	la,	Lula,	Lula”]	
Não	demorou	muito	e	começou	uma	confusão.	Policia	militar	tentou	manter	os	grupos	a	favor	e	
contra	em	lados	separados.		
[footage	of	in-fighting	between	protesters]	
Teve	socos,	chutes,	gente	machucada,	e	muita	briga	
[footage	of	more	fighting	at	airport,	by	busses	and	behind	barriers]	
A	cena	se	repetiu	em	frente	ao	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	Manifestantes	a	favor	e	contra	o	ex-
presidente	entraram	em	confronto.	
Sobrou	provocação	para	todo	lado;	
[footage	of	people	protesting	inside	Congonhas	terminal]	
E	em	frente	a	sala	onde	Lula	estava	depondo.	
No	saguão,	muita	gente,	e	mais	discussão	
Teve	protestos	contrários	
[people	chanting	“a	nossa	bandeira	jamais	será	vermelha”]	
e	favoráveis	ao	ex-presidente	Lula	
[people	chanting	“não	vai	ter	golpe”]	
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[close-up	of	Luiz	Carlos	da	Silva	in	front	of	the	airport	office	of	the	federal	police]	
Professor	Luizinho,	um	dos	fundadores	do	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores,	estava	no	aeroporto.	
Ele	chegou	a	ser	investigado	no	esquema	de	Mensalão	e	foi	absolvido.	Ele	discutiu	com	uma	
passageira;	mostrou	uma	cueca,	e	fez	com	a	mão	a	letra	“l”,	de	Lula.	
[footage	of	airport	front	road,	on	the	ground	and	from	helicopter]	
Do	lado	de	fora,	um	pequeno	grupo	de	manifestantes	soltou	fogos	no	canteiro	central	de	avenida	
que	fica	em	frente	ao	aeroporto.	O	trânsito	parou	nos	dois	sentidos.	
[footage	of	Paulo	Teixeira	in	front	of	airport]	
O	deputado	federal	do	PT	Paulo	Teixeira	que	acompanhou	o	depoimento	do	ex-presidente	diz:	
[footage	of	Atibaia	ranch	from	helicopter,	while	quoting	Teixeira]	
“Lula	afirmou	que	os	donos	do	sítio	em	Atibaia	são	Jonas	Suassuna	e	Fernando	Bittar.”	
[footage	of	beach	side	apartment	complex]	
O	ex-presidente	explicou	que	teve	uma	quota	do	triplex	na	Guarujá,	mas	que	não	exerceu	a	opção	
de	compra	de	apartamento.	Lula	confirmou	que	visitou	o	imóvel	
[footage	of	Atibaia	ranch	from	helicopter]	
já	de	acordo	com	o	deputado,	Lula	se	irritou	quando	foi	perguntado	sobre	os	pedalinhos	com	os	
nomes	dos	netos	e	que	estão	no	sítio	de	Atibaia	
[footage	of	Paulo	Teixeira	in	front	of	airport]	
Paulo	Teixeira:	Ele	ficou	indignado	e	falou	que	acha	essa	pergunta	na	tal	altura	nem	é	da	policia	
federal	e	nem	do	Ministério	Público	Federal	e	não	dar	...	a	minha	altura		
[low-resolution	photo	of	Lula	on	the	phone	at	the	airport	hall,	zooming	out	and	revealing	the	
propinoduto	graphic	again,	substituted	for	another	photo	of	Lula	in	the	hall]	
Reporter	VO:	Depois	de	responder	às	perguntas	dos	delegados	da	Polícia	Federal,	o	ex-presidente	
saiu	pouco	
[footage	of	garage	entrance	of	the	Congonhas	presidential	hall	section,	circled	by	a	yellow	ring]	
depois	do	meio	dia	por	trás	do	aeroporto.		
[studio,	torso-and-desk	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Os	investigadores	disseram	que	as	suspeitas	contra	o	ex-presidente	Lula	são	baseadas	em	
provas	e	depoimentos.	
O	Ministério	Público	e	a	Polícia	Federal	investigam	o	papel	dele	no	esquema	criminoso	[RV	nods]	
da	Petrobras	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Há	motivos	para	investigar	o,	o	senhor	Luiz	Inácio.	Neste	momento,	o	motivo	é	verificar	se	
esses	pagamentos,	feitos	a	ele,	são	um,	um	“quid	pro	quo”,	como	diz	os	americanos,	do,	do,	dos	
benefícios	alcançados	pro	favores	no	governo.	
[torso-and-desh	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Agora	Você	vai	conhecer	os	detalhes	dos	motivos	dessa	condução	de	Lula,	apresentados	
pelos	investigadores.	
Esses	motivos	foram	divulgados	numa	entrevista	junto	com	um	documento,	e	o	repórter	Marcelo	
Rocha	mostra	na	reportagem:	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[Reading	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	Estão	
sendo	cumpridos	
[in	this	case	and	the	following,	the	graphic	shows	quotes	from	document,	with	lines	of	text	
swooping	closer	to	the	spectator]	
		 212	
nesta	data,	mandados	de	busca	e	apreensão	e	de	condução	coercitiva	para	aprofundar	a	
investigação	de	possíveis	crimes	de	corrupção	e	lavagem	de	dinheiro	oriundo	de	desvios	da	
Petrobras,	praticados	por	meio	de	pagamentos	dissimulados	por	José	Carlos	Bumlai	e	pelas	
construtoras	OAS	e	Odebrecht	ao	ex-presidente	da	República,	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	e	pessoas	
associadas.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Nesse	caso	estamos	falando	de	uma...	organização	criminosa	infiltrada	dentro	do	governo	
federal	que	se	utilizava	da	Petrobras	e	das	outras	empresas	para	o	financiamento	político	e	
também	para	apropriação	pessoal.	Essa	organização	criminosa	certamente	possui	uma,	um	
comando.	Foi	verificado,	e	nós	aí	fizemos	a	acusação,	que	o	ex-ministro	Zé	Dirceu	fazia	parte	deste	
comando	junto	com	ex-tesoureiro	José	Vaccari	entre	outros.		
[break	in	footage	to	other	part	of	conference,	still	Lima	talking]	
Nós	precisamos,	e	fazemos	uma	investigação,	da	continuidade	dessa	cadeira	de	comando.	Hoje,	
nós	estamos	analisando	evidências	de	que...	o	ex-presidente	e	sua	família	receberam	vantagens	
para	...	eventualmente	...	a	...	consecução	de	atos	dentro	do	governo	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
Esse	grande	esquema	era	coordenado	a	partir	das	cúpulas	e	lideranças	dos	partidos	políticos	que	
compunham	a	base	do	governo	federal,	especialmente	o	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores,	o	Partido	
Progressista	e	o	Partido	do	Movimento	Democrático	Brasileiro.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Esse	é	um	esquema	de	compra	de	apoio	político	partidário,	entretanto:		
[10:00]	Se	ele	conhecia	as	vantagens	indevidas	pagas,	e	se	ele	recebeu	vantagens	indevidas,	nós	
estamos	ainda	em	investigação.	
[footage	from	other	angle,	showing	more	desk	and	still	focus	on	Lima]	
As	investigações	são	exatamente	
[footage	from	first	angle,	head-on	–	possible	hiding	a	break	in	the	footage]	
no	sentido	de	comprovar	–	ou	não	–	a	participação	do	ex-presidente	nas	decisões	de	
beneficiamento	dos	partidos	políticos	da	base	aliada.	Nesse	aspecto,	as	investigações	já	vêm	
acumulando	evidências	do	principal,	eeh,	beneficiário	disso,	era	o	governo	do	PT;			
que	foi...	cujo	titular	foi	o	ex-presidente.	Então,	fica	claro	que	o	benefício	político	recebido	foi	
basicamente	do	ex-presidente	Lula,	e	atualmente	da	atual	presidente.	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
O	ex-presidente	Lula,	além	de	líder	partidário,	era	o	responsável	final	pela	decisão	de	quem	seriam	
[11:00]	os	diretores	da	Petrobras	e	foi	um	dos	principais	beneficiários	dos	delitos.	De	fato,	
surgiram	evidências	de	que	os	crimes	o	enriqueceram	e	financiaram	campanhas	eleitorais	e	o	
caixa	de	sua	agremiação	política.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Está	sob	analise	todo	os	atos	de	nomeação	de	diretórias	da	empresa	Petrobras	-	e	de	outros	
casos	envolvendo	outras	empresas	ou	órgãos	estatais	-	e	verificando	se	este	aparelhamento	da	
Petrobras	e	deu-se	por	orientação	do	governo.	Nós	sabemos	que	José	Dirceu	estava	realmente	
aparelhando	a	Petrobras	para	desvio	de	recursos.	Nós	vamos	verificar	agora	se	esses	desvios	de	
recursos	eram	de	reconhecimento	do	ex-presidente.	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
A	suspeita,	aqui	novamente,	é	que	os	valores	com	que	o	ex--presidente	foi	agraciado	constituem	
propinas	pagas	a	título	de	contraprestação	pelos	favores	ilícitos	obtidos	no	esquema	Petrobrás.	
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[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	A	vantagem	não	precisa	ser	dinheiro,	não	preciso	estar	diretamente	ligada	ao	ato;	nós	
podemos	verificar	que	mesmo	após...	o	exercício	da	Presidência	pode	estar	sendo	pagos	ainda	
vantagens	ao	ex-presidente	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
Todos	esses	fatos	estão	sendo	investigados	no	âmbito	da	Lava	Jato	porque	eles	se	relacionam	com	
o	destino	de	verbas	desviadas	da	Petrobras	por	empresas	e	pessoas	participantes	do	mega-
esquema	criminoso.	Os	fatos	são	de	competência	federal	não	só	por	se	relacionarem	com	crimes	
financeiros	e	de	lavagem	de	dinheiro	transnacional,	mas	também	por	haver	fatos	praticados	
quando	o	ex-presidente	estava	no	exercício	de	mandato	no	âmbito	da	União	Federal,	onde	
possivelmente	sua	influência	foi	usada,	antes	e	depois	do	mandato	–	o	que	é	objeto	de	
investigação	–	para	que	o	esquema	existisse	e	se	perpetuasse.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	head-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima,	this	
time	in	the	midst	of	scores	of	reporters	holding	microphones]	
Lima:	Certamente	o	governo	dele	foi	um		
[credit	texts	appear	in	the	bottom	of	the	screen]	
dos	grandes	beneficiários	da	compra	desse	apoio	político	partidário,	eeh,	nós	estamos	
investigando	se	houve	algum	vantagem	ao	senhor	Luiz	Inácio.		
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
A	investigação	sobre	o	ex-Presidente	não	constitui	juízo	de	valor	sobre	quem	ele	é	ou	sobre	o	
significado	histórico	dessa	personalidade,	mas	sim	um	juízo	de	investigação	sobre	fatos	e	atos	
determinados,	que	estão	sob	suspeita.	Dentro	de	uma	república,	mesmo	pessoas	ilustres	e	
poderosas	devem	estar	sujeitas	ao	escrutínio	judicial	quando	houver	fundada	suspeita	de	
atividade	criminosa.	
[repeating	the	footage	of	the	escalada	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	
Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Este	é	um	momento	de	sermos	republicanos;	
Não	há	ninguém	isento	de	investigação	no	pais.	
[repórter	on-site	in	Curitiba,	outside	of	the	PF	offices]	
Marcelo	Rocha:	Foram	estes	os	argumentos	apresentados	pelos	procuradores	ao	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	
para	pedir	a	condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	Lula.	O	juiz	concordou	que	não	dava	para	
marcar	uma	data,	já	que	isso	pode	causar	tumultos	como	o	que	ocorreu	em	São	Paulo	no	mês	
passado	quando	Lula	seria	ouvido	numa	investigação	conduzidas	por	promotores	paulistas.	O	juiz	
destacou	que	a	condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	não	significa	antecipação	de	
responsabilidade	criminal,	e	nem	tem	por	objetivo	cessar	os	direitos	de	Lula	ou	colocá-lo	em	
situação	vexatória.	
Sérgio	Moro	estabeleceu	como	condição	para	o	cumprimento	do	mandado	que	os	policiais	não	
utilizassem	algemas	e	em	hipótese	alguma	permitissem	a	filmagem	do	deslocamento	e	
interrogatória	do	ex-presidente.	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Os	partidos	citados,	PP	e	PMDB,	negam	(RV	shakes	her	head)	qualquer	envolvimento	em	
irregularidade.	O	Ministério	Público	Federal	também	tinha	pedido	a	condução	coercitiva	da	ex-
primeira-dama,	Marisa	Letícia,	mas	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	indeferiu	o	pedido.	O	juiz	alegou	que	no	
caso	de	Marisa	Letícia	é	possível	agendar	um	depoimento	sem	que	se	implique	um	maior	risco	à	
ordem	pública.		
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[torso-and-desk-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Uns	dos	principais	focos	dessa	fase	da	operação	Lava	Jato	são	os	pagamentos	ao	Instituto	
Lula	e	ao	LILS,	a	empresa	de	palestras	do	ex-presidente.	
RV:	As...	[interrupted	by	WB]	
[close-up	head-shot	of	WB,	angled	from	the	left	of	the	desk]	
WB:	As	investigações	mostram	que	empreiteiras	que	mais	desviaram	dinheiro	da	Petrobras	são	as	
maiores	financiadores	das	duas	instituições.	
[footage	from	older	interview	with	Lula]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		Assim	que	deixou	a	Presidência	em	2011,	Lula	criou	a	LILS,	empresa	
que	promove	principalmente	palestras	do	ex-presidente.		
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
No	mesmo	ano,	ele	também	criou	o	Instituto	Lula,	que	funciona	sem	fins	lucrativos	
[propinoduto	graphic	again,	this	time	from	another	angle,	with	the	BR	logo	prominent	(the	well-
known	gas	station,	a	sub-company	of	Petrobras)	–	again	ending	in	money	bundles	and	a	document	
swooping	in	from	the	left,	this	time	illustrating	Institute	Lula’s	web	page]	
De	acordo	com	seu	site	na	Internet,	o	instituto	tem	com	missão	principal	a	cooperação	do	Brasil	
com	a	África	e	a	América	Latina	
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
A	LILS	e	o	Instituto	Lula	estão	na	mira	da	Polícia	Federal	e	do	Ministério	Público	Federal	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors;	credit	subtitle	at	the	
bottom	of	the	picture]	
Os	investigadores	da	Lava	Jato	querem	saber	se	há	relação	entre	dinheiro	desviado	da	Petrobras	
pelas	empreiteiras	e	os	pagamentos	e	doações	feitas	a	LILS	e	ao	Instituto.	
[footage	of	tax	auditor	Leonel	at	press	conference,	torso,	and	the	Paraná	police	department’s	flag,	
the	state’s	flag,	and	other	banners	in	the	background]	
Roberto	Leonel:	Nós	seremos	aí	a	verificação	de	que	–	que	a	coincidência	há	-	que	as	cinco	
maiores	empresas	que	pagaram	palestras	para	a	LILS	Palestras	de	2011	a	2014	–	são	as	mesmas	
empresas	que	doaram	os	maiores	valores	para	o	Instituto	Lula.	
[break	in	footage,	resuming	instantly	in	same	shot]	
Esse	é	umas	das	considerações	em	relação	às	origens	dos	recursos.	
[propinoduto	graphic	again	–	again	with	the	BR	logo]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		os	procuradores	já	identificaram	que	entre	2011	e	2014,	o	Instituto	
Lula	recebeu	mais	de	20	milhões	de	reais	em	doações	-	perto	de	60%	da	receita	-	dinheiro	das	
construtoras	Camargo	Correa,	Odebrecht,	Queiroz	Galvão,	OAS	e	Andrade	Gutierrez.	
No	mesmo	período,	essas	empreiteiras	e	mais	a	UTC	fizeram	pagamentos	a	LILS	para	palestras	do	
ex-presidente	Lula,	no	total	de	quase	10	milhões	reais,	47%	do	faturamento	da	empresa.	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors	seen	from	right]	
Todas	essas	empreiteiras	que	fizessem	os	pagamentos	e	doações	são	investigados	na	Lava	Jato	e	
parte	delas	já	teve	executivos	condenados.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Caracterizavam	núcleo	duro	do	cartel	que	delapidou	património	da	Petrobras	
[break	in	footage,	resumed	instantly]	
Isto	é	um	valor	significativo.	É	claro	que	doações	pode	serem	realizados	por	diversos	motivos,	mas	
nós	precisamos	analisar	claramente	se	isso	tem	alguma	vinculação	com	as	obras	...	eeh...	
fraudadas,	e	com	a	Petrobras	e	outras	órgãos.		
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[new	propinoduto	graphic	–	zooming	in	on	a	sombre	landscape	with	a	lone	refinery]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	No	despacho	que	autorizou	a	operação	de	hoje,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	
afirmou	que		
[half-quoting	text]	
não	se	pode	concluir	pela	ilicitude	das	transferências	às	empresas	do	ex-presidente,	mas	é	forçoso	
reconhecer	que	tratam-se	de	valores	altos	para	doações	e	palestras,	o	que	no	contexto	do	
esquema	criminoso	da	Petrobras	gera	dúvidas	sobre	a	generosidade	das	empresas.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		Os	procuradores	também	querem	investigar	se	as	palestras	feitas	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
pelo	ex-presidente	Lula	e	pagas	pelas	empreiteiras	foram	realmente	realizadas	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	head-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima,	this	
time	in	the	midst	of	scores	of	reporters	holding	microphones]	
Lima:	Nós	queremos	verificar-se	circunstancias	em	que	as	ocorreram,	os	locais	em	que	as	
ocorreram,	e	se	houve	um	ato	do	governo	que	possa	ser	vinculados	a	essas	empreiteiras	que	
pagaram	essas	palestras	e	aos	governos	que	onde	essas	palestras	ocorreram	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
	Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	Outro	ponto	da	investigação	é	saber	se	houve	favorecimento	das	
empresas	ligadas	a	filhos	do	ex-presidente	através	de	pagamentos	
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
do	instituto	Lula	e	da	LILS	Palestras.	
[propinoduto	graphic	of	a	sombre	landscape	with	a	lone	refinery	again;	again,	document	swoops	
in	from	left	]	
O	Instituto	Lula	pagou	G4	Entretenimento	e	Tecnologia	Digital,	que	tem	como	sócios	Fabio	Luiz,	
filho	de	Lula,	e	Fernando	Bittar,	e	Kalil	Bittar.	Entre	2012	e	2014,	a	empresa	recebeu	mais	de	1,3	
milhão	reais.	Fernando	Bittar	é	um	dos	donos	oficiais	do	sítio	de	Atibaia.		
O	Instituto	também	pagou	a	FlexBR	tecnologia	que	tem	sede	no	mesmo	endereço	da	G4	e	tem	
como	sócios	os	filhos	de	Lula,	Marcos	Claudio	e	Sandro	Luís,	além	de	Marlene	Araújo	Lula	da	Silva,	
nora	do	ex-presidente.	A	Flex	recebeu	114.000	reais	em	2014.	
A	LILS	também	pagou	a	FlexBR	mais	de	72	mil	reais	entre	2013	e	2014	e	fez	pagamentos	ainda	a	
outro	filho	de	Lula	–	Luís	Claudio	–	mais	de	227	mil	reais	entre	2011	e	2013.		
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Como	nós	não	vemos	nenhuma	motivação	econômica	na	contratação	por	parte	do	Instituto	
Lula	de	empresas	dos	familiares	do	ex-presidente,	eeh,	nós	estamos	investigando	se	esses	valores	
correspondem	aos	serviços	prestados	ou	não.	Se	não	corresponderem,	certamente	há	um	
beneficio	aos	familiares	
[break	in	footage,	instantly	continuing]	
Como	Instituto	Lula	recebe	das	cinco	maiores	empreiteiras,	nós	estamos	verificando	se	isso	não	é	
apenas	uma	triangulação	de	um	beneficio	final	da	família	do	senhor	Luiz	Inácio	
[repórter	on-site,	night-time]	
Malu	Mazza:	A	Receita	apontou	outra	possível	irregularidade:	Por	não	ter	fins	lucrativos	e	ser	
isentos	de	impostos,	os	recursos	que	entram	no	Instituto	Lula	só	podem	ser	usados	dentro	da	
função	principal	da	entidade.	Já	a	LILS	Palestras	é	uma	empresa	comum	com	fins	lucrativos,	mas	
na	prática	a	Receita	Federal	e	os	investigadores	afirmaram	que	o	Instituto	e	a	LILS	têm	os	mesmos	
funcionários.	A	coincidência,	segundo	eles,	se	repete	com	doadores	e	clientes.	
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[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	Para	os	investigadores,	isso	leva	a	uma	mistura	na	movimentação	
financeira	do	Instituto	e	da	LILS.	Essa	confusão	precisa	ser	investigada.	
[Torso	shot	of	tax	authority	auditor]	
Roberto	Leonel:	A	empresa	LILS	não	possui	nenhum	empregado;	exceção	é	que,	há	alguns	anos,	
tinha	um	só	empregado	que	era	um	dos	filhos,	eeh,	e	toda,	e	a	sede	dela	na	sss...	na	casa,	na	
residência	do	ex-presidente.	Tá.	Então	toda	atividade	de	contatos,	eeh,	eeh,	eeh,	com	empresas	
que	vão	contratar	para	fazer	as	palestras,	as	questões	financeiras,	as	questões	de	análise	de	
documentos,	et	cetera,	tudo	é	feito	no	instituto,	que	não	tem	esse	objetivo.		
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	24o	fase	da	Lava	Jato	teve	operação	de	busca	e	apreensão	no	sítio	de	Atibaia	que	a	família	
do	ex-presidente	Lula	costuma	a	frequentar	no	interior	de	São	Paulo,	
[shot	of	studio	from	the	right	of	RV	zooming	in]	
e	surgiram	novas	informações	sobre	esse	imóvel.		
[footage	from	helicopter	of	Atibaia	ranch]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Os	investigadores	da	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	não	têm	dúvidas:	O	
ex-presidente	Lula	é	o	verdadeiro	dono	do	sítio	em	Atibaia.	
[graphics	of	table	with	documents]			
Eles	chegaram	a	essa	conclusão	depois	de	constatar	que	parte	considerável	dos	itens	pessoais	do	
ex-presidente	foi	transportada	de	Brasília	para	o	sítio	quando	Lula	deixou	o	Planalto	no	fim	de	
2010.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	As	despesas	de	armazenamento	nós	temos	comprovação	que	foram	pagos	pela	empresa	
OAS.		
[graphics	of	table	with	documents,	voice-over	quoting	document]			
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Segundo	investigação,	os	pertencias	do	ex-presidente	foram	
transportados	por	duas	empresas:	Mudanças	5	Estrelas	Limitada	e	Três	Poderes	Mudanças	e	
Transporte	Limitada,	a	Granero	–	as	duas	contratadas	pela	União.	Coube	a	Granero	a	realização	do	
transporte	das	roupas	que	foram	para	apartamento	de	São	Bernardo	de	Campo	e	parte	da	adega	
que	foi	entrega	no	sítio	de	Atibaia.	Segundo	documento,	o	acervo	audiovisual	do	ex-presidente	se	
encontra	atualmente	armazenado	na	Granero.		
[still	photos	of	archive	and	items	on	shelves]	
É	o	que	mostram	essas	fotos	feitas	pela	Polícia	Federal	no	campão	da	transportadora.	Duas	delas	
mostra	uma	caixa	e	um	pacote	em	que	está	inscrito:	caixa	madeira	sítio.	A	5	Estrelas	também	
transportou	parte	dos	bens	para	o	sítio	de	Atibaia	e	para	o	depósito	de	Granero	com	custos	pagos	
pela	OAS,	segundo	a	Receita	Federal.	Em	dezembro	de	2010,	o	presidente	do	Instituto	Lula,	Paulo	
Okamotto,	autorizou	a	Granero	a	prestar	esses	serviços.	Já	de	acordo	com	o	documento,	três	dias	
depois,	a	construtora	OAS	assinou	um	contrato	de	armazenagem	com	a	Granero	no	valor	de	
21.536	reais	e	84	centavos	-	em	beneficio	do	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva.	
Segundo	a	investigação,	a	OAS	indicou	que	o	contrato	tinha	pro	objetivo	armazenagem	de	
materiais	de	escritório	e	mobiliário	corporativa	de	propriedade	da	OAS.	O	serviço	foi	prestado	
entre	janeiro	de	2011	e	janeiro	deste	ano,	no	valor	total	de	quase	um	milhão	e	300	mil	reais.		
O	relatório	conclui	que	há	evidências	de	que	o	ex-presidente	Lula	recebeu	vantagens	indevidas	da	
OAS	nesse	valor	com	adoção	de	práticas	de	lavagem	de	dinheiro,	com	ocultação	e	dissimulação	de	
origem,	natureza	e	propriedade	de	bens	e	recursos.		
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[footage	of	police	car	in	Atibaia	woods,	credit	text	at	the	bottom	of	the	picture]	
A	polícia	federal	esteve	hoje	no	sítio	para	cumprir	mandado	de	busca	e	apreensão.	
[helicopter	footage	of	the	ranch	área]	
Em	2010	o	local	passou	por	uma	grande	reforma	e	a	suspeita	é	de	que	as	obras		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	two	logos	and	the	Picture	of	
Bumlai]	
têm	sido	bancadas	pelas	empreiteiras	OAS	e	Odebrecht,	investigadas	pela	Lava	Jato,	e	também	
pela	pecuarista	José	Carlos	Bumlai,	preso	em	Curitiba	e	réu	no	esquema	de	corrupção	da	
Petrobras.		
[helicopter	footage	of	the	ranch	área]	
Lula	nega	ser	o	verdadeiro	proprietário	e	diz	que	apenas	frequentava	o	local	em	dias	de	descanso.		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	pictures	of	documents,	Jonas	
Suassuna,	Fabio	Lula	da	Silva,	and	a	emblem	of	a	man	substituting	for	a	Picture	of	Bittar]	
A	propriedade	está	registrada	nos	nomes	do	Fernando	Bittar	e	Jonas	Suassuna,	sócios	de	um	dos	
filhos	do	ex-presidente.	
[new	overlays,	this	time	of	three	checks,	showing	numbers	R$	1	milhão,	R$	400	mil	and	R$100	mil]	
O	Jornal	Nacional	teve	acesso	a	copias	dos	cheques	usados	na	compra	do	sítio	que	foram	entregas	
pela	defesa	do	Lula	ao	Ministério	Público.	
Todos	os	cheques	são	assinados	por	Jonas	Suassuna	no	total	de	1	milhão	e	meio	de	reais.	
[graphics	of	table	with	documents]			
Numa	petição	em	que	pedia	ao	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	a	suspensão	das	investigações	sobre	o	
sítio,	a	defesa	do	ex-presidente	afirmou	que	foi	Jacó	Bittar,	pai	de	Fernando	Bittar	e	amigo	de	Lula,	
que	procurou	o	sítio	para	que	as	famílias	pudessem	conviver.	
[Reporter,	on-site	at	the	ranch	gates]		
Bruno	Tavares:	Os	procuradores	da	Lava	Jato	receberam	mais	uma	prova	de	que	pessoas	muito	
próximas	do	ex-presidente	cuidaram	pessoalmente	da	reforma	aqui	no	sítio.	O	empreiteiro	é	o	
que	forneceu	a	mão-de-obra,	e	os	equipamentos	por	a	obra	diz	que	quem	pagou	a	obra	foi	um	ex-
assessor	especial	de	Lula.	
[new	graphics	of	table	with	documents,	blue	and	yellow	hues]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Na	defesa	que	apresentou	ontem	na	Lava	Jato,	o	empreiteiro	Carlos	
Rodrigues	do	Prato	disse	que	o	pagamento	era	feito	semanalmente	e	em	espécie,	por	Rogério	
Aurélio	Pimentel,	totalizando	167.500	reais.		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	photo	of	Rogerio	and	Lula]	
Rogerio	Aurélio	Pimentel	foi	assessor	especial	de	Lula.	
[photo	substituted	by	mug-shot	style	photo	of	Rogerio]	
Ele	deixou	o	governo	quando	Dilma	assumiu	a	Presidência.	
O	nome	do	Aurélio	já	tinha	aparecido	no	escândalo	dos	Aloprados	em	2006.	
[footage	of	Aurélio	in	car	prior	to	his	interrogation	the	same	morning	in	São	Paulo]	
Aurélio	foi	levado	para	prestar	depoimento	hoje	cedo	na	sede	da	Polícia	Federal	em	São	Paulo.		
[footage	of	interview	on	a	road,	repórter	showing	an	iPad	to	interviewee,	interviewee	looking	
down	and	camera	angle	over	her	shoulder	and	cheek]	
Mostramos	a	foto	dele	para	Patrícia	Nunes	que	era	dona	de	um	depósito	em	Atibaia	e	vende	
materiais	de	construção	para	obra	no	sítio.	
Nunes,	almost	off-screen:	Já	passou	cinco	anos,	né...	a	descrição	dele	seria	essa:	vaibam,	branca,	
cabelo	branco,	meio	gordinho,	que	algo	que	me	lembrava	dele.	
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[break	in	footage]	
É	muito	parecido	com	o	que	me	lembro...	mas	não	consigo	de	certeza,	viu?	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Em	depoimento	a	Lava	Jato,	o	engenheiro	da	Odebrecht,	Frederico	
Barbosa,	disse	que	em	dezembro	de	2010,	o	diretor	da	construtora	Emyr	Costa	Junior,	solicitou	
que	fosse	analisado	uma	obra	de	um	sitio	em	Atibaia.	
Ele	foi,	na	ocasião,	disse	que	foi	recebido	por	uma	pessoa	de	nome	Aurélio.	O	engenheiro	
informou	ainda	que	Aurélio	era	responsável	por	lhe	passar	decisões	sobre	o	acabamento	da	obra;	
e	que	os	trabalhadores	foram	pagos	pela	Odebrecht,	mas	não	era	uma	obra	de	Odebrecht.	
[helicopter	footage	of	police	agents	and	cars	on	parking	lot]	
Depois	que	ficarem	mais	de	sete	horas	no	sítio,	policiais	federais	foram	até	uma	propriedade	perto	
da	ali.	
[footage	of	cellular	antena	site,	zoom	out	and	move	towards	repórter	on-site]	
Bruno	Tavares:	essa	antena	de	telefonia	celular	também	é	alvo	dos	investigadores	da	operação	
Lava	Jato	
Eles	querem	entender	porque	que	essa	antena	foi	colocada	ao	menos	de	100	metros	do	sítio	
Santa	Barbara.	
[footage	of	the	top	of	the	antenna]	
Ela	foi	instalada	pela	operadora	Oi.	
[interview,	police	delegate	sitting	in	car	and	pointing	up]	
Eduardo	Mauat:	O	que	nos	achamos	interessante	é	o	seguinte:	geralmente	antena	se	põem	na	
cima	do	morro...	na,	se	tá	em	baixo.	Então	se	as	pessoas	saem	dessa	racha	não	[...]	antena	
Female	interviewer,	off-screen:	Seria	para	quem	mora	que	bem	por	no	s..	sofrido	sinal		
Eduardo	Mauat:	Exatamente.	
[more	footage	of	the	antenna,	credit	text	at	the	bottom]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Os	investigadores	apuram	se	a	instalação	da	antena	teria	sido	mais	
um	beneficio	concedido	irregularmente	pro	uma	empresa	ao	ex-presidente.	
[studio,	torso-and-desk	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	O	Instituto	Lula	declarou	que	é	absolutamente	falsa	a	afirmação	de	que	a	mudança	do	ex-
presidente	de	Brasília	pra	São	Paulo	tem	há	sido	pago	por	uma	empresa.	
WB:	O	Instituto	afirmou	que	a	mudança,	como	ocorre	com	todos	os	ex-presidentes,	foi	
providenciada	pela	Presidência	da	República.	Segundo	instituto,	parte	dos	objetos	foi	levada	para	
apartamento	em	São	Bernardo,	e	parte	para	o	sítio	Santa	Barbara,	com	o	conhecimento	dos	
proprietários.		
RV:	O	instituto	afirmou	ainda	que	no	fim	do	governo	Lula,	a	Presidência	da	República	providenciou	
triagem	e	entrega	do	acervo	documental	privado	do	ex-presidente	da	mesma	forma	como	
procedeu	com	os	anteced	–	com	os	antecessores.	
WB:	A	Granero	declarou	que	fez	parte	da	mudança	do	ex-presidente	Lula	de	Brasília	para	São	
Paul,o	e	que	o	acervo	audiovisual	continua	armazenado,	e	que	o	acervo	museológico	foi	retirado	
por	outra	transportadora	contratado	por	Paulo	Okamotta.	
RV:	A	defesa	de	Fernando	Bittar	e	Jonas	Suassuna	afirmou	que	o	sítio	em	Atibaia	pertence	a	eles.	
A	defesa	de	Suassuna	diz	ainda	que	todas	as	despesas	de	sítio	foram	pagas	por	ele.	
	
[end	of	transcript	at	28.55]	
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Jornal	Nacional,	broadcast	on	TV	Globo,	20:30	on	March	16,	2016	–	see	section	4.4.3	
Retrieved	from	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z_k		
	
[WB	=	William	Bonner;	RV	=	Renata	Vasconcellos]	
	
[music,	zoom	in	on	anchors	in	Globo	studio]	
WB:	Boa	noite	
RV:	Boa	noite	
WB:	A	crise	do	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	atinge	o	ponto	mais	alto.	
[graphic	of	document	on	desk]	
RV	VO:	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	é	nomeado	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Ele	sai	do	alcance	de		
[footage	of	Sergio	Moro	speaking	publicly]	
Sérgio	Moro,	o	juiz	federal	do	Paraná	responsável	pela	Lava	Jato,	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	passa	a	ter	o	chamado	foro	privilegiado	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	O	juiz	Moro	suspende	o	sigilo	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	a	Justiça	Federal	torna	publicos	os	grampos	telefónicos	do	ex-presidente,	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	um	deles	de	hoje	a	tarde.	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Lula	recebeu	ligação	da	presidente	Dilma	
[graphic	of	a	futuristic	sound-scanner	instrument,	dividing	the	screen	in	two,	with	a	picture	of	
Dilma	and	a	picture	of	Lula	–	the	sound	of	their	recorded	dialogue	is	accompanied	by	text	in	the	
middle	of	each	instrument	section]	
-	Dilma:	Alô	
-	Lula:	Alô	
-	Dilma:	Lula,	deixa	eu	te	falar	uma	coisa.	
-	Lula:	Fala,	querida.	Ahn	
-	Dilma:	Seguinte,	eu	tô	mandando	o	'Bessias'	junto	com	o	papel	pra	gente	ter	ele,	e	só	usa	
em	caso	de	necessidade,	que	é	o	termo	de	posse,	tá?!	
-	Lula:	Uhum.	Tá	bom,	tá	bom.	
-	Dilma:	Só	isso,	você	espera	aí	que	ele	tá	indo	aí.	
-	Lula:	Tá	bom,	eu	tô	aqui,	fico	aguardando.	
-	Dilma:	Tá?!	
-	Lula:	Tá	bom.	
-	Dilma:	Tchau.	
-	Lula:	Tchau,	querida.	
[1:00		-	torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Os	grampos	têm	indícios	fortes	de	que	o	objetivo	da	ida	de	Lula	para	ministério	foi	mesmo	
tirá-lo	do	alcance	do	juiz	Moro,	
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[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	indicam	que	o	ex-presidente	tentou	influenciar	várias	autoridades	para	se	proteger.	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Uma	edição	extra	do	Diário	Oficial	publica	a	nomeação	do	agora	ministro	Lula.	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Quarta-feira,	17	de	março:		
[full	studio	shot	from	above]	
WB:	O	Jornal	Nacional	está	começando		
[graphic	with	logotype;	music]	
[full	studio	shot,	zooming	in	slowly	on	WB	until	torso-and-desk	shot]	
WB:	Nesta	quarta-feira	crise	que	envolve	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	atingiu	ponto	mais	alto	desde	o	
início.	
Antes	que	o	Diario	Oficial	efetivasse		
[WB	turns	halfway	towards	RV	and	RV	then	turns	towards	WB,	before	WB	breaks	eye-contact	
again	and	looks	towards	camera;	RV	remains	turned	towards	WB]	
a	nomeação	de	Lula	como	ministro,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	retirou	o	sigilo	de	toda	a	investigação	sobre	
o	ex-presidente,	e	com	isso	tornaram-se	públicas	no	fim	da	tarde	conversas	telefônicas	de	Lula.	
Os	integrantes	da	Lava	Jato	afirmam	que	há	indícios	de	uma	ação	para		
[WB	stresses	each	syllable]	
a-tra-pal-har	as	investigações.	
Ainda	nesta	edição	Jornal	Nacional	vai	mostrar	o	conteúdo	desses	grampos	e	as	reações	que	eles	
provocaram.	
[2:00	-	WB	looks	to	the	left,	câmera	shifts	to	torso-shot]	
WB:	A	nomeação	de	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	como	novo	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil,	seis	dias	
depois	de	promotores	estaduais	de	São	Paulo	terem	pedido	a	prisão	dele,	foi	anunciada	no	início	
da	tarde.	Mas	começou	a	se	concretizar	na	noite	de	terça-feira	numa	reunião	no	Palácio	da	
Alvorada.	
[footage	of	the	Alvorada	in	the	distance	at	night-time]	
Reporter	VO	Delis	Ortiz:	Foi	uma	decisão	demorada	mais	de	quatro	horas	na	Alvorada.		
[grainy	zoomed-in	footage	of	a	staircase	in	the	palace,	visible	from	the	outside,	of	Dilma	and	Lula	
walking	down]		
Os	principais	ministros	do	Planalto,	Dilma,	e	o	ex-presidente	Lula	saíram	tarde	da	noite,	
despistando	a	imprensa,	ainda	sem	nenhuma	certeza	-	em	jogo,	segundo	governistas	
[footage	of	the	palace	gates,	Alvorada	visible	behind	the	bars	of	the	gate,	gates	slowly	opening	
and	letting	a	car	out]	
os	questionamentos	do	Lula	sobre	os	poderes	que	passariam	ter	como	alcance	de	condução	da	
economia,		
[close-up	footage	of	the	car	front	window,	Lula	visible	in	the	back]	
e	se	a	presença	dele	no	governo	recuperaria	de	fato	a	duvidosa	fidelidade	de	base	aliado	no	
Congresso,		
[car	on	the	road	outside	of	the	Palace]	
a	do	PMDB	principalmente.	
[footage	of	the	entrance	of	the	Royal	Tulip	hotel,	neighbour	of	the	Alvorada	palace,	and	close-ups	
of	supposedly	Carvalho	talking	to	the	porter]	
		 221	
As	tratativas	seguiram	madrugada	dentro	os	velhos	conselheiros	do	ex-presidente,	como	ex-
ministro	Gilberto	Carvalho,	madrugaram	no	hotel	onde	ele	estava	hospedado.		
[3:00		-	footage	of	the	Alvorada	in	daylight,	and	cars	on	the	road	leading	inside	the	palace	gates]	
Dilma	nem	pedalou,	como	de	costume,	retomou	a	conversa	com	Lula	no	café	da	manhã	com	
ministros.	
Ainda	precisaram	de	quase	três	horas	de	conversa	para	chegar	finalmente	a	um	termo.	
[graphic	of	a	workstation	with	a	computer	screen,	zooming	in,	on	a	twitter-like	feed	in	red,	
indicating	PT	leaders’	feeds,	quoting	“Lula	novo	ministro	da	pasta!”]	
Mal	acabou	a	reunião,	e	líderes	do	PT	no	Congresso	já	anunciavam	a	decisão	pela	internet.		
[footage	of	Lula	going	into	a	car	in	front	of	Alvorada]	
Lula	voltou	pra	São	Paulo;		
[footage	of	Wagner	at	press	conference,	torso-shot]	
Jacques	Wagner	viajou	pra	Bahia;	
[footage	of	the	entrance	ramp	to	the	Planalto	palace,	shot	towards	the	Congress]	
Houve	um	entra-e-sai	de	petistas	e	ministros	no	Planalto.	
No	inicio	da	tarde	veio	o	anúncio	discreto:	
[graphic	of	a	desktop	with	document	on	top]	
Uma	nota	de	treze	linhas	oficializou	Lula	para	Ministro-Chefe	de	Casa	Civil	
Jacques	Wagner,	Chefe	de	Gabinete	de	Dilma,		
e	Mauro	Lopes	de	PMDB	para	Secretaria	de	Avião	Civil	
Reporter	Delis	Ortiz,	on-site:	O	governo	tenta	convencer	que	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	tem	
caráter	estrutural	de	reforço	para	alterar	os	rumos	de	economia	e	de	ânimo	para	relação	com	o	
Congresso.	Argumentos	à	parte,	fato	é	que	Lula	no	ministério	implica	o	direito	ao	foro	privilegiado,	
ou	seja,		
[4:00]	
ele	escapa	das	mãos	do	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	em	Curitiba,	porque	a	investigação	contra	ele	passará	
para	o	Procurador-Geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	e	o	juiz	do	caso	será	o	ministro	Teori	
Zavascki	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.		
[footage	of	delegate	Igor	Romario	de	Paula]	
Igor	Romario	de	Paula:	Os	autos	são,	são,	encerrados	no	estado	em	que	se	encontram,	e	
entregados	ao	juízo	da	13O	Vara,	que	automaticamente	encaminha	isso	tudo	pro	Supremo	para	
apreciar.	
[footage	of	Renan	Calheiros,	Rose	de	Freitas	and	other	PMDB	bosses,	together	with	Lula,	exiting	
the	house	of	Renan]	
Reporter	VO	Deliz	Ortiz:	Lula	seguirá	trabalhando	na	sedução	dos	caciques	do	PMDB.	Já	recebeu	
do	Presidente	do	Senado,	Renan	Calheiros,	o	aceno	de	que	pode	irem	frente.	Eles	ainda	terão	um	
encontro.	
O	vice,	Michel	Temer,	também	é	alvo	da	investida	de	Lula	nessa	articulação.		
[studio,	RV	in	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	O	presidente	Lula	já	estava	em	São	Paulo	quando,	no	fim	do	dia,	o	Palácio	do	Planalto	
publicou	uma	edição	extra	do	Diário	Oficial.	
[footage	of	Diario	Oficial	document,	parts	highlighted	in	the	document	swoops	closer	to	the	
spectator]	
RV	VO:	O	documento	é	o	que	garante	a	posse	do	ex-presidente	no	cargo	de	ministro.	A	edição	
extra,	no	mesmo	dia	do	anúncio	da	nomeação,	não	é	usual.		
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[5:00]	
Normalmente,	a	presidente	Dilma	assina	o	termo	de	posse	na	cerimônia	de	posse,	e	só	depois	o	
documento	é	publicado	no	Diário	Oficial.	
[studio,	WB	in	desk-and-torso	shot]]	
WB:	A	entrada	de	Lula	no	governo	repercutiu	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	e	no	Congresso.	
[footage	of	impromptu	press	meeting	with	Afonso	Florence	in	Congress	antehall]	
Reporter,	VO,	Zileida	Silva:	No	Congresso	foi	o	líder	do	PT	na	Câmara	que	deu	a	noticia.	Lula	pediu	
para	que	antes	do	anúncio	formal,	todos	lideres	dos	partidos	que	apoiam	o	presidente	fossem	
informados	da	nomeação.		
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Lula	avisou	que	quer	se	reunir	com	os	lideres	na	semana	que	vem,	
após	a	posse.	Quem	conversou	com	o	ex-presidente	diz	que	deixou	claro	que	quer	mudar	a	
relação	com	a	base	aqui	no	Congresso,	e	para	alguns	parlamentares,	a	presidente	Dilma	não	tinha	
a	mesma	outra	saída	-	que	o	governo	dela	precisa	ser	reinventado.	
[interview	in	Camara	with	deputado	José	Guimares	(PT)	
Guimares:	Vai	ser	um	braço	forte,	junto	a	presidenta	Dilma,	para	agilizar	e	tomar	as	medidas	que	
foram	necessárias	para	retomar	do	crescimento	e,	principalmente,	do	emprego.		
[footage	of	senator	Humberto	Costa	in	corridor	at	the	Congress]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Governistas	negaram	que	o	ex-presidente	tem	aceitado		
[6:00,	close-up	of	Costa]	ser	ministro	para	ter	foro	privilegiado	
Humberto	Costa:	Vindo	para	o	ministério	ele	estará	sujeito	a	responder	qualquer	inquérito	e	
investigação	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[cut	in	footage]	
É	áte	um	desrespeito	ao	Supremo	esse	tipo	de	argumentação.		
[footage	of	impromptu	press	meeting	with	Pauderny	Avelino	of	DEM	in	Camara	antehall]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Mas	a	oposição	vai	insistir,	e	entrou	com	um	serie	de	ações	
populares	na	Justiça	Federal	para	tentar	impedir	a	posse	do	ex-presidente.	
Avelino:		A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	está	se	utilizando	de	um	ato	lícito	para	promover	um	ato	
ilícito	que	é	nomear	uma	pessoa	que	está	denunciado	na	justiça,	e	uma	pessoa	que	pode	se	
transformar	em	réu	de	momento	para	outro	para	um	cargo	apenas	
[cut]	
para	blindar-lo	junto	a	Justiça	Federal	
[footage	of	Aécio	and	?	in	a	crowded	room]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	O	senador	Aécio	Neves,	presidente	do	PSDB,	diz	que	na	prática	
está	abdicando	do	seu	mandato,	e	que	é	absolutamente	condenável	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	
Lula	para	Casa	Civil.	
[7:00,	head-shot	of	Neves	in	the	midst	of	interview]	
Neves:	A	razão	da	posse	do	presidente	Lula	no	ministério	tem	um	sentido	que	supera	todos	os	
outros:	
[cut	in	footage]	
É	impedir	o	bom	andamento	das	investigações,	seja	no	Operação	Lava	Jato,	daquelas	conduzidas	
pelo	Ministério	Público,	eh,	de	São	Paulo.		
[footage	of	Camara	floor,	few	persons	in	the	room]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	No	início	da	noite,	o	PRB,	que	tem	21	deputados,	um	senador,	e	o	
Ministro	do	Esporte,	George	Hilton,	anunciou	que	vai	deixar	a	base	aliada.		
[footage	of	Camara	central	panel]	
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[footage	outside	of	STF]	
A	nomeação	de	Lula	também	repercutiu	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal:	
[footage	of	STF	session,	Supreme	Justice	Gilmar	Mendes	at	his	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Mendes:	A	crise	só	piorou.	Só	se	agravou,	a	ponto	de	agora	a	presidente	busca	inclusive	um	tutor	
para,	--	colocar,	no,	no,	no	seu	lugar	de	presidente,	e	ela	assumiu	um	outro	papel.	
[cut	in	footage]	
...e	um	tutor	que	vem	com	problemas	criminais	muito	sérios,	mudando	inclusive	a	competência	
do,	eh,	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	–	tema	que	nos	vamos	ter	aqui	discutir	-	mudando	inclusive	a	
competência	da	justiça	federal.		
[8:00,	footage	of	interview	with	Supreme	Justice	Marco	Aurélio	Mello]	
MAM:	Eu	não	vejo	como	alguém	aceitaria	um	cargo	depois	ter	sido	presidente	da	Republica	
apenas	para	buscar	a	prerrogativa	se	é	que	a	prerrogativa	de	ser	julgado	pelo	Supremo	
[cut	in	footage]	
Eu	vejo	essa	saída	do	presidente	como	uma	tentativa	de	sairmos	do	impasse	nacional.		
[studio,	both	anchors	at	the	desk,	slowly	zooming	in	and	panning	right,	RV	gets	up	from	the	chair	
and	walks	towards	screen	on	the	right]	
RV:	Vamos	agora	ao	vivo	à	Brasília	porque	o	repórter	Fernando	Rego	Barros	tem	informações	
deste	momento	–	olá	Fernando,	boa	noite,	manifestantes	protestam	agora	em	frente	ao	Palácio	
do	Planalto?	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego:	Boa	noite	Renata,	boa	noite	a	todos.	Os	manifestantes	
começaram	a	chegar	aqui	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto	por	volta	das	cinco	horas	da	tarde,	bem	antes	até	
da	divulgação	da	gravação	entre	a	presidente	Dilma	e		
[helicopter	footage	of	protests	in	front	of	Planalto]	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego	VO:	o	ex-presidente	Lula,	que	foi	divulgada	um	pouco	depois.	
Esses	manifestantes	vieram	aqui	para	protestar	contra	nomeação	pela	presidente	Dilma	do	ex-
presidente	Lula	como	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil.	A	gente	vê	essas	imagens	aéreas	aí	[explosions	
of	fireworks]	nesse	momento	aqui	em	frente	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	
[9:00]	
Segundo	Polícia	Militar,	cerca	de	duas	mil	e	500	pessoas	–	esse	numero	até	foi	atualizado	agora	há	
pouco	-	para	cinco	mil	pessoas	postadas	aqui	em	frente	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	
A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	saiu	daqui	do	Planalto	por	volta	da	6	e	35	da	noite	e	foi	para	Palácio	
da	Alvorada,	mas	as	manifestantes	continuam	aqui.	Eles	não	aceitam	a	nomeação	do	ex-
presidente	Lula	como	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil.	Os	protestos	são	pacíficos	e	em	nenhum	
momento	houve	violência,	nem	por	parte	da	Polícia	Militar,	nem	por	parte	dos	manifestantes.	Os	
manifestantes	só	não	podem...	a,	a,	a	Guarda	Presidencial	está	postada	logo	depois	da	mureta	de	
proteção	para	evitar	qualquer	invasão	–	mas	não	houve	essa	invasão.		
Um	grupo	de	deputados	da	oposição	chegou	aqui	logo	depois	do	início	do	protesto,	mas	demorou	
pouco	foi,	m,	foi	logo	embora;	
E	houve	alguns	deputados,	bem	que	chegaram,	foram	expulsos	pelos	manifestantes		
[10:00]	
que	não	queriam	a	presença	de,	de	alguns	deputados	protestando	aqui	junto	com	eles.	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego:	A	gente	tá	acompanhando	aqui	esse	movimentação	ainda	em	
frente	aqui	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	Bonner,	Renata...	
[Studio,	RV	still	standing	in	front	of	screen]	
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RV:	Fernando	Rego	Barros	mostrando	cerca	de	5000	pessoas	protestando	nesse	momento	em	
frente	do	Palácio	do	Planalto;	e	de	Brasília,	a	gente	vai	agora	a	São	Paulo;		
[RV	turns	halfway	looking	out	to	the	right,	standing	in	profile;	while	the	screen	behind	her	changes	
to	helicopter	footage	of	Avenida	Paulista	and	people	walking	on	the	street]	
Repórter	Tiago	Elz,	também	tem	informações	para	gente	–	Thiago	que	é	que	Você	ver	nesse	
momento?			
[helicopter	footage	continued	in	full-screen;	7	seconds	of	traffic	noise]	
Reporter	VO,	Tiago	Elz:	Há	um	grande	protesto	já	na	Avenida	Paulista	nesse	momento.	Vale	
lembrar	que	começou	antes	do	anúncio	da	divulgação	do	grampo	da	ligação	entre	o	ex-presidente	
Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma.	Varias	pessoas	já	se	dirigiram	aqui	para	Avenida	Paulista	para	protestar	
contra	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente;	essa	manifestação	começou	a	ganhar	mais	corpo	–		
[11:00]	
agora	noite	depois	da	divulgação	desse	áudio	-	depois	da	divulgação	do	grampo.	Às	8	horas,	por	
volta	das	8	horas	da	noite	a	Avenida	Paulista	foi	fechada,	e	ela	segue	fechada	e	com	manifestantes	
ocupando	os	dois	lados	da	Avenida	aí	em	frente	a	FIESP,	que	Você	vê	aí	com	essa	bandeira	com	a	
faixa	preta.	
Renata,	Bonner;	-	
[Studio,	RV	still	standing	in	front	of	screen]	
RV:	Tiago	Elz,	mostrando	ao	vivo	da	Avenida	Paulista,	um	protesto	em	frente	da	Federação	das	
indústrias	de	São	Paulo,		
[RV	turns	and	câmera	changes,	torso	shot	with	the	News	room	in	the	background]	
e	ainda	nesta	edição:	A	crise	politica	no	auge	em	Brasília.	
[desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB,	slow	zoom]	
WB:	A	justiça	torna	publica	um	diálogo	entre	Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	
[RV	standing,	torso-shot]	
RV:	A	polícia	federal	afirma	ver	indícios	de	ações	para	atrapalhar	as	investigações	da	Lava	Jato	
[desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB,	slow	zoom]	
WB:	E	a	seguir,	você	vai	o	que	diz	a	presidente	Dilma	sobre	nomeação	de	Lula	para	o	cargo	de	
ministro.	
[Graphics	of	G1	/	JN	url,	JN	jingle	music]		
WB:	A	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	Lula	para	ministério	foi	feito	de	uma	maneira	muita	discreta,	
numa	nota	de	13	linhas	–	e	depois	disso	veio	silencio.		
[12:00]	
Silencio	isso	que	só	foi	quebrado	no	meio	da	tarde.	
A	presidente	Dilma	deu	uma	entrevista	no	Palácio	Planalto,	e	logo	no	início,	a	presidente	foi	
questionada	se,	com	essa	nomeação,	Lula	teria	a	virar	uma	espécie	de	super-ministro	e	ela	iria	
perder	poder.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Eu	vou	ter	a	riso	porque,	tem	quatro	anos	de	governo	mais	um	cinco;	estou	entrando	no	
sexto.	Tem	seis	anos	que	Vocês	tentam	[porque]	tentam	me	separar	de	Lula.	A	minha	relação	com	
Lula	não	é	uma	relação	de	poderes	ou	super-poderes	–	a	minha	relação	com	Lula	e	uma	sórdida	
relação	de	quem	constrói	um	projeto	junto.	Então,	o	presidente	Lula,	no	meu	governo,	terá	os	
poderes	necessários	para	nós	ajudar	–	para	ajudar	o	Brasil,	sobretudo	Brasil.	Tudo	que	ele	pode	
fazer	pra	ajudar	o	Brasil	será	feito.	
[13:00]	
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Punto!	
[studio,	RV	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	foi	questionada	sobre	as	negociações	para	que	Lula	aceitar	seu	
cargo.	Junto	com	os	rumores	de	que	ele	seria	nomeado,	surgiram	informações	de	que	Lula	estaria	
fazendo	exigências	para	aceitar	o	cargo.	A	presidente	negou.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Eu	digo	para	Vocês	que	isso	não	é	do	perfil	do	presidente	Lula.	Presidente	Lula	não	age	
dessa	forma.	
[cut	in	footage]	
Porque	o	presidente	Lula	tinha	dúvidas	se	ele	deveria	ou	não	assumir	o	cargo.	Dúvidas	essas	-	mais	
ligadas	a	situação,	eh,	do,	do	confronto	que	a	oposição	poderia	fazer	sobre	as	suas	razões	do	que	
sobre	esse	tipo	de	questão.		
[cut	in	footage]	
E	acho	que	essas,	essas	dúvidas,	foram	integralmente,	eh,	superadas,	e	nós,	já	ontem,	já	ontem!	-	
tínhamos	a	decisão.	Mas	nós	aprofundamos	hoje	porque	[indecipherable]	tentamos	de	vários	
assuntos...	
[14:00;	repórter	interrupts]	
Reporter	off-screen:	Presidente...	
Dilma:	Mais	práticos.	
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Quando	o	repórter	perguntou	se	o	fato	de	Lula	está	sendo	investigado	na	Operação	Lava	Jato	
causaria	algum	constrangimento,	a	presidente	voltou	a	defendê-lo	e	disse	que	estranha	a	forma	
como	as	investigações	sobre	o	Lula	têm	sido	conduzidas.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	os	critérios	de	investigação	são	extremamente	estranhos	em	relação	ao	presidente	Lula.	
Muito	estranhos.	Por	quê?	Porque	o	presidente	Lula	nega	que	tem	o	tríplex,	nega	que	tem	o	sítio,	
e	deu	explicações	suficientes;	não	se	recusa	dar	explicações	–	sempre	foi	chamado,	foi,	foi...	
informou,	e	acho	estranho	–	já,	já	manifestei	isso	–	que	ele	tinha	lev-		se	que	-		seja	levado	
coercitivamente	ou	que	seja	pedida	preventiva	dele,	sem	base	num	fato	que	caracteriza	isso.	Não	
só	eu,	mas,	um	opção	de	juristas	falaram	isso.		
[15:00	-	cut	in	footage]	
Acho	que	não	está	certo	isso	–	mostra	minha	confiança	na	trajetória	dele,	na	biografia	dele,	no	
compromisso	dele	–	que	eu	conheço	ele	–	um	compromisso	com	todas	as	praticas	corretas	e	
idôneas.		
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Uma	das	criticas	da	oposição	sobre	a	nomeação	de	Lula	é	que	como	ministro,	ele	ganha	foro	
privilegiado,	ou	seja,	deixe	de	ser	investigado	em	Curitiba	pelo	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	e	passa	a	ser	
investigado	em	Brasília	pelo	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	A	presidente	Dilma	rebateu	esse	
argumento.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Prerrogativa	de	foro	não	é	impedir	investigação.	É	fazê-la	em	determinada	instância	e	não	
em	outra.	E,	a,	o	tropo	de	que	eu	vou	achar	de	investigação	do,	do,	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	é	melhor	do	
que	a,	a	investigação	do	Supremo,	essa	é	uma-	,	é	uma	inversão	da	hierarquia,	me	desculpa,	eu	
não	posso	acrescentar	mais	nada	uma	resposta	dessas	
[16:00	–	cut	in	footage]	
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Então,	eu	não	entendo	porque,	quando	chega	na	ca-,	no,	no	nesse	caso,	criam	essa	hipótese;	a	
minha	desculpa,	mas	eu	acho	que	se	essa	hipótese	-	ele	é	apenas	uma,	uma	sombrinha;	uma	
proteção	ao	fato	de	que	-	vou	falar	a	verdade	-	a	vinda	do	Lula,	pro	meu	governo	–	fortaleza	o	meu	
governo.	Tem	gente	que	não	quer	que	ele	seja	fortalezado	–	o	que	que	eu	possa	fazer?	
[many	interruptions	of	reporters	off-screen]	
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	falou	sobre	crise	econômica.	Ela	negou	que	o	governo	vá	usar	
reservas	internacionais	–	uma	espécie	de	poupança	que	Brasil	tem	no	exterior,	para	incentivar	o	
crescimento	da	economia	ou	a	queda	da	inflação.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Nós	jamais	teremos	uma	pauta	de	uso	dessas	reservas	para	alvo	que	não	seja	proteção	do	
país,	contra	flutuações	internacionais.	E	essas	reservas	também,	elas	podem,	eh,		
[17:00]	
dê	um	papel	em	relação	à	divida.	Mas	elas	não	são	a	forma	adequada	de	se	solucionar	questões	
de	investimento;	portanto,	as	especulações	que	existem	quando	esse	fato	do	uso	das	reservas	são	
isso:	Especulações.	E	elas,	infelizmente,	só	beneficiam	os	poucos	que	lu-,	que	lucram	com	ela.	Que	
lucre,	que	tentam	um,	um,	uma,	uma	–	eu	acho	criar	uma	situação	de	especulação.		
[cut	in	footage]	
Nós	temos	de	fazer	buscar	estabilidade	fiscal	–	Por	quê	é	que	se	acham	que	eu	falei	do	
compromisso	do	Lula	com	estabilidade	fiscal?	Porque	ele	é	real!	Se	sabem	disso.	Olha	
retrospectiva	do	presidente.	Que	historia	esse	do	presidente	não	mantém	compromisso	com	
estabilidade	fiscal.	Que	historia	é	esse	que	ele	não	mantém	compromisso	com	controle	da	
inflação?	Eu	acho	que	é	demissível	–	tudo	é	demissível	–	mas	tem	coisas	que	passa	
[18:00]	
eu	diria	se	que	tal	por	kima	cima	do	noticiário	especulativo.		
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	assegurou	que	não	haverá	mudanças	na	equipe	econômica.		
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Não	se	demite,	porque	cria	turbulência	na	economia;	me	desculpe,	isso	tem	um	sentido	
especulativo.	Nem	o	Ministro	Nelson	Barbosa,	nem	o	Ministro	Tombini	estão	com	alguma,	alguma,	
ouve,	alguma	ou	alguém	ou	qualquer	coisa	que	levantou	a	possibilidade	de	sair	do	governo.	Pelo	
contrário,	eles	estão	mais	dentro	do	que	há	nunca.	
[Studio,	shot	of	both	anchors	at	desk]	
WB:	A	seguir,	a	crise	política	no	auge	em	Brasília:	
RV:	A	Justiça	torna	público	um	diálogo	entre	Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	
WB:	e	a	Polícia	Federal	afirma	ver	indícios	de	ações	para	atrapalhar	as	investigações	da	Lava	Jato		
[cut	for	commercials;	Graphics	of	G1	/	JN	url,	JN	jingle	music]		
WB:	O	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	manteve	as	regras	estabelecidas	ao	fim	do	ano	passado	para	
tramitação	de	pedido	da	abertura	de	processo	do	impeachment	no	Congresso	contra	a	presidente	
Dilma	Rousseff.	
[19:00]	
[TV	Justiça	footage	of	STF,	Supreme	Justice	Luís	Roberto	Barroso	speaking	at	his	desk	next	to	Rosa	
Weber,	camera	slowly	zooming	out	and	panning	towards	rest	of	plenary]	
Reporter	VO	Marcos	Losekann:	O	Ministro	relator	Luís	Roberto	Barroso	manteve	o	voto	de	
dezembro.	Rejeitou	os	recursos	da	Câmara	dos	Deputados	contra	o	rito	do	impeachment	
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[Shot	from	opposite	angle,	Barroso	reading	his	verdict]	
Barroso:	Cabe	às	instâncias	políticas	deliberar	sobre	a	permanência	ou	afastamento	do	Chefe	de	
Estado.	O	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	toca	tal	somente	zela	pelo	cumprimento	da	Constituição	e	
das	demais	normas	aplicáveis.	
[shot	of	the	whole	STF	plenary]	
Reporter	VO	Marcos	Losekann:	Oito	ministros	seguiram	o	relator.	Entenderam	que	não	houve	
omissão,	nem	contradição	nas	decisões	do	tribunal	e	que	o	recurso	da	Câmara	não	poderia	ser	
usado	pra	julgar	tudo	de	novo.	
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Teori	Zavascki	at	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Teori:	Fato	simplesmente	não	aceito	do	agrado	da	parte	que	não	viu	atendido	se	o	interesse	não	
se	justifica,	por	si	só	provocará	um	novo	julgamento	a	causa	–		
[20:00]	
a	causa	está	julgado.	
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Luiz	Fux	at	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Fux:	O	que	a	corte	fez	foi	manter	a	integridade	e	a	interessa	das	[indecipherable]	jurisprudência	já	
sedimentada	após	a	Constituição	de	1988.	
[footage	of	other	Justices	and	the	plenary	seen	from	above]	
Reporter	VO:	Gilmar	Mendes	e	Dias	Toffoli	foram	os	únicos	a	discordar.	Toffoli	disse	que	há	
contradição,	porque	com	a	indicação	das	integrantes	da	comissão	do	impeachment	pelos	lideres	
partidários,	e	sem	chapa	avulsa,	não	há	eleição		
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Dias	Toffoli	at	his	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Toffoli:	Nós	estamos	trocando	a	representação	de	513	por	28	lideres	partidários.	Ou	menos,	
porque	há	os	blocos,	e	aí	nos	blocos	quem	indicam	são	os	lideres	dos	respectivos	blocos.	
[Reporter	on-site	at	the	Planalto,	looking	towards	the	Camara]	
Reporter	Marcos	Losekann:	Essa	posição	final	no	Supremo	é	na	pratica	um	sinal	verde	para	
Câmara.	Os	deputados	poderão	retomar	o	processo	de	impeachment	da	presidente	Dilma	
Rousseff,	desde	que	as	regras	determinadas	pelo	STF	sejam	obedecidas.		
[21:00]	
E	se	surgirem	divergências,	acorde	por	ser	acionada	de	novo.		
[footage	of	the	Eixo	Monumental	in	Brasilia,	centred	on	the	Congress,	with	graphic	overlay,	
morphing	into	next	shot]	
	Reporter	Marcos	Losekann	VO:		Como	a	rejeição	do	recurso	a	Comissão	Especial	na	Câmara	que	
analisa	a	pedido	de	abertura	do	processo	deve	ser		
[footage	of	empty	commission	meeting	room	in	Câmara]	
eleita	com	voto	aberto.	
[letters	spelling	“voto	aberto”	appears	levitating	on	desk	in	the	empty	meeting	room]	
Os	nomes	serão	indicados	pelos	lideres	dos	partidos,		
[letters	spelling	“indicados	pelos	lideres”	appears,	followed	by	“sem	chapa	alternativa”]	
e	não	poderão	haver	chapa	alternativa	
[the	meeting	room	diminishes	into	a	window,	and	the	Eixo	appears	again	as	background	of	
graphics	of	a	pie	chart	showing	impeachment	process	voting	requirements]	
Se	dois	terços	da	Câmara	aceitarem	abertura	do	processo,	o	Senado	poderá	decidir	por	maioria	
simples,	pelo	arquivamento	ou	pela	continuidade.	
[letters	spelling	“O	afastamento	da	presidente	somente	após	Senado	abrir	processo”	appears	on	
the	background	of	the	Eixo	Monumental	in	Brasília]	
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O	afastamento	da	Presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	do	cargo	ocorrerá	somente	depois	do	plenário	do	
senado	decidir	pela	abertura	do	processo	de	impeachment	por	maioria	simples.				
[studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Nesta	quarta-feira	crise	politico	atingiu	ponto	mais	alto.	O	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	suspendeu,	no	fim	
da	tarde,	o	sigilo	da	24o	fase	da	Operação	Lava	Jato,	e	com	isso,	conversas	com	ex-presidente	Lula	
se	tornaram	públicas	
[22:00,	RV	turns	to	another	angle	and	camera	shifts	to	a	head	shot	of	RV]	
Integrantes	da	operação	Lava	Jato	afirmaram	que	há	indícios	de	uma	ação	para	atrapalhar	as	
investigações.		
[footage	from	various	angles	of	Paraná	PF	station]	
Reporter	VO:	As	interceptações	telefônicas	foram	feitas	com	autorização	da	justiça,	começaram	
no	dia	19	de	fevereiro	e	continuavam	até	hoje.	Numa	conversa	gravada	em	27	de	fevereiro,	dias	
antes	da	condução	coercitiva	de	Lula	em	4	de	março,		
[footage	of	Lula	exiting	car	in	the	midst	of	many	people,	one	of	them	supposedly	Falcão]	
o	ex-presidente	conversa	com	Rui	Falcão,	presidente	do	PT.	
[graphic	of	refinery	tubes,	with	the	BR	logo	visible	in	the	background.	In	the	foreground,	a	
document	with	federal	police	stamps	at	the	top	is	overlayered,	while	Money	bundles	well	out	
from	the	oil	line.	Highlighted	parts	of	the	document	appear	in	yellow]	
Lula	disse:		É,	eu	tô	esperando	segunda-feira.	Eu	tô	esperando	segunda-feira	a	Operação	de	busca	
e	apreensão	na	minha	casa,	do	meu	filho	Marcos,	do	meu	filho	Fábio,	do	meu	filho	Sandro,	do	
meu	filho	Claudio.	E	Rui	Falcão	respondeu:	É,	eu	vi	esse	noticiário	aqui.	
Reporter	on-site	Vladimir	Netto:	Investigadores	dizem	que	essa	conversa	e	outros	que	foram	
interceptadas	indicam	que	Lula	podem	fica	sabendo	contra	ele	e	tentava	atrapalhar	os	trabalhos	
da	Lava	Jato.	Lula	teria	inclusive	buscado	influenciar	ou	conseguir	ajuda	de	autoridades	do	
Ministério	Público	Federal	e	até	de	ministros	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[23:00	-	footage	of	Lula,	standing	at	a	pulpit,	reading	from	documents	at	a	press	conference]	
Reporter	VO	Vladimir	Netto:	Numa	conversa	gravada	no	dia	27	de	fevereiro,	o	ex-presidente	fala	
com	Paula	de	Tarso	Vannuchi,		
[footage	of	Lula	in	armchair	during	interview]	
ex-Ministro	da	Secretaria	de	direitos	humanos	no	governo	Lula	
[footage	of	police	station]	
De	acordo	com	a	Polícia	Federal	há	indícios	de	que	no	diálogo,	Lula	esteja	se	referindo	ao	Ministro	
indicado	da	Justiça	Eugenio	Aragão	que	também	é	sub-Procurador-Geral	de	República		
[graphic	of	refinery	tubes	again]	
Lula	disse:	“O	problema	é	o	seguinte,	Paulinho,	nós	temos	que	comprar	essa	briga,	eu	sei	que	é	
difícil,	sabe?!	Eu	as	vezes	fico	pensando	até	que	o	Aragão	deveria	cumprir	um	papel	de	homem,	
porque	o	Aragão	parece	nosso	amigo,	parece,	parece,	mas	tá	sempre	dizendo	‘olha...’”	
[helicopter	footage	of	parking	lot	in	front	of	Congonhas	airport	of	SP]	
Logo	depois	de	saído	de	depoimento	de	Polícia	Federal	no	dia	de	operação	“Aletheia”	em	4	de	
março,		
[footage	of	Dilma	standing	in	TV	show,	being	instructed	before	broadcast]	
Lula	falou	com	Dilma	sobre	um	pedido	dos	advogados	dele	
[Footage	shot	in	front	of	STF	sign]	
que	estava	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	
[Footage	shot	in	front	of	STF]	
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Questionando	quem	deveria	investigá-lo			
[Footage,	shot	from	the	ground	up,	in	front	of	justice	statue	in	Praça	dos	Tres	Poderes	]	
se	o	Ministério	Publico	de	São	Paulo	ou	a	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	em	Curitiba	
[new	graphic	of	refinery	tubes,	still	Money	bundles	flowing	and	BR	sign	visible;	document	again	
highlighting	text]	
Lula	falou:	Eu	acho	que	eles	queriam	antecipar	o	pedido	nosso	que	tá	na	Suprema	Corte,	que	tá	na	
mão	da	Rosa	Weber	
[24:00	-	footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
Após	a	conversa	com	Dilma,	Lula	conversa	com	então	ministro-chefe	da	Casa	Civil	Jacques	Wagner	
e	solicita	que	ele	conversa	com	Dilma	a	respeito	do	negocio	com	Rosa	Weber	
[graphic	of	the	inside	of	a	oil	tube	with	smudgy	Money	bills,	document	text	again	swooping	
towards	spectator:]	
Lula	falou:	“Mas	viu,	querido,	ela	tá	falando	dessa	reunião,	ô	Wagner,	que	queria	que	você	visse	
agora,	falar	com	ela,	já	que	ela	tá	aí,	falar	o	negócio	da	Rosa	Weber,	que	tá	na	mão	dela	pra	
decidir.	Se	homem	não	tem	saco,	que	sabe	uma	mulher	corajosa	possa	fazer	o	que	os	homens	não	
fizeram.”	
[helicopter	footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
A	ministra	Rosa	Weber	negou	o	pedido	da	defesa	de	Lula	porque	entendeu	que	não	houve	
ilegalidade	nas	duas	investigações.		
[footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
Em	outro	telefonema,	o	homem	identificado	como	Roberto	Carlos	deixa	claro	que	o	ministério	
serve	de	foro	privilegiado	para	Lula.	
Roberto	Carlos	fala:	“Eu	acho,	tá,	tem	uma	coisa	que	tá	na	mão	de	vocês.	É	ministério,	acabou.”		
Roberto	Carlos	continua:	“Agora	você	tem	uma	coisa	na	tua	mão,	você,	o	PT,	a	Dilma...	Vai	ter	
porrada?	Vão	criticar?	E	daí?	Numa	boa,	você	resolve	outro	problema,	que	é	o	problema	da	
governabilidade.“	
[24:00	-	Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Numa	conversa	gravada	na	27	de	fevereiro	o	ex-presidente	Lula	fala	com	fala	com	Paula	de	
Tarso	Vannuchi,	ex-Ministro	da	Secretaria	de	Direitos	Humanos	no	governo	Lula.	De	acordo	com	a	
policia	federal,	há	indícios	de	que	no	dialogo,	Lula	esteja	se	referindo	ao	novo	Ministro	da	Justiça,	
Eugênio	Aragão	que	também	é	sub-Procurador-Geral	de	República.		
Lula	disse	assim	abre	aspas:	Lula	disse:	O	problema	é	o	seguinte,	Paulinho,	nós	temos	que	comprar	
essa	briga,	eu	sei	que	é	difícil,	sabe?!	Eu	as	vezes	fico	pensando	até	que	o	Aragão	deveria	cumprir	
um	papel	de	homem	naquela...”	-	e	o	presidente	disse	um	palavrão	-		“...porque	o	Aragão	parece	
nosso	amigo,	parece,	parece,	mas	tá	sempre	dizendo	‘olha...’”	fecha	aspas.	
[RV	in	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	Na	introdução	da	de	gravação	de	uma	conversa	entre	Lula	e	o	advogado	Luiz	Carlos	
Sigmaringa	Seixas,	ocorrida	no	dia	7	de	março,	os	investigadores	dizem	que	nesse	trecho,	Lula	diz	
que		
[26:00]	
o	PGR	recusou	4	pedidos	de	investigação	do	Aécio,	de	Aécio	Neves,	e	aceitou	o	único	pedido	da	
investigação	da	LILS.	Ele	fala	que	essa	é	a	gratidão	do	PGR	por	ser	nomeado	Procurador.	
Sigmaringa	que	vai	fazer	uma	petição	formal	e	jogar	pra	imprensa	pra	constranger	o	PGR:	
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[graphic	of	a	futuristic	sound-scanner	instrument,	divided	into	two,	with	a	picture	of	Dilma	and	a	
picture	of	Lula	–	the	sound	of	their	recorded	dialogue	is	muted,	but	still	accompanied	by	text	in	
the	middle	of	each	instrument	section]	
RV	voice-over:	Lula	diz	abre	aspas:	“Eu	não	sei	o	quê	que	eu	pedi	pra	você	de	manhã.	Mas	era	
uma	coisa	simples	que	não	precisava	de	formalidade.”	
[RV	in	studio,	desk-and-torso]	
RV:	Sigmaringa	Seixas	pergunta:	“Não.	Mas	simples	ele	vai	dizer	não.	Ele	não	vai	receber.	Eu	
conversei	com	gente	só.”		
Lula	diz:	“É	porque	ele	recusou	quatro	pedidos	de	investigação	ao	Aécio	e	aceitou	a	primeira	de	
um	bandido	do	Acre	contra	mim.”	
Sigmaringa	responde:	
[27:00]	
“Pois	é...	mas	se	fizer	uma	petição...”	Lula	diz:	“Essa	é	a	gratidão...Essa	é	a	gratidão	dele	por	ele	ser	
Procurador.”	Sigmaringa	responde:	“Pois	é.		Mas	ele	se	tiver...	se	a	gente	formalizar,	inclusive,		
jogando	pra	imprensa,	ele	vai	ficar	constrangido.	Se	for	lá	conversar	com	ele	diz	não	e	pronto.	Ou	
não	diz	né.”	Lula	diz	a	Sigmaringa:	“Então	conversa	com	o	Cristiano.”	
[WB	headshot]	
WB:	No	dia	7	do	março	a	policia	federal	interceptou	entre	o	ex-presidente	Lula	e	o	prefeito	do	Rio	
Eduardo	Paes.	O	prefeito	diz	que	está	sofrendo	e	Lula	rebate,	dizendo	que	ele	é	abençoado	por	
Deus	por	causa	das	Olimpíadas.	O	prefeito	Eduardo	Paes	afirma	então	que	fazendo	Olimpíada	com	
Lula	e	com	Sergio	Cabral	é	uma	coisa,	mas	segurar	com	aquele	bon-mot	da	Dilma	e	do	Pezão	-	Lula	
comenta:	“Não	é	fácil,	querida.”	A	conversa	seque	e	o	prefeito	do	Rio	afirma:	“Agora,	da	próxima	
vez	o	senhor	me	para	com	essa	vida	de	pobre,	com	essa	tua	alma	de	pobre	comprando“	esses	
barco	de	M	–		
[28:00]	
ele	usou	o	palavra	que	eu	não	preciso	repetir	aqui	-	“sitiozinho	vagabundo”,	e	aí	diz	um	palavrão.	
Isso	a	palavra	do	prefeito	do	Rio	Eduardo	Paes.	Ai	o	ex-pref,	o	ex-presidente	Lula	ri	e	Eduardo	Paes	
continua:	“O	senhor	é	uma	alma	de	pobre.		Eu,	todo	mundo	que	fala	aqui	
no	meio,	eu	falo	o	seguinte:	imagina	se	fosse	aqui	no	Rio	esse	sítio	dele,	não	é	em	Petrópolis,	não	
é	em	Itaipava.	É	como	se	fosse	em	Maricá.”	E	o	prefeito	diz	alguns	palavrões.	E	Lula,	mais	uma	vez,	
ri.		
[headshot	of	RV]	
RV:	Em	uma	das	ligações	interceptadas	pela	polícia	federal	o	ex-presidente	Lula	fala	para	o	
ministro	da	Fazenda	Nelson	Barbosa	acompanhar	o	que	a	Receita	Federal	está	fazendo	junto	com	
a	Polícia	Federal.	No	diálogo,	Lula	fala	o	seguinte:	abre	aspas	“O	Nels-,	O	Nelson,	vou	te	falar	uma	
coisa	por	telefone,	isso	daqui.	O	importante	é	que	a	Polícia	Federal	esteja	gravando.	É	preciso	
acompanhar	o	que	a	receita	tá	fazendo	junto	com	a	Polícia	Federal,	bicho!”	
[29:00]	
Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Não,	é...	Gagueja	um	pouco	e	depois	prossegue.	Eles	fazem	parte.”	
Lula	retruque:	“É,	mas	você	precisa	se	inteirar	do	que	eles	estão	fazendo	no	instituto.	Se	eles	
fizessem	isso	com	meia	dúzia	de	grandes	empresas,	resolvia	o	problema	de	arrecadação	do	
Estado.”	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Uhumm,	sei.”	Lula	continua:	“Sabe?	Eu	acho	que	está	faz-	eu	
acho	que	eles	estão	sendo”	–	e	fala	um	palavrão.	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Tá.”	Lula	
complementa:	“Tão	procurando	pelo	em	ovo.	Eu	acho...	eu	vou	pedir	pro	Paulo	Okamotto	botar	
tudo	no	papel,	porque	era	preciso	você	chamar	o	responsável	e	falar”	ele	fala	um	palavrão	"Vocês	
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estão	fazendo		o	mesmo	com	a	Globo,	com	Instituto	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso,	o	mesmo	com	
Gerdau,	o	mesmo	com	o	SBT,	o	mesmo	com	a	Record?!	Ou	só	com	Lula?”,	e	o	ex-presidente	fala	
um	palavrão;	e	logo	em	seguida	outro	palavrão.	
[30:00]	
E	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Tá,	pede	pro	Paulo	colocar”.	
	
[end	of	transcript	at	30:05]	
	
